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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an exploration of how the use of temporary agency work in French car plants 
modifies the experience and mechanisms of labour control in the labour process. Over the last 
decade, car manufacturers in France have made extensive use of this form of employment, 
despite regulations which restrict  the use of agency labour to exceptional circumstances. Legal 
challenges aimed at  reclassifying temporary agency contracts into permanent employment 
contracts have revealed that some agency workers have accumulated many years of 
employment as an agency worker with user-company. The presence of significant proportions of 
agency workers on assembly lines for long periods of time has implications for the labour-
capital relation on the shopfloor. Precarious working conditions for low-skilled workers are 
assumed to affect the capacity of workers to negotiate relations on the shop-floor. The thesis 
employs a conceptual framework based upon Burawoy’s (1985) theory of production politics to 
examine the specific way in which the triadic relationship between the temporary agency 
worker, temporary employment  agency and user-organisation modifies the factory regime 
within which temporary agency workers labour. Starting from an analysis of the macro- and 
meso-level development of the post-war French state and of the key economic sectors that 
constitute the “politics of production”, the thesis focuses on the PSA Peugeot-Citroën plant  in 
Aulnay-sous-Bois as a case study, and combines interview data with other qualitative (textual) 
data. The research finds that temporary agency workers in the car sector respond to their 
employment situation in a more complex way than studies of coercion and consent in the labour 
process suggest. Employment insecurity and the “duality of control” which flows from the 
triadic relationship upon which the temporary agency contract rests gives rise to a factory 
regime more conducive to compliance/coercion than consent. However, the “traces of consent” 
identified by the research illustrate the complex nature of hegemony and despotism in the labour 
process. Drawing on the findings of the empirical data in the context of France, the thesis 
develops the concept  of hegemonic despotism by examining how hegemonic despotism is 
expressed  across a variety of employment contexts. The thesis identifies a tension between 
adverse conditions of employment and hegemonic practices, such as the formal adhesion to 
“soft” models of HRM, alongside the recasting of norms of employment to fit  the requirements 
of contemporary capital accumulation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an exploration of how the use of temporary agency work in French car plants 
modifies the experience and mechanisms of labour control in the labour process.  The focus of 
the research is a PSA Peugeot-Citroën plant in Aulnay-sous-Bois, a northern suburb of Paris, 
which is currently threatened with closure. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was 
widespread concern in the French labour movement, and in French society as a whole, over the 
numbers of agency workers in car assembly plants and in supplier firms. PSA, in particular, was 
repeatedly criticised for its “excessive” use of agency labour.1  The company responded by 
entering into an agreement  with temporary employment  agencies setting out responsibilities 
towards temporary agency workers. PSA also reduced the maximum number of months of a 
temporary agency contract to below the legal maximum. Yet the company, in keeping with 
employment trends in the sector, has continued to maintain high numbers of agency workers 
amongst its production line workforce, in what is widely perceived to be an evident disregard 
for labour legislation (Belkacem et al., 2011). The presence of large numbers of agency workers 
allows car manufacturers to shed a large section of the workforce in response to market 
pressures without having to engage in lengthy negotiations around redeployment and 
redundancy packages. France still maintains strong protective legislation regarding dismissal for 
economic reasons. In addition, the legislative framework provides the space for workers 
collective organisations to press forward with demands to increase compensation for 
redundancies. In recent  years, high profile militant  struggles against factory closures have 
resulted in substantially better redundancy terms, the most notable being the occupations of the 
Continentale tyre factory and of New Fabris, a sub-contractor of PSA and Renault (where the 
workforce threatened to blow up the factory). The outcome of these mass redundancies 
contrasts with the simultaneous lay-off of large numbers of agency workers, who received no 
compensation beyond the statutory 10% “end of assignment” bonus. The crisis that  hit the 
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1  In a search of French newspaper articles on “temporary agency worker” (intérimaire) and the auto 
sector (secteur automobile) on the Factiva news archive search engine between 1995 and 2005, PSA was 
most cited. The articles were overwhelmingly related to the excessive use of agency labour over and 
beyond that permitted by French legislation.
automobile sector2 in 2008 has been illuminating in a number of respects. First  it illustrated the 
extent  to which the sector relies on agency workers to adjust its workforce with ease when faced 
with perturbations produced by the market. In 2007, agency workers filled 282,000 full-time 
equivalent  posts in the French automobile sector, constituting just under 10% of the total 
workforce (in contrast  to 3.6% for all economic sectors). This figure fell to 263,000 in 2008 
(DARES, 2009). The loss of so many temporary agency jobs in the sector within such a short 
period also highlighted the lack of protection accorded to a significant proportion of production 
line workers, a consequence of a labour resource strategy which transfers risks back to some of 
its lower-skilled workers, thus undermining the protective measures of post-war labour laws.
In this respect, the example of the Aulnay plant was enlightening. Over the course of the 
research, the numbers of agency workers at the Aulnay plant declined; the ending of the night 
shift, for example lead to the loss of 600 temporary agency workers. The future of the plant 
itself was also called into question in June 2011 when a leaked memo sent  to the CGT  branch at 
the site claimed that  the PSA group was planning to close Aulnay once the production of the C3 
model ends in 2014. This was confirmed by management in July 2012, despite being vigorously 
denied over the course of the previous year. The closure of the plant is a part  of a restructuring 
plan that  entails the loss of 8,000 jobs. At Aulnay, it  is 3,300 jobs that are under threat (as well 
as thousands of jobs which depend on the plant). The 300 temporary agency workers that  make 
up this number will be excluded from the negotiated settlement between state, labour and capital 
aimed at  alleviating the effects of the closure through financial compensation, redeployment and 
training – regardless of the number of working years accumulated at the plant. This is just  one 
aspect of how the temporary agency contract  undermines the rights and protections normally 
associated with the employment relationship. 
Such disparity in “quality” of employment between temporary agency workers and permanent 
workers is an important  and appropriate subject  for research on this group of workers, which 
this thesis contributes to. Yet  there are further dimensions of the temporary agency employment 
relationship within the context  of auto manufacturing which have been overlooked in 
Chapter 1 Introduction
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2  The automobile sector is made up of vehicle assembly and suppliers. Until 2008, it was classified 
separately for the purposes of government statistics (Code C29).
contemporary literature. Whilst  research on temporary agency work has identified the negative 
consequences of agency work for lower-skilled occupations, there has been little sustained 
engagement with the triadic relationship embodied in the temporary agency contract from the 
perspective of theories of control in the workplace. This is surprising, given the encroachment 
of agency labour across a wide range of sectors and occupations, including those that have 
served as the empirical grounding of labour process analysis. Temporary agency work has been 
growing across EU15 countries since the 1990s and, more recently, in new member states 
(Arrowsmith, 2009). It  is a distinct form of atypical employment, characterised, by the time-
limited (temporary) nature of the employment contract, and by the three-way (triadic) 
employment relationship between agency worker, temporary employment agency and user-
organisation, in contrast to the standard bilateral employment relationship upon which core 
employment legislation is based. Traditionally associated with “peripheral” employment and 
sections of the workforce said to have “marginal labour market  attachment”, the expansion of 
agency work into sectors and occupations not  normally associated with this form of 
employment has led to an increased interest  in agency work within academic and policy circles. 
There has been a particular interest within Anglo-Saxon literature with a growing number of 
agency workers amongst professional occupations. Research has focused upon motivations for 
choosing agency work above permanent employment, and the consequences of the agency 
contract on job satisfaction, organisational commitment  and other themes common to theories of 
organisational behaviour (Albert and Bradley, 1998; Guest, 2004; Tailby, 2005; Kirkpatrick and 
Hocque, 2006; Connelly et al., 2011). 
The focus of research on agency work varies depending upon country context. In France, where 
agency work is overwhelmingly low skilled, research situates agency work within a wider 
context of the degradation of work in general, and debates around “workplace suffering” 
following a number of workplace suicides (Sciences Humaines, 2005; Lefresne, 2006; Thébaud-
Mony, 2007). Agency work is rarely perceived by French researchers as a positive career choice 
(Barbier, 2005), despite the attempts of the temporary employment  agency sector to present 
agency work as an attractive and acceptable form of work. Differences in the literature on 
agency work partly reflect  national variations in conventions concerning employment norms. In 
Chapter 1 Introduction
11
France, “flexibility” – of which agency work is one form – is a widely contested concept, seen 
as synonymous with précarité, a term which is rooted in a rejection of employment  models 
outside of the standard employment relationship, with little concession given to the idea that 
flexible employment  is driven by the needs of employees to balance work and personal life – a 
common rationale in the Anglo-Saxon literature.3  Differences also reflect national variations in 
the occupational and sectoral composition of agency work. Whilst  low and semi-skilled 
occupations dominate agency work in the EU, there are more likely to be white-collar and 
higher-skilled agency workers the UK. At the other end of the spectrum, the agency workforce 
in France and Spain is typified by the young, male manual worker (Arrowsmith 2009; Vosko, 
2009). In France, it  is the auto sector, a sector traditionally associated with the “male 
breadwinner” model of standard employment upon which post-war labour legislation has been 
based, that  has the highest  number of agency workers. Much of the French literature on 
temporary agency work has revolved around the contextualisation and critique of processes seen 
to encapsulate the gradual rolling back of workers’ gains. French approaches to agency labour 
are influenced, not only by a strong attachment to post-war employment norms, but also by an 
historical opposition to the activities of temporary employment agencies. Through most  of the 
last century, temporary employment  agencies were viewed as “marchands d’hommes” (traders 
in human labour). Whilst  there is a wide body of sociological literature critiquing the spread of 
précarité, there has been a lack of focused empirical or theoretical engagement with the impact 
of agency work on workplace behaviour and experiences. Quantitative studies have examined 
indicators of “job quality” and the trajectories and motivations of agency workers, but, there is 
little qualitative research on agency workers. This is all the more surprising given the large 
numbers of temporary agency workers that have passed through the factory gates of major car 
manufacturers since the late 1990s. French sociologie du travail is rich in in-depth qualitative 
research on the working lives of workers in major car assembly plants, yet  there has been no 
Chapter 1 Introduction
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3 The amalgamation of distinct forms of flexible employment practices within the concept flexibility is a 
barrier to comparative analysis of national responses to flexibility. Numerical flexibility (the use of 
temporary workers to respond more efficiently to market signals) can be opposed by, for example, trade 
unions which consider it undermines job security.  Working time flexibility, on the other hand, may be 
viewed as a way of combining employment with caring obligations, and has been promoted in the UK 
and elsewhere as an important right for women in the workplace (see Hegewisch, 2009).
attempt to unravel the implications of the temporary agency contract  on theories of labour 
control. 
The restructuring and introduction of new forms of work organisation and labour management 
that have characterised the sector in recent decades have promoted the extensive use of agency 
labour to the extent that agency labour is “structurally embedded” within the labour sourcing 
strategies of auto manufacturers. According to government data, until the late 1990s the rate of 
agency labour, (in relation to total workforce) stood at  around 3-5%. This grew rapidly in the 
following years so that  rates of agency workers were consistently higher than 8%, reaching over 
10% at times (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011, p. 79). However, these figures, conceal the high rates 
of agency labour amongst  production workers, and within specific plants. This is not  only a 
French phenomenon – similar trends are observable in Italy and Spain, and agency labour is 
increasing in German car plants (Banyuls and Hapeiter, 2010). Given the importance of the auto 
sector for these national economies, and its historic influence on national employment  models, 
industrial technology and workplace practices (Grimshaw and Lehndorff, 2010, p. 28), this gap 
in research is problematic. From a theoretical perspective, labour process analysis has failed to 
address the implications of agency labour in the European auto sector for theories of labour 
control, remaining instead in a framework that prioritises the experience of core workers.
The research presented here contributes to the literature on temporary agency work by 
addressing this gap. It employs a conceptual framework that  draws upon Burawoy’s (1985) 
theory of the politics of production, to examine how the triadic relationship alters the political 
apparatus of production governing temporary agency work, specifically in French car plants. 
The thesis draws upon literature that  has identified the significance of the employment contract 
in governing the control of labour in the labour process (Steinberg, 2003; Nichols et al., 2004), 
and recent  literature which has reappraised Gottfried’s (1992) concept of duality of control 
through the lens of Burawoy’s theory (Degiuli and Kollmeyer, 2007, Zhang, 2010).  
This introductory chapter presents an overview of this thesis. The first  section briefly discusses 
the growth of temporary agency work in Europe within the context of a European employment 
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policy agenda that promotes the flexibilisation of European labour markets. The chapter then 
explores the relevance of examining temporary agency work in the French automobile sector 
before introducing the conceptual framework which is applied to the thesis. The final part of the 
chapter sets out the aims and objectives of the research and the structure of the thesis.  
1. Neoliberalism, labour market flexibility and the growth of agency work in Europe
Labour market  flexibility has long been a key component  of the European Commission’s 
Employment  Strategy. Jacques Delors (1993) White Paper on “Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment: The Challenges and Way Forward into the 21st Century”, promoted numerical 
flexibility and labour market deregulation as key components in driving employment growth. 
This was further legitimised by the OECD 1994 Job Study which focused on removing 
institutional barriers to jobs growth (Gold, 2009, p. 20). European countries have followed these 
policy prescriptions to varying degrees, typically through legislation weakening employment 
protection legislation (EPL). France is one of the countries that, due to popular opposition to 
proposed reforms to labour legislation, has maintained relatively high levels of EPL. However, 
outside of the standard employment  relationship which remains covered by an extensive range 
of statutory protection, the French employment  landscape has undergone extensive changes in 
the past two decades in the direction of flexible (precarious) working arrangements. The growth 
of temporary agency work in France has been replicated across a number of EU states, a 
phenomenon which the International Confederation of Private Employment  Agencies (CIETT), 
the international trade body of employment agencies, attributes to the progressive liberalisation 
of labour markets and a combined move towards deregulation and regulation of agency work 
(CIETT, 2011). Deregulation has lifted some of the restrictions on agency work and the 
activities of employment agencies, whilst regulation has established a legal framework for 
agency work in countries where there was, until recently, no legal recognition of agency labour.   
Although the lack of robust data complicates cross-national comparisons, estimates of the extent 
of agency labour suggest  that in the last  decade, agency work has accounted for between 0.2% 
and 5% of total employment in European countries (Vosko, 2009). In 2010, France had one of 
the highest  rates of agency work in the EU (3%). The sectoral distribution of agency work 
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varies considerably, with Sweden and the UK having a higher proportions of agency labour in 
services sectors. However, in the UK, it  is likely that  official statistics do not capture the number 
of migrant  agency workers in agricultural and small scale manufacturing (such as food 
processing) that accompanied the entry of the A8 accessions states into the EU in 2004 (May 
and Markova, 2010). The UK is also one of the few countries where agency labour has a 
presence in the public sector. In some countries restrictions on the use of agency labour in the 
public sector have not yet  been been deregulated, which the temporary employment  industry 
sees as a barrier to flexibility (CIETT, 2012).
2. The growth of temporary agency work in car manufacturing 
France presents an interesting case for examining the spread of agency work. One of the 
explanations for the use of agency labour resides in the strength of protections accorded to 
workers on standard contracts and the obstacles that  employers face in shedding labour. 
Employers are said to turn to agency labour as a way by-passing the strict  legislation associated 
with standard employment  contracts (although the high rates of agency labour in the UK 
suggest  that  agency work can also grow in other regulatory environments). The French context, 
however, is more complex in that strict employment legislation also extends to agency work. 
The 1972 legislation which legalised and regulated the activities of employment  agencies, 
established a special employment  relationship between agencies and agency workers, alongside 
a parallel commercial relationship between the agencies and the client  or user-organisation. It 
set out the key principles governing the use of agency labour; the non-substitution of permanent 
workers, the use of agency work only in “exceptional” circumstances and the “temporary” 
nature of the employment. Over much of the last five decades, these core principles have 
remained largely in place. Yet  despite this, France has one of highest rates of temporary agency 
work in the EU. More significantly, the largely sectoral nature of agency work (Kornig, 2011) 
means that  rates of agency work in manufacturing are far higher than European averages, in 
particular in the auto sector. Manufacturing accounts for over 40% of the volume of agency 
work in France (DARES, 2010) with the automobile sector being the most prolific user, with 
rates of agency labour regularly reaching 10% of the total workforce, in contrast to a peak of 
3.6% for all economic sectors combined (DARES, 2009).
Chapter 1 Introduction
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The economic turmoil that  engulfed the world economy in 2008 exposed the extent of 
employment insecurity of agency workers in the auto sector. In France, the number of agency 
contracts fell by nearly 50% in the fourth quarter of 2008. It also illustrated how the car 
manufacturers and suppliers have access to a “permanent  pool of agency workers” (Gorgeu and 
Mathieu, 2009), via the mediation of temporary employment agencies, providing them with a 
key tool to respond rapidly to fluctuations in product markets (Larbi and Lecroux, 2008). In 
2010, following state intervention (a scrappage scheme) to stimulate demand for the domestic 
vehicle market, there was an increase in the numbers of agency workers working in the sector. 
When the effects of the scrappage scheme declined, thousands of agency workers were left 
without employment. 
The growth in agency labour in the auto sector has occurred alongside a steady decline in the 
number of permanent  posts as employers have adjusted human resource strategies to fit in with 
the dominant  mantra of flexibility. On one level it is not surprising that  the auto sector, 
traditionally at the forefront of industrial “innovation” and change in the organisation of work 
and industrial relations, and exposed to intense competition, has been at the forefront of aligning 
its workforce more efficiently to the market. At the same time, in France, the sector has been a 
model of the social compromise of the Trente Glorieuses (post-war boom) and the 
accompanying guarantee of stable ongoing employment and protective collective bargaining. 
Added to this is the external regulatory environment  in which agency work is highly regulated, 
with limitations on the duration of contracts and strict  stipulations concerning the circumstances 
in which it  is permitted. Yet  the extensive use of agency labour in the sector over the past 
decade points to practices which go well beyond the legal boundaries, allowing agency labour to 
be used as a “standard human resource strategy” (Viprey, 2002), which has had the effect  of 
structurally embedding agency labour within the auto sector (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011). 
This development  has wide-reaching implications for local labour markets dependent upon the 
auto industry for employment. Automobile clusters determine the local employment  landscape 
in regions such as the Ile-de-France and Franche-Comté. Beaud and Pialoux’s (1999) and 
Durand and Hatzfeld’s (2002) studies of the iconic PSA Peugeot-Citröen plant  at  Sochaux have 
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documented the profound changes in the organisation of work at the plant, including the 
introduction of agency labour. These studies illustrate how the human resource strategies of car 
manufacturers and suppliers influence the labour market  integration of young workers in these 
areas, in particular those who leave school with limited qualifications. These studies also 
examine the workplace outcomes of agency labour. In common with research in the UK car 
sector (Danford, 1998), there is an assumption that agency workers are subject  to despotic forms 
of labour control, given the combination of job insecurity and the fact that  the  sector has 
undergone significant intensification of work. One of the aims of this thesis is to examine how 
this despotism is filtered through the triadic employment  relationship and whether the agency 
contract generates additional elements of labour control beyond despotism.
3. Temporary agency work and labour process analysis
Much of the research on contemporary labour process in auto manufacturing has centred on the 
changes in regimes of labour control. Researchers within the tradition of labour process analysis 
(LPA) have challenged the claims of new management  theories that innovations in technology 
and management would lead to a new experience of work characterised by job enrichment  and 
autonomy (Durand, 2009; Stewart  et al., 2009). In the place of this positive view of changes in 
the auto sector, they argue that car manufacturers are engaging in new forms of labour control. 
The discourse of participation and autonomy is a way of eliciting consent  to work harder in a 
context where the certainties of the “Fordist” era of car production have given way to 
restructuring and generalised job insecurity. Burawoy’s concepts of “manufacturing consent” 
and “factory regimes” (Burawoy, 1979, 1985) has been employed to examine and theorise these 
changes in the mechanisms of labour control. Researchers identified aspects of what  Burawoy 
referred to as “hegemonic despotism”, the factory regime that  replaced the “hegemonic regime” 
of the post-war decade, and which is characterised by a partial return to “market  despotism” due 
to increasing job insecurity in conditions of global competition. Within the debates around 
control and consent in the workplace, agency workers have been largely absent, or referred to in 
order to illustrate despotic workplace relations and/or management techniques to undermine 
union organisation (Danford, 1998; Hatzfeld, 2004). Bouquin (2006) provides one of the few 
examples of an account  of agency workers which suggests that  their experience is more 
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multifaceted than assumed, indicating sources of consent rooted in the agency contract. The 
research presented in this thesis builds upon this by reasserting Burawoy’s (1985) broad 
framework for understanding how different  configurations of coercion and consent are 
generated by the dynamic confluence of different  factors which constitute the “political 
apparatus of production”. 
The case of agency workers focuses attention on the employment contract as a regulatory 
mechanism. This has been acknowledged in a body of research that has introduced the 
specificity of the temporary agency employment relationship as a factor in mediating workplace 
behaviour (Gottfried, 1992; Smith 1998; Padavic 2005), in particular through identifying a 
dualistic system of control within which consent is seen to play a role. Recent  research by 
Nichols et al. (2004), and Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007) has examined the place of hegemonic 
practices of agencies within this dual system of control. By applying Burawoy’s categories to 
agency work, it is possible to examine what  appear to be elements of hegemony within 
despotism, thus suggesting a modified version of hegemonic despotism. Again, this thesis builds 
upon this body of work to develop a conceptual framework through which to examine the 
experience of agency work in French car plants and to draw conclusions regarding the factory 
regime under which agency workers labour. 
A further body of literature is relevant to this research. Peck and Ward (2005), Peck and 
Theodore (2007) and Coe et al. (2010) have analysed the role of temporary employment 
agencies in constructing flexible labour markets, finding them much more than the neutral 
actors responding to market  signals that  neo-classical approaches to labour markets assume, and 
which is replicated in the public image that the temporary employment  sector promotes. This 
literature also complements Burawoy’s emphasis on going beyond the internal logic of the 
labour process, by bringing to the story a wide range of constitutive elements that  make up the 
factory regime, thus adding to the conceptual scaffolding upon which this thesis rests. 
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3. Thesis aims
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the nature of the factory regime that shapes the 
working lives of temporary agency workers in car plants, and in doing so contribute to labour 
process analysis by better understanding the significance of employment  status for 
configurations of consent and coercion in the labour process. The research adopts a case study 
methodology. Starting from the macro- and meso-level developments of the post-war French 
state and the key economic sectors under scrutiny, the research focuses on PSA Peugeot-Citröen 
and the Aulnay plant. The thesis examines the historical factors that have generated 
contemporary trends in human resource practices in the French auto industry. The research sets 
out to explain the historical development of auto manufacturing and its place with the French 
Gaullist  state of the post-war years, and to critically examine the history of the temporary 
employment sector and its gradual transformation from marchands d’hommes to official 
partners to public employment services. The synergies between these two histories are 
important  to understand the processes from which the “structural embeddedness” of agency 
labour in car plants emerged. The consistently high proportions of agency workers in the auto 
sector cannot be fully explained by traditional explanations of agency work. Although France 
has strict employment protection legislation4  which is one of the common rationales for 
companies turning to atypical employment  contracts, it also has comprehensive legislation 
governing the use of agency labour aimed at restricting its use. The research draws upon work 
by Peck and Ward (2005), Peck and Theodore (2007) and Coe et  al. (2010), with the aim of 
contributing to an understanding of the emergence of the temporary employment sector in the 
post-war French national context. Through an exploration of alliances between large agencies 
and the auto sector, and of state-capital relations, the thesis aims to investigate the processes 
through which temporary agency work has grown within a restrictive legislative framework, in 
a key industrial sector.  
Thirdly, the research aims to explore how the status of agency worker affects the experience of 
work in car plants, with a view to revealing their conditions of work and to better understand the 
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employmentpoliciesanddata/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
mechanisms of coercion and consent which emerge from this very distinct  form of employment. 
In so doing, the thesis builds upon previous research that  has identified worse employment 
outcomes for temporary agency workers in low-skilled occupations, by focusing on issues 
which will contribute to a deeper theoretical appraisal of agency employment. Related to this 
research aim is an assessment of how French trade unions have reacted to the growth of agency 
work in the sector, both historically and contemporaneously. The growth of agency labour 
presents challenges for organised labour since it fragments and weakens working class 
organisation. Temporary work, and agency work in particular due to the involvement of a 
private employment service, has been problematic for trade unions as they have tried to balance 
opposition to the casualisation of labour with protecting temporary workers. The triadic 
relationship also poses problems for unions in terms of organising and protecting the 
employment rights of agency workers. The growth of agency work across occupations and 
sectors has forced French trade unions to engage with temporary agency workers in a more 
consistent manner, with varying results (Béroud, 2009). The thesis examines the historical 
evolution of approaches to agency labour in order to contextualise the challenges faced by the 
French labour movement today. 
Finally, the thesis aims to contribute to the recent theoretical advances in LPA which have 
sought to incorporate the employment contract and the triadic relationship of the temporary 
agency contract into Burawoy’s concept of factory regimes. By analysing the data from a labour 
process perspective, and, specifically, drawing upon Burawoy’s concept of factory regimes, the 
research aims to situate the employment  status of the agency worker, and the conditions that 
flow from this status, within a framework that moves beyond the empirical description of 
employment outcomes to an interrogation of the theoretical significance of this contract, within 
the context of auto manufacturing.  
4. Structure of the thesis
The next  chapter locates temporary agency work both empirically and within contemporary 
literature, setting out  how temporary agency work has been theorised as a marginal form of 
employment by both neo-classical and segmented labour market approaches in opposition to the 
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standard employment  relationship. The literature focusing upon the nature of the triadic 
relationship in relation to labour control which is introduced at  the end of this chapter is 
expanded upon in Chapter 3, which presents the theoretical contribution of the thesis by first 
setting out  the significance of Burawoy for Labour Process Theory (LPT) before discussing the 
relevance of the concept of factory regimes as a conceptual framework for analysing temporary 
agency work. 
Chapter 4 presents an extensive methodological discussion of aims and objectives and the 
philosophical paradigm guiding the research, including a reflexive account  of the research 
process. The final chapters of the thesis, along with Chapter 3, constitute the theoretical and 
empirical contribution to knowledge of the thesis. The historical accounts of the temporary 
agency sector and the auto industry presented in Chapters 5 and 6 are not  only contextual 
markers for the primary data; in assessing and tracing the processes that lie behind current 
practices in both sectors, they provide an account of the key constitutive elements of the 
“production politics” that  are scrutinised in Chapter 7, and are further explored in the final 
chapter, within the conceptual framework set  out in the Chapter 4. Chapter 8 summarises these 
findings and Chapter 9 draws upon the research presented in the thesis to develop Burawoy’s 
concept of hegemonic despotism and its relevance for contemporary production politics beyond 
the example of agency labour. The final chapter sets out the contribution of the thesis and 
proposes areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK IN EUROPE: AN EMERGING RESEARCH AND 
POLICY AGENDA
1. Introduction
The growth of agency work in Europe has generated a wide body of literature addressing 
different  dimensions of temporary agency work. This chapter reviews this literature and 
identifies how the theoretical framing and empirical focus of this thesis challenges, builds upon 
and contributes to current perspectives on agency work. Existing literature within the fields of 
labour market  economics and management studies tends to privilege the rationales of user 
organisations and the workers engaged in agency labour, whilst  sociological accounts of agency 
work have identified outcomes of agency work for both workers and organisations. In addition 
to these main research foci there are two further strands of research that direct the discussion of 
agency labour towards new theoretical concerns by depicting staffing agencies as active agents 
in the spread of agency work (Coe et al., 2010), and by reappraising theories of labour control in 
the context of a triadic employment relationship.
The first  part of the chapter briefly describes the regulatory and policy context  within which 
agency labour has grown in the EU15 economies. There then follows a discussion of how the 
literature presents the rationale behind employers’ decisions to use agency labour which calls 
attention to the varied and complex factors that  influence organisational decisions, from direct 
organisational concerns regarding labour costs to the role of regulation and the practices of 
employment agencies. The next  section broadens out the discussion of the literature to examine 
the importance of the standard employment  relationship in post-war European societies and how 
temporary agency work is viewed in relation to long-standing employment norms. The 
traditional use of agency labour is contrasted with recent trends that  challenge common 
assumptions within the literature concern the function of agency labour within labour markets. 
There then follows a summary of research on employment  outcomes of agency labour before 
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moving onto the final part of the chapter, which introduces literature that  takes the triadic 
employment relationship as a key factor in mechanisms of control in the labour process. 
2. The standard employment relationship: protecting the “core” 
Agency work poses challenges for employment  studies because it deviates considerably from 
the standard employment relationship that has predominated in advanced Western economies 
and has served as a benchmark for labour standards in the post-war period (Campbell and 
Burgess, 2001). The standard employment  relationship is broadly defined as full-time, indefinite 
employment with a single employer (Connelly and Gallagher, 2004), and is the basis upon 
which many of the rights accorded to workers are guaranteed. These rights begin at  the 
workplace with the guarantee of an ongoing employment relationship, protection against unfair 
dismissal, rights to representation and collective bargaining and extend to welfare state support 
to mitigate against the risks associated with ill-health, loss of employment and old age 
(Campbell and Burgess, 2001; Vosko, 2009). 
2.1. Advancing the position of labour in post-war employment systems
The institutional protection accorded to labour through the “contractualisation” of the 
employment relationship (Deakin, 2001) embodied a trade-off or compromise between labour 
and capital that extended beyond the wage-labour relationship in the labour process. The 
contract of employment  is a “societal” contract that  is intricately bound up with the societal-
wide adoption of a comprehensive welfare state, guaranteeing the minimum material support 
and social rights that  are the basic conditions for participation in society (Supiot, 1999, cited in 
Deakin, 2001). Esping-Andersen (1990) theorises this arrangement as the “decommodification” 
of labour. Decommodification refers to the way in which labour-capital relationship is 
(partially) freed from the operation of market  forces. State intervention in the labour-capital 
relation, through employment  legislation, changes the balance of power between labour and 
capital, whilst  welfare protections minimise the dependency of workers on employers for 
material subsistence. This allows workers to escape the restrictions of being propelled into 
wage-labour dependency, and broadens the scope of workers to intervene more freely in work 
and social life. Protective employment regulation lessens the impact  of what Davidov (2002) 
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refers to as the “democratic deficit” in the employment  relationship: the mechanisms lodged in 
the employment relationship by which the employee retains control over the employee. By 
placing limits on the power of the employer, labour regulation becomes “the labour market 
equivalent  to social citizenship rights” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 122), providing the means by 
which the structural power imbalance between labour and capital (McGovern, 2004) can be, in 
part at least, redressed. Deakin (2003) suggests a more analytically precise way of defining the 
intersection between the social and the economic (production) by viewing social rights as being 
at  the very core of labour market relationships; the employment relationship being constituted 
by essential social rights such as the principle of fair treatment or the expectation that health and 
safety will be protected (Deakin, 2003, p. 74). 
The concept  of “decommodification” is commonly referred to in sociological accounts of 
employment (Gumbrell-McGormick, 2011), and frequently employed as a heuristic device to 
categorise welfare and employment regimes in cross-national studies. The focus upon the 
institutional underpinning of the standard employment relationship and associated social 
protection in setting out  the parameters within which labour is able to challenge the power of 
capital within the workplace and without (through its trade unions) has the merit  of viewing 
employment outcomes in relation to determining/causal factors external to the workplace. Other 
accounts of variants of “capitalisms” focus on other dimensions of economic systems as being 
influential in establishing/generating different  forms of employer-employee relations. Theories 
of production regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Helen, 2004, cited in Gallie, 2007) shift the 
emphasis away from the national level to the meso-level, focusing on the role of employers in 
coordinating meso-level relations between organisations and employees (industrial relations) 
according to competitive (market) arrangements (liberal market economies) or non-competitive 
(non-market) arrangements (coordinated market economies). 
How production is coordinated has wide-reaching effects on economies and societies feeding 
through to systems of education and training, industrial relations, job quality and job security. 
There is an assumption that these dimensions of employment  will have better outcomes for 
workers in coordinated market  economies (Gallie, 2007, pp. 87-88). Liberal market economies 
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are characterised by a polarised skill structure and orientation to emerging international 
competitive markets, such as services, thus leaning towards a regulatory environment  conducive 
to hiring and firing at low cost (Gallie, 2007, p. 88). Gallie (2007) critiques this approach for 
taking as its point of departure the role of employers in shaping institutional structures, thereby 
assigning a secondary role to governments and other crucial institutions such as organised 
labour – or other institutional mechanisms at work in the standard employment relationship – in 
creating a context for improved job quality and security. Gallie (2007) prefers instead the 
“power resources framework”, which underpins Esping-Andersen’s theory of welfare states (see 
Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 16), as an analytical tool by which to explain patterns of 
employment policies in terms of the competing power bases within societies viewed as 
“distinctive types with stable, mutually reinforcing systems of social relations” (Gallie, 2007, p. 
100). 
Explanations for employment  regimes which result  in less “commodified” labour accord a 
central role to the mobilising power of organised labour to bring about social-democratic 
political outcomes (Gallie, 2009). The institutions that constitute a national socio-economic 
framework (labour laws, social insurance, industrial relations, systems of vocational training 
etc.) are the manifestation of a bargain that has been struck between labour and capital (Huws, 
2010, p. 3) in the context  of a particular historically constituted balance of power between the 
two sides of the employment relationship (Grimshaw et  al. 2010, p. 28). The standard 
employment relationship is one such institution which embodies societal expectations of 
employment (Rubery, 2005) and associated social rights. It is this societal contract  which is 
under stress due to economic pressures and the increasing lack of security associated with 
employment, and the growth of the temporary employment  relationship as an alternative to the 
standard employment relationship (Supiot, 1999, p. 8; Vosko, 2000, Chapter 4, cited in Davidov, 
2004).
2.2. The excluded periphery
For much of the post-war period, employment  which did not fit the standard arrangement of 
employment was confined to peripheral sectors of the economy and to marginal groups of 
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workers (women, younger workers and students, older workers, migrant  workers) for whom the 
male breadwinner model of employment  did not  apply (Bosch, 2004, p. 618; Lewis et al., 
2006). A number of studies since the 1990s have demonstrated the association between 
“atypical” work and bad working conditions, as measured by a range of indicators such as low 
pay, job satisfaction, job and task autonomy and discretion, limited opportunity for progression 
and lack of representation (Letourneux, 1998; Robson et al. 1999). Feminist accounts identified 
the gendered nature of part-time and temporary work and the ghettoisation of women in low 
paid jobs of poor quality (Vosko, 2008). The preponderance of low skilled work within atypical 
jobs reinforces the precarious situation of labour market “outsiders” with a high risk of 
unemployment and lack of training (Barbier et al., 2002, p. 92; Blossfeld et  al., 2008; Lloyd et 
al., 2008). Disadvantage also extends to higher skilled agency workers who, whilst they may be 
able to command a higher wage, lack the benefits of permanent workers (Hocque and 
Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
The growth of agency work beyond the groups and occupations that have traditionally 
constituted agency work is viewed, therefore, as undermining the standard employment 
relationship (Campbell and Burgess, 2001; Kalleberg, 2000; Goudswaard and Andries, 2002), 
through the imposition of a tougher social contract  between employers and workers (Thurow, 
1996). According to this perspective, the growth of agency work signifies a reassertion of the 
structural imbalance between capital and labour that was modified in favour of labour by the 
post-war employment paradigm. Agency work is a regression to “employment  at  will”, or forms 
of employment  contingent on the needs of employers (Nolan, 2004; Degiuli and Kollmeyer, 
2007; Peck and Theodore, 2007).
2.3. Labour market segmentation versus efficient labour market sorting
These critical accounts of atypical employment and “bad” jobs are typically informed by dual 
and labour market  segmentation theories (Piore, 1971; Rubery, 1978). According to labour 
market segmentation theorists, the concentration of certain groups in jobs “on the margins” is a 
result of structural inequalities within society. In other words, groups such as women and 
migrant workers are over-represented in agency work (Vosko, 2009) because of societal-wide 
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structural constraints that act as a barrier to their full labour market  integration (Rubery, 1978). 
The secondary labour market, characterised by low-skilled work with few opportunities to 
progress, reinforces this “ghettoisation”. Workers experience inferior conditions of work relative 
to those in the primary labour market (Rubery, 1978), and are more exposed to market 
governance of employment (Capelli et al., 1997; Crouch; 1997; Campbell and Burgess, 2001)
In contrast, neo-classical economic theories view labour markets in isolation. According to this 
view agency work is the result  of the actions of rational economic actors. Markets lead to an 
efficient allocation of labour and within this agency work is a result  of the “voluntary sorting” 
in the labour market. This is the view taken by proponents of human capital theory (Bergström 
and Storrie, 2003, p. 20). Inferior jobs go to those who have not  invested in qualifications and 
skills. Individual characteristics of workers determine their position in the labour market  and 
differentiation in labour market  outcomes reflects the efficient labour market  allocation based 
upon levels of human capital. From this perspective, assumptions are made about the 
characteristics of the temporary agency workforce; the most significant being that agency 
workers possess marginal labour market  attachment; women with children for example, or older 
workers in the run up to retirement, or the long-term unemployed. Agency workers may also be 
younger workers who need to enhance their human capital as they make the transition from 
education to employment. Agency work, therefore, does not  necessarily lead to the ghettoisation 
of those with marginal labour market attachment, it  can be a “stepping stone” to labour market 
integration. Gray (2002) found that in the UK there was some evidence of agencies assisting 
long-term job seekers into employment; however, Forde and Slater (2005) found that  a 
significant number of agency workers do not make the transition into permanent work. 
Similarly in France, evidence for the stepping stone function of agency work is mixed 
(Jourdain, 2002; Papinot, 2011). Stanworth and Druker (2004) argue that  the labour market 
integration function of agency work is not  unproblematic due to the disadvantage experienced 
by agency workers in the long term, in particular their lack of training.
There is a growing recognition that  organisations are increasingly using agency workers to 
substitute fore permanent employees (Stanworth and Druker, 2006; Coe et al., 2010; Belkacem 
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et  al., 2011), although traditional functions of agency labour still remain. The next  section 
examines explanations for employers’ use of agency labour.
3. Explaining the growth in temporary agency work
Explaining employers’ motivations for using temporary labour constitutes a large proportion of 
the literature on agency work. Coe et al. (2009) group literature on agency around four main 
themes: 1) agency work as numerical flexibility; 2) reduction of costs associated with hiring and 
firing; 3) reduction of labour costs and 4) externalisation of risks associated with permanent 
employment. These themes are examined below, before the broader factors beyond the 
organisation are explored.
3.1. Flexibility, cost reduction, and externalising risks
Numerical flexibility allows organisations to make rapid adjustments to their workforce. Sectors 
that rely upon regular cycles of activity (for example, agriculture or tourism) have traditionally 
used the flexibility of a casualised workforce to manage their labour force according to seasonal 
cycles. In addition, employers have turned to agency work intermittently to resolve unforeseen 
human resource issues arising from long term absence due to sick leave or maternity leave 
(Houseman et al. 2003). Beyond these traditional uses of agency work, authors have identified 
the use of numerical flexibility in a structural way to manage the workforce (Houseman et  al., 
2003; Purcell et al., 2004; Mitlacher, 2007). Atkinson’s (1984) model of the “flexible firm” 
identified how organisations divided the workforce between core or permanent  workers who 
possess complex and firm specific skills, and peripheral workers who are low-skilled and may 
be engaged in non-core activities (Coe et al., 2009, p. 7). The “flexible buffer” is viewed as 
being symptomatic of a trend towards a structural “two-tier, core/periphery employment 
system” (Peck and Theodore, 2007) in which the workforce is increasingly divided between a 
reduced core of workers who receive the benefits of the standard employment  contract, and the 
peripheral ring of workers who are cheaper and easily disposable (Booth et  al., 2002; Forde and 
Slater, 2005 Elciogly, 2010). 
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Pollert (1998) takes issue with the core-periphery model that  became prominent in debates 
about labour market  flexibility. The “flexible firm” thesis ignores the structured prevalence of 
labour market vulnerability prior to the context  of the competitive pressures of global 
competition. By presenting flexibility as a “natural” reaction to the new conditions confronting 
business organisation, casualisation is seen as a “viable direction to take”, thus ignoring both the 
role of the state in facilitating labour market  deregulation, and labour market conditions, such as 
unemployment, in providing a supply of cheap labour (Pollert, 1998, p. 310-311). In addition, 
the expansion of the “periphery” into sectors and activities previously associated as the core 
suggests that the core-periphery model is too simplistic. Equally, in some occupations such as 
hospitality, temporary and part-time work has long been the norm due to the specific 
requirements certain sectors of economic activity such as hospitality (Lucas, 2004). Whilst both 
Atkinson and his critics assumed that jobs on the “periphery” were substandard and a way of 
reducing labour costs (McGovern et  al., 2004, p. 227), other authors have stressed the 
heterogenous nature of agency work (Faure-Guichard, 1999; Guest, 2004; Forde and Slater, 
2005; Davidov, 2005; Kornig, 2011). However, Forde and Slater (2005) emphasise that  the 
identification of diversity amongst agency workers and agency work should not detract  from a 
focus on the low-skill, low-paid and insecure employment which characterises agency labour.  
The advantages of a more flexible workforce lie in the ability to adapt the workforce without 
incurring costs associated with hiring and firing. Employers also use agency labour to bypass 
the “burden” of employment relations; the statutory obligations that are a further cost  and 
impediment to flexibility (Davidov, 2004; Forde, 2006). Risks associated with permanent 
employees reside in the legal responsibilities towards permanent  staff arising out  of the 
obligations of standard employment regulations (Coe et  al., 2010). These responsibilities cover 
unfair dismissal, compliance with health and safety regulations, employee benefits and training. 
Bypassing regulatory requirements is a further way of minimising labour costs (Gray, 2002) by 
transferring responsibilities to the temporary employment  agency and freeing up organisations 
to engage in practices that  they consider to be competitive (Connell and Burgess, 2002; Purcell 
et  al., 2004). Additionally, some regulations become applicable only when the number of direct 
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employees reaches a legally defined threshold; agency labour therefore can keep employee 
numbers below that threshold (Davidov, 2004). 
The reduction of direct and indirect  labour costs is frequently cited as a driver for agency labour 
(Grimshaw et  al., 2001; Gray, 2002; Forde, 2008; Koene et  al., 2004; Larbi, 2008; Thommes et 
al., 2010). Agency workers in the EU15 receive lower than average wages (Vosko, 2009). On 
the hand, whilst evidence points to the lower wages of agency workers, at least  for the bottom 
end of the labour market (Thébaud-Mony, 2000; Storrie, 2002; Arrowsmith, 2006), since the 
agency receives a fee for its services, it  does not automatically follow that agency labour results 
in the reduction of fixed labour costs (Coe et  al., 2009; Vosko, 2009). This has to be weighed up 
against the reduction employer related social costs (Forde, 2001; Ward et al., 2001), and the lack 
of incremental wage rises due to length of service (Erhel et al., 2009), which can result  in 
employers paying less for more experienced older agency workers.
There are also additional advantages that underpin the trend to outsource non-core activities, 
such as advertising and recruitment  (Coe et  al., 2010). Agency work provides a low-cost way of 
screening prospective employees (Autor, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Gray, 2002; Forde and Slater, 
2005; Glaymann, 2005). Employment  agencies “first source” workers for clients who are then 
able to observe performance, productivity and behaviour before making decisions about 
permanent hiring (Autor, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Mitlacher, 2007). Coe et al. (2010) refer to 
this process as “trying them out  for size” over a longer period of time than would be possible 
under normal probationary periods. 
McGovern et al. (2004), suggest that “union busting” is a further rationale for agency work 
since agency workers are less likely to be unionised, whilst Peck and Theodore (2007) refer to 
agency labour as a mechanism for sourcing labour for jobs which are considered undesirable, 
such as assembly, packing and loading and other physically demanding jobs. Agency work 
appears to serve a variety of functions although its rapid expansion across a wide range of 
sectors and occupations does suggest that  organisations are turning to agency labour as a means 
of minimising costs associated with permanent employment. From the standpoint  of neo-
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classical economic theory5, the growth of agency work is not  problematic, since it  reflects the 
rational action of the employer seeking to reduce transaction costs and the employee who is 
either seeking flexible employee by choice or who lacks the “human capital” necessary for 
secure work (Coe et al., 2010). Neo-liberalism, which dominates the political and economic 
landscape of Europe at regional and national levels, emphasises the employer side of this 
economic rationale, with organisations adopting a variety of strategies, including the use of 
temporary agency work, in order to enhance their competitivity (Bergström and Storrie, 2003). 
The reduction of costs associated with standard employment regulations is necessary and 
desirable whilst  the presence of temporary agency workers allows organisations to “efficiently” 
respond to economic shocks or changes in product  markets by rapidly adjusting the workforce 
(Nollen, 1996).
3.2. The role of regulation
CIETT, the International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies, situates the success of 
its industry within a context of deregulation and liberalisation (CIETT, 2011). National 
governments have facilitated employers’ use of agency work through legislation removing 
regulatory barriers that had previously restricted the scope of services that employment 
intermediaries can engage in (Campbell and Burgess, 2001). Within the general trend to 
deregulation, inter-country variation still exists, which provides one explanation for differences 
in rates of agency work between countries. If, as discussed above, agency labour is a way of 
sidestepping regulation governing permanent  employment, agency labour should be more 
prevalent  in countries with strict  employment  protection legislation (Coutrot, 2000; Golsch, 
2003; Mitlacher, 2007). However, recent studies have shown that  this is not necessarily the case. 
Koene et al. (2004) found that there was no association between national legislative frameworks 
governing employment and rates of agency work. The country with the highest rate of agency 
work in the EU, the UK, is the country with the weakest employment protection legislation 
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5  In accordance with the theories of neo-classical economics, which views the market as the ultimate 
regulator, temporary agency work is a consequence of the market “sorting” those with “marginal labour 
market attachment” into peripheral forms of employment. 
(EPL) amongst  EU15 countries. France, with the strongest  EPL, also has a high prevalence of 
agency work.6  
Whilst agency work has flourished within the overarching context of liberalisation of the 
temporary agency sector, the relatively high proportions of agency work at opposite ends of the 
EPL spectrum, coupled with the expansion of agency work in the countries that  lie between 
these “extremes”, point to a general growth of agency work regardless of the specificities of the 
regulatory context. Koene et al. (2004) attempt to address country variation by bringing other 
less tangible factors to explain higher rates of agency work into their analysis. They conclude 
that, beyond, the general “business imperative”, national cultures may explain differences. 
Lower rates may be attributable to the persistence of deeply embedded negative attitudes 
towards precarious forms of employment. The authors suggest that the relatively low rate of 
agency work in Sweden, a country that  has considerably liberalised legislation governing the 
use of agency labour, may be due to a cultural antipathy towards agency work, in contrast to, for 
example, the Netherlands, where agency work is culturally more acceptable. So whilst 
permanent employment  and the termination of permanent employment is highly regulated in 
Sweden, levels of agency work remain relatively low, whereas in the Netherlands and the UK, 
levels of agency work are higher, although there is less of an imperative to avoid regulations 
governing permanent employment  in these countries since it  is easier to terminate employment 
contracts. 
This illustrates the difficulty in unpacking different  national characteristics as explanatory 
factors behind employment  trends. Koene et  al. (2004) point out  that in the example of Sweden, 
it  is not merely cultural attitudes to agency work that  have put  a brake on its expansion.7 Strong 
labour unions also play an influential role in shaping the employment landscape. This influence 
may be both direct  and indirect (i.e. influencing attitudes to precarious work). On the other 
hand, in France, where there is a strong tradition of hostility to agency labour and other forms of 
precarious employment, and a strong attachment  to the post-war “norms” of employment 
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6 See CIETT, 2011, p. 23.
7 Since 2004, temporary agency work in Sweden has been growing significantly. See Eurofound country 
report: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0807019s/se0807019q.htm.
(Barbier, 2005), agency work flourishes. For Koene et al. (2004) this is due to the weakness of 
French unions and their corresponding inability to combat the growth of agency work. The 
factors which give rise to agency labour therefore are complex and are not easily explained by 
isolated elements of “employment regimes”.
3.3. The role of temporary employment agencies
A small group of authors have begun to examine the role of a hitherto overlooked factor in the 
expansion of agency work – employment agencies. As highlighted by Forde et al. (2008) and 
Coe et  al. (2010), accounts of the growth of agency work tend to present temporary work 
agencies as passive agents responding to market trends, providing organisations with the 
flexibility to adjust  their workforce on the one hand, and responding to changing employment 
preferences on the other. The temporary agency work sector also promotes this neutral 
economic vision of their business.8 An emerging body of research, predominantly based in the 
US, has challenged this notion of agencies by examining how the temporary work industry has 
actively engaged in practices that have transformed the structure of employment relations at 
local, national and international levels (Peck et  al. 2005; Coe et al., 2010, Elciogly, 2010). Coe 
et  al. (2010) note that temporary staffing agencies are rendered invisible in much of the 
literature even though, as profit-making entities, they are legitimate subjects for research. 
Building a coherent account of agency work, therefore, involves theorising the role of labour 
market intermediaries (Benner, 2002, cited in Coe et al., 2010), starting from an 
acknowledgement of the activities, practices and discourses of the industry (Peck and Theodore, 
2002; Peck et al. 2005) that enable them to influence the construction of the market within 
which they operate. Agency labour, as a particular form of labour flexibility, has grown not only 
because of the choices and actions of the firms and workers that  are engaged in agency labour, it 
is also the outcome of the business strategies of agencies which are taking on a bigger role in 
labour market  mediation. The business strategies of the big firms have involved a process of 
internationalisation and diversification (Peck et al. 2005; Ward, 2004). Diversification of 
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8 See the various annual reports of CIETT (International Confederation of Private Employment 
Agencies), for example CIETT Annual Report 2011, and PRISME (Professionnels de l’intérim, services 
et métiers de l’emploi) which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
activities has facilitated the “normalisation” of agency work in wider areas of the economy, thus 
challenging traditional employment relations norms (Coe, et al., 2010). 
For Peck and Theodore (2007), the role of the temporary employment  industry in the US is 
unambiguous. The “industrial and regulatory transformation” (Peck and Theodore, 2007, p. 
183) that has taken place in the US is the outcome of processes that include lobbying, seeking 
out new geographical markets and strategic alliances with large user-firms. Through this, 
powerful multinational companies have played an essential role in the transformation of agency 
beyond the narrower economic rationale of “ad hoc labour substitution” to a more strategic and 
systematic labour market  function. In the context of intense competitive pressures, such 
companies come to depend upon agencies as part of an overall strategy to keep down wages and 
reduce social costs associated with employment (Peck and Theodore, 2007, p. 189).
Coe et al., (2010) draw upon the US literature to investigate the operation of temporary work 
agencies in transforming agency work into a form of work that is integral to the business 
strategies of client  (user) organisations. They place particular emphasis on the campaigning 
activities of CIETT which is fast going beyond its remit  as an international trade body and is 
becoming a campaigning, “independent” labour market  commentator, building upon the 
national trade organisations in the US and the UK which have campaigned vigorously to 
reshape norms and expectation of employment. The business strategies of employment agencies 
have led to an expansion of services, facilitated by the liberalisation of the sector which opened 
up the range of activities that can be carried out  by employment agencies (Glaymann, 2005; 
Peck and Theodore, 2007; Kinnie et al. 2008). Recent legislation in France has permitted 
agencies to be involved in permanent placements, whilst  strategic partnerships between 
governments and key agencies accord a key role to agencies in the labour market  integration of 
young workers in areas of high unemployment. 
Echoing Peck and Theodore (2007), Coe et al. (2010) argue that agencies cannot, therefore, be 
viewed as simply being “embedded” in national labour markets. They increasingly have an 
“institutional place” that enables firms to engage in forms of “intermediated employment 
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practices” which “otherwise would be logistically and socially infeasible” (Peck et al., 2005). 
Therefore, research needs to broaden out from too narrow a focus on employers and/or the 
national regulatory context, in order to take account of the institutional space that agencies 
occupy. To do otherwise is to underestimate “the wider institutional context in which staffing 
industries operate” and is likely to result in missing the “complex and variegated ways in which 
distinctive staffing markets are continually produced (and reproduced) through interactions 
between [these] various elements” (Coe et, al., 2009, pp.15-16).  
4. The profile of agency workers in Europe: continuity amidst change
The expansion of agency work to a broader range of sectors and occupations has, to some 
extent, modified the profile of agency workers (Koene et al., 2004; Larbi, 2008). The weakening 
of the “job-for-life” with one employer which underpinned expectations and norms of 
employment has been accompanied by the emergence of skilled agency workers (McCann, 
2006, p. 89). A new kind of “voluntary temp” has been identified and associated with profound 
changes in the organisation of work. These are the “boundaryless workers” (Guest, 2004) that 
have come to symbolise the new world of “portfolio” career paths (Knell, 2000). Equipped with 
high levels of human capital, these mobile workers employ the services of labour market 
intermediaries to sell their skills, operating as “free agents” actively intervening in a changing 
employment market (Albert  and Bradley, 1998). According to this view, employment 
intermediaries are neutral facilitators in a labour market driven by changing preferences in 
supply and demand. It is an account  that  corresponds to the image promoted by the temporary 
agency industry, which emphasises the “win-win” outcome of agency working, meeting both 
the needs of businesses and the shifting preferences of employees for more flexible working 
arrangements (Reilly, 1998; CIETT, 2011). However, data on agency work contrasts with this 
positive image. Whilst professional agency workers have expanded the ranks of the agency 
workforce, the weight given to high-skilled agency workers in the recent literature does not do 
justice to the continued presence of enduring forms of low-skilled agency work. 
Capturing the profile of temporary agency workers is hampered by the lack of robust data. Most 
EU countries have only recently begun to distinguish between temporary agency work and other 
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forms of temporary employment in Labour Force Surveys.9  Labour Force Surveys are also 
limited in their capacity to reflect forms of work that are carried out  by low-skilled and, 
frequently, migrant  workers (BERR, 2008, p. 2), and cross-country comparisons are 
complicated by some countries having more reliable data than others. Despite these limitations, 
Bergström and Storrie (2005) show that temporary agency work is still dominated by low-
skilled work carried out by sectors of the labour force traditionally viewed as 
“disadvantaged” (women, youth, ethnic minorities, migrant  workers) – a finding confirmed by 
national studies (Thébaude-Mony, 2001; Peunter, 2003; Pérez, 2003). Data collated by CIETT 
confirms the prevalence of workers with low-levels of qualifications. In most countries, the 
majority of agency workers have no qualifications beyond secondary school (CIETT, 2011, p. 
32). On a European-wide level, three out of four agency workers have “at best finished their 
secondary education” (CIETT, 2011, p. 8). CIETT  interprets this data as confirming the 
important  role agency work plays in helping “low-skilled workers enter the labour market and 
gain valuable experience”.
Differences in skill levels between countries reflect  the different  sectoral distribution of agency 
work in Western Europe, which takes three distinct forms (Vosko, 2009, p. 397). In the first 
group, temporary agency work is heavily concentrated in manufacturing (Austria, France, 
Netherlands and Portugal). In the second group, services predominate (Spain and Sweden). In 
the final group (Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Italy), there is a mixed sectoral distribution. 
Vosko (2009) adds a further group consisting of Norway and the UK, where a relatively high 
proportion of agency workers are employed in the public sector. 
Although, studies of the UK have identified the growth of professional and skilled agency 
workers, particularly in the public sector (Forde and Slater, 2005), the proposition that this 
confirms the rise of the high-skilled, highly motivated voluntary temporary worker (Bernhard-
Oettell, 2008, p. 570) has been challenged by a number of studies. Forde and Slater (2005) 
situate the rise of the skilled public sector “temp” in the context  of budgetary constraints within 
the UK public sector leading to the externalisation of sections of the workforce. Other 
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associated factors also seem to be driving this trend. Carey (2007) and De Ruyter (2007) 
suggest  that “push” factors arising from the deterioration of employment  in the UK public 
sector lie behind decisions of public servants such social workers, nurses and teachers to turn to 
agency work as a preferred employment  option, thus accelerating the externalisation of 
employment relations. Authors like Forde and Slater (2005) argue that the emphasis upon high 
skill agency staffing by the industry diverts attention away from the growing numbers of 
migrant workers in the UK that are supplied to the hospitality, agriculture and food processing 
industries via employment intermediaries (French and Mörhke, 2006; McKay and Markova, 
2008; Anderson, 2010). 
Whilst a common feature across all European countries is the youthful profile of agency 
workers, there are significant gender differences between countries due to the sectoral 
distribution of agency work. Where there is a high proportion of agency workers in 
manufacturing, agency workers are overwhelmingly male; in Austria, France and Germany, 
over 70% of agency workers are men (CIETT, 2011). Vosko (2009) argues that  patterns and 
trends in agency work suggest a deterioration in the employment  situations of some male 
occupational groups alongside the continuing economic hardships amongst “equity-seeking” 
groups, such as women and workers lacking national citizenship rights (Vosko, 2009, p. 398). 
Whilst these latter groups continue to be significant  within the “secondary” labour market, 
indigenous male workers are now expanding the ranks of the agency workforce, suggesting that 
traditional supply side explanations of agency labour do not hold. Data on the “volition” of 
agency workers, that is whether agency workers are choosing agency work over permanent 
work, reinforces the view of the constrained nature of agency work; 72% of agency workers in 
the EU15 countries report  that they are in this form of employment  due to the unavailability of 
permanent jobs (Vosko, 2009). This holds true regardless of gender, the figures are 73% for 
women compared to 70% for men (2006 data), further undermining a key “supply side” 
explanation that  agency work is a preferred option for women combining paid employment with 
caring responsibilities. The 2011 CIETT  report contains similar data regarding volition, 
although the organisation chooses to highlight in a bullet point that “[A] significant proportion 
of agency workers do not seek permanent employment”.
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5. Assessing the “job quality” of agency workers
There is little empirical evidence of the working conditions of agency workers. An early cross-
national study on the situation of agency workers was carried out  in 2002 by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). The study 
brought together a variety of data sources from the EU15 countries (official statistics, 
government reports, anecdotal evidence, reports from social partners). The study concluded that 
in the key indicators of job quality (occupational health and safety, incidence of workplace 
accidents, choice of contract, autonomy in the workplace), agency work is associated with poor 
quality work (Storrie, 2002). In another Eurofound study (2003), agency workers were shown to 
experience less stress and occupational health problems, whilst a minority of agency workers 
appear to conform to the free agent  construct, citing freedom and independence and better work-
life balance as positive aspects of agency work (Eurofound, 2003, p. 14), reflecting the “top 
end” of the agency labour market (Coe et al., 2010, p. 10).
Eurofound also carries out regular five-year surveys of working conditions in Europe, the 
European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). The dataset is relatively small (approximately 
30,000 workers in each country), so the sample of agency workers is also small. However, the 
surveys do give an indication of the issues that  face agency workers. Whilst  there appears to 
have been little change in the conditions of agency work over the course of the three surveys 
carried out  since 1990, there are a number of themes arising from the data. Data from the third 
survey (2000) showed that agency workers were the least  satisfied with their working 
conditions. They were more exposed to jobs that involved working in a painful position; more 
likely to be working in jobs that involved repetitive tasks than other workers; and had less 
control over hours. In some dimensions of job quality, conditions appeared to have worsened 
over time for agency workers, for example, task autonomy and having enough time to finish 
tasks. Whilst  intensification of pace due to external demand increased from 1995 to 2000 for 
workers on all types of employment contracts, there was a marked increase from 53% to 60% 
for agency workers. The agency contract was also shown to reduce the likelihood of being 
informed of workplace risks, though the perception of being at  risk from occupational health 
hazards was lowest amongst  agency workers (Paoli and Merllié 2001). Secondary analysis of 
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data from the Third EWCS by Nienhüser and Matiaske (2006) found that the principle of non-
discrimination (parity between agency workers and workers on the standard employment 
contract) did not protect agency workers from direct discrimination in the workplace.
The Fourth EWCS (2005) highlighted how agency workers are actively dissatisfied with their 
working conditions. Agency workers also reported much higher levels of job insecurity than 
permanent workers, and relatively higher levels than workers on fixed-term contracts, despite in 
many countries being “employed” by an agency, in contrast  to accounts of agency work which 
emphasise the positive role of agencies in facilitating labour market integration. Periods of 
economic stress also increase anxieties over lack of job security. In 2005, 43% of agency 
workers were concerned about  job insecurity, compared with 10% of workers on permanent 
contracts and 35% of workers on fixed-term contracts. Initial findings from the Fifth EWCS, 
carried out  in 2010, in the aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis, showed that  53% of agency 
workers felt  anxious about  job insecurity, compared with 11% of permanent  workers and 39% 
of workers on fixed-term contracts.  
Qualitative studies of agency work yield a more ambiguous picture of the world of the agency 
work which undermines generalised accounts of agency work as categorically “bad” (Silla et  al., 
2004). The literature suggests that identifying the roots of disadvantage is not  straightforward. 
Contrasting findings may be an indication that  job characteristics are more influential than 
employment status. Storrie (2002), for example, points out the difficulty in differentiating 
between factors related to agency work as a specific form of employment  and those factors that 
are related to the jobs that  agency workers do. The body of qualitative research is relatively 
limited in its scope and much of it  focuses on examining the claims of the new world of the 
highly skilled “temp”. One of the earliest studies is Albert  and Bradley’s (1998) comparative 
study of female accountants. Those on agency contracts were found to be actively choosing 
agency employment to gain what they perceived to be control over their work. Subsequent 
studies in the UK, however, suggest  that positive reporting of agency work may be the result  of 
an illusion of control or a means of escaping the deteriorating conditions of permanent 
employment (Druker and Stanworth, 2004; Kirkpatrick and Hocque, 2006; Carey, 2007; de 
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Ruyter, 2007). Research in Sweden has led to similar conclusions (Storrie, 2007). Grimshaw et 
al. (2003) advance the notion that the growth of agency work amongst  higher skilled workers 
might  be reasonably viewed as a form of “individualised resistance” against the degradation of 
professional standards, thus locating agency work within broader changes in employment  in 
general. 
On the other hand, there are other studies that do echo Albert and Bradley (1998), for example, 
Torka and Schyns (2007) and Tailby (2005). However, Tailby (2005) found that negative 
perceptions of employment in the NHS influenced positive attitudes to agency work. Carey 
(2007) raised the issue of whether what  might be taking place is a process of deskilling or 
“proletarianisation” due to the lack of training and development opportunities for non-
permanent staff. Such observations constitute important challenges to approaches which seek to 
explain the growth of agency work in terms of changing supply side preferences. Agency work 
is less an alluring employment  option and more an alternative to the deterioration of standard 
employment (Grimshaw et  al., 2003). Underpinning these socio-economic analytic approaches 
to agency work is the idea that it is “best  understood when contextualised within broader trends, 
most notably the linked economic, political and cultural processes of globalisation and 
marketisation” (Carey, 2009, p. 558).
Qualitative research has drawn attention to the impact of fragmented patterns of employment on 
the experience of work and relationships with colleagues. Frequent  job changes, multiple 
relationships and transitory, weak bonds with user organisations are “core components” of the 
agency contract (Galais and Moser, 2009). The constant change of workplace means that  agency 
workers are unable to forge the bonds necessary for supportive workplace interactions, bonds 
which are important for well-being in the workplace (Storrie, 2002, p. 47). Similarly, in a 
Swedish study, Isaksson and Bellagh (1999) reveal the negative effects of the fragmentation of 
working lives that  agency workers experience. Thus, the lack of a sense of collective and shared 
identity has led some agency workers, who have previously sought  the “freedom” of agency 
work, back into more secure employment (Carey, 2007). In addition, agency workers are 
expected to frequently switch to new duties and roles and learn new firm-specific norms over a 
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short  period of time (Druker and Stanworth, 2004). Proponents of agency work present 
changing working environments in a positive light, arguing that  agency workers derive 
satisfaction from the variety and challenge of constant change (CIETT, 2000 and 2007).
On the whole there has been little research on agency work in low-skilled occupations, as the 
literature has tended to focus on emerging forms of agency work in professional and skilled 
occupations, although there have been recent  qualitative studies that  have attempted to capture 
the experience of agency workers in low-skilled jobs. In the UK, researchers have looked at 
low-skilled agency workers through the lens of migrant workers. May et al. (2006) carried out 
extensive qualitative research amongst  London’s migrant workforce carrying out low-skilled, 
low-paid work, in many instances employed on agency contracts. The authors refer to this 
workforce as a “reserve army of labour” that  exists alongside London’s highly paid professional 
workforce employed in the financial and other professional service sectors in an increasingly 
polarised and ethnically divided landscape. May et  al.’s (2006) analytical framework focuses in 
particular on the role of the State in shaping this “migrant division of labour”. Recent migrants 
to the UK are typically employed via temporary employment agencies despite a preference for 
direct employment. They face poor working conditions, low pay and lack of opportunity to 
progress (Anderson et al., 2006; French and Mohrke, 2006). A more recent  study by McKay and 
Markova (2008) examined employers’ use of migrant  agency labour in food processing, care 
work and cleaning, and found that  migrant  agency workers were used both to cover seasonal 
peaks (in particular in food processing) but also as alternative to permanent  staff. Research on 
low-skilled agency in the UK is characterised by the intersection of ethnicity and migration 
status, reflecting a concern for the abuse of migrant  labour by activities of small, and until 
recently, largely unregulated, agencies operating in a similar fashion to “gang masters” (French 
and Mohrke, 2006). 
In France, Glaymann and Grima (2008) looked at how low skilled agency workers in the Paris 
region responded to their position in labour market. This study is notable in that  the authors 
reject the dichotomy between the passive “vulnerable” agency worker and the active 
“empowered” knowledge worker. These low-skilled agency workers, despite their lack of 
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“market capacities”, are able to exercise choice within the constraints of their socio-economic 
position. The study concluded that low-skilled agency workers are a diverse group in terms of 
the strategies they adopt. On the other hand, strategies are primarily framed by a desire to reach 
the final goal, that of permanent employment. 
Despite the high levels of agency work in the car sector, there has been surprisingly little 
research on this group of workers working in a key economic sector. The car sector has been an 
important  site of in-depth qualitative studies, and whilst  agency workers increasingly figure in 
this research they have not, until recently, been the focus of specific investigations. Beaud and 
Pialoux’s study of the PSA plant in Sochaux (1999) included interview data from agency 
workers who had been recruited en masse to cope with increased demand. They were found to 
experience harsher conditions compared with permanent employees and to have a lack of 
individual or collective voice by which they could counter management prerogatives. A more 
recent study by Hatzfeld (2004) of the same plant concluded that agency workers were subject 
to tighter control and more surveillance than permanent workers. The use of agency work in the 
auto sector has been explained with reference to the “buffer”  function (Beaud and Pialoux, 
1999). As with some studies in the UK (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Danford, 1998), agency 
workers in the auto sector are discussed not only from the standpoint of how their experience 
compares with that of permanent workers but also as a way of illustrating the range of labour 
resourcing techniques that are employed to manage a potentially recalcitrant workforce 
(Bouquin, 2006, p. 155). More recent research by Gorgeu and Mathieu (2011) which focused an 
agency workers within the auto sector, has identified how temporary agency work serves an 
essential function in the French car sector as both an instrument of flexibility and a way of 
screening for permanent workers, as well as describing harsh working conditions, lack of 
autonomy and lack of respect in the workplace. The authors found that agency workers were 
engaged in a dangerous trade-off between health and employment. Gorgeu’s and Mathieu’s 
(2011) work is an important contribution to research on the role and consequences of agency 
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work in the auto sector in France. This and the other French research described above is 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 6. 
6. The triadic employment relationship
An emerging body of research has examined the triadic employment relationship as a defining 
feature of agency work that has wide-ranging effects on employment  outcomes for agency 
workers. For Vosko (2009) the precarious nature of agency work relates not only to the 
temporary nature of the contract, it  is also explained by this triadic relationship. The traditional 
bilateral relations between employee and employer, with clearly defined obligations and 
responsibilities, is replaced by one in which employer responsibilities are not only divided with 
the agency, there are also characterised by an ambiguity as to where the dividing lines of 
responsibility lie. This is particularly the case in countries such as the UK where, due to a lack 
of clear legislation, the agency worker has, through case law, been denied the status of 
employee. In most  European countries, including those that  have recently legislated for a form 
of employment  which had for a long time been illegal (for example, Greece), the formal legal 
employer is the agency. The agency takes on “employment-related responsibilities such as 
hiring and firing and dismissal as well as administrative responsibilities related to pay and 
benefits” (Vosko, 2009, p. 398). The agency may also take on other functions related to human 
resources such as interviewing, testing and screening. The user organisation remains responsible 
for overseeing the direct  management  of the labour process/task, whilst “outsourcing” other 
employer responsibilities and obligations (Davidov, 2004). 
6.1. Fragmentation, complexity and ambiguity
As a result  of the division of responsibilities between agency and user organisation, agency 
workers are subject to a two-way fragmentation which hinders collective action and solidarity. 
First, agency workers are separated from the permanent workers they work alongside since they 
do not share the same employer. Because wages and benefits are the responsibility of the 
agency, agency workers do not receive the same pay as permanent workers (typically lower, 
although in some cases they may receive more), and they are denied the package of rights and 
benefits associated with the permanent  employment contract  (Davidov, 2004). The triangular 
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relationship, therefore, creates obstacles to worker representation and collective bargaining, 
since legal and managerial responsibilities are divided between two different entities (Peck and 
Theodore, 2003; Kalleberg, 2000). Furthermore, whilst  there will be an overlap between the 
kinds of concerns that could be subject  to negotiation and bargaining, there will also be issues 
that are not  shared, for example, compensation between assignments (Davidov, 2004). Second, 
agency workers are isolated from other agency workers, who form the natural constituency for 
collective bargaining. This second layer of fragmentation hinders collective organisation and 
employee voice, undermining the ability of agency workers to combat low pay and bad 
conditions, thus reinforcing their precarious status. The structure of the triadic relationship, 
therefore, operates against the process of employer-employee workplace negotiation – a key 
feature of the standard employment relationship (Cheng, 2010, p.81). There are instances of 
collective organisation and representation, albeit bedevilled by the obstacles associated with 
organising a temporary workforce, scattered across various sites. Where collective bargaining 
occurs, it is normally with the agency, the site of the longer-term stable relationship (Davidov, 
2004), as is the case in Sweden and France (Storrie, 2004).
The situation is further complicated by the complexity and ambiguity of the triadic relationship 
that renders the agency worker vulnerable in the face of two “employers”. It is not  always clear 
in legal frameworks what responsibilities can be expected to lie with the agency. In the formal 
legal sense, in most European countries, the employment relationship is between the agency 
worker and the agency, whilst the “work relation” is between the employee and user 
organisation (Gonos, 1997). The coordination of work (managerial control) takes place at the 
site of labour, whilst  the employment relationship – the contractual relationship by which social 
and economic risk is alleviated through social insurance, holiday pay etc. – is transferred to the 
agency (Deakin, 2001) and the agency worker lacks the security and full range of social rights 
available under the standard employment contract. However, this division is not  straightforward. 
Where strong protective legislation is in place, for example in France, certain employer, for 
example, health and safety, responsibilities are transferred to the user organisation (Davidov, 
2004). Where there is ambiguity over responsibility, as the case in the UK, risk tends to fall on 
the shoulders of the agency workers (Deakin, 2001).   
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6.2. Redefining models of workplace behaviour and attitudes 
Employment  and organisational studies are also concerned with how the employment 
relationship functions within sites of work through the behaviour of individuals who relinquish 
their autonomy to the control of managers. The theories that have been developed to understand 
the dynamics of the relationship between worker and employer/management  are based upon the 
assumption of a two-way relationship between employing organisation and employee in a single 
site. The growth of agency work has led to a reappraisal and/or reworking of these theories. 
A key question that  organisational behaviour research seeks to answer is what factors contribute 
to optimal function in the workplace (De Cuyper et  al. 2011, p. 5). From the human relations 
movement to contemporary human resource management, enhancing output is a core goal 
(Thompson, 1983, p. 15). The field of organisational behaviour (OB) has incorporated 
approaches from psychology to examine what kind of workplace behaviour and attitudes 
generate positive employment  outcomes that  can enhance performance/productivity and what 
organisations can do to cultivate such behaviours and attitudes. Essential constructs in OB are 
the psychological contract, organisational commitment  and organisational citizenship behaviour, 
which describe the affective bond that  the worker has towards the employing organisation. 
These constructs assume a dyadic employer and employee relationship and the mutual 
obligations and expectations that  flow from this within the framework of the standard 
employment relationship (Connelly et al. 2011) and are not  readily transferable to a tripartite 
relation whereby the agency worker “simultaneously fulfils obligations to more than one 
employer through the same act  and behaviour” (Gallagher and McLean Parks, 2001). The 
absence of mutual expectations and obligations leads to a rupture in the “psychological 
contract” and organisational commitment  is undermined by the existence of two potential 
recipients or loci of commitment – the agency and the user organisation (Gallois, 2000; Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2006, Gallagher and Sverke, 2005, p. 192; Lacroux and Larbi, 2008). Connelly et 
al. (2011) found that agency workers could engage in either productive or contra-productive 
behaviour depending on the direction of commitment  and that  this tended to be influenced by 
whether or not their employment status corresponded to preferences. Those who sought 
permanent employment were more likely to engage in productive behaviour towards the user, 
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by excelling in the workplace as a strategy to increase their chances of permanent  employment 
(De Cuyper, 2011).
In a subsequent  study Connelly et  al., (2011), identified “spill-over” effects in which positive 
feelings towards user organisations could spill-over to the agency that  placed them there, 
indicating the complexity that  can arise from multiple affiliations (Galais and Moser, 2009). 
Drawing upon social exchange theory, Connelly et  al. (2011) go on to show that perceptions of 
social justice (or lack thereof) affect  workplace commitment  and productivity. The authors argue 
that employers therefore should build upon this, seeking ways to enhance feelings of social 
justice amongst agency workers by, for example, ensuring parity of treatment, pay and 
conditions (Chambel and Sobral, 2011). A number of studies on work in the auto sector in 
France have referred to the way in which aspirations for permanent employment  can influence 
the behaviour of agency workers (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 1998; Beaud and Pialoux, 1999; 
Bouqin, 2006). However, these studies discuss this from a different  theoretical perspective; one 
in which “motivation” to perform is rooted in the basic inequality of the labour-capital 
relationship, and the specifically insecure nature of agency labour. Thus agency workers are 
subject to intense exploitation that  obliges them to work harder (Larbi, 2008). Expression of 
commitment  to the agency may also flow from a sense of dependency on the agency for the next 
assignment (Davidov, 2004). 
By focusing on the behaviour of workers within the organisational setting, OB approaches fail 
to take into account the nature of work and the employment relationship within the wider 
context of societal inequality (Thompson, 1983, p. 13). Managerial attempts to engineer 
behaviour in the workplace, even when this entails improving the organisational environment  of 
the workplace setting and other means of enhancing the subjective experience of labour in the 
production process, are not simply the product  of a neutral or benign process of organisational 
efficiency. At the heart of managerial control lies the essential nature of the capitalist labour 
process, by which labour power is transformed into a product that embodies use value and 
exchange value. The pressure upon agency workers to be motivated and work hard is, therefor 
more usefully understood with reference to theories that view the function of management  as 
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being fundamentally one of transforming potential labour (labour power) into realised labour. 
This brings forth workplace interactions which can be understood less as “affective ties” of 
loyalty and commitment  to the employer and more as a complex and changing set  of behaviours 
(consent, compliance and resistance) through which the worker carves out  his/her positionality 
within an unequal social relationship.
6.3. Regulating labour through the triadic relationship
An emerging strand of research locates the experience of agency workers in the labour process 
conceived of as a site of control (and resistance) as management endeavours to elicit consent to 
work from its workforce. This research draws upon labour process analysis (LPA) which is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 3. This body of literature examines the way traditional 
conceptualisations of control are challenged by the triadic relationship and the presence of 
multiple sites of work that define the working lives of agency workers. One of the first  attempts 
to theorise the “triangular relationship” with reference to labour control and regulation was 
Gottfried’s (1992) account of US agency workers in clerical positions. From her observations of 
the intake process of five temporary employment  agencies, Gottfried reappraised theories of 
control based upon “industrial models” (Burawoy, 1985; Edwards, 1990) in order to capture 
what she referred to as the “institutional space” that  spans multiple locations – since for 
temporary agency workers “management  of production and management of labour reside in 
separate organisational domains” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 447). New strategies of control emerge 
from this fragmented employment  relationship, strategies which extend beyond the site of 
production. The outcome is a dualistic system of control, a concept that captures both the two 
distinct structures of management and the different  roles of each in regulating and managing 
agency work, and the two levels of control that  operate at the site of the agency, resulting in a 
“flexible frontier of control”. Bureaucratic control refers to the way agencies rationalise jobs by 
setting out the tasks, competencies and responsibilities of the assignment. Decentralised control 
is the process by which agencies indirectly control agency the agency worker by “decentering 
regulation and dispersing responsibility to control to individual workers” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 
446). Self-disciplinary pressure arises from the continuous need to gain access to paid 
employment via the temporary employment agency. The agency also cedes, by way of the 
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contract with the client organisation, management (control) over the labour of the agency 
workers, resulting in a dual, overlapping system of sanctions. The agency worker must then 
acquiesce simultaneously in the rules and procedures of the agency as well as those of the client 
organisation.  
This points to an intensification of control in the labour process arising out of the triadic 
relationship and the pressures associated with labour market vulnerability linked with the lack 
of a permanent contract. This compels agency workers to accept  working conditions that they 
are unable to influence and which are likely to be inferior to those of permanent  co-workers. 
Vosko (2000) observed this process of acquiescence in her study of “temps” in Canada:
In registering with a temporary help agency, temporary help workers surrender 
their right  to choose both their worksite and their direct  employer….They also 
yield their right to select  freely their place within the division of labour, because in 
signing an employment  agreement with the agency, the temporary help workers 
forfeit their ability to choose their preferred type of work.
(Vosko, 2000, p. 19, cited in Coe et al., 2010)
However, Gottfried (1992) argues that  even in this disadvantageous context, consent can be 
relevant. Both employment agencies and user organisations tap into the future aspirations of 
agency workers to encourage workplace behaviours of consent  and compliance, engaging in 
discourses that correspond to aspirations, so that flexibility/job insecurity becomes a key 
dimension of labour regulation. Smith’s (1998) study of temporary agency workers – again in 
the US – sets out  to explain why workers “consent to labour under conditions of marginality and 
disadvantage with which those jobs are typically associated” (Smith, 1998, p. 411) She also 
identifies flexibility as a mechanism for control in the context of participatory workplace 
settings. The temporary agency employment  contract  “conditions participation and compliance 
of workers in positions that are formally organised as non-permanent” (Smith, 1998, p. 414). 
Dispersed control embodies self-discipline stemming from the perception by agency workers 
that assignments function as a screening mechanism for permanent  recruitment. Their desire for 
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a “real job” led them to engage in “deep self-discipline that  well served a production system 
based on individual initiative, decision-making and responsibility”. The agency worker is, 
therefore, under pressure to present  her/himself as a “reliable contingent” worker (Peck and 
Theodore, 2001) who has to deliver an error-free performance in the belief that  this will 
increase their chances of obtaining a permanent  job. For Smith, this was a “powerful tool of 
control over temp workers and served to cement  their acceptance of their marginalised labour 
market status” (Smith, 1998, p.424). 
Gottfried (1992) also described how agencies project an image of being a placement  service, 
which resonates well with the aspirations of the agency worker, calling attention to what 
Collinson (1987) refers to as the reciprocal and voluntary nature of temporary work, which 
serves as “an ideological mechanism for obscuring the reality of low pay and lack of job 
mobility and carrying the contradictory message of worker self reliance and attachment to the 
firm” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 451). More recent  research has developed the theme of ideological 
control further. Degiuli and Kollmeyer (2007) draw upon both Gramsci’s theories of hegemony 
and Burawoy’s theory of hegemonic despotism to present an account of how temporary work 
agencies are engaged in actively constructing their own narratives to render agency work 
socially acceptable. Their starting point  is the acknowledgement  that  “economic systems must 
develop certain capacities to align the actions of individual workers with the specific goals of 
their employers” (Degiuli and Kollmeyer, 2007, p. 497) and that “labour control regimes” are 
those “historically contingent but  fairly enduring methods by which management exerts control 
and imposes discipline over its workers” (Degiuli and Kollmeyer, 2007, p. 498). Theories of 
control, by placing greater emphasis on how organisations elicit consent from, rather than 
control over, their workforce, have sought to explain how cooperation is ideologically 
constructed in the workplace (Friedman, 1977; Burawoy, 1979; Burawoy, 1985). 
Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007) describe the strategies used by the sector to cultivate similar 
affective ties between agency workers and agencies. The authors identify three organisational 
practices of labour control. First, agencies seek to normalise the insecurity of flexible working 
by presenting it  as a fact  of contemporary economic systems. Employment agencies thereby 
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become the “ideological intermediaries” of neo-liberalism. Second, the “myth” of the permanent 
post encourages agency workers to exert  more effort  for the client  organisation. Third, 
hegemony is reinforced by coercion due to an employment contract that exposes temporary 
agency workers to the practice of “hire and fire”, thus diminishing the likelihood that  agency 
workers will complain about working conditions or seek union representation. The authors 
associate this with a labour control regime characterised by aspects of “market despotism” 
typical of early capitalism (Burawoy, 1985). However, ideological power is prominent in the 
organisational practices of labour control within the temporary work sector, although it is 
unclear from this study how far these practices succeed in establishing hegemonic control over 
agency workers. The US studies carried out  by Gottfried (1992) and Smith (1998) suggest  that 
practices aimed at  rhetorically aligning agencies’ goals with those of the temps can be 
successful. It  is not clear whether this is applicable to a different  national context where labour 
has a stronger institutional role, although Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007) propose that is the case. 
7. Conclusion
In reviewing the literature on temporary agency work, this chapter has discussed how the 
growth of agency work has generated a reappraisal of traditional approaches to its labour market 
function. Temporary agency work has traditionally been viewed as a marginal form of labour 
destined for those sections of the labour force with weak labour market attachment, or sections 
of the working class whose societal position reinforces their exclusion from the core workforce. 
Depending upon the theoretical approach taken, it has been viewed either as a deviation and 
regression from the post-war standard employment  relationships that protects labour from the 
unmediated and unfettered market, or as an outcome of efficient market  sorting of less qualified 
or less attached workers into less well-protected employment. The growth of temporary agency 
work has undermined all these approaches, leading to two divergent strands of research; one 
that espouses fears of the extension of precarious forms of employment in the context of 
competitive pressures to externalise risks, reduce costs and enhance numerical flexibility, and 
another which views the expansion of agency work within professional occupations as a 
reflection of changing occupational trajectories within modern flexible organisations. This latter 
strand of research fails to take into account  that whilst  there has been a growth in skilled, 
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professional agency work, the overwhelming majority of agency workers remain in low-skilled 
occupations. Although quantitive evidence demonstrates the prevalence of low-wages and low 
levels of job quality, qualitative evidence has, until recently, focused upon the new phenomenon 
of the high skilled temporary agency workers. In particularly, there has been a lack of research 
focus on agency workers in manufacturing industries where the standard employment 
relationship has underpinned the “male breadwinner” model of the post war years, such as in car 
manufacturing plants, particularly in a country such as France, where agency labour constitutes 
a large proportion of the workforce. 
This gap has begun to be filled by recent research on agency work in low-skilled occupations, 
particularly in the UK where research has focused on migrant workers. Gorgeu and Mathieu’s 
(2011) study provides a further contribution to the body of literature on agency work by 
assessing its impact on occupational health in the context  of repetitive and intense assembly line 
work. These studies contrast  sharply with the qualitative research assessing agency workers’ 
rationale behind employment  choices and/or the impact of agency work on organisational and 
employment outcomes which dominates much of the research of the last decade. Additionally, 
Gorgeu and Mathieu’s (2011) work builds upon a tradition of French research that  has followed 
the changes in the organisation of work in the automobile sector and in particular the 
consequences of lean production upon work and labour force management. Whilst  this literature 
has identified the increasing reliance upon agency labour within the sector, there has not been a 
focused engagement with the consequences of the triadic relationship on workplace dynamics 
and experience, nor with the theoretical implications of changing employment relations in a 
core sector of the French economy. 
The research discussed in the final section above provides a starting point for interrogating how 
temporary agency work alters the relationship between capital and labour. By focusing on the 
triadic relationship, the importance of the specific contractual nature of the agency employment 
relationship is brought to the fore. The vulnerability lodged in the temporary employment 
contract is combined with the distinct feature of the division of employment  responsibilities 
(Vosko, 2009) conceptualised by those working within the LPA perspective as dual control 
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(Gottfried, 1992; Smith, 1998). This prioritisation of the agency employment contract  as a 
mechanism of labour regulation (Smith, 1998) is significant as it takes the study of the agency 
labour process away from an emphasis on the micro-dynamics of workplace interactions 
between management  and labour (Nichols et al., 2004), which is a feature of much of the 
literature within LPA.
Agency work by its very nature demands an attention to factors external to the workplace since 
it spans multiple locations (Gottfried, 1992) and incorporates an employment relation which is 
separate from the immediate labour process. To capture the dimensions of labour control in 
relation to agency work requires a framework that incorporates the complexity of the triadic 
relationship. Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007), by examining agency work through the analytical 
lens of Burawoy’s (1985) theories of labour control, point to how contemporary agency work 
incorporates aspects of both market  despotism and hegemony. This theoretical path can be 
further developed by considering how the employment contract is a central part  of the range of 
“institutions which regulate and shape struggles in the workplace” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 123). The 
next  chapter examines how LPA theorises work and employment through its primary focus on 
the transformation of indeterminate labour power into productive labour via management 
control, and how Burawoy’s (1985) theory of production politics provides a relevant  analytical 
framework for examining the labour control regime of agency work.
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CHAPTER 3
VARIETIES OF FACTORY REGIMES
1. Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on temporary agency work, setting out  contrasting 
explanations for temporary agency work and how the literature has responded to the growth in 
agency work. The chapter ended by presenting recent literature which has examined more 
closely how the triadic employment  relationship reconfigures the relationship between capital 
and labour, and the mechanisms of labour control which operate therein. This literature, situated 
within labour process analysis with its assertion of the control imperative in capitalist  labour 
process (Gottfried, 1994, p. 105), sought  to understand how control and consent  operated under 
the conditions of a temporary agency contract, characterised not  only by job insecurity but  also 
by the presence of a third party in the employment relationship. Subsequent literature (Degiuli 
and Kollmeyer, 2007; Zhang, 2008) turned to Burawoy’s concept of factory regimes in order to 
understand how the temporary agency contract modifies the wage-labour relationship. In doing 
so, it directed attention to the significance of the employment  contract, with the standard 
employment relationship being a key element  of the factory regime that dominated the industrial 
labour process in the post-war decades, acting as a “positive source of control, consent and 
loyalty” (Smith, 1998, p. 414). This body of literature has contributed to the research on 
temporary agency work that has focused on the impact of the agency contract for agency 
workers by delving deeper into the “black box” of the labour process, examining the 
mechanisms and sources of control (and consent) that  affect employment outcomes, by adopting 
a labour process perspective. It also contributes to labour process analysis (LPA) by applying 
these concepts to a non-standard form of employment. It is this theoretical contribution which 
this thesis builds upon, by examining more thoroughly in this chapter the literature introduced 
in Chapter Two. 
This first  part of this chapter summarises the main debates that propelled the trajectory of LPA 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
Chapter 3 Varieties of factory regimes
53
2.  Theorising the labour process under advanced capitalism
Labour process theory (LPT) is concerned with the nature, forms and dynamics of the capitalist 
labour process. Originally a Marxist-derived analysis of the nature of work, LPT  assumes that 
the control imperative is a consistent  feature of the labour process under capitalism (Thompson 
and Vincent, 2010, p. 47). This proceeds from the status of labour as a commodity of a special 
kind, characterised by its indeterminacy (Littler and Salaman, 1982). Labour, or to be precise, 
labour power, is not  a fixed entity. The amount  of labour power exerted on the shop-floor is the 
outcome of negotiations and interactions within the social relations that  constitute the labour 
process. Converting labour power (the potential to work) into labour (actual work effort) lies at 
the heart  of the “structured antagonism” (Edwards, 1990) that defines this social relation. From 
this assumption, it follows that LPT is concerned with the mechanisms by which on the one 
hand, internal management  structures attempt to resolve the indeterminacy of labour by 
increasing the amount  of labour expended during the working day, and, on the other hand, the 
related issue of the degree to which workers acquiesce in management projects to draw out 
labour effort. Central to these questions is the issue of control in the labour process; how do 
management systems steer the process of production to meet the accumulation requirements of 
the organisation, and the extent to which workers respond? Debates within LPT over the past 
three decades have revolved around understanding the factors that  generate different forms of 
control, from “traditional” methods of direct  coercion to “normative control” which cultivates 
consent  through shared values and an emotional attachment to the firm (Sturdy et  al, 2010, p. 
116) and, for those within labour process analysis (LPA) working from an explicitly Marxist 
perspective, interpreting the significance of workers’ responses to management  strategies for 
theories of class consciousness and struggle. 
It  was Braverman’s (1974) seminal work “Labour and Monopoly Capitalism” that prompted this 
debate by arguing that Taylorism was deepening the fragmentation and deskilling of labour, thus 
weakening the capacity of workers to retain some form of control over production. For 
Braverman, scientific management  is the principal means by which capital appropriates 
knowledge of the labour process and thus control over the worker. According to this 
perspective, deskilling and fragmentation of production represents an inexorable drive towards 
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what Marx refers to as the real subordination of labour as opposed to the formal subordination 
of labour. Under capitalism, labour is only formally subordinated since whilst  the ownership of 
the means of production is in the hands of the capitalist, the worker retains some degree of 
control over his or her labour. The struggle on the “shop floor” represents the attempts of the 
capitalists to undermine the degree to which labour imposes itself within the production process. 
Prior to scientific management it was possible to identify significant areas of production where 
labour retained control over labour (Littler and Salaman, 1982, p. 255). Braverman’s contention 
that twentieth century methods of work organisation were qualitatively undermining the ability 
of the worker to resist  management “diktat” has been extensively challenged; few authors 
within the labour process tradition hold the view that  managerial regimes operate only on the 
basis of coercion. However, Braverman’s intervention was significant in that it aimed to redirect 
industrial sociology towards structural features of the labour process at a time when there was a 
trend towards overlooking the centrality of labour and the workplace as the site of fundamental 
societal division, exploitation and identity for the working class. Neo-marxists and critical 
theorists such as Marcuse were gaining influence and were looking elsewhere for sources of 
oppression (e.g. gender and race), whilst  micro-studies of workers, such as Goldthorpe et al.’s 
(1969) The Affluent Worker, were proposing new sociological explanations for differentiation 
within the working class which were at odds with traditional Marxist theories of class identity. 
However, whilst  reasserting the continued relevance of the workplace and the structural 
antagonism between capital and labour within the labour process, Braverman overlooked the 
significance of workers’ agency (Thompson and Vincent, 2010, p. 49). Braverman’s generalised 
view of capitalist  development as one in which real (as opposed to formal) subordination of 
labour is achieved over time by capital’s appropriation of workers’ knowledge through 
deskilling, failed to take account  of two interrelated outcomes of capitalist production: 
variations in forms of control in the workplace, and variations in responses to control. A focus 
upon one form of control fails to take account of how capitalism is a social system as well as a 
mode of production, the institutions and structures of which influence relations in production 
(i.e the set of relations between human subjects as they transform raw material in the labour 
process) and vice versa: “[the] external environment alters relations-in-production and …. 
relations-in-production might, through political action, alter external and internal social 
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relations” (Warde, 1989, p. 50). Despite these analytical shortcomings, Braverman was 
important  in reorienting studies of work within a Marxist framework and establishing labour 
process theory as a major body of thought  within the sociology of work. Braverman can also be 
credited with sparking a fundamental debate over forms of control within contemporary 
capitalist organisations. 
2.1.  The emergence of agency – Burawoy’s politics of production
Burawoy was one of the key theorists who challenged Braverman’s one-sided analysis of the 
labour process. Implicit  in Burawoy’s (1985) ontology is the acknowledgement of the role of 
the subjective agency of social actors in the (re)construction of both the relations of production 
(the social relations which define capitalism as an economic system) and the relations in 
production. The dynamic relationship between social actors reacting within, to, and upon social 
structures drives social change and the emergence of social phenomena and institutions which 
are time- and space-bound (Coe et  al., 2008, p. 284). The labour process takes place within the 
societal and institutional contexts that  have emerged in a particular historical time and 
geographical space, so that  the analysis of work and organisations has to move outside of the 
workplace in order to account for the constitutive factors of factory regimes at  any one time. 
Rather than confining analysis to the “internal logic of the labour process” (i.e. the relations in 
production expressed as negotiations/conflict  around consent, coercion and resistance) it is 
necessary to “look over the factory gates” to understand the changing organisation of work 
within the trajectory of the broader dynamics of capitalism (Peck, 1990).
Historically constituted national configurations of capitalism and their expressions at the meso- 
and micro-levels are the products of myriad, context-specific social (inter)actions. While these 
interactions share fundamental features associated with the capitalist mode of production, they 
lead to different forms of labour control as exercised through management techniques. 
Burawoy’s theory of the politics of production encapsulates this philosophical approach, and 
reinforces the dialectical method which guides the Marxist understanding of social systems and 
social change. This approach permits causality or causal mechanisms to flow in both directions 
in what  is a relationship of contradictory interdependence. The contradiction and conflict that 
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characterise the process of production influence the broader context, which in turn shapes and 
regulates the labour process. 
A key issue for labour process analysis is, therefore, the articulation of a range of causal 
phenomena that  both maintain capitalism and explain local outcomes (Thompson and Vincent, 
2010, p. 51) such as high rates of temporary agency work in a country or sector. Since the 
labour process does not  exist  in a vacuum and non-work social institutions play a key role in 
sustaining the social relations of capitalist production (Littler and Salaman, 1982; Hyman, 
1987), there is a need to examine the “complex web of influences, actions and feedback 
mechanisms” (Sturgeon et al, 2008, p. 297) of capitalist economies in general, and of workplace 
relations in particular. The analytical distinction between the labour process conceived as a 
particular organisation of tasks, and the “political apparatuses of production” which constitute 
the mode of regulation of the labour process (Burawoy, 1985, p. 125), is a solid basis upon 
which to do this.  Political apparatuses of production are made up of various social institutions 
which directly and indirectly regulate the relationship between employer and worker. 
Furthermore, the process of capitalist  production itself is a formative element  of the political 
apparatuses of production through the struggles of collective labour that  transcend the factory 
gates and burst onto the political level:
[Thus] the historical development of the process of production must  be seen in 
terms of the changing forms of labor process, apparatuses of production and their 
interrelationship. With this formulation, we can examine how the labour process on 
the one side and the production apparatuses on the other generate, first, ideological 
effects – that is, shape interests – and second, political effects – that is, determine 
the realisation of those interests through struggles. In turn we can observe how 
actual or anticipated struggles reshape the labour process and its regulative 
apparatuses.
(Burawoy, 1984, p. 7, cited in Hyman, p. 36)
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The concept  of production regimes is the analytical anchoring of the abstract notion that the 
process of production has “two political moments”, first, the political and ideological effects of 
the organisation of work (labour process); and second, the political and ideological apparatuses 
of production within which production takes place (Burawoy, 1985, p. 8). The changing and 
varied forms of managerial control within the labour process are an outcome of these political 
apparatuses of production, which define the parameters of interaction between capital and 
labour in the workplace. This insight  is not  unique to Burawoy or to Marxism, as illustrated by a 
large body of literature examining the factors that  shape contemporary labour markets and work 
(Gallie, 2007; Tangian, 2007; Grimshaw and Lehndorff, 2010). Institutionalist accounts of 
labour and the governance of economic action contend that  the “strategies pursued by collective 
actors are [thus] shaped by their institutional embeddedness” and “the exact structure of these 
arrangements develops through path-dependent processes that are historically unique for each 
society” (Steinberg, 2003, p. 453). Grimshaw and Lehndorff (2010) refer to the way anchors of 
“job quality” interact and lead to different  outcomes. (Grimshaw and Lehndorff , 2010, p. 31). 
Fleetwood (2011) calls attention to the work of various strands of “socio-economists” who see 
the need for an “integrated approach” to labour markets, citing Beynon et al.’s (2002) call for an 
“integrated and iterative analysis between the macro and micro and the external and the internal 
labour market systems” (Fleetwood, 2011, p. 16) by bringing together various elements of the 
employment relationship and connecting them to historical processes in order to situate and 
explain the mechanisms of contemporary labour process. 
By insisting on “the interconnected nature of labour markets, institutions, organisations and 
other phenomena” (Beynon et  al., 2002, p. 26) Fleetwood argues that  these approaches go a 
considerable way towards overcoming what Rubery and Grimshaw (2003) refer to as “artificial 
separation between employment systems and production regimes” (Rubery and Grimshaw, p. 
51). In a similar vein, Thompson and Vincent (2010) bemoan the lack of conceptual “connective 
tissue” between labour process and broader political economy within workplace case studies, 
limiting their contextual framing to one aspect  of context such as conditions of competition 
within a sector or the institutional conditions of labour markets or employment regimes 
(Thompson and Vincent, 2010, p. 56). Different  conceptual schemes do generate knowledge 
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about work and employment, but they cannot  be fully apprehended in isolation since they 
“correspond to different  constellations of entities and causal forces interacting” so that 
“embeddedness” is multiple in nature (Thompson and Vincent, 2010, p. 63).
This thesis returns to Burawoy’s conceptual account of labour process to respond to these 
limitations. Burawoy does not simply bring together the “socio-economic institutions” and the 
wage-capital relationship or embed the latter in the former. He first  analytically separates the 
labour process and political apparatuses of production in order to unravel the processes by 
which regimes of production and labour discipline are constructed outside of the labour process 
and then reconstitutes them in dialectical unity in the concept of factory regimes. The political 
apparatuses of production regulate the struggle that emerges from capitalist labour process 
(production politics). However, production politics too “sets limits on and precipitates 
interventions by the state”, although the effects are not  necessarily observable and the primacy 
of one direction of determination over the other are difficult  to ascertain, though Burawoy views 
this dynamic interaction as being ultimately conditioned by the substratum of relations of 
production (Burawoy, 1985, p. 139). Burawoy’s analysis of the transition to different  forms of 
factory regimes, multi-levelled and multi-directional in its exposition of causal mechanisms, 
reflects an ontology not  dissimilar to that of critical realism, the philosophical approach guiding 
this thesis (which is discussed in Chapter 4). 
2.2. The political apparatuses of production as refracted class struggle
The factory regime typical of the post-war period is the outcome of what is commonly referred 
to as a “compromise” between capital and labour, which has been the basis of modern western 
democracies. The consequence of a confluence of diverse influences, this compromise is seen as 
an example of how, in certain contexts, economic and social concessions to labour can favour 
capital accumulation. For example, higher wages and the redistribution of wealth through state 
welfare can resolve some problems of under-consumption. “Social compromise” also finds its 
corollary in the workplace through the security of long-term employment, structures of the 
internal labour market  and strong institutions of worker representation, which combine to secure 
and maintain higher wages and to improve labour conditions. However, the emergence of what 
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appears as mutually beneficial organisational structures and rules within the workplace, does not 
negate the fundamental antagonism between labour and capital. Transitions towards 
accommodation in employment relations cannot be dissociated from the formative and 
constitutive effect of that antagonistic relationship on tendencies towards accommodation. 
History has yielded critical moments where the centrality of social relations in production in 
driving social change has been starkly revealed. Post-war labour relations in France, in 
particular forms of cogestion, were designed directly to defuse the revolutionary potential of 
factory occupations that accompanied the liberation in Paris and Toulouse in 1944 (Cobb, 2009, 
pp. 277-279). At  an ideological level, a similar process occurred in the aftermath of World War 
One. The incorporation of workers’ rights and minimum labour standards into treaties ratified at 
the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent  establishment of the ILO was as a reaction to the 
dangers posed to capitalist economies by the spread of revolutionary ideas inspired by the 
Russian Revolution (Kaufman, 2004, p. 552). These examples illustrate how different forms of 
state intervention that serve to regulate the labour process are themselves the outcome of a 
struggle over the labour process. Whilst there is no direct “reading off” from the class struggle 
at  work to wider society (Thompson and Vincent, 2010, p.≠), state politics, like other societal 
phenomena, is only “relatively autonomous” (Thompson and Vincent, 2010, p. 50) from 
production politics, echoing Burawoy’s conception of the interconnected relationships at play:
State politics do not hang from the clouds; it  rises from the ground, when the 
ground trembles, so does it...... Thus the strike waves in the United States during 
the 1930s and in Sweden, France, Italy and England in the late 1960s and early 
1970s all led to attempts by the state to reconstruct factory apparatuses.
(Burawoy, 1985, p. 139)
The transition to forms of co-operation described by Burawoy (1979), Friedman (1977) and 
Edwards (1979), is an outcome of antagonistic class relations in the labour process that 
“decisively shapes working class struggles” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 7) on the one hand, and the 
refracted image of those struggles in the political sphere on the other. The state intervenes 
directly and indirectly to regulate relations in the labour process. Labour legislation has a direct 
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impact  on the arbitrary exercise of power by management – although the implementation of 
legislation is mediated by the presence or lack of other institutions such as unions, which also 
redefine spheres of interaction in the workplace. Welfare state institutions have an indirect 
influence upon the relationship between workers and employers. The guarantee of minimal 
income levels, access to health services and education, social protection from risk and other 
social rights which are associated with standard employment contracts, substantially alters the 
relationship between labour and capital by guaranteeing the material reproduction of labour 
outside this relationship. This weakens the dependency of labour on value-producing activity for 
material existence. Both forms of intervention undermine the market  governance of the labour-
capital relationship. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “decommodification of labour” thesis also 
associates employment outcomes with the degree to which state intervention through welfare 
and employment legislation frees labour from market forces. However, Esping-Andersen’s 
framework is commonly associated with notions of “decent work” and “quality of 
work” (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Rubery et al., 1999), whereas Burawoy’s concept  delves deep 
into the labour-capital relationship. As Bouquin (2011) argues, domination and subordination at 
work lie not  in the practices and rules which enforce management  control, but  rather in the 
nature of the exchange; the domination of work rather than domination at work (Bouquin, 2011, 
p. 62). For Burawoy, the signification of state intervention lies not so much in incremental 
improvements in work quality, but rather in the way the political apparatuses of production that 
emerged in the twentieth century had the effect of “break[ing] the ties binding the reproduction 
of labour power to productive activity in the workplace” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 125), thereby 
altering the balance of power in the workplace. This is the fundamental explanatory factor in the 
transition to a different form of factory regime, in which coercion alone can no longer achieve 
corporate objectives:
Although many have pointed to the development of [these] social and political 
rights, few have explored their ramifications in the regulation of production. Now 
management can no longer rely entirely on the economic whip of the market. Nor 
can it impose an arbitrary despotism. Workers must  be persuaded to cooperate with 
management.
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(Burawoy, 1985, p. 126)
2.3. From despotism to hegemony 
Post-war labour relations, therefore, should be understood through a broad and expansive lens 
which detects the interconnections between state, market, politics and ideology. The “anarchy of 
the market” which means that workers were “free” to work or starve were modified to labour’s 
advantage (Nichols et  al., 2004, p. 664), hence the emergence of a “managerial ideology” 
seeking to mute workers’ critique of existing workplace relations (Padavic, 2005, p. 113). The 
adoption of forms of management inspired by theories of human relations and organisational 
behaviour are thus viewed as mechanisms for legitimising management authority – the “human 
face” of management 10. Secure employment and the possibility to progress within the 
organisation through clearly defined career ladders which underpinned an “industrial 
elite” (Smith, 1998, p.  412), were part  of the structures and practices of hegemonic domination 
through which workers interests were perceived to be tied to the employing organisation.
Whilst the central problem of capitalist  production remained the same, i.e. resolving the 
indeterminacy of labour in favour of capital, the external environment – the social and political 
institutions which influence the process of capitalist accumulation – changed.  For Marx, the 
despotic coercion of labour was the typical form of factory regulation under capitalism, so 
typical there was no need to analytically separate the political apparatuses of production from 
the labour process (Burawoy, 1985, p. 123). The replacement  of despotism by more subtle 
forms of control over the labour process revealed the historically contingent nature of the 
factory regime described by Marx, and its replacement by a regime that required employers to 
elicit  consent  from the workforce (Burawoy, 1979; Friedman, 1977). By locating the sources of 
post-war management changes in control strategies in contingent and historically bound 
compromises, (the outcome of struggles which, though forged in the workplace, found their 
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10  Bendix (1956) identifies the rhetorical nature of human relations management: the US National 
Association of Manufacturers exposed “two-way communication” (as opposed to top down orders to the 
workforce). This operated as employers relaying “facts” to the workforce in order to promote 
cooperation, whilst the communication from the workforce is designated as “information” for 
management which is then used to eliminate misunderstandings (Bendix, 1956, p. 326, cited in Thompson 
and McHugh, 1990).
political expression in the institutions of governance external to the workplace) it  is possible to 
see how the working class presses its demands on capital at both factory and state levels. 
Labour, therefore, is an active agent reacting to and transforming production politics, via its 
position in the workplace and its external political and cultural organisations. This can take the 
form of both formal and informal workplace cultures, with the latter, through the emergence of 
informal countercultures of opposition and resistance (Taylor and Bain, 2003) potentially 
precipitating the former. Paradoxically it is the ability of the working class, through its 
representatives, to diffuse its power at various key sites of economic and social interaction that 
makes necessary the strategies of management  control which seek to incorporate labour, in 
order to minimise disruption to production and gain consent to practices aimed at enhancing 
productivity. 
The hegemonic regime identified in the factory that provided the empirical data for 
Manufacturing Consent exemplified a “soft” control which was then theorised as being typical 
of the post-war period. No longer able to rely purely on coercion, persuading the workforce to 
perform to higher standards and improve output, involves cultivating an environment in which 
the interests of employer and employee are perceived as coinciding, or at the very least as being 
dependent on each other. The hegemonic regime, therefore, relies on the perception that  the 
workplace can be a site for mutual gains achieved through higher wages (negotiated via strong 
trade unions) and job security, thereby obscuring the social relations of exploitation which are 
hidden beneath the employment  relationship. This can also be viewed as a “trade-off” between 
performance and job security, a compromise rather than a coordination of interests. It is, 
however, a compromise that informs workers’ orientations to work (Padavic, 2005, p. 112). The 
internal labour market means that long-term material interests are identified as resting with the 
firm, and modified workers’ orientations to their employer. The ideological component of 
control is strengthened by the perception that “we” now means “we the firm”, not “we the 
workers” (Edwards, 1979, p. 148). The standard employment  relationship was an essential 
element  of this narrative which realigns workers’ allegiances and perceived interests, and was 
particularly observable in large organisations where workers’ strength was concentrated and in 
those sectors characterised by monopoly capitalism.
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The hegemonic regime, therefore, was not all-encompassing (Padavic, 2005, p. 113). Outside of 
the core, typically white, male workforce which Burawoy observed in his research, there existed 
groups of workers who were excluded from the benefits accorded to the “industrial 
elite” (Rubery, 1978; Grimshaw et  al., 2001). It  is also important  to note that the nurturing of 
cooperative management  strategies does not  exclude conflict, since conflict and antagonism are 
constant  features of labour-capital relations even when they are suppressed or cloaked in 
hegemonic discourse. The automobile sector, viewed as typical of the kind of factory regime 
that Burawoy described, has been certainly not been immune to labour-capital tensions and 
coercive forms of management (Linhart, 1978; Thornett, 1998; Durand, 2004). It is necessary, 
therefore, to make a distinction between the aims of management strategies and their actual 
success on the ground, as well as taking into account local contexts on factory regimes. 
2.4. The marginalisation of labour and the re-emergence of despotism in the labour 
process
Temporary agency work has flourished within the political and ideological context of neo-
liberalism, an essential element  of which has been the undermining of the role of the state in 
regulating the labour-capital exchange. Neo-liberalism has also overseen capitalist restructuring 
and relocation, and in some countries, persistent  unemployment  and welfare state retrenchment. 
The increased exposure of labour to highly competitive, global markets, through deregulation of 
financial, product and labour markets, has been accompanied by a shifting balance of power 
between labour and capital in the workplace (Grimshaw et al., 2001, p. 29), resulting in shifting 
relations in production. Macro-economic trends, in particular the financialisation of productive 
capital, are seen as the main drivers of changing forms of factory regimes in which hegemonic 
forms of control are increasingly supplemented or replaced by despotic forms of control. For 
Burawoy, hegemonic despotism arose from the contradictions of a hegemonic regime which 
placed constraints upon capital accumulation in the context of increased competitive pressures. 
Labour was unable to resist unfavourable transformations in work due to its weakening under 
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the structures of hegemony in the workplace (Burawoy, 1985, p. 149).11 The new conditions of 
accumulation strengthened the market governance of labour relations, resulting in a trend 
towards the (re)commodification of labour (Rutherford, 2004, p. 431). The new political 
apparatus of production was primarily defined by labour’s collective vulnerability to capital 
mobility: “The fear of being fired is replaced by the fear of capital flight, plant  closure, transfer 
of operations and plant disinvestment” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 150). The result is a regime where 
consent  and coercion coexist through new mechanisms of internal production politics, with an 
accompanying shift to new managerial forms commonly associated with “post-Fordism”. This 
represents a partial return to labour vulnerability, since although welfare states are under strain, 
minimum material support is still provided. On the other hand, the guarantees associated with 
the standard employment relationship are severely weakened (Smith, 1998, p. 414) and forms of 
contingent work, such as temporary agency work, which have expanded beyond the “periphery” 
as discussed in the last  chapter, is one of the components of the restructuring of workplace 
relations (Burawoy, 1985, p. 265; Padavic, 2005, p. 113). Whilst  research has identified this 
process at work across economy sectors, the auto sector has served to highlight profound 
changes in the organisation of work. On a global level, this sector has undergone significant 
restructuring altering the mechanism by which management  aligns worker behaviour to 
corporate goals. The interests of labour and capital are perceived to be “coordinated” in a 
radically different way. In the context  of intense global pressures, survival of the firm has come 
to be associated with workers ceding to management  demands to intensify labour and reorganise 
production (Nichols et al., 2004). Future job security is therefore perceived to be dependent 
upon the relative profitability of the organisation, in order to avoid de-localisation, 
centralisation and plant  closure. Burawoy (1985) observed the emergence of this new form of 
factory regime, predicated on the marginalisation of labour and the reassertion of management’s 
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11 Burawoy, like many other scholars engaging with what we now refer to as globalisation, makes an error 
similar in form to that of Braverman, in that there is a one-sided emphasis on the role of transnational 
capital in reshaping employment. In a departure from the methodology of the comparative and rounded 
approach to the transition to the hegemonic regimes in western economies, Burawoy ignores the role of 
government in facilitating the movement of capital. The inability of the working class to resist worsening 
conditions of employment is said to be located in the neutralising effects of the hegemonic regime on 
class consciousness (Burawoy, 1985). This conclusion flows from a major flaw contained within The 
Politics of Production: that the working class lacks any organisational space for oppositional tendencies 
within the workplace due to the incorporating effects in hegemony. The defeated struggles of the working 
class to defend the gains of the post-war years and the associated problem of political leadership does not 
figure in this account. 
“right  to manage”. However, the weakening and marginalisation of labour in those industries 
where it  had a tradition of strength was accompanied by new trends in management, introduced 
primarily in the auto sector and said to be aimed at  generating “participation” and “autonomy” 
in the workplace, through teamwork and continuous improvement  or total quality management 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000). These changes, associated with the “post-Fordist” paradigm, purport 
to engage with the skills of the labour force by enhancing autonomy and discretion, thereby 
eliciting personal motivation and internal sources of self-discipline, whilst  improved quality and 
productivity provides the organisation with a better chance of surviving in the global market. 
The organisation of work, therefore, is reconfigured towards a new form of hegemony, 
accompanied by the despotism of an unregulated market, which was not anticipated by 
Burawoy. Subsequent  authors have evoked this reworked version of hegemonic despotism in the 
auto sector to dispel the claims of the proponents of new management techniques. The next 
section examines how well the concept  of hegemonic despotism corresponds to the labour 
process within car manufacturing and whether this concept can be applied to the temporary 
agency workers who in a number of European countries, such as France, Italy and the UK, make 
up an increasingly significant proportion of workers on the assembly line. 
3. Hegemonic despotism: constructing hegemonic practices under new conditions of 
capital accumulation 
Because employment security is no longer guaranteed by the permanent employment contract in 
the face of relocation, centralisation and plant closure, the pressure to ensure that  the 
organisation can compete in a global market has become a powerful rhetorical tool to elicit 
cooperation with management productivity and efficiency strategies which have been 
implemented under the general umbrella of “lean production”. Proponents of lean production 
argue that new management techniques associated with “lean” enhance the experience of work 
so that concepts such as “mutual gains” (Womack et al., 1990) and “shared destiny” (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992, p. 85, quoted in Stewart, 1998) are, therefore, reformulated ideological props 
of the hegemonic regime. Workers are said to embrace company values and exhortations to 
work harder, all but  eliminating the need for coercion, whilst  the “post-Fordist” firm values the 
skills of a flexible and polyvalent modern worker who is brought into shop-floor decision-
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making structures through decentralised command chains, teamwork and quality control/
continuous improvement. These claims have been extensively challenged by theorists in the 
LPA tradition, who have drawn upon the concept of factory regimes, and in particular the 
concept of hegemonic despotism, to expose the reality behind the rhetoric.
3.1. Labouring under hegemonic despotism in car plants
Sallaz argues that the US auto sector is “an ideal typical example of hegemonic 
despotism” (Sallaz, 2004, p. 691), with hegemonic domination based upon what appears to be a 
compelling argument  regarding risks associated with losing competitive advantage, combined 
with a discourse of participation, empowerment  and job satisfaction. The “flattened”, vertical 
structures that  are associated in particular with teamwork (Vallas, 2003) disperse power 
throughout the organisation and facilitate the internalisation of company goals and promote a 
culture of autonomous self-discipline (or self-subordination – Garrahan and Stewart, 1992, p. 
36), which represents the soft  hegemonic side of labour control (Graham, 1995; Nichols et  al., 
2004). Despotism is therefore located in the reduction in the labour force as a result  of 
restructuring and the constant fear of further reductions or even factory closures. Internally, 
despotism is reinforced by the marginalisation of unions, circumvention of collective bargaining 
and the weakening of the standard employment relationship through increased job insecurity 
and casualisation of sections of the labour force. The reduced capacity of labour to resist the 
intensification of work reinforces a managerial ideology which seeks alternative sources of 
labour representation and participation (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992). 
Empirical research has drawn attention to the negative consequences of contemporary working 
practices for workers on the shop-floor. Intensification of work (Delbridge et  al., 1992; 
Garrahan and Stewart, 1992), increased surveillance and tighter control (Hatzfeld, 2004) and 
scant  evidence of employee empowerment (Danford, 1998) all suggest that  the rhetoric of an 
enhanced working environment corresponds little to reality. For Durand (2004), writing about 
the French auto industry, the socio-technical tools through which lean production, just-in-time 
and total quality management are implemented, play a fundamental role in securing acceptance 
of management  goals, the means by which “subordinate workers are persuaded to share the 
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firm’s objectives”: “[W]ho can be opposed to quality? Who can object to being able to react 
immediately to the market? Who can be hostile to reductions in costs (and therefore in increases 
in productivity) to ensure the survival of the firm?” (Durand, 2004, p. 9). From this perspective 
workers lose their independent, collective voice and become “locked” into the goals of the firm 
(Oliver et al., 1998, p.249). 
On the other hand, Durand (2004) does concede that  within the diversity of situations that 
constitute workplace settings, there is room for benefits to workers, including autonomy 
(Durand and Hatzfeld, 2002, p.32), although a continuity with the controlling aspects of 
Taylorism undermines the optimistic accounts of autonomy, creativity and commitment.The 
implementation of total quality management may also have contradictory effects on workplace 
practices. Diffused structures of quality control, such as quality circles, are viewed as a 
mechanism through which direct  control is replaced by constant monitoring by peers and team 
leaders, and presented as crucial in the context of new customer supplier relationships (Sewell 
and Wilkinson, 1992; Edwards, et al., 1998). Participation in quality control represents the 
contemporary version of “making out” or “playing the game”, thus generating commitment  and 
subordination to the valorisation process (Durand and Stewart, 1998, p. 146). Whilst  this is an 
example of workers being complicit in changes that intensify work effort (Stewart  et  al., 2004), 
it  also points to the complex and contradictory ways in which workers engage in activities 
which, within the constraints of the wage-labour relationship and drawing upon their internal 
resources, enable them to construct their own workplace identities (Burawoy, 1979; Padavic, 
2005, p. 112) as a way of enhancing their experience of what is, at heart, an exploitative 
relationship. Durand (2003) refers to this process as one of “paradoxical consent” in situations 
of constraint  born out of generalised insecurity of employment. Resistance and opposition to 
management are channelled towards individual adaptation through which workers accept their 
position within the workplace and try to avoid the negative aspects of work.12 In the absence of 
a successful challenge to management-driven processes of change, workers will draw upon their 
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12 All of these examples point to the drive to escape the alienating experience of the labour process under 
capitalism. Brook (2009) views this “daily struggle to secure a dignified sense of self” (Brook, 2009, p. 
29) as indicative of the active resistance of workers to the commodification of their labour.  It is, however, 
a struggle that can never be won since, as Brook (2009) makes clear, alienation is an inevitable and 
essential aspect of the labour-capital relationship, within which labour is transformed into an activity 
external to the worker.
individual resources which can range from the active engagement described above to hidden 
individual acts of resistance or “misbehaviour” (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1999). 
It  should also be acknowledged that  ideological appeals to change do not always succeed in 
winning over the hearts and minds of the workforce. Local historical legacies can have a 
determining impact  upon the way in which change is perceived and the subsequent 
manifestation of hegemonic despotism. In Danford’s (1998) study, resistance to change was 
rooted in the long history of militancy at the plant, leading management to bring in “temps”, in 
order to overcome resistance to change in a plant that  had a strong tradition of workplace 
militancy. Local settings can give rise to a variety of outcomes, from the incorporation of 
workers, via their unions, in management goals (Danford, 2000; Vidal, 2003) to a more nuanced 
negotiated repositioning of power (Stewart et al., p.63) and resistance to change (Danford, 
1998). Managers also acknowledge the numerous ways in which labour can intervene on its 
own behalf in the labour process, hence the constant need to find (new) ways of undermining or 
bypassing a potentially recalcitrant workforce (Graham, 1998, p. 12; Danford, 1998).
3.2. Agency workers as part of the regime of hegemonic despotism
The introduction of temporary labour is one of the means by which management  can undermine 
long-established positions of organised labour strength. As Danford (1998) illustrates, 
workplace restructuring is frequently an opportunity to reverse a history of troublesome labour 
relations. Bringing in a temporary workforce lacking in the resources and capacities of the 
collective strength of a long-standing core workforce can be part  of that strategy. In France, 
local labour markets provide car plants with a steady flow of young workers on agency 
contracts (Beaud and Pialoux, 1999; Hatzfeld, 2004; Bouquin, 2006), which can serve a number 
of labour control functions. Agency workers are frequently referred to as “peripheral ring” or 
“buffer” (Christensen, 1989; Byoung et  al., 2004) to protect core workers, not  only from 
economic risks, but  also from the hardest  jobs (Beaud and Pialoux, 1999). On the other hand, 
their precarious working lives are a manifestation of the fate that awaits workers who do not 
perform sufficiently to improve the profitability of their firm (Nichols et al., 2004; Sallaz, 
2004). Agency workers can also be incorporated into labour forces in order to nurture pro-
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management attitudes, as management screens agency workers to identify those who 
demonstrate behaviours and attitudes that correspond to company objectives (Danford, 1998). 
Bouquin’s (2006) research in France arrived at similar conclusions to Danford (1998); 
recruitment  in French car plants was carried out exclusively through the medium of agency 
contracts, and used as a powerful management  tool to socially engineer a specific kind of 
worker (Bouquin, 2006, p. 155). 
The introduction of agency workers can serve a similar function to the establishment  of 
greenfield sites and a “green” workforce in order to cultivate an environment conducive to the 
forms of management  control that form the ideological basis of contemporary management 
(Garrahan and Stewart, 1992), reducing the likelihood of labour-management  conflict  that 
undermines the key ideological message of participation and empowerment. Lack of local 
employment opportunities can provide a backdrop for consent, facilitating the generation of a 
“new regime of subordination” premised on the marginalisation of trade unions (Garrahan and 
Stewart, 1992; Durand, 2004).
Nichols et al. (2004) and Sallaz (2004) make an explicit  reference to the role of agency work in 
reinforcing the regime of hegemonic despotism within the core workforce. Whilst  unions have 
been historically hostile to the presence of casualised forms of employment (Gumbrell and 
McCormick, 2011), unions and the workers they represent  may reluctantly “accept” agency 
workers as a necessary encroachment on the standard employment relationship to ensure the 
viability of the firm. Discourses which conjure up the need to reduce the core workforce for the 
sake of future survival, therefore, appear to align the interests of core workers with 
management, so long as it is “credible” – agency labour will increase the firms chance of 
survival – and “consequential” – core workers depend upon the survival of the firm to maintain 
living standards (Sallaz, 2004).
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3.3. The employment contract as a component of factory regimes
Agency workers, therefore, are part of the repertoire of strategies used by management to shape 
workplace relations according to the priorities of the firm; the introduction of temporary 
workers strengthens capital in relation to labour by undermining union organisation and 
dividing the workforce. This is a recurrent theme in accounts of the flexibilisation of labour 
(Paugam, 2000; Barbieri, 2009; Standing, 2011). It is also a recurrent theme within LPA and 
accounts of control in the car sector (Danford, 1998;  Bouquin, 2005; Pulignano et  al., 2008). 
However, past  and recent  literature on the labour process has not adequately engaged with how 
the temporary agency employment contract defines features of labour control, beyond the 
assumption that precarious contracts are likely to be characterised by despotic control. This is 
despite the recognition that a key trend over the past three decades has been a rise in contract 
differentiation with workers doing the same job, in the same organisation but  on different 
employment contracts (Smith, 2010, p. 277). Nichols et al. (2004) puts this absence down to an 
exclusive focus upon the dynamics of shop-floor relations within the context  of a regime of 
hegemonic despotism in which the standard employment relation is assumed. Material support 
and contract type hardly figure in the literature cited above, despite Burawoy’s insistence on the 
significance of indirect  and direct forms of state intervention in the construction of factory 
regimes. Admittedly, Burawoy too pays little attention to the nature of the employment  contract, 
referring instead to generic labour legislation, however the analytical framework outlined in The 
Politics of Production points to the role of a range of social relations in determining factory 
regimes (Nichols et  al., 2004), including the employment  relationship. This is an unfortunate 
lapse. Wage-labour occurs within institutional contexts that delineate conceptions of rights and 
control, such as the legal institutions that define the employment relationship and which bound 
the construction of factory regimes, thereby constituting “the ways labour relations can be 
conceived and the feasible strategies by which capitalists can subordinate workers” (Steinberg, 
2003, p. 446). 
Agency work cannot simply be reduced to a despotic relationship arising from labour market 
insecurity. The nature of the triadic relationship that frames agency work needs to be 
incorporated more fully into the narrative of hegemony and coercion, as played out  in the 
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regime of hegemonic despotism. Since many contemporary theorists claim that  volition needs to 
be present  in the labour process alongside coercion (Hyman, 1987, p. 40) and that cooperative 
human resource management  is an important  mechanism in obscuring the coercive and 
exploitative basis of work, then it is necessary to look closer at how this operates within the 
context of agency work. The expressions of hegemonic despotism described in the literature on 
the automobile sector, regardless of its success or otherwise in obscuring exploitation and 
diminishing labour conflict, are based upon constructs that are not  applicable to temporary 
agency workers. Whilst  workers with permanent employment  contracts are more likely to link 
their job security to the survival of the firm, this is a less likely scenario for agency workers, for 
whom insecurity is omnipresent regardless of the profitability or viability of the firm for which 
they work. All the more so given that  the firm’s survival strategy in a period of crisis is likely to 
involve the shedding of the peripheral workforce. Similarly it  is doubtful that the organisational 
practices associated with lean production and identified as characteristic of hegemonic 
domination contained within hegemonic despotism (team working, decentralised control, and 
participation) will elicit the same response from a section of the workforce that  has a time-
limited association with the firm (Deguili and Kollmeyer, 2007). Danford (1998) hints at this 
when he observes that teamwork is experienced differently by different parts of the workforce. 
This raises questions regarding the sources and the range of workplace behaviours in the context 
of agency work. If it is unlikely that the sources of consent identified above apply to agency 
workers in the automobile sector, and that agency workers lack the same opportunity to oppose 
their conditions of work, does the contractual status of agency work represent a (partial) return 
to market despotism? If this is the case, how does this correspond to management techniques 
that seek to mobilise the productive capacities of the workforce through a discourse of 
empowerment  and participation? Even if management disregards some purported benefits of 
new management  techniques and focuses on the core principles of lean production, which 
emphasise a skilled, well-trained and motivated workforce (Stewart, 1998, p. 219), this still sits 
uneasily in a sector that has been recruiting increasing numbers of agency workers.
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Degiuli and Kollmeyer (2007) argue that there is little scope for co-operation and consent for 
agency workers within LPA. Agency workers reside outside of the complex constructions which 
attempt to capture the contradictions of hegemonic despotism. There is an assumption that 
agency workers are less likely to be subject  to the complex and contradictory interplay of 
coercion/compliance, consent  and resistance. Their experience of work in a contemporary 
automobile factory seems to correspond more to the market despotism evoked by Braverman 
(1979), characterised by deskilling and subordination due to the precarious, dependent  and low 
skilled nature of the work they carry out in the sector. This narrative corresponds to the 
experience of temporary agency workers in Beaud and Pialoux’s (1999) study of PSA Peugeot-
Citroën in France.
By not  focusing in any great depth on the nature and location of agency work within the overall 
theory of factory regimes and the concept of hegemonic despotism in particular, there has been 
a failure to capture how the unique status of the triangular employment  contract modifies the 
factory regime which shapes the experience of agency workers. The singular focus upon 
unmediated control through coercion in the temporary employment agency contract leads to a 
lack of consideration of more nuanced and complex employment outcomes. This goes against 
the main thrust of the debates in LPA over the past  three decades, which have sought to account 
for workers’ agency, in terms of both consent  and resistance, in a variety of production contexts. 
Whilst the space for resistance on the one hand, and active consent  to, and engagement  with, 
management goals on the other, may be more constrained for agency workers than for 
permanent workers, it  is a space nonetheless. If “games” are the means by which workers 
endure subordination to the labour process (Burawoy, 1979), then what  kinds of resources do 
agency workers draw upon in to order endure their subordination to the labour process?
4. Hegemony and despotism in the triadic relationship
Burawoy provides some insight  into this question in one of the rare references to agency work 
in The Politics of Production, tucked away in the concluding chapter. Here Burawoy, situating 
agency work within hegemonic despotism, describes the split  nature of a labour process that is 
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mediated by an employment  agency and which obscures the relationship between agency 
worker and agency:
The growth of part time-work and temporary work, particularly among women, 
orchestrated by specialised agencies, enhances the separation of relations of 
production from relations in production, mystifying the former while effectively 
subordinating workers to the latter. On one side relations of production often 
revolve around the temporary work agency. The worker relates to her employer as 
an individual, receiving assignments by telephone and driving to them in an 
automobile. Unions are barred and fellow employees unknown. Moreover the 
worker is sucked into this oppressive isolation not only by her material 
circumstances by also in the name of enhanced autonomy, greater “freedom” to 
balance domestic work and low-paid wage labour. On the other side, she moves 
from one set of relations in production to another, unless she should prove herself 
“worthy” of a permanent job.
(Burawoy, 1985, p. 264-265)
This account of agency work is one of intense subordination of an atomised and vulnerable 
workforce. The agency worker cedes without  struggle to the whims of management. Despotism 
is facilitated by the spatial separation of relations of production from relations in production, 
upon which is based the fragmentation and isolation of the workforce. Little else is said about 
how this split  or dual management  structure alters the nature of labour control and discipline. It 
is left to subsequent authors to take up where The Politics of Production left off. 
4.1. Duality of control and hegemony in conditions of vulnerability
Gottfried’s (1992) ethnographic study of female clerical temps in the US serve as a basis for her 
elaboration of the concept  of duality of control. Duality of control describes the double layer of 
management that  the agency worker faces in the employment relationship. Agency and user-
organisation engage in an overlapping system of sanctions imposed by and between them upon 
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the agency worker (Gottfried, 1992, p. 448). Furthermore, her observations of the micro-level 
control mechanisms at work in employment agencies leads her to conclude that  the spatial 
separation of agency workers from their employers (the agency) obliges agencies to disperse 
labour control downward to agency workers, who very soon understand the need to cultivate 
self-disciplinary behaviours to meet the exacting standards required of them. The discontinuities 
that characterise the working time of the agency worker (assignments being interrupted by 
periods of unemployment) further reinforce the responsibilities of the agency worker, who is 
compelled to maintain a relationship with the agency outside of periods of wage labour. Agency 
workers, therefore, exist  on the margins between wage- and non-wage work, since flexibility 
which “is a feature of THS [temporary help services] work….must be sustained by, and, 
between, both the firm and the client” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 448). This dependency means that  the 
agency worker must  acquiesce simultaneously to the direct  supervision of work at the point of 
production and to the organisation norms of the agency if they wish to secure future 
opportunities. 
The cultivation of ideological control lies with the agency. For Gottfried (1992) the user 
organisation has a limited range of control strategies that  it  can employ over the agency worker, 
although user organisations do expect a worker whose “conduct and demeanour conforms to 
extant  organisational norms” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 449). The narrative of the “ideal worker”, 
however, begins during the intake process; it  is the agency that sets out the standards and 
behaviours which, if fulfilled, could lead to permanent employment. The agency engages in 
discourses that  tap into the aspirations for permanent work as a means of drawing out 
appropriate behaviours and attitudes, which are reinforced by the insecurity inherent in the 
employment relationship and which oblige the agency worker to present  him/herself as “reliably 
contingent” (Peck and Theodore, 2001, p. 486) in order to access future assignments. Thus, the 
process of the internalisation of control generates a sense of “deep self-discipline” within a 
“mistake-free” performance environment (Smith, 1998), located in the dependency on the 
agency, which acts as the gatekeeper to waged work. Within a restricted and constrained space, 
agency workers whose aspirations are shaped by the structure of opportunity in local labour 
markets construct  their occupational trajectories around the goal of permanent employment, 
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engaging in strategies to get themselves noticed by future employers whilst simultaneously 
presenting themselves as “good temps” to the agency (Smith, 1998).
Degiuli and Kollmeyer (2007) add a further dimension to the hegemonic practices that  agencies 
engage in. Temporary employment  agencies seek to normalise precarious forms of work 
through a rhetoric aimed at countering the widespread negative associations with agency work. 
Through vigorous marketing campaigns, agencies have attempted to rebrand agency work to fit 
in with the “new world of work” in which job stability is no longer a feature. Agency work, 
therefore, can be a path for motivated individuals to progress in the labour market under these 
new conditions whilst enjoying the freedoms of flexible work (Degiuli and Kollmeyer, 2007, p. 
505). A form of work associated with the historical relic of “employment at will” (Campbell and 
Burgess, 2001) turns into its opposite by being presented as the future of work. The agency 
plays a central role, therefore, in constructing new norms of employment  which amount to 
“normalised insecurity” (Peck and Theodore, 2007, p. 172). This constitutes the hegemonic 
element  in an employment relationship rooted in the restoration of market despotism and which 
is the basis of the acquiescence of workers confronted with bad working conditions. The 
temporary work agency is, therefore, an active institutional agency in the construction of 
flexible labour markets (Peck and Theodore, 2001; Ward, 2005).
However it  is not  clear if whether attempts to normalise agency work have any purchase on 
agency workers, or on wider society in general, particularly in national contexts that  are 
traditionally hostile to precarious forms of employment. The capacity to change attitudes will 
depend upon the weight  of culturally specific assumptions regarding employment  relationships, 
as well as sectoral norms, and the willingness of core workers to accept an expanding peripheral 
ring of workers within the workplace. Demographic characteristics of agency workers can also 
influence the effectiveness of hegemonic discourse; young workers are frequently more 
susceptible to the idea that agency labour is an inevitable part  of the employment landscape 
(Beaud and Pialoux, 1999). Thus the nature of labour as a commodity that  is “idiosyncratic and 
spatially differentiated” (Storper and Walker, 1983) creates opportunities for capital as well as 
obstacles.
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It  is difficult  to know if agency workers internalise those ideological practices that seek to 
construct a coordination of interests obscuring the despotism that  is lodged within labour market 
vulnerability and the inequality of the triangular relationship. Surface appearances that  indicate 
active consent  can conceal deeper feelings of discontent, particularly when reality does not 
correspond to aspirations. Smith’s (1998) study of agency workers in a computer components 
manufacturing company revealed how, whilst agency workers expressed a positive, 
conscientious attitude to work, they kept resentments to themselves (Smith, 1998, p. 421), 
reflecting the “muted resentment” that has been identified as a feature of vulnerability in the 
workplace (Thompson, 1983). However, in the case of temporary agency work, the lines of 
power are obscured by confusion over who the employer is (Smith, 1998).
On the other hand, it  is not  unreasonable to assume that for ideological hegemony to be 
sustained, there needs to some correspondence to reality. If agency work is presented as a 
stepping stone to permanent  work, and a permanent contract becomes increasingly elusive as 
the succession of agency contracts does not yield the desired outcome, the perceived benefits 
associated with “making out” may be undermined. Enthusiastic participation may then be 
replaced by compliance under the yoke of vulnerability and dependency, as the effects of the 
duality of control in disciplining a workforce into accepting inferior conditions of work 
becomes transparent.
4.2. Internal sources of consent
There is some correspondence between these themes and what is known about  the situation of 
agency workers in the auto sector. The examples presented in earlier sections of this chapter 
(see section 3.2 in this chapter) suggest that  auto companies do indeed draw upon the 
aspirations of agency workers for permanent contracts. On the one hand, car manufacturers can 
forge their future pliant workforce by screening agency workers for those who “displayed 
malleability, strong performance and pro-company attitudes” Danford (1998). On the other 
hand, they benefit from the temporary workforce as it  stands, as agency workers try to prove 
themselves worthy of a permanent contract  by exceeding what is expected of them. Bouquin 
(2006) describes how agency workers engage in strategies to secure permanent employment 
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with the user firm, and he explicitly links management control to the aspirations of workers on 
agency contracts to obtain a permanent contract, thus suggesting a positive, albeit  constrained, 
response to their contractual situation. The eager participation described is similar to the 
situation observed by US researchers where agency workers display commitment  to their tasks 
and colleagues despite the lack of reciprocal positive behaviours (Hodson, 1996; Heckscher, 
1995). 
Padavic (2005) argues that such behaviours cannot simply be attributed to instrumental motives 
arising from dependency on the agency or the user firm. Agency workers (and other contingent 
workers) may be exhibiting emotions of loyalty and consent which stem from a deep 
psychological need to frame identity and self-respect  around notions of the “good worker”, 
thereby overcoming negative stereotypes associated with being “just  a temp” (Hensen, 1996). 
Agency workers, like other workers, need to find meaning in their subordination to the labour 
process. As a consequence, their subjective incentives may coincide with the ideological 
messages promoted by temporary work agencies. By a process of “identity-management” as a 
means to address the “spoiled identity” that  accompanies non-permanent  work, a managerial 
ideology that  restricts opposition to existing employment relations is reaffirmed. Strategies of 
“making out” can therefore reinforce or reproduce the social relations that sustain precarious 
work (Burawoy, 1979). 
Taken together, there is a tension in these accounts of hegemonic labour control in the agency 
work relationship. On one side, there is the notion that hegemonic practices operate to elicit 
positive signifiers of consent  in the labour process from agency workers, whereby the 
experience of work is enhanced by drawing upon individual aspirations and internal resources. 
By masking the exploitative despotism that  flows from increased exposure to market 
governance, the experience of work can be perceived as positive. On the other side, there is the 
concern that, in conditions of labour market vulnerability and precarious, fragmented 
employment, hegemony does not  prompt  consent  but instead promotes the silent  submission of 
an atomised labour force (Burawoy, 1985, p. 265). 
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This tension is a thread that  runs through LPA over the relative weights of consent, compliance 
and resistance in the wage relationship, and over the significance of different control strategies 
for class consciousness and subsequent responses. Hyman (1987) argues that “[u]nless 
supervision is close and uninterrupted, the conversion of labour power into productive labour 
must entail (in part, at least) the labourer’s ‘voluntary’ initiative” (Hyman, 1987, p. 40). Here 
the need for some form of cooperation is, at least partly, a consequence of the practicalities of 
the labour process that  place responsibility on the worker to interact  with the tools put at  his/her 
disposal. Therefore, some element of workers’ discretion needs to factored into the analysis of 
labour process since it  can never be eliminated (Cressey and MacInnes, 1975, pp. 24-6). Capital 
is, therefore, faced with a contradiction. There needs to be some disciplinary form of control to 
limit  the discretion that might be turned against its interests. At the same time, capital needs to 
harness some element of volition given there will always be some quantity of discretion in 
production. Over-reliance on coercion can have negative feedback effects and create new areas 
of conflict leading to “institutionalised low-trust” (Fox, 1974) that  can undermine the firm’s 
objectives. So whilst the condition of the agency worker appears to be similar to that of a 
reserve army of labour, performing deskilled work and with little space for discretion (Gottfried, 
1992, p. 448; Deguili and Kollmeyer, 2007; Williams, 2009), management  still has to cultivate 
an environment of consent and cooperation with regard to these workers. Since the user firm is 
engaged in the kind of hire and fire practices that have the potential to corrode commitment 
(Hyman, 1987, p. 41), it  is all the more critical that  the agency constructs a narrative that evokes 
a positive picture of agency work. 
It  should be noted that within this perspective of the inevitability of cooperative forms of labour 
control, the balance between despotic and hegemonic methods of control will vary depending 
on a variety of influences, including the nature of the work. High-skilled occupations are more 
likely to be associated with high levels of task autonomy, whereas routine, operative work on 
the assembly line can be carried out with little discretionary involvement on the part  of labour 
(Parent-Thirion et  al, 2007). Whereas permanent workers in a similar situation can adjust  to 
coercive methods of labour control over time and can find different ways to express opposition 
to the “invisible chains” that  bind them to the tight  flows of production (Thompson and 
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Ackroyd, 1999), this possibility is not open to agency workers, due to the transitional nature of 
the contract  and a dual pressure to perform well. It  appears then that the discussion has gone full 
circle, back to Braverman’s vision of a deskilled and an increasingly subordinated workforce. 
There are hints of this in Burawoy’s short  account  of agency work, with despotism seeming to 
overwhelm hegemony. Whilst there is a general insistence that the labour process must  involve 
the two sides of labour control, this “must be understood in terms of the specific combinations 
of force and consent  that elicit co-operation in the pursuit  of profit” (Hyman, 1987, p. 41). If 
that balance tips too far towards coercive relations, the element  of hegemony may become so 
irrelevant that, to all intent and purposes, it  ceases to exist. If this is the case, the concept  of a 
hegemonic despotism begins to lose its theoretical validity when applied to temporary agency 
work. 
5. Manufacturing regimes of despotism
Having examined the nature of factory regimes and discussed the concept  of hegemonic 
despotism in relation to agency work, questions remain as to where agency work fits within the 
analytical framework of factory regimes. It  is still unclear whether hegemonic despotism 
adequately captures the complex structures of management of agency work and the highly 
insecure nature of the working lives of agency workers that  affects orientations to work. Even if 
hegemonic despotism is an appropriate framework, the various influences upon workplace 
relations (i.e. political apparatuses of production) do not  wholly correspond to those of the 
workers on standard contracts who work alongside agency workers, frequently carrying out the 
same tasks. The coexistence of different  forms of management regimes in a single capitalist  unit 
stemming from labour segmentation was observed by Zhang (2006) in his study of factory 
regimes in China’s automobile plants. Driven by market reform and globalisation, “lean and 
dual” labour-management relations characterise those factories that  continue to provide high 
levels of security and benefits for the core workforce, alongside a growing peripheral workforce 
made up of temporary agency workers drawn from rural areas. Despotic labour control 
characterises labour-management  relations for this latter group of workers, whilst  core workers 
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enjoy the protections of a hegemonic regime, resulting in what  Zhang (2006) calls a “hybrid” 
factory regime.  
The example of China’s auto sector also illustrates how capital nurtures different forms of 
factory regimes by taking advantage of the structural divisions that  exist  within labour markets. 
The Californian agribusiness in the US described by Burawoy (1985) is a similar example of a 
highly exploitative factory regime forged out of social inequality and oppression. US 
agricultural labour in the 1980s lacked a vital element of state support  since it  was not  covered 
by national labour legislation (Burawoy, 1985, p. 127). In addition, the labour force tended to be 
made up of illegal immigrants; the state played no role in the physical/material sustenance of 
their labour power. Non-citizenship and the fear of being “discovered” by the state further 
reinforced dependence upon the employer. A defining feature of the political apparatus of 
production in this instance is the lack of citizenship rights which is the basis for despotic labour 
relations. Similar forms of labour process have been identified recently in the UK; illegal 
migrants, dependent  upon gang masters, are forced to labour in highly intensive and potentially 
dangerous conditions13. Despotic forms of dependency can also exist  within the realms of 
legality. Again, migrant workers are a particularly vulnerable section of the labour force who 
may find themselves dependent  upon employers or employment  agencies for work, visas and 
housing. In post-war France, the use of a migrant  workforce in the French car industry is a 
further illustration of the coexistence of different  forms of labour process. Through the state-
administered “foreign workers recruitment scheme”, migrant workers from French colonies 
were employed to resolve the shortage of labour in key economic sectors, under strict 
conditions of employment. Employment and residence in France were contingent  upon 
employment with a specific company and mobility was severely restricted. As a result, the 
regime of labour control for these migrants differed considerably to that  of the French workers 
with whom they worked alongside.
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13 In 2004, 18 cockle pickers died after becoming trapped in rising tides in Morcambe Bay in the UK. All 
were undocumented migrant workers from China whose work in the UK was organised by illegal 
gangmasters. The incident prompted changes to legislation governing the operation of gangmasters 
(Gangmasters licencing Act 2004).
The composition of available labour and the role that the state plays in defining the employment 
relationship for certain groups of workers can present  opportunities to capital, demonstrating the 
highly contingent nature of factory regimes and the significance of the politics of production. 
Both are examples of the weight  of history (in this case, the long history of colonialism) in 
generating the conditions for a labour process based upon intense exploitation, and the 
multiplicity of ways in which state intervention (or lack thereof) sets the parameters of factory 
regimes. In the example of migrant  workers in California, the state is both absent and present. 
Absent from its role as regulator of the wage-labour relation and present in its coercive role of 
policing migration, thus making possible despotic forms of labour regulation. In the example of 
the foreign workers recruitment scheme, state institutional action directly facilitates the despotic 
relationship between employer and migrant  workers by reducing the “mobility power” of labour 
(Smith, 2010), and, as a result, its bargaining power in the labour process. The foreign workers 
recruitment  scheme, by curtailing labour mobility, negated the “free” labour market and created 
a relationship of dependency similar to indentured labour. 
For Burawoy, the example of migrants in Californian agribusiness was an “anomaly” resulting 
from the success of Californian agribusiness in establishing a “relationship to the state 
reminiscent of early capitalism” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 127). Urban enterprise zones are similar 
examples of despotism within global capitalism. Yet, whilst these examples of highly coercive 
forms of labour exist  on the margins of the modern capitalist  labour process, i.e. outside of the 
dominant forms of labour process/labour control under which core workers labour, this does not 
mean they are not an integral part  of the process of capital accumulation. Furthermore, between 
“extreme” and dominant  forms of labour control there exists a growing section of workers for 
whom the capacity to optimise their position in the labour market is severely curtailed. Whilst 
they are “free” in the formal sense of labour market  exchange, they are less “free” in relation to 
core workers.14  As labour market segmentation accounts have described, precarious and low-
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14  Steinberg draws upon capitalist world system approaches in his critique arguing that Burawoy 
overlooks the fact that there is no simple dichotomy between free and unfree labour; the legal concepts 
and the practices they precipitate are historical products, the outcome of struggle over legally defined 
relations and practices including gender and race as well as class. (Steinberg, 2003, p. 450). 
Paradoxically, given the notion of the (re)commodification of labour, the concept of “unfree labour” 
denotes the restriction on the capacity of workers to “freely” commodify their labour power due to state-
imposed restrictions, such as work permit systems (Miles, 1987, cited in Andersen and Ruhs, 2011). 
wage dependent  forms of labour are facilitated by the historical and structural legacy of gender 
and race oppression15  (Rubery et al., 1999). Burawoy overlooks the differentiated forms of 
labour in advanced capitalism which give rise to a range of labour control techniques that 
mediate the process of capital accumulations and which are compatible with capitalism in its 
advanced stage (Steinberg, 2003, p. 451). A mix of labour control strategies can develop in any 
one period, not merely as exceptions to dominant  forms of factory regimes, but  also as integral 
to the expansion of capital. 
The point  here is to illustrate the different facets of regimes of labour control within any one era 
of capitalism, and the intersection between specific forms of labour control and the wider socio-
economic contexts that  constitute the politics of production in particular sectors and governing 
particular groups of workers. The case of the migrant  workers in France and of the illegal 
immigrants working in the Californian agribusiness illustrates how legal institutions, for 
example, can be employed to “provide capitalists with solutions to problems of labour discipline 
otherwise not available” by constructing “legal frameworks of unfreedom to subordinate 
labour” (Steinberg, 2003, p. 446). 
6.  Towards a new variant of hegemonic despotism? 
As ideal types, categories of factory regimes are not always easily transposable to concrete 
instances of the labour process. The form and degree of state intervention, as well as the relative 
strengths of the main actors in industrial relations systems, lead to country-specific generic 
forms of factory regimes. The differentiation of control regimes is an outcome of national 
difference, sectoral contexts and priorities, so that, for example, the private sector may veer 
more towards coercion than the public sector, (Burawoy, 1985, p. 127). Exposure to global 
competition, state-capital relations, the availability of local labour markets and the composition 
of available labour: all these factors influence labour control strategies, and the capacity of 
labour to respond. The position of the firm and the nature of supplier and customer relations 
within supply chains also influence management strategies and pressure to intensify labour 
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15 According to Andersen and Ruhs (2011), the role played by legal systems in formalising the position of 
migrant workers in labour markets and hence, their experience of intense exploitation, needs to be further 
considered in research on migrant agency workers. 
(Pulignano, 2002; Taylor, 2010). At an abstract  level, all forms of the capitalist  labour process 
are conditioned by the social relation between those who possess the means of production and 
those who possess only their labour power. However, whilst  the indeterminancy of labour 
creates the imperative to control, it  does not dictate how that  control is expressed (Thompson, 
1990). Thus the social phenomena that  emerge from the building blocks of the capitalist  social 
system do not correspond to any predefined path. Categorisations of social phenomena such as 
“modes of production” or “factory regimes” can never capture the totality of the phenomenon 
and the full range of potential outcomes. As a result  it  is always necessary to reappraise existing 
theories in the light of emerging phenomena.
For Burawoy, the decisive factor in the transition from despotic labour control regimes to 
hegemonic regimes was the unity/separation of the reproduction of labour power from capitalist 
production in the form of the welfare state and state protection from despotic labour relations – 
relations which had threatened the productive capacity of labour in the long term. However, 
within the overall context of the hegemonic regime it was possible to identify variations 
resulting from various factors such as levels and type of state interventions, industrial relations 
systems, skills, technology, competition, with variations that were detectable at the inter-
national and intra-national levels. Within contemporary capitalist  labour process, Burawoy 
argued that  vulnerability to capital mobility is the greatest  determinant  of regimes of labour 
control (Burawoy, 1985, p. 127). This explanation of current  forms of labour control needs to be 
expanded. One of the weaknesses of this account is that  it  prefigures explanations of 
globalisation that deny the capacity of the state and political actors to resist the “ineluctable” 
forces of transnational capital and that also play down the role of state politics in facilitating the 
mobility of capital (Ohmae, 1995). The political apparatus of production from which labour 
vulnerability has emerged resides in the political choices made at  the state level to liberalise and 
deregulate markets, and in the inability of the key institutions of national industrial relations 
systems to adapt  to the new economic situation. Burawoy expresses a similar fatalism in his 
contention that  the defeats suffered by labour in key western economies since the early 1980s 
are rooted in the success of the hegemonic regime in neutralising workers’ opposition by a 
process of incorporation in the workplace (Burawoy, 1985). On the contrary, the 1980s was a 
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time of intense struggle across national capitalisms as labour fought to defend negotiating 
positions, wages and conditions, and to resist casualisation. The rise of precarious forms of 
work needs to be situated within the defeats of these struggles (more profound in some 
countries than others) and a subsequent redrawing of the balance of power between labour and 
capital at local and national levels. 
As well as the threats associated with capital mobility, labour is faced with the consequences of 
its own mobility within regional economies. Whilst  labour mobility offers opportunities for 
individual workers, for labour collectively the effect has been to increase access to cheaper and 
more malleable labour at a time when the institutions of the hegemonic regime have been 
severely weakened. Control strategies are also determined by what Smith (2006) refers to as 
“mobility indeterminacy”. Where labour is easily substituted, as in low skilled routine work, 
labour mobility works to the advantage of employers, frequently facilitated by employment 
intermediaries who act  as go-betweens for firms seeking to bypass the restrictions of local 
labour markets (French and Mörhke, 2006; Anderson and Ruhs, 2011). 
Agency labour drawn from local labour markets can also serve to alleviate the constraints on 
capital presented by a core workforce. The choice of management  to embark on this form of 
human resource (and labour control) strategy will depend upon a combination of the factors 
outlined above. Capturing the complex structures of the management  and labour control regime 
of agency workers in French car plants requires a close examination of these various factors. 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology adopted for the research and the operationalisation of the 
concepts that  have been introduced and discussed in this chapter, in order to achieve the aims 
and objectives set out in Chapter 1.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH PARADIGM AND METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction 
Since all social scientists approach their subject  via explicit  and implicit  assumptions about the 
nature of the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Mason, 1996), it is important to make 
clear from the outset the philosophical paradigm that frames the research process. The 
methodological framework that  I adopt  is informed by critical realism, a philosophical approach 
that recognises an objective reality that exists independently of our knowledge of it. At the same 
time, critical realism acknowledges how prevailing discourses and theoretical constructs 
influence our knowledge of reality. Critical realism, therefore, simultaneously rejects empiricist 
claims to direct and unmediated access to the world through our sensory experiences, and social 
constructivist claims that  social reality is made up of our discourses and constructs.  Critical 
realism is utilised in this thesis as a philosophical under-labourer that is ontologically and 
epistemologically compatible with Marx and Engels’ (1976) dialectical materialist  approach to 
the social world. Like dialectical materialism, critical realism considers structural and agential 
dimensions of social reality to be in a dialectical, multi-directional relationship (Sayer, 1992, p. 
142), most comprehensively expressed by Archer’s (1995) Morphogenetic-Morphostatic 
approach, and transcending the positivist-interpretivist divide within social science (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979; Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000, p. 3). Brown (2002, p. 19) argues that within 
Marx and Engels’ body of work it  is possible to detect  concepts that critical realism articulates 
in a similar way: the distinction between thought and mind-independent reality; the notions of 
tendencies and emergence; and the practical side of knowledge. Not  all Marxists accept  this 
view, however. Roberts (1999), for example, rejects the idea that Marx implicitly used a critical 
realist  framework, asserting instead that critical realism severs the link between theory and 
practice, whilst  conceding too much ground to Kantian critiques of Humean causality (Brown, 
Fleetwood and Roberts, 2002, p.12). From this perspective, critical realism is said to prioritise 
abstractions and “contemplation” over empirical, sensory experience. However, the view taken 
in this thesis is that critical realism’s focus upon theoretical constructs to apprehend 
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unobservable structures that give rise to observable empirical outcomes is compatible with the 
Marxist distinction between “surface appearance” and “essence”, expressed by Marx in his 
critique of Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories of surplus value (Marx, 1969 – see Pratten 1993, p. 
414) and his contention that all “science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of 
things directly coincided with their essence” (Marx, 1981, p. 956).
The first part of this chapter discusses how the stratified ontology of critical realism resonates 
with Marxism at a philosophical level, as a powerful alternative to the ontology and 
epistemology behind positivist and interpretivist approaches. The chapter then briefly outlines 
the place of critical realism within broader debates around structure and agency. The 
supplemental relationship of critical realism to the Marxist  dialectical method is then presented 
as the basis for the research strategy and choice of methodology, before setting out the research 
strategy and design employed in this research. The final part of the chapter is a reflexive 
account of the research process. 
2. The research paradigm: ontological and epistemological perspectives
2.1. Critical realism: transcending the positivist/interpretivist divide
Social scientists are commonly faced with two opposing ways of viewing the world and 
acquiring knowledge of that world:
“either the world is objectively and unproblematically available….or it is not 
knowable objectively at all; and in the place of claims to objectivity, we find only 
the idea that what is known is merely the product of discourse” 
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000, p. 4)
Critical realism rejects this polarised view, adopting in its place a dualist ontology, which 
recognises an objective world that exists outside of our knowledge and our perception of it, with 
the important caveat  that our understanding of the world is mediated by socially constructed 
concepts and discursive acts, and that these constitute an important aspect  of the social world 
(Fleetwood, 2005). Within organisational studies, critical realism has challenged the post-
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structuralist/postmodern and linguistic/cultural turn that became fashionable in the 1980s and 
has since gained prominence (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). The appeal of critical realism lies 
in its simultaneous critique of positivism’s (false) claims to neutrality in accessing an 
unproblematised social world, and social constructivism’s ontological prioritisation of 
“Verstehen” – the “world of lived reality and situation specific meanings that constitute the 
general object  of investigation” (Schwandt, 1994. p.118). Both approaches conflate ontology 
and epistemology. For positivism, there is a correspondence between what we observe and the 
social world. For constructivism, our meanings and interpretation determine the “content  and 
boundaries” of the world and, it  follows, the nature of the world. Critical realism, in contrast, 
argues that  there is a deeper social world that lies beyond these two forms of surface appearance 
(objective observations and interpretations/meanings). In other words, reality and our 
descriptions of reality are not  in perfect correspondence, though our descriptions constitute an 
aspect of reality. As an example, class is a contested concept depending on whether priority is 
given to reality at the level of what we can easily observe (our impressions) or to some deeper 
dimension of reality from which class emerges (the social relations of production). Thus, 
definitions of class based on observation and subjective identification (e.g. Weberian 
approaches to class), may define class with reference to lifestyle and market position. Marxists, 
on the other hand, understand class in terms of the position of individuals in relation to the 
process of production. These social relations are not directly observable at the level at  the level 
of experience, though their effects are experienced by social actors engaged in these relations.
Interpretivist  approaches reject the idea that material and social phenomena possess essential 
properties outside of our perceptions of them, and instead argue that all that  we can know about 
an object  and an event  is how it appears to us. Critical realism, on the other hand, accepts the 
positivist claim that  the object  of knowledge – the “thing” being studied – possesses properties 
irrespective of our comprehension of them. It  is the task of science to reveal these properties. 
Unlike positivism, however, critical realism recognises that our attempts to gain knowledge of 
reality are mediated through how our belief systems lead us to express these objects (Chalmers, 
1978, p. 114). Therefore, critical realism acknowledges the interpretive influence of the 
researcher and rejects the notion of value-free notion social science that positivism proposes 
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researchers should aim for. Since social scientists are a part of the social world that they study, 
they cannot  escape their own individual standpoint. As a result, observation can never be truly 
neutral. Instead, access to the world is mediated by our conceptions of the world (Fleetwood, 
2005). 
The recognition that  observations and perceptions form only part of the social world flows from 
critical realism’s stratified ontology (Bhaskar, 1978). A stratified ontology leads to an 
epistemological focus on different  layers or domains of reality – the empirical (experiences and 
perceptions), the actual (events and actions) and the deep (structures, mechanisms and power 
relations). In his critique of critical realism, Brown (2013) argues that  by separating reality into 
different  layers, critical realism is unable to integrate localised phenomenon into a system-wide 
account of that  phenomenon, instead it  remains isolated in its separate domain. In response, 
Fleetwood (2013) argues that analytically separating social domains is not the same as treating 
them as isolated spheres of reality. Rather it  is by recognising the distinction between what  we 
observe (e.g. a strike) and the deep structures and mechanisms that produce the things we 
observe (e.g. extraction of surplus value, alienation) that  it  is possible to understand the 
underlying conditions by which human behaviour is possible and probable (Callinicos, 1985; 
Pratten, 1993). The absence of conflict (e.g. strike action) does not  mean that the structures and 
mechanisms that give rise to that conflict are not there, or that, to use this example, the 
antagonism between labour and capital has been resolved. The realm of the deep, as a discrete 
analytical unit, is important  for critical realism since it  is from this realm of “enduring 
structures” that “generative mechanisms” emerge, which may or may not  be felt at  the level of 
experience. This is a process of abstraction similar to that  employed by Marx (Pratten, 1993). 
Although Marx never systematically explained his dialectical method, it can be inferred from 
the way in which the various levels of abstraction at  which Marx operates capture both the 
“moment” of social phenomena and the historical evolution of those phenomena as products of 
“intersecting and overlapping contradictions arising out of the past  and arching towards the 
future” (Ollman, 2003, p. 164).  
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2.2. Structure and agency: interconnected and analytically separate
Critical realism’s account of the relationship between “enduring structures” and the interactions 
of social actors/agents within these structures provides a compelling response to the debate 
around the nature of structure and agency that  has divided social science and competing 
accounts of Marxist theory. It  does so in a way that  is compatible with and enriches those 
Marxist accounts that  have attempted to overcome the undialectical polarity of structure and 
agency presented by deterministic and voluntarist  versions of Marxism16. Archer (1995, cited in 
Parker 2000) cogently sets out the complex relationship between structure and agency within 
which human social interaction gives rise to social structures, which in turn influence the social 
interaction of humans, in what is a “sophisticated” development  from Giddens (1976, cited in 
Parker, 2000) and Bourdieu’s (1977; 1981, cited in Parker, 2000) ontological perspectives on 
the interplay between structure and agency (Fleetwood, 2013). Giddens’ (1976) structuration 
theory sees structure and agency as interwined in a complex feedback loop whereby agency 
shapes structures that  shape social agents and so on ad infinitum, so that  both dimensions of 
social reality are simultaneously constitutive of each other. Bourdieu’s concept  of “habitus” is 
an explanation of how social structures are the outcome of patterns of behaviour repeated over 
time. Individuals appropriate the “legacy of history” which engenders an understanding of the 
behaviours required (habitus) for maintaining their position within society (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 
305). In Bourdieu’s account, structures – the outcome of historical patterns of behaviour – 
primarily constrain agency by positioning humans according to their access to resources, whilst 
also enabling social agents to pursue interests. Although agency is a key element of historical 
social evolution for Bourdieu, his concept of habitus leans heavily in the direction of the 
reproduction of elite power within society as both dominant  and dominated reproduce persistent 
and enduring social structures (Parker, 2000).
In all three approaches, structure and agency are interdependent  dimensions of the social world, 
however these approaches part  company over the nature of the relationship and the conceptual 
tools employed to understand this relationship. Archer (1995, cited in Parker, 2000) proposes 
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Althusser who view history as a “process without subject or goals” and “voluntaristic” versions of 
Marxism who view history as driven by human agency (Callinicos, 1985, pp. 9-10). 
analytical dualism as a way of investigating these two interdependent categories of social 
reality. This is necessary since, although it is agents that construct structures through social 
interaction, agents at any particular historical time are interacting within and upon structures 
that pre-exist them. Archer’s model, therefore, takes account of the antecedent structures that 
historically precede social actors. Giddens (1976), on the other hand, refers to the “duality” of 
structure and agency in the sense that the two categories can only be conceived of in relation to 
the other, thus failing to integrate the past fully into accounts of contemporary social action. 
Archer’s “historicism” and “analytical dualism” capture Marx’s contention that  the 
circumstances in which humans make their history are inherited from the past. In addition, 
Archer develops a more complex and deeper way of understanding how human agents and 
structures interact  and integrate and, in so doing, resolves the tension in structure and agency 
(Fleetwood, 2013). Although prior human agency has constructed the structures that frame 
contemporary social action, they have an objective existence that  is analytically separate from 
social interaction (Mutch, 2004). At any one time in history, human action can reproduce or 
transform these social structures that prior action has given rise to. The reproduction or 
transformation of structures is driven by the social positioning of agents as collective agents 
(e.g. class or gender), and as reflexive actors who possess powers to actualise or block 
generative mechanisms (Archer, 1995, pp. 174-76, cited in Parker, 2000) depending on how 
they perceive or interpret their interests. 
This Morphogenetic-Morphostatic (M-M) approach is Archer’s (1995, 1998) contribution to 
Bhaskar’s (1978) Transformational Model of Social Agency. Grounded in a stratified ontology, 
it  rejects the deterministic approach of structural Marxism by viewing social reproduction and 
change as the outcome of particular combinations of phenomena, processes and practices in 
social life that have the potential to give rise to new emergent properties (Carter and New, 2004, 
p. 7). The dialectic relationship between action/agency and its products in the form of enduring 
structures captures the concept  of praxis that is implicit within Marx’s writings. For Marx, 
social life is “essentially practical” and the acts of social agents that shape and change the world 
are conditioned by the ability of human beings to reflect  upon the consequences of intentional 
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action17. Furthermore, action not only has the potential to reproduce, shape and transform social 
structures, it  also changes social agents, a process described within the context  of Marx’s 
discussion of the transformative impact  of labour on the worker (Pratten, 1993, p. 417). This 
opens up the possibility of a transformed consciousness though the combined effects of action 
and reflexivity. Social action, however, is framed by the constraining and enabling function of 
socio-economic structures, expressed by Marx in his famous dictum that  “[M]en make history, 
but they do not make it just  as they please: they do not make it  under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past.” (Marx, 1979). Archer (1995) expresses a similar dialectical and historical approach in her 
understanding of the way the past interacts with the present through the social structures that 
have been historically constituted by the actions of previous generations of social agents.
2.3. Critical realism and research strategy
From an epistemological perspective, critical realism can be viewed as a philosophy of social 
science that  informs the theory and method of social science rather than prescribing methods for 
analysing the social world (Yeung, 1997). Although directing the researcher to seek out 
underlying structures and mechanisms that  give rise to phenomena, as well as describing those 
phenomena, critical realism does not provide a methodological blueprint for research. The lack 
of clarity over methodological choices has been cited as a major flaw of critical realism (see 
Yeung, 1997). However, by drawing attention to the combined importance of antecedent  social 
structures that constrain and enable social actors, the events that arise from emergent  properties 
and the way in which they are experienced and responded to by individuals, critical realism is 
able to draw upon the traditions of both positivism and interpretivism for selected insights and 
techniques (Sayer, 1992, pp. 36-55). For critical realism, methodological choices are determined 
by the nature of the research problem or issue to be addressed (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). 
Critical realism, therefore, can lend itself to a plurality of methods, the integration of which can 
overcome the limitations of single-focus methodologies associated, in particular, with positivist 
approaches. Positivist  approaches to employment  and labour economics can generate 
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“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”
knowledge about  various facets of employment (wages, types of employment, characteristics of 
workers) whilst interpretivist approaches can inform about organisational practices and cultures 
at  the local level (Prasad and Prasad, 2002). The constructs and conceptualisations that 
individuals employ to make sense of wage labour represent  a valid dimension of reality 
(Kirkpatrick and Hocque, 2006; De Ruyter, 2007; Carey, 2007), although their 
conceptualisations may be incorrect, or only partially correct (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000, p. 
11). For example, employees may perceive that the employment  relationship is unequal and 
hierarchical, but lack a deeper knowledge of the structures that generate that relationship. 
The triangulation of different methods permits the social researcher to gain a knowledge of 
different  domains of a stratified social reality. The intransitive domain, the domain of the deep 
which cannot be observed, is revealed through theoretical abstractions that serve to explain 
social phenomena. Theory abstracted from the empirical domain is the lens through which 
critical realism accesses the realm of the deep, providing an explanation of the structures from 
which social phenomena emerge. These theoretical models constitute “truth-like” theories 
which serve as a bridge to the intransitive dimension (Bhaskar, 1993, pp. 399-340, cited in 
Curry, 2002, p. 126). The validity of “truth-like” claims about reality relies upon “analytical 
generalisations” through a process of retroductive inference, similar to the notion of “abductive 
inspiration” (Risjord et al., 2002) which seeks explanation rather than prediction. The ideas 
generated about a phenomenon provide the basis for a conceptual framework that can best 
explain the phenomenon (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 77) as theory is refined by iteratively 
moving between observations and lived experience and propositions about underlying 
structures. Analytical generalisation, therefore, is premised upon the explanatory power of 
theory, and it  is through the observable domains that theories about the deep, intransitive 
domain of reality are maintained and developed. This can be applied to Marx’s explanation of 
the workings of the capitalist  system, observed at  the empirical level as the condition of the 
working lives of the English proletariat  in the 19th century. Marx’s critique of the slogan of “a 
fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work”18 was rooted in his theoretical abstractions, which revealed 
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18 Marx argued strongly against those who raised this slogan since it ignored the fundamental inequity of 
wage labour by which surplus value was abstracted at the point of production. See Marx (1875), Critique 
of the Gotha Programme.
the social relations from which profit  and capital accumulation emerge, thereby revealing the 
unobservable structure necessary for the observable phenomenon through retroductive 
inference. Critical realism’s use of theoretical constructs to apprehend unobservable structures 
that give rise to observable empirical outcomes is compatible, therefore, with the Marxist 
distinction between “surface appearance” and “essence”. Essence for Marx refers to the nature 
of phenomena, made knowable through the use of theoretical abstractions (e.g. the operation of 
the law of value as an ultimate explanation of the accumulation of capital, rather than classical 
economic’s focus on price and wages as phenomena that can be observed). 
3. Research strategy and design 
The research strategy employed in this research is premised upon the search for explanation 
through a deep understanding of the various dimensions that  feed into and constitute the 
phenomenon of agency work in French car plants. The research design that flows from this aims 
to combine data from a number of different sources, including the incorporation of quantitative 
data sources with qualitative data in the research design. Historical analysis of textual and 
numerical sources forms the basis of an “analytically structured account  of the material, 
structural and political forces and dynamics” within which the phenomenon is embedded, thus 
allowing for an exploration of associated generative mechanisms (Reed, 2005, p. 1636). The 
main unit  of analysis is agency work in the French car sector examined at various 
interconnected dimensions and levels. It includes an exemplifying case (Bryman, 2008) which 
aims to illustrate the phenomena of agency work in a localised setting in order to provide an 
additional explanatory facet. The research design combines interview data with other sources of 
qualitative (textual) data, and descriptive, quantitative data, to explore changes in patterns of 
agency work over time. Through a combination of contextual descriptive analysis, documentary 
data and the perceptions and meanings of social agents as derived from interview data, different 
data collection techniques address the different (and interconnected) levels of exploration, 
interrogation and analysis (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003). 
The research also includes a post-hoc semi-ethnographic dimension by which I was able to 
observe events that  provided insight  into the research setting. In Section 4 below, I discuss the 
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processes by which I came to extend my range of data sources. Barriers encountered in 
accessing the potential data sources that had been identified early on in the research process led 
me to adopt  Glaser’s (1998) approach: “all is data”. The research design evolved through a 
process of elimination and identification of opportunities as doors opened and closed, 
presenting me with difficult choices to make. One of the outcomes of this was the decision to 
make use of any data that  I was presented with to pursue my research aims, with the recognition 
that the data collected would vary in quality and usefulness. Thus field notes from observations 
and events became more prominent than originally envisaged, both in relation to data collection 
and theory development. Ethical considerations were taken into account when using less formal 
sources of data collection. For example on one occasion I was invited to be present during an 
emotive casework meeting. Although I was permitted to take notes at  the meeting, I was 
mindful that  I was witnessing a worker in a highly stressed and agitated state. I was allowed to 
participate in this meeting as I was perceived to be a “concerned observer” and “on the side” of 
the workforce. It was assumed, therefore, that I would treat  the information to which I had 
access with sensitivity, and an awareness of the vulnerable situation of such workers. 
A further issue associated with the use of observational data relates to its integration in the data 
analysis stage. Combining different sources of data collection and data analysis, whilst 
generating information-rich data, poses problems in terms of how to integrate different types of 
data within the overall analysis of the thesis. The data from field notes are treated as 
complementary data to further contextualise the research setting, with the caveat  that it 
represents a partial view of the setting. 
3.1. Case selection and data collection
The identification and selection of the exemplar case was based upon the criteria of relevance 
(Stake, 1994) and practicality. My starting point was that any of the major automobile plants in 
France would be relevant and appropriate for the research, given the widespread use of agency 
work throughout  the sector. Each one would yield both general and unique aspects of agency 
work. For reasons of geography, it was preferable to chose a site relatively easy to reach from 
the UK, either in Paris or northern France. Having made relatively early contact  with a union 
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representative at  the Toyota factory in Valenciennes, it  was expected that  this would be the site 
for a case study.  Unfortunately attempts to organise interviews with workers at  the plant  – 
through email contact  and visits to Valenciennes – proved unfruitful. As a result, the focus of the 
study moved to PSA Peugeot-Citroën, specifically to the plant situated at Aulnay-sur-Bois, in 
the northern suburbs of Paris. However, due to problems of accessing sufficient  numbers of 
interview participants, in particular, agency workers at the Aulnay plant, the thesis draws upon a 
wider range of interview respondents. The reflexive account in Section 4 of this chapter presents 
a more detailed discussion of access issues and difficulties.
Primary data collection began in December 2009 when the first contact  was made with a local 
union representative in the south of France. Interviews were then carried out  over a period of 18 
months, a time scale which reflects the barriers encountered in gaining access to willing 
participants. The interviews and field visits to the Peugeot  plant took place between September 
2010 and June 2011.
3.1.1 Interviews
Interviews took place with key informants and agency workers. My overall approach to the 
interviews was one of a guided conversation facilitated by a checklist of topics and questions to 
be covered, although the specific application of this approach differed according to the type and 
purpose of the interview. I had expected that unanticipated themes would emerge from the 
interviews. As a result, I did not  want to restrict  interviews by ascribing too many pre-
determined categories to the interview schedule (Patton, 1990). The aim was to draw out a range 
of relevant themes, including unexpected ones (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).  
At the outset  of the research, it  was proposed to interview between 15-20 agency workers as 
well as a number of key informants, using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. 
Purposive/purposeful sampling, selected on the basis of how useful respondents are for the 
pursuit  of the inquiry (McEvoy and Richards, 2006, p. 67), is a common sampling strategy in 
qualitative research. The aim is to select cases that will provide a rich source of information 
relevant to the research inquiry (Patton, 1990). Snowball sampling involves using contacts and 
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informants to identify appropriate cases, again a common sampling strategy in qualitative 
research. It is also referred to as a “opportunistic” sampling, in that researchers take advantage 
of situations as they arise during the data collection phase of the research (Kemper et al., 2003, 
p. 283)
The final number of interviews carried out  did not  meet  original expectations. A variety of 
attempts were made to increase the number of interviews, including a web questionnaire survey 
through which it  was hoped to filter potential interview participants, and a dedicated blog aimed 
at  stimulating an online chatboard type discussion amongst agency workers19. A flyer containing 
details of the blog was distributed directly to Peugeot  workers during one of the visits to the 
plant, and union contacts agreed to distribute the flyer inside the plant. Prior to this, a flyer with 
details of the research and a call for interview respondents from the target  population was 
distributed via union contacts. None of these strategies worked – the agency workers that were 
interviewed were introduced directly by key informants. The final sample of interviewees, 
therefore, did not correspond to that  expected at the outset  of the research, both in relation to 
composition and to numbers. This had a significant impact on both the nature and the quality of 
the interview data. 
Much of the interview data came from respondents who were originally perceived as  key 
informants. Key informants are people can provide crucial information about the phenomena, 
target  population and local context. They can be experts on the phenomena being researched, 
either formally through their official roles, or informally given their immersion in research 
settings. They may also have insight  into the wider social, national and political context. 
Whereas individual respondents describe their personal feelings and opinions, key informants 
are more likely to provide information (Kumar et  al., 1993). They can also act  as local 
gatekeepers or as a bridge to individual respondents, and therefore, play an important role in the 
research process. Two types of key informants were interviewed. Those that  are immersed in the 
local setting (local union representatives), and “national experts” (national union officials) who 
provided broader contextual information on agency work. During the course of the data 
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collection, the role of the first  group became blurred between key informant and respondent due 
to their in-depth knowledge of agency work in the auto sector, particularly those who had direct 
experience of agency work through their personal work biographies. 
The interview tool for key informants reflected the purpose of the interviews – to obtain both 
contextual information and informed perspectives on a variety of dimensions of agency work in 
car plants, given differing degrees of familiarity with the phenomenon. The interview guide was 
unstructured although there was a checklist of topics to be covered, acknowledging the need to 
both explore the specialised knowledge of key informants and to target specific aspects of that 
knowledge. However, the structure of the interviews differed according to the type of key 
informant and the location of the interview. Interviews held in cafés with local union 
representatives were more like conversations, whereas those with national officials, taking place 
in an office or by telephone, felt  more structured, with the interviewee rarely straying from the 
questions asked. In two instances, where interviews took place during the occupation of an 
agency, it was not appropriate to record the interviews.  
Individual respondents are underrepresented in this research. Given this was the target 
population for the research, this has implications for the research. Whilst a large number of 
interviews does not guarantee a better quality dataset, it  is more likely to include a wider range 
and variation of experiences, views and perceptions (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 19) which will 
enhance interpretation and analysis. Whilst  the methodological approach adopted does not 
demand representativeness, a greater number of individual respondents would have presented a 
larger corpus of data from which to compare, contrast  and analyse the different  experiences of 
agency workers. 
Contact with individual respondents was made in the first  instance through local informants. 
The preferred strategy was to obtain contact  details of respondents to arrange interviews directly 
with individual agency workers in a convenient and neutral location. However, one of the 
informants was not  prepared to facilitate direct contact and retained control over access to 
respondents and locations of interviews, including participating in one of the interviews. This 
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posed a problem for conducting the interview given the perceived knowledge advantage of the 
key informant who regularly interrupted the interview. The different  circumstances in which the 
interviews took place is taken account  in the interpretation and analysis, by drawing attention to 
the way the interview data may have been compromised by the setting and form. All individual 
respondents were assured anonymity through the use of pseudonyms. This was important given 
the assumption, based upon intuition and a reading of the literature, that those on precarious 
employment contracts are vulnerable to victimisation should they choose to speak negatively 
about employers or agencies. Respondents were informed of the purposes of the research at the 
start  of the interviews and the possibility of withdrawing. Interviews with respondents were 
recorded, transcribed and translated. Where an interview took place outside the plant, notes 
were also taken, given the levels of noise.
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Type of Interview Workplace/
location
Mode and location of 
interview
Key informants/Respondents
Patrice, CGT union rep, ex-agency 
worker
Ford, Bordeaux Individual interview, café
Eddie, CGT union rep, ex-agency 
worker
Toyota, 
Valenciennes
Individual interview, café
Halim, SUD union rep PSA, Aulnay Individual and group 
interviews, Café
Pierre, CGT union rep PSA, Aulnay Individual interview, café
Victor, CGT union rep, ex-agency 
worker
PSA, Mulhouse Individual interview, café
Gilles, SUD national official 
(organising in the auto sector)
SUD national 
HQ
Individual interview, office
Paul, CFDT national official  
(organising in auto sector)
CFDT national 
HQ
Individual interview, 
telephone
Dominique, USI-CGT official 
(organising agency workers)
USI-CGT 
offices
Individual and group 
interview, during union action
Sandra, USI-CGT (organising 
agency workers)
USI-CGT 
offices
Individual interview, during 
union action
Occupational physician specialising 
in agency work
Seine-et-Marne Individual interview, 
telephone
 Individual respondents (respondents 
who were agency workers at the time of 
the interview or in the previous 3 
months)
Daniel Toyota, 
Valenciennes
Individual interview, café
Léa PSA, Aulnay In café (with union rep)
Amina PSA, Aulnay Outside plant (with fellow 
agency worker)
Elodie Toyota, 
Valenciennes
Individual interview, 
telephone
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All interviews were transcribed and translated by the researcher. Carrying out  qualitative 
research in a foreign language and setting presents researchers with a number of issues. Xian 
(2008) presents a persuasive critique of the tendency of researchers to view the translation of 
data as a uniquely technical exercise, whilst  Temple and Young (2004) argue that translation 
issues are rarely present  in cross-cultural research. There is, however, a small body of literature 
that discusses the significance of linguistic and cultural barriers in the translation process 
(Brislin, 1973; Harkness, 2003; Douglas and Craig, 2007, cited in Xian, 2008) and suggests 
various techniques (for example, back translations and multiple translators) to ensure an 
accurate transmission of meaning. Xian (2008) argues this is not  an adequate response to the 
problems posed by translation in qualitative research. The process of translation is “a 
(re)construction of the social reality of a culture in a different language, in which the translator 
interacts with the data, actively interpreting social concepts and meaning” (Xian, 2008, p. 233). 
Translation is always difficult, since there is a tension between the formal correspondence 
between two sets of words or phrases and the need to transmit an idea. With qualitative 
interview data, the focus on meanings 10vey questionnaires or structured interview schedules in 
order to verify that  all respondents are responding to the same questions. Instead, two interviews 
were selected and translated by an accomplished translator of academic books. This translator 
has also published non-fiction work which has relied in large part on the translation from French 
into English of eye-witness accounts of historical events, therefore, ensuring a sensitivity to the 
need to maintain authenticity in the process of translation. These translations were then 
compared with the original translations, and inconsistencies were discussed with reference to 
the original French transcription. Having lived in France for ten years (from 1992 to 2002), I 
consider my level of French fluency to be sufficient  to carry out  qualitative research in French. 
Collaborative discussion with another bi-lingual academic over the best  terminology to convey 
meaning in translated texts provided further confirmation of the quality of translations (Brislin 
et  al. 1973, p. 46). Furthermore, the translation of interview transcripts, and the attention to 
detail therein, provided a further opportunity to become familiar with the data (Temple and 
Young, 2004, p. 168). 
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3.1.2 Documentary data
Documentary data provide both an important contextual layer to the research objectives and a 
further lens through which to understand the phenomena. Appropriate documents can constitute 
an expression or representation, or textual trace of facets of a phenomena, either in a literal 
sense (factual evidence) or in an interpretive sense (Mason, 1996, pp. 72-73). A number of 
sources of textual data are included in this thesis. 
Archived newspaper articles provided an important source of data regarding the growing 
discussion around the use of agency labour in the auto sector, providing colour to the quantitive 
data documenting the increasing use of agency workers by manufacturers. Documents and 
missions statements from the organisations representing temporary employment agencies 
(PRISME and CIETT) were accessed to provide further contextual and analytical information. 
Similarly, documents from Peugeot PSA and the UIMM (Union des Industries des Métiers de la 
Metallurgie) and the MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France) also provide an 
appropriate source of data given the emphasis on the political apparatus of production as 
outlined in Chapter 3. 
There are methodological issues to be considered when accessing documentary data. Scott’s 
(1990) fourfold criteria for assessing the quality of documentary data is widely cited in the 
literature. The first  is authenticity – is the document  genuine? The second is credibility – does it 
contain bias and distortion? The third is representation – are the documents sampled 
representative of other relevant documents? Fourthly, does the document express clear meaning 
(Scott, 1990, p. 30). The documents accessed in this thesis fit  the criteria of authenticity as their 
authorship is verifiable – the documents are organisational documents in the public domain. 
With regards to credibility, identifying bias or distortion is part  of the analysis. Documents from 
employment agencies and unions are understood to be written for a distinctive purpose; they are 
not neutral documents. Understanding the context  in which they are written and their purpose is 
part of a process of data analysis which attempts to uncover an underlying reality that  needs to 
be accessed (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004, p. 54, cited in Bryman, 2008). This involves looking 
for meaning in bias by revealing who the intended reader is and what message the author hopes 
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to transmit or what  reality they want  to portray. This also addresses the fourth criteria – 
meaning. With regards to the third criteria – representativeness – this also depended on the 
category of data. 
3.1.3 Official statistics
Official statistics serve as complementary data which are easily accessible and can cover long 
periods, allowing for the identification of social trends at  an aggregate level. For the critical 
realist  researcher, however, government statistics are used with the acknowledgement  that they 
are a relatively static, one dimensional form of data that  needs to be combined with other 
sources to enhance interpretation. Government statistics can also be unreliable and prone to data 
gaps (Gill, 1993). The relatively recent inclusion of agency work in government  statistics in 
most EU countries, coupled with the transient  nature of the employment  contract  hindered the 
mapping of trends. Likewise, differences in the quality and rigour of national datasets creates 
problems for comparative analysis (Arrowsmith, 2009). France is one of the countries with 
relatively reliable data on agency work (Arrowsmith, 2009). Temporary work agencies are 
legally bound to submit  monthly declarations to the government agency, UNEDIC (Union 
nationale interprofessionelle pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce) which are the basis 
of monthly reports on agency work statistics, compiled by DARES (Direction de l’animation de 
la recherche, des études et des statistiques). However, for the purposes of cross-national 
comparison of the extent and profile of agency work across Europe, methodological 
considerations need to be taken into account. Whilst  definitions of agency work in EU member 
states are converging (Arrowsmith, 2009, p. 18), it  is only in recent  years that  agency work has 
figured as a separate category, reflecting the traditional focus on core, full-time, regular 
employment in national labour force statistics (Greenwood, 1999). Labour force statistics 
continue to be a weak source of data on agency work, and tend to under-represent  low-skilled or 
agency work which has a high proportion of migrant workers (Ford and Slater, 2005). With this 
caveat in mind, cross-national comparisons of labour statistics are considered to have some 
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degree of comparability due to EU endeavours to ensure the harmonisation of concepts and 
definitions.20  
Despite the technical limitations of official datasets, and the social bias inherent in statistics that 
reflect the assumptions, concepts and priorities of governments and policy makers, they can 
usefully serve to describe aspects of a phenomenon at  a national and international level. Official 
statistics can serve both a descriptive and analytical function; providing significant 
complementary contextual data, and, through the mapping of the evolution of agency work in 
the agency work in the car sector, allow for a more analytical interpretation of trends when 
discussed with reference to other key socio-economic and legislative developments. Through 
the identification of sector level trends in human resource strategies, such data add a further 
dimension to the triangulation of multiple data sources. This approach to official statistics 
chimes well with Olsen’s (2005) proposition that social statistics are not to be treated as facts 
that speak for themselves, but  rather interpreted and analysed in a critical and reflexive way, 
preferably in conjunction with other forms of data. 
3.1.4 Observations
During field visits, a number of opportunities arose to directly observe social and physical 
spaces relevant to the research. On one occasion, the observation was participant  (taking part in 
an action against a temporary employment agency), with my participation being that of an 
“interested outsider”. Such observations were recorded in field notes, and, though limited in 
scope, constitute a further, unexpected, dimension to the research. Observations are included in 
the data since events and instances witnessed will inevitably affect the analysis and 
interpretation of data, and provide an alternative way of viewing the world of the car worker, 
potential issues facing agency workers and union responses to agency work. Thus, making clear 
the influence of connections between observations and analysis and interpretation enhances the 
validity of the research findings. At a basic level of analysis, observations can capture different 
dimensions of the context and thus enrich the narrative of the analysis, bringing the reader 
closer to the world being investigated. 
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20 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/lfsq_esms.htm#comparability
Methodological issues associated with the practice of observing in qualitative research are well 
documented. Whilst advanced as a way of directly accessing “naturalistic” environments, what 
is observed, recorded and interpreted is determined not  only by the researcher’s research 
interest, but also by the researchers’ autobiography and worldview (Atkinson, 1992, p. 9). As 
such it  is a highly subjective practice, both in terms of what  is recorded and how the observation 
is translated into a field note, even when recording seemingly factual data about  physical 
environments. “Selective perception” (bias in the researchers’ perception of what is significant 
and what  is not) is particularly problematic in the recording and interpretation of observations 
(Johnson and Turner, 2003, p. 315). No grand claims to privileged access to knowledge are 
made from observational data. The recorded observations were opportunistic rather than 
structured, and offer merely a snapshot  of dimensions of the phenomenon from which limited 
inferences can be made, primarily in relation to other data.
3.2 Data analysis
In qualitative research, data collection and analysis is not strictly separated, and accordingly, 
aspects of data analysis are referred to in the presentation of data collection above. Whilst  the 
data sources are mixed, the data analysis follows an overarching logic of the identification of 
themes and patterns, and connections. Thematic analysis is a way of capturing significant 
information about data in relation to the research aims (Braun and Clarke, 2006. p. 82), and can 
be both theoretically and data driven. It is compatible with a number of philosophical and 
theoretical concerns, including a critical realist  outlook which acknowledges the significance of 
both social context and individual meanings assigned to experience. As Braun and Clarke 
(2006) put  it, thematic analysis of data is a method that can work “both to reflect  reality and to 
unpick or unravel the surface of “reality” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 81). The process of 
coding data according to themes and sub-themes involves a process of moving from description 
of data to “theoretical redescription” (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 109-110), as the data is 
organised into tentative concepts which are then interrogated through retroductive analysis. 
In both early and later stages of analysis, data was read and re-read in order to identify 
emerging, tentative themes and to become familiar with the data. Initial, tentative analysis 
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occurred during the transcription process as ideas and memos were noted for future reference. 
The interviews were transcribed into French using a dedicated transcription computer 
programme (ExpressScribe). Transcription is an effective way of getting “to feel the data”. It 
prompts reflections on the interview process which enables the researcher to “relive” the 
interview, jogging the memory and opening doors to a deeper understanding of the responses 
which may not  have been captured at the time. Transcription, therefore, provided the context for 
an initial formulation of ideas and the tentative identification of themes, which were recorded as 
notes attached to segments of the data. Further identification of themes was carried out  first 
manually by reading through the transcripts and then by attaching codes to data segments within 
TAMS Analyzer, an open source qualitative analysis software, similar to NVivo. This facilitated 
the organisation of the data, the mapping of themes, and the efficient  retrieval of data for 
analysis.21 
Documents and newspaper articles were analysed using a similar process of identification of 
themes, although treated as separate types of data, and therefore analysed separately, before the 
process of making appropriate and theoretically valid connections between the different  types of 
data sources. The management of lengthy documentary data entailed first the manual 
identification of extracts according to their relevance to the research. As with observational data, 
this demands an element of trust  in the skills of the researcher, and transparency in relation to 
the researchers philosophical and theoretical priorities. Extracts were organised according to the 
category of data (newspaper, union documents, industry and agency documents) and with 
reference to the function of data: persuading, expressing or informing (Bauer and Gaskell, 
2000).  
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21  Sobh and Perry (2005) argue that qualitative data analysis software is not appropriate for a realist 
philosophical paradigm that “emphasises relationships, connections and creativity” since it may result in a 
decrease in the researchers sensitivity. Computer programmes, it is argued, are only suitable for 
“subjective” research that is concerned only with the properties of the text (Sobh and Perry, 2005, p. 
1206). However, this is too prescriptive an approach to methods and techniques employed in critical 
realist informed research, based upon the assumption that the technology determines what the researcher 
sees. The use of data analysis software, in combination with the manual organisation and reading of data, 
does not in and of itself,  preclude the researchers’  intellectual creativity in making connections and 
interpretations beyond the text.  
The recording of observations and other field notes served to complement the analysis of the 
main data, by providing contextual information and the possibility of alternative interpretations. 
3.3 Triangulation, multiple data sources and retroduction
Since critical realism holds that our knowledge of the world is fallible, and that the aim of 
research is to present  a “truth-like” explanatory account of a phenomenon, criteria for 
evaluating critical research revolves around notions of “completeness” and “theoretical 
generalisation”. For research informed by critical realism, the use of multiple types of data can 
bring bring the researcher closer to the nature of a phenomenon through an examination of its 
various dimensions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p. 9; McEvoy and Richards, 2006, p. 72) and 
the triangulation of these different  sources and/or methods of data collection. For Olsen (2004), 
triangulation is not aimed merely at validation of the research but also, and more significantly, 
at  a deepening and widening of understanding22. This contrasts with positivist approaches to 
validity which insist  upon rigorous codification of research procedures. Qualitative research, on 
the other hand, lacks operationally defined tests of validity or “truth” (Eisner, 1991, p. 53). 
Although there are a variety of terms within qualitative research methodologies that  act  as 
substitute markers for validity and reliability – for example, trustworthiness, authenticity, 
credibility, dependability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 43) – there is no clear consensus as to 
what validity means or entails (Creswell, 2003, p. 196). Replicating such codification in 
qualitative research is not  necessarily desirable, since it  relies upon positivist epistemological 
assumptions (Bryman and Burgess, 1994, cited in Bryman, 2008, p. 538). 
For critical realist approaches, the “worth” of the research is established through an emphasis on 
depth and extent  of research aimed at  building a more rounded, more complete and more 
compelling picture and explanation of social life. Some of the methods employed by critical 
realism for evaluating research are shared with interpretivist research methodologies. For 
example, from Creswell’s eight  strategies for verifying the “accuracy” of research (Creswell, 
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22 Olsen (2004) points out that the use of multiple data sources to describe social phenomena has a long 
history, giving the example of the extensive analysis carried out by Lenin for his 1889 work The 
Development of Capitalism in Russia. This entailed a detailed attention to quantitative datasets and a 
critique of the discursive practices which concealed the true nature of capitalist social relations. The result 
was a critical account of bourgeois political economy resulting from the methodological triangulation of 
discourse analysis and survey data.
2003, p. 196), it  is possible to discern three strategies which can apply to a critical realist 
perspective. The first  is the use of different  data sources. Secondly, clarifying (rather than 
neutralising) researcher bias through self-reflection (reflexivity) “creates an open and honest 
narrative that  will resonate well with readers”. Thirdly, Creswell suggests presenting discrepant 
information that runs counter to themes – or to assumptions built  upon from the literature or 
theory (Creswell, 2003). Problematising theory in this way can result in a deeper probing of 
theory, identifying and resolving shortcomings. Taken together, the aim is to build a coherent 
picture of the phenomenon, the interpretation of which can be held up against the various data 
sources and the theoretical framework that guides the research. 
McEvoy and Richards (2006) present  a critical realist  approach to triangulation which 
incorporates corroboration and completeness with retroduction. Confirmation through 
corroboration occurs at all levels of data analysis including theoretical corroboration, through 
the process of retroductive abstraction. Completeness, whilst  not  an easy goal to achieve in 
social science research, is sought through an analysis of different aspects of the phenomenon 
(McEvoy and Richards, 2006, p. 72). In its broadest  sense, triangulation is the combining of 
more than one set of insights (Downward and Mearman, 2006, p. 79), capturing as much of 
reality as possible in order to increase the persuasiveness of the evidence presented and enhance 
the accuracy and representativeness of the data (Denzin and Lincoln, 1989, p. 82).
How these multiple sources are analysed and interpreted also influences the cogency of the 
account. Qualitative research methodologies tend to emphasise the need to overcome researcher 
bias so that  the data “speaks” and overrides the theoretical preconceptions of the researcher. 
Patton (1990) talks about “emphatic neutrality”, or empathy towards those encountered, 
demonstrated by a neutral stance to findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985) similarly argue for 
neutrality; findings of a study should be shaped by respondents, rather than researcher bias or 
motivation. For Strauss and Corbin (1990), qualitative research involves the ability to recognise 
and avoid bias. I argue that  whilst it is important  to acknowledge and make clear the political 
standpoint  of the researcher, it  is undesirable (and impossible) to totally eliminate “bias” from 
the research process. The findings of this thesis are shaped both by the data and by the 
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interpretation given to that  data. That interpretation is based upon the philosophical, theoretical 
and political positions that have been discussed in this and previous chapters. This approach to 
research is informed by an appreciation of critical realism’s emancipatory goal (Wilson and 
Green, 2004). Taking into account that readers need to be reassured that  data is not simply 
manipulated to fit  the arguments (Porter, 1993), the combination of multiple sources, analysed 
critically according to the logic of theoretical retroduction, seeks to provide a compelling 
account of agency work in French car plants and the underlying structures from which specific 
regimes of labour control arise. 
3.4 Ethics
Informed consent  was sought  from the research participants. The consent  form included a brief 
summary of the research and a clause explaining that respondents could withdraw from the 
study at  any point  up to the submission of the thesis. For consistency, the same consent  form 
was used for all interview participants. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity by the use 
of pseudonyms throughout the written stages of the research (transcription, written thesis, 
published articles). There are also informal ethical considerations beyond the formal dimensions 
of research ethics. The choice of research subject  was driven by personal/political sympathies 
regarding the situation of agency workers, as well as academic concerns. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the precarious nature of the employment contract places agency workers in low-
skilled jobs in a vulnerable position. This has implications for the welfare of potential research 
participants, and is likely to have had an impact on the willingness of temporary agency workers 
to participate in the research. The difficulties associated with researching vulnerable workers in 
the “conflictual” setting of the workplace (Fantasie, 1988) and the persistent  concern for 
workers encountered during the research is explored in the reflexive account below (section 4).
3.5 Limitations
The reflexive narrative below discusses the limitations of the research in more detail. Here, I 
signpost  the main issues affecting the quality of the research. Weaknesses and limitations of the 
study stem mainly from the difficulty in accessing appropriate research participants. The 
original aim of the study was to directly access the voices of agency workers working in the car 
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sector. The research would have clearly benefitted from more interviews from agency workers, 
since a key aim of the research is to understand the social dynamics between agency worker, 
employment agency and user firm. Since some of the union officials had previous experience of 
agency work in the sector, I was able to gain some direct insight  into this dimension of the 
study. Yet  the data obtained from these interviews lacked the depth that was required to 
adequately reflect  the experiences of agency workers. These were retrospective accounts, 
filtered through the lens of their current position as lay unfion officials. Problems of access to 
agency workers in the French car sector have been identified in a recent  study by Gorgeu and 
Mathieu (2011). The authors, both experienced qualitative researchers of the French car sector 
since the 1990s, carried out a focused follow-up study of agency workers who had responded to 
2003 national SUMER survey on occupational health and safety23. They note that many of the 
agency workers who had indicated that they would be prepared to participate in a face-to-face 
interview, responded negatively when subsequently contacted. Given the small number of 
interviewees (eight), the authors were obliged to supplement  these interviews with those of 
permanent workers who had spent  a period of time in the past on agency contracts. Similar 
problems are also highlighted in Farcy (2008). This illustrates the difficulties in accessing this 
group of precarious workers. This problem and possible explanations of the difficulties 
encountered are discussed further below. 
4. Reflecting on the research process
In this section I discuss in more detail the methodological issues associated with carrying out 
qualitative research, by describing critical points in the research process which determined the 
direction of data collection. Reflexivity in qualitative research is widely acknowledged as an 
important  dimension of the research process (Mason, 1996),  and lends to the transparency of 
the research (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The degree of reflexivity and the specific role of 
reflexivity in research varies, from an acknowledgment of the situated position of the 
researcher, to the notion that the inter-subjectivity of the researcher imposes and transforms the 
world under investigation (Finlay, 2002). Notwithstanding these differences, qualitative 
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23  SUMER is the annual Medical Survey of Exposure to Professional Risks (Surveillance médicale des 
expositions aux risques professionnels)
researchers tend to be keenly aware of their active role in identifying, selecting, collecting and 
analysing data, and of the social process of researching a world of active social agents. 
Reflexivity is an acknowledgement that  the researcher is not  a neutral observer/collector of data 
in the research process (Mason, 1996). The way a researcher interprets and acts upon guidelines 
for qualitative research is influenced, not only by the ontological and epistemological standpoint 
of the researcher, but  also by any implicit or explicit political partisanship. All research bears 
the personal stamp of the researcher as the methodology which guides the research is filtered 
through a “personal lens that is situated in a specific sociopolitical and historical 
moment” (Creswell, 2003, p.182). An equally important  and often overlooked aspect  of the 
social practice of research is the personality of the researcher, whose interpersonal skills, and 
even degrees of doggedness in the pursuit of research aims, can influence the ease or difficulty 
in gaining access to the research site (Feldman et al., 2003).
4.1 Gaining access to interview participants
Gaining access to agency workers willing to participate in the research was a major issue 
throughout the research, and one which was never satisfactorily resolved. The interview data 
was to be made up primarily of agency workers, supplemented by interviews of local and 
national union officials, and, if possible, representatives from car manufacturers and temporary 
employment agencies. As expected, attempts to solicit interviews from these two latter sources 
(via email, formal letters, telephone calls and visits to agencies) were unsuccessful.24 I had not 
anticipated the scale of difficulty in finding agency workers and union officials willing to 
cooperate in the research. On reflection, expectations regarding access to potential interview 
participants were based upon my own personal history and experience. I assumed that workers 
in precarious, “bad” jobs would want to participate in a study which sought to “reveal” their 
experiences at work and provide a “voice” for a marginalised section of workers. This 
assumption flowed from my own political standpoint and history of union activity in which 
articulating and conveying realities of exploitation and oppression were a “natural” compulsion. 
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24  An attempt to arrange an interview with Head of Communications at PSA-Aulnay was unwittingly 
“scuppered” by the SUD union official who contacted the person concerned on my behalf prior to my 
introductory telephone call. This meant that my request for an interview was treated as “suspect” due to 
my association with a militant trade union
I therefore expected that  those who lived intense levels of exploitation would enthusiastically 
agree to participate in the research.   
The problems I experienced in finding interview participants amongst  the agency worker 
population illustrate the difficult in carrying out this kind of study “from the outside”. The best 
known and arguably richest studies of work and labour control regimes in the auto sector are in-
depth ethnographic studies carried out by male researchers working for long periods alongside 
car workers in factories (Linhart, 1978; Beynon, 1948; Thornett, 1998; Beaud and Pialoux, 
1999; Durand and Hatzfeld, 2002). Other studies have entailed forging strong relationships with 
key informants who become important gatekeepers to the world of the car worker (Stewart, 
1998b; Bouquin, 2006). The inability to cultivate strong relationships with key contacts in the 
sector hindered the process of data collection. Yet beyond this, it  became apparent  that  the very 
nature of agency work, in the context of intensive manufacturing labour, is a barrier. Lack of 
integration and vulnerability in the workplace works against  reliance on local lay officials to 
mediate access. Fantasia (1988) points out  how the conflictual nature of the workplace 
problematises studying the world of labour through the accounts of workers. Where labour 
relations are marked by distrust  and hostility the field can constitute sensitive zones which are 
difficult to access from the outside.
Initial steps to make contact  with relevant  actors were made through contacts in the UK, 
through which I was able to request an interview with a délégué syndicale (trade union 
representative) at  the Ford Aquitaine plant in Bordeaux. The interview served two purposes. 
First, to provide interview data from the perspective of a trade unionist and lay official, and 
second, to investigate further avenues for field work. The interview was shaped by other, 
contextual factors. Taking place in December 2009, it was at the height  of the economic crisis, 
which was disproportionately hitting the automobile sector. Job losses in the sector were 
significant and large numbers of agency workers were being laid off. This necessarily shaped 
the interview, and subsequent interviews.  
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From this interview, I was introduced to two union (CGT) contacts working in the automotive 
complex in Nord-Pas-de-Calais: one in the Toyota factory in Valenciennes and one in the 
Peugeot plant  at Sevel-Nord. One of these contacts, Eddie, a union rep at  Toyota, agreed to be 
interviewed and potentially to introduce me to agency workers. This second interview served a 
similar purpose to the first  interview: data collection and negotiation over access. Eddie was 
able to provide me with the contact details of just  three agency workers. This was disappointing. 
Further inquiry as to the possibility of enlarging the scope of potential interviewees was met 
negatively: my research requirements were low on the list of priorities of a busy union activist 
who was also heavily involved in upcoming regional elections. Further contact  with Eddie was 
sporadic and inconsistent, and was met without much enthusiasm, on his part.
This highlighted a further ethical issue with which I had to grapple throughout my attempts to 
solicit  cooperation from union activists and agency workers: how far to go in pushing forward 
my research needs. In other words, how much of a nuisance should I make of myself to impose 
my agenda on social actors with other pressing priorities. Feldman et  al. (2003, p. 33) refer to 
the importance of chutzpah in qualitative research or having the audacity necessary to get  the 
information sought. “Chutzpah” is an intensely personal trait  that  cannot be acquired from 
methodology textbooks. Getting the balance right between eliciting cooperation and being 
troublesome and pushy is difficult; excessive “chutzpah” may not  be an ethically desirable 
characteristic in qualitative research, even if being “audacious” achieves research goals. This 
issue also highlights the role of the researcher’s socio-biographical history in the research 
process, the significance of which is contingent upon the nature of the social world under 
investigation.25  In a study such as this one, whilst  tenacity and audacity were appropriate at 
some points in the research, so too was a sensitivity to the complex and busy lives of those who 
were being solicited.   
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25  On the other hand, the degree of “pushiness” can depend upon who is being interviewed. Given the 
acknowledgement of the political nature social researcher, consideration of the social position of the 
potential interview subject can affect the methods employed to gain access to interview data.  Those in a 
position of social and political power may be treated less sensitively than those in a position of social 
vulnerability.
Following a further identification of potential sites of research, I made contact with Rachid, a 
union rep (SUD) at the Peugeot plant in Aulnay, in the northern suburbs of Paris, who agreed to 
meet me and set up interviews with agency workers. After the disappointment  at  Toyota, I was 
careful to explain my research and the need to carry out  one-to-one interviews with agency 
workers. Rachid suggested that it would be possible to proceed as requested. In preparation for 
my visit  to the site, I carried out web-based research on the history of the plant  and the local 
labour market. However, the field visit did not progress as anticipated. Despite a number of 
email exchanges setting out  the parameters of the visit, Rachid did not  mediate appropriate 
access to agency workers at the plant. The sense that  the visit  would not  go as planned was 
evident from the outset, when I was introduced to agency workers as “a journalist”. I corrected 
this several times, yet Rachid continued to refer to me as a journalist  as he approached agency 
workers coming off their shift to see if they would “talk” to me. A few were prepared to chat to 
me before boarding company coaches laid on to transport  workers to and from surrounding 
towns. The noise of hundreds of workers piling through the factory gate did not facilitate 
communication. Rachid was busy chatting to the many workers who approached to greet  him 
with a handshake. It was only after the final coaches began to leave that it  became clear that 
only one “formal” interview was going to take place and that Rachid would be accompanying 
us. The interview, with a young female agency worker (Léa), took place in a cafe in a local 
shopping centre. It was not  an ideal situation. The café was noisy and the presence of Rachid 
may have compromised her responses. Rachid was reticent to provide contact  details of other 
agency workers. Instead, he phoned the national office of SUD to arrange an interview the next 
day with an official whose remit was organising agency workers. This was appreciated as it 
provided appropriate data, but  I was still lacking direct  access to the experience of agency 
workers. 
Rachid was unable to see me for the rest  of the week so a further visit  was arranged. I expressed 
my disappointment at  not  being able to interview agency workers as planned and stressed that 
this was an imperative part  of my study. However, the second visit  was barely more successful 
than the first. Instead of agency workers, Rachid decided that  I could speak to young workers on 
apprenticeship contracts (Contrats de Professionnalisation, or Contrats-Pros). Contrats-pros 
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were presented as being “like” agency workers in that they are on temporary contacts, arranged 
via an employment agency and linked to an apprenticeship. These contrats are also subsidised 
by the state and viewed by some in the trade union movement as a form of cheap labour. The 
data from the contrats-pros is informative and has been integrated into the data analysis, but  it  is 
not data from typical agency workers. However, it was difficult to get across my specific 
interest in the temporary agency work contract, which lay in part  in the importance of the triadic 
nature of the employment contract for the theoretical contribution of the thesis. 
This relates to a further problem I encountered – that of feeling uncomfortable and out of place 
as an “academic” in a factory environment. I dealt with this discomfort by spontaneously 
emphasising my other “hat” – a trade unionist  and a political activist. This became an important 
way of relating to and creating a positive relationship with union gatekeepers whom I knew 
were members or sympathisers of left political organisations. I also felt a need to express my 
empathy for workers labouring under difficult  conditions, not  “neutral empathy” (Patton, 1990) 
but rather empathy arising from partisanship and a sense of social outrage at  intensely 
exploitative working conditions. I was also acutely aware of the status of academics amongst 
sections of the French left  and labour movement: often dismissed as “petits intellos”, roughly 
translated as a “jumped-up intellectual”, someone who knows little about the real world of the 
worker. As a result, I found myself frequently asserting my own working class credentials in 
order to “fit in” and to cultivate a “comradely”, “fraternal” relationship. 
Partisanship can play a key role in field access (Fantasia, 1988). However, this is complicated in 
the context of France, where union affiliation is political and core union activists are likely to 
identify with different competing political organisations. Whilst knowledge of these divisions is 
useful, it  hindered the field work in that  I was anxious to avoid alienating my contacts, and was 
sensitive to the repercussions of saying “the wrong thing”. The intense hostility to other unions 
expressed by one of the union representatives (Rachid) took me by surprise. The use of strong 
derogatory language in reference to CGT  activists at the plant  (e.g. “fascists”, “bosses union”) 
was awkward to deal with for a number of reasons. First, on a personal/political level, I objected 
to the use of such terms within the labour movement. Second, given I wanted to interview CGT 
Chapter 4 Research Paradigm and Methodology 
115
officials, the lack of cooperation, indeed hostility exhibited by Rachid (Rachid even lightly 
chastised me for wanting to take a leaflet  from the CGT officials outside of the plant) created a 
further layer of complexity which demanded creative thinking in negotiating access. It  is 
notable, too, that when I mentioned to Rachid that I wanted to interview other unions he seemed 
unhappy and suggested that it  would not be possible. This may have contributed to a severing of 
links. During the course of my second stay in Paris, Rachid stopped replying to emails and did 
not respond to my telephone messages. I also had the impression that  I was beginning to get in 
the way, with my persistent requests for help (distribution of flyers requesting research 
participants, contact details of agency workers). 
Bad relations between unions in France is to be expected, although the main line of hostility is 
traditionally between the “militant” pole which includes the CGT and SUD, and the “reformist” 
pole which includes the CFDT (Pernot, 2005). However, factors external to plant  politics and 
national industrial relations shaped Rachid’s perception of the CGT. Rachid is a fellow traveller 
of the recently formed Nouveau Parti Anti-Capitalist  (NPA), whilst two of the CGT reps at the 
plant are members of the Trotskyist  organisation Lutte Ouvrière (LO). LO, imbued with an 
“economistic”, “workerist” view of revolutionary politics (to use the jargon of the far left), is 
commonly perceived as ignoring the specific issues faced by immigrant  communities within the 
French working class. Thus, on the question of the “foulard” (islamic headscarf), a long-
standing issue which has divided the French left, and which was a live issue at the time of the 
interviews, LO emphasises the need to the oppose the wearing of the headscarf as a symbol of 
women’s oppression. The leading CGT activists at  the plant, because of their affiliation to LO, 
are therefore seen by Rachid as unable to relate to the largely North African workforce. 
Paradoxically, Rachid’s interview itself revealed a negative attitude to the largely immigrant 
workforce at  the plant, associating a lack of class consciousness with the fact that many of the 
(older) workers were first  generation North African immigrants. My experience with Rachid 
highlights a further issue of qualitative research. Whilst  qualitative research aims to access the 
interpretations and perceptions that individuals construct  from their experiences, researchers 
also have to be aware that the “knowledge” they aim to reveal is partial, and some accounts may 
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be more “distorted” (consciously or otherwise) than others (Gaskell, 2000, p. 44). The social 
dynamics and interactions that occur in the field also inform the researcher as to the relative 
“trustworthiness” of the various accounts of a social phenomenon, thus influencing the way the 
researcher “reads” the data. This further illustrates the agential role of the researcher in 
identifying “good” and “bad” interviewees.
4.1.1 Chasing the elusive interview
The second visit to the Aulnay plant coincided with the 2010 social movement  against changes 
to public sector pensions. A strike wave was occurring in the public sector and some parts of the 
private sector with a strong history of militant  trade unionism. I took the opportunity to attend a 
national demonstration that took place during my stay in Paris, which I participated in. At  the 
end of the demo, I apporached a small contingent  behind a CGT  PSA-Aulnay banner and was 
introduced to Patrice, a délégué syndicale. I explained my research and took his contact details. 
This chance encounter provided me with another potential door into PSA at Aulnay – one that I 
feared had been cut off by Rachid. Fantasia (1988) in his discussion of the “chaotic” nature of 
qualitative research, refers to the role of serendipity in opening doorways to research sites. 
Evidently researchers cannot  rely on serendipity in the research process. However, where 
attempts at purposive sampling fail, chance encounters can be an important  lifeline in salvaging 
failed attempts to gain access (as was the case with Fantasia’s research). For my research, this 
meeting allowed me to gain some further data and better understand the obstacles to researching 
agency workers. Patrice was more reliable than Rachid in that  he did not raise my hopes in 
obtaining interview data from agency workers. He assumed that  it would be difficult  to arrange 
interviews, his workplace elections were coming up and he did not have the time to seek out 
participants. In addition, he did not  think agency workers were particularly open to being 
interviewed. Once they finished their shift, they wanted to get  on with their life and not  think 
about the plant. However, he promised to distribute a flyer with information about my research. 
Serendipity also brought  me into contact  with a CGT  representative (Vincent) at  the Peugeot 
plant in Mulhouse, in the north-east  of France, not far from the iconic Peugeot Sochaux plant. A 
chance link to an article on a social networking site alerted me to the fact that we shared a 
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mutual acquaintance. After a series of email exchanges in which I explained my research and 
the difficulties encountered, he informed me of positive responses from five agency workers 
and five contrats-Pros. My subsequent experience in Mulhouse was, however, the “straw that 
broke the camels’ back” in terms of my attempt  to obtain data-rich interviews with agency 
workers in car plants. The result  of my week-long visit  to Mulhouse was two interviews with 
Vincent. Interviews arranged over the phone with the young workers did not take place. One 
young man who I phoned after waiting fifteen minutes at  the designated location, assured me 
that he was five minutes away, yet  did not materialise. One young woman who I had spoken to 
more than once to confirm that she was still happy to be interviewed, did not  turn up at the 
designated time and place. Two young men, who had requested to be interviewed together, 
appeared to treat  the situation as a joke and were uncooperative. The remaining workers did not 
reply to my phone calls. During this time, Vincent was mediating between myself and his co-
workers, cajoling them to contact  me when they did not reply to my emails. This intervention 
did not  succeed and may have even created a gulf between Vincent  and his young colleagues, 
who, as the week went  on, were keeping out of his way. Vincent expressed anger towards them 
due to what  he perceived to be a lack of seriousness on their part. This was a further unexpected 
turn in the research process. I had, it  seems, unwittingly been the cause of a deterioration 
(hopefully temporary) in relations between a union representative and a group of young 
workers. Whilst  this study was not a deep ethnographic study in which the researcher is 
emerged in the social world under investigation, and thereby, intervening in and/or acting upon 
that world, my very limited intervention into the research setting created an effect which left 
behind unanticipated negative traces.
I was similarly ill-at-ease with Vincent’s evident discomfort with the way things had turned out 
given that  I had insisted that  I would only travel to Mulhouse on the basis of guaranteed data in 
the form of interviews with agency workers (my time and finances were running out). We 
discussed at length the possible reasons for their uncooperative behaviour. He surmised that the 
problem was a generational one. He had noticed a change over his years at  Mulhouse, with 
many young workers he encountered appearing to lack the seriousness, responsibility and, 
ultimately, class solidarity of previous generations. This is one subjective opinion based upon 
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the experience of a long standing union activist  – investigating such perceptions would 
constitute another research project. However, this experience in the field does raise questions 
regarding the way agency workers view themselves as part of a collectivity in the labour 
process. The harsh working conditions that are physically draining (the union representatives 
that I interviewed who had just come off shifts were visibly tired during the interviews) may be 
one explanation. A combination of lack of integration in the plant, the decline of trade unionism 
and associated lower levels of class consciousness may also be an explanatory factor in my lack 
of success in gaining access to this key source of data.
4.2 The pursuit of public sociology and preserving integrity
The political standpoint of the researcher, or more specifically, the partisanship involved when 
researching labour from a Marxist perspective, has re-emerged in recent years. Martinez Lucio 
and Stewart  (2011) contrast  a research agenda that  seeks to break down barriers between 
researchers and researched and is concerned with expressing in a “critical, sociological way, the 
active voices of the marginalised and their collective views” (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 2011, 
p. 338, italics in original) with research which depoliticises new management practices and ends 
up reinforcing the “hegemonic moment in the isolation of critical voices” (Martinez Lucio and 
Stewart, 2011, p. 332). This echos Burawoy’s (2005) pronouncement on the need for “public 
sociology”, a return to the “original passion for social justice, economic equality…. or simply a 
better world” (whatever the perspectives of individual sociologists of what  constitutes a better 
world), and a turn away from the narrow pursuit of “academic credentials” (Burawoy, 2004, p. 
260). Partisanship does not  compromise the search for “truth” or “truth-like” representations of 
the world, however, it does direct the researcher to a particular area of research and frames the 
interpretation of that  research. At  the same time, the academic process of pursuing 
methodologically rigorous research should not  lead the researcher to “stand aside, neutral and 
indifferent, from the struggles in which the future of the world is at stake” (Bourdieu, 2003, p.
11), however small and local the research may be.
Ironically, the difficulties encountered during this research threatened to undermine the pursuit 
of public sociology and turn my attention to the less laudable concern of the pursuit  of academic 
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credentials. As time went on, I became more anxious about the lack of interview data. As a 
result, my motivation in gaining access to the world of the agency worker appeared to change. 
However high-minded the motivation of the researcher, the instrumental dimension of research 
cannot be ignored. Research is undertaken for a variety of reasons beyond the intellectual and 
the political; for example, the achievement of a qualification or career progression, as Burawoy 
(2005) notes. This leads to pressure to fulfil research objectives in timely fashion, deemed 
appropriate by research funders. As research goals were undermined by barriers to access, I 
recognised that  there was a danger that  instrumental motivations could supplant the pursuit  of 
public sociology. However, this emerged more in the form of reflexions on the research process, 
so that the original motivating aims to engage in some form of “public sociology” did not 
disappear.
4.3 Research in a foreign language
Conducting research in a foreign language affects various dimensions of the research: quality of 
the data; interpretation of the data; relationship between researcher and interviewee. French is 
not my native language; however, having lived and worked in France for ten years during the 
1990s, my level of French is of a high conversational standard, and my grasp of the French 
cultural and political context  is strong. At  times, the stressful and noisy situations in which 
interviews were carried out  (outside the factory gate), had a negative affect my ability to 
communicate freely. On transcribing interviews, whilst  language errors were detected, only on a 
few occasions did this lead to a misunderstanding between me and the interviewee, and these 
misunderstandings were overcome at the time. It  was interesting to note that, where interviews 
took place in a formal setting, for example in an office (or even over the phone), where I felt 
more in control of the situation, the language flowed more fluently. 
My previous immersion in French trade union and political culture was a significant advantage 
in the interviews. A number of phrases and terms used by the interviewees were very colloquial 
and required a working knowledge of the language used by French workers. My biographical 
background meant that  I was able to understand the context  of key terms such as touché 
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(meaning the amount  of salary/income you receive), les gars (lads), la boîte (workplace), au self 
(canteen). 
Another issue that  arose from being a foreign researcher was the assumption from trade union 
officials that  they needed to explain the “landscape” to me – for example, the legislation 
surrounding agency work or the divisions between the unions. This was not new knowledge for 
me. However, I felt  that in order to extract further information it  was necessary to permit the 
sense that they had a “knowledge advantage” (Meardi, 2000, cited in Connelly, 2010). 
Cultural issues were at times problematic despite my personal history. I was particularly 
exercised over the use of the formal “vous” or the familiar “tu” when addressing contacts and 
interviewees. Given my acknowledged lack of neutrality, my desire to establish comradely 
bonds with those I was interviewing, and my dislike of the formal vous form, I had wanted to 
use the tu form. On the whole this worked, given I was operating in a labour movement setting 
where this is a normal form of address amongst “comrades”. As one of the union representatives 
said “yes, of course, it’s normal in trade unions to address one another with ‘tu’”. However, it 
did not necessarily work with the younger workers. On reflection, the fact  that  they did not 
know me and that  I was older than them, a foreigner and either an academic or a journalist, 
meant  that  it  is likely that they would have felt  more comfortable had I used the “vous” form.26 
There was an unspoken sense, particularly for one agency worker, that  the informal address was 
not the correct way of communicating.
This chapter has set  out  the ontological and epistemological perspectives which frame the 
methodology applied to this research. The research strategy, design and methods that flow from 
this have been described and the limitations of the research outlined. The reflective account of 
the research has further detailed issues arising from the research process. The main, and 
significant limitation, of this research is the absence of a comprehensive set of in-depth 
interviews from agency workers. On the other hand, this in itself constitutes part of the data 
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26 I was reminded of the story of an acquaintance working in a French university. As a UK ex-pat,  he tried 
hard to break down such a hierarchical and socially conservative form of address. Yet try as he might, the 
French students refused to address him informally.  This issue can also be very explosive. For example, 
those in authority can use the tu form over their social “inferiors” and expect to be addressed back with 
vous. Struggles have broken out over this in workplaces, and, more recently, in relations between police 
and ethnic minority youth in the suburbs, when the youth have demanded that they be addressed with the 
vous form.
from which analytical conclusions can be drawn, taking into account  the experience of the 
research process described above. This not  insignificant gap in the data was filled by drawing 
upon other sources of data through which to propose an explanatory account  of the labour 
regime of agency work in the French auto sector. By bringing together diverse sources of data, 
each expressing different  dimensions and perspectives of the phenomenon, this thesis provides 
some, though not  all, of the pieces of the theoretical jigsaw that  has been set out in previous 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5
THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SECTOR IN FRANCE FROM MARCHANDS 
D’HOMMES TO PRIVILEGED PARTNERS
1. Introduction
France has a long history of agency work. Since its emergence in the post war period, the sector 
has grown substantially, demonstrating a resilience within different economic and political 
environments. The history of agency work in France is one in which the sector has not only 
survived within a hostile environment (Belkacem et  al., 2011), but has also reached a point 
where the sector is now recognised as a partner with the state that mediates access to work for 
workers on the margins of the labour market. One of the explanations for the high levels of 
agency work in France in comparison with other EU15 and EU27 countries is the relative 
rigidity of French labour laws. High levels of temporary agency work are frequently associated 
with strong employment  protection legislation (EPL)27, yet since 1972 France has also had strict 
legislation governing temporary agency work the aim of which is to combat the use of agency 
work as a means of circumventing labour laws. Despite this, the temporary employment sector 
has been able to progressively expand from being a provider of temporary help – the original 
function of the sector – to being a facilitator of “maximum flexibility” (Beau, 2004). Moreover, 
in recent  years, the sector has been able to successfully embed itself as a formal partner of the 
state in facilitating the labour market insertion of “difficult to place” unemployed persons. The 
2005 law on “social cohesion” (Loi de cohésion sociale) overturned the state monopoly on 
employment placement and officially acknowledged the role of temporary employment 
agencies in labour market allocation. The story of the temporary employment  sector that 
emerged in France in the post-war years, tainted with the image of marchands d’homme (traders 
in human labour), is a compelling illustration of Peck and Theodore’s (2007) thesis that 
employment agencies actively construct their position in the labour market. In the space of fifty 
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27 In 2008, on a scale of 0 to 6, France was rated 2.6 in terms of strictness of Employment Protection 
Legislation for permanent employers, compared with a EU15 average of 2.2, and 1.2 for the UK. 
Countries with higher levels of EPL strictness were Germany, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal and 
Sweden. http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/
oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htma. 
years, agency work has gone from being a stigmatised form of employment to an officially 
recognised labour market intermediary. 
The aim of this chapter is to set out and examine the processes that  have brought  this about, 
taking as its starting point  the assumption that  the actions of social actors that drive, resist, 
respond and react  to trends in employment, are shaped by cultural and institutional factors 
which are rooted in historical processes. The way in which the contemporary pressures of the 
globalised economy are expressed across nation states is a consequence of the combination and 
interaction of the myriad and, at times, contradictory forces which both constitute and change 
local contexts. What follows is a summary and analysis of the historical processes that  underpin 
the evolution of agency work and temporary employment  agencies in the French context and a 
presentation of the key characteristics of agency work. The first part of the chapter describes the 
emergence of temporary agency work in the post-war years and the strategies embarked upon 
by the larger agencies to ensure the survival of the sector in a social and political environment 
that was inimical to non-standard employment. The second part  of the chapter examines the 
path to the 1972 law that legalised agency work, with a focus on the debates that  led to the 
specific French response to the triadic relationship which constitutes the agency work contract. 
The chapter then looks at the way in which the major temporary employment  agencies have 
vigorously and systematically carved out their position within the labour market as 
indispensable intermediaries, and then summarises the composition of agency work in France. 
The final part of the chapter is an overview of the evolution of union responses to the growth of 
agency work over time.
2. From “marchands d’hommes” to legalisation: Temporary employment agencies in 
post-war France
2.1 Supplying labour during post-war reconstruction and economic boom
Agency work in its modern form emerged in France in the 1950s28  in a period of post-war 
reconstruction and economic boom. These were also the formative years of the French version 
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28 Employment agencies were present in France in the 1920s, however these were very small in number 
and they covered highly specialised occupations (Belkacem et al., 2011, p. 21).
of the “social compromise” that modified the state-labour-capital nexus within advanced 
capitalist  societies. The Trente Glorieuses (Golden Age) which spanned the three decades 
following the Second World War established the institutional place of labour within a socio-
economic context in which the state played a central dirigiste role. A series of legislative 
reforms on union recognition, participation on tripartite committees overseeing the running of 
an emerging welfare state and the establishment of works councils at plant level cemented the 
role of organised labour within this model of social partnership (Crouch, 1993, pp. 178-187). 
The subsequent evolution of French industrial relations in the run up to the events of 1968 was 
one of accommodation and contestation, reflecting the tensions that arose from a highly 
politicised labour movement whose power was keenly felt  at  national level, though less so at 
workplace level (Jefferys, 2003). The post-war Gaullist state strove to present itself as an arbiter 
between capital and labour, exhibiting corporatist tendencies that sought to incorporate the non-
Communist inspired unions by treating them as partners in constructing the post-war welfare 
state (Goetschy, 1998). The intervention of the state in a wide range of areas of social and 
economic life occurred at  a time when some sections of the capitalist  class had seen their 
position delegitimised as a result of their collaboration during the Occupation (Jefferys, 2003; 
Cobb, 2009). This provided an additional rationale for the nationalisation of key sectors of 
economy, including the punitive nationalisation of some companies (e.g. Renault). Economic 
étatism, the French version of the post-war Keynesian consensus, was firmly rooted in a 
commitment  to the market  – an important  ideological marker given the growing influence of the 
Communist Party – and was a model fraught with contradiction. That  France had the highest 
numbers of agency workers in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (Caire, 1973) illustrates the 
disjointed way in which the “Fordist compromise” extended its reach. 
Temporary employment agencies were making their mark on French employment relations at  a 
time when the standard employment contract, the Contrat de Durée Indeterminée (CDI), was 
becoming the benchmark for employment. Through the gradual extension of the Labour Code 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the arbitrary power of the employer was being curtailed, 
particularly in large firms where strong union representation was able to enforce the 
implementation of statutory employment rights. The “decommodification” of labour was further 
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entrenched by the development  of welfare rights, many associated with employment  status 
(Belkacem et  al. 2011, p. 24).29 Temporary agency work, as a deviation from this trend towards 
secure, protected employment, was met with deeply entrenched hostility, not only because it 
undermined the gains of the labour movement, but also because of an historical aversion to the 
supply of labour for a fee which was prohibited in France in the nineteenth century. 
Employment  agencies were commonly viewed as socially regressive businesses engaged in 
disreputable activities. Despite this, the limited data that  exists suggest that  it was a thriving 
industry. Two early studies on agency work raise the alarm about  the “spectacular growth” of 
the sector. The first, by Guilbert (1970), viewed the rise in agency work as a labour force 
strategy that sought to avoid the obligations of the standard employment contract:
The more the state seeks to safeguard stable employment, the more employers are 
trapped in rigid rules, the more they will favour the development of temporary 
work, precisely to escape this rigidity. 
(Guilbert, 1970, p. 101)
The second study, by Guy Caire, published in 1973, entitled Les nouveaux marchands 
d’hommes ? Études de travail intérimaires (“The new traders in men? Studies in agency work”), 
estimated that in the five year period between 1957 and 1962, the number of agency workers 
had increased from 6,000 to 33,616. Two years later there were 66,393 agency workers (Caire, 
1973, p. 45). The themes raised in these early studies are similar to those in the literature on 
agency work today. The authors question the correspondence between the claims of temporary 
employment agencies (freedom to choose when to work; facilitating the labour market 
integration of women with children), and the reality of agency work.30  Caire (1973) also 
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29 France is seen as an example of a corporatist or continental welfare state regime, whereby employment 
status is fundamental to the provision of benefits and the social redistribution of wealth is narrow rather 
than universal (Esping-Andersen, 1995).
30 Despite the claims of the industry that agency work offered workers a way of training whilst earning, 
the evidence suggested that jobs allocated to agency workers provided little opportunity for advancement 
(Caire, 1973, p. 26). The rhetoric of choice which was omnipresent in the publicity campaigns was 
similarly compromised by a survey which found that nearly half of agency workers were not agency 
workers by design (Caire, 1973, p. 96). The profile of agency workers (under 35, without children, a high 
proportion of male workers) also belied the common perception promoted by the industry that that it 
served a demographic that was not suited to regular employment relations, such as women with children, 
or those with health issues. (Caire, 1973, p. 26; Guilbert. 1970 p. 184).
suggests that agency work allowed companies to avoid having to accept  workplace committees 
since it  artificially reduced the numbers of employees (p. 56). The securing of representative 
rights in the workplace encouraged the use of agency work, in the absence of regulatory 
restrictions.  
2.2 “A room and a telephone”: Temporary employment agencies in the 1950s and 1960s
Whilst the absence of reliable data prior to 1972 obscures the extent  of agency work in the 
1950s and 1960s, the early studies provide some indication of the sector in its early stages of 
development. Caire puts the number of temporary employment  agencies in 1956 at seven. The 
following year saw a ten-fold increase in the number of agencies. By 1962, this had risen to 170 
(Caire, 1973, p. 45), and the sector continued to grow rapidly throughout the 1960s with large 
numbers of small companies existing alongside a smaller number of nationally-implanted 
companies. The lack of regulation meant  that  there was little risk involved in setting up an 
employment agency. Start-up costs were minimal, all that  was needed was “a room and a 
telephone” (Belkacem et al., 2011, p. 24), whilst the demand for employment services in a tight 
labour market guaranteed a good return (Grunelius, 2004). For Le Tourneur (1969), such 
businesses were “driven almost exclusively during this period by financial gain”. From this 
perspective, employment  agencies are little more than the “unproductive hawkers” described by 
Peck and Theodore (2002) whose sole activity is to act as an interface between employers and 
workers, in return for a fee. 
Lack of regulation had the effect  of perpetuating the bad image of the sector. The smaller 
companies in particular were seen as perpetrators of reprehensible activities. As a result, the 
larger, more strategically-inclined agencies sought to distance themselves from smaller ones in 
order to present themselves as reputable businesses with a legitimate place and positive function 
in the labour market (Pialoux, 1979). The creation of the public employment agency, the Agence 
Nationale de l’Emploi (ANPE) in 1967 had also worried the sector. A state monopoly on 
employment placements could compromise the position of temporary employment agencies by 
placing their activities outside of the law. The arguments employed by some of the larger 
agencies during the parliamentary debates in the year preceding the 1972 legislation illustrate 
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both the polarisation of the sector and the image that the larger companies wanted to convey. 
The following extract  from the Journal Officiel encapsulates the concerns of the big players at 
this time and their desire to put an end to the “wild west” free-for-all situation that threatened 
the sector: 
The functioning and use of temporary work has been seriously hindered by the 
absence of an adequate legal status. This situation….has allowed firms of all kinds 
to open agencies in an anarchic way during recent  years and to run them in a 
questionable manner. It is well known that  the growth of the profession attracts 
those who seek to make a quick profit rather than engage in a natural vocation.
(Head of a temporary employment agency, Journal Officiel, National Assembly 14th 
December, 1971, p. 6723)
The prevalence of disreputable agencies engaging in unsavoury activities contrasted with the 
evolving mores of the time, particularly as the sector expanded into economic areas with strong 
union implantation, such as in manufacturing, where the Confédération Générale du Travail 
(CGT) was strong, or in larger retail concerns, where the Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) had a significant presence. There is anecdotal evidence from 
the period that  confirms the negative image of the sector.31 An article in Nouvel Observateur 
from 1966 refers to the use of agency workers to break strikes or to replace strikers, and cases of 
agency workers not  being paid for the work carried out (Kornig, 2003). The larger companies, 
conscious of the potential market  possibilities of the sector and fearing that  their activities could 
be prohibited, established a representative body (SNETT) to promote the interests of agencies 
and present agency work as an acceptable form of employment. 
2.3 The 1969 agreement between Manpower and the CGT 
It  is impossible to explain the development and legalisation of agency work in France without 
reference to the role played by Manpower France in propelling the strategic aim of acceptability 
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31 The literature on the history of the sector contains numerous anecdotes about the “cowboy-like” 
activities of some of the small agents, such as holding onto salaries or changing the terms of the verbal 
contract between the agency workers and the agency. (Guibert, 1970; Caire, 1973)
in a country which eschewed these marchands d’hommes. The evolution of the sector and its 
regulatory environment owes much to the business strategy of Manpower.32  The success of 
Manpower’s success in the US had been due in no small part to the company’s sectoral spread. 
By expanding beyond the sector’s traditional area of administrative and office work into 
manufacturing, Manpower US was able to sustain an impressive rate of growth in the post-war 
years. The founder of Manpower France, Michaël Grunelius, calculated that  the market 
potential of supplying agency labour to French manufacturing was three times that of office 
work. Highly automated industries, such as the car sector, could be particularly lucrative, given 
the reported problems of absenteeism that threatened the integrity of the production line 
(Grunelius, 2004, p. 48). At the same time, Grunelius was aware of the challenges associated 
with importing atypical employment practices into economic sectors with a tradition of 
workers’ struggle and organisation:
As long as we dispatch only typists, secretaries, and accountants, professions 
which are not  associated with working-class bastions, we will be left  in peace. If, 
on the other hand, we penetrate their principal domains, for example, that of the 
“legendary” steelworkers, they will, no doubt, make life hard for us.
(Grunelius, 2004, p. 48)
Despite such reservations, Manpower Industrie was launched in 1960. Manpower engaged the 
services of a legal expert, Professor Carmerlynk, to formulate a new type of employment 
relationship which could be acceptable to unions and set  the sector on the path to legalisation. 
However, trade unions were, as Grunelius predicted, unsettled by the incursion into 
manufacturing, and Manpower became a target  for militant action against  agency work. During 
the events of May 1968, a poster appeared depicting two symbols of capitalism, Publicis (an 
advertising agency) and Manpower (Grunelius, 2004, p. 74) and the offices of Manpower 
Industrie were occupied. Prior to this, offices of agencies had been targeted by graffiti 
campaigns and, at times, the smashing of windows. Faced with the possibility of an outright ban 
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32 Michaël Grunelius has recorded his legacy in his autobiography (2004) which is rich in detailed 
information on the early days of temporary employment agencies. However, it does have the feel of a 
vanity project and should be read with this in mind. Grunelius insists on the determining role of his 
farsightedness and business acumen in pushing forward the sector. Whether Grunelius is an astute 
businessman or a manipulating CEO will depend on the point of view of the reader.
in the post-1968 settlement, Manpower sought  out a union federation that  would agree to enter 
into negotiations, as part  of a strategy to strengthen the case for legalisation. It was in this 
context that Manpower entered into secret  negotiations with the CGT, the outcome of which 
was an agreement in 1969 which served as a basis for subsequent  legislation. The aim of the 
agreement  was to “to bring together, for the temporary workers of Manpower France, the 
benefits and guarantees which are due to them taking into account their situation as temporary 
workers”.33  According to Grunelius, the CGT signed the agreement after stormy negotiations. 
There is little discussion in the historical accounts about  why the CGT  decided to sanction 
agency work by signing the agreement. Despite a principled opposition to agency work, the 
unions’ negotiators claim to have been acting in the best  interests of agency workers. The 
section of the CGT that  dealt  with agency labour saw a chance to improve the situation of 
agency workers by giving Manpower the legitimacy it  sought. One of the negotiators described 
the process:
I felt naked. We didn’t  have trade unionists, no organisation, no bargaining power. I 
knew it, he [Grunelius] knew it. So. We discussed, for whole mornings, we talked. 
And then one day, I understood. This agreement, they needed it: it was a question 
of the image of the brand, recognition. So in fact  we did have something to bargain 
with, even if it wasn’t the normal kind of bargaining power. 
(Tartakowsky, 1985, p.19). 
For its part, Manpower was engaging in a judicious business strategy. On the one hand, it  hoped 
to establish its position within the temporary employment sector since agency workers would be 
more likely to sign with an agency that offered enhanced employment rights. On the other hand, 
it  wanted to enhance the credibility of the entire sector and improve its chances of persuading 
the government  to embark on the legalisation of the sector. Manpower achieved both these 
goals. By establishing minimum standards, the company was able to distance itself further from 
other companies and present  itself as a good employer, thus increasing its market  share at  the 
expense of BIS, the other major player. Two years later the legislation that  would guarantee the 
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survival of the sector was passed. As a result  of acting on its own, however, Manpower was 
expelled from SNETT, which expressed its discontent that:
the CGT concluded an agreement which was limited and which served as a public 
relations launching pad for Manpower, although the principles upon which the 
agreement  was based are a result of the work carried out  by SNETT’s 
commissions.
(Caire, 1973, p.42)
In response, Manpower set  up a rival organisation, NORMATT, an acronym for the professional 
association “for the normalisation and the promotion of temporary work”, a mission statement 
and acronym that  encapsulates a public relations strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds 
of French public opinion. The tensions that existed within the sector are indicative of the 
heightened competitive environment with the temporary employment  market. This was a time 
of both expansion and “creative destruction”, as smaller companies floundered and mergers and 
acquisitions led to the concentration of the sector. 
That the CGT signed the agreement was also controversial, reflecting an ongoing tension 
between opposing agency work on principle, and the perceived need to respond to the lack of 
regulation that  exposed agency workers to abusive practices. Two other unions, the CFDT and 
Force Ouvrière (FO), declined to negotiate on the issue, considering that  to do so would give 
credibility to working arrangements that were unacceptable to the labour movement. Though the 
CGT was able to obtain employment  rights, such as union recognition, holidays and access to 
training for Manpower’s agency workers, and promote itself as the union for agency workers, it 
also underwrote the survival of the agency work sector by setting it on the path to legalisation. 
3. The legalisation of employment agencies and the regulation of agency work
The law of 3rd January 1972 ushered in a new phase in the history of agency work in France. 
The creation of an employment  contract  specific to agency work redefined the employment 
relationship for a small but  growing segment of the labour force. The strict  codification of the 
employment relationship necessitated the resolution of various complexities arising out of 
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temporary agency work before the law could be passed. In addition, the business activities of 
temporary employment agencies needed to be reconciled with French law on the supply of 
workers to a third party (Vigneau, 2008, p. 86). These issues were controversial, as illustrated 
by the extensive debate that  took place across the media (newspapers, magazines, radio and 
television) between opponents and proponents of agency work. The temporary employment 
sector was a major contributor to the debate and engaged in a well-resourced campaign of 
lobbying to combat the widespread negative image (Caire, 1973; Grunelius, 2003). 
3.1 Debating the triangular relationship
A report commissioned by the National Assembly drew attention to the problem of whether it 
was the agency or the user organisation who was the employer, given both exhibited features 
which could be attributed to the role of employer as specified in the Labour Code. There is no 
international consensus on this; for some countries the agency is the employer, for others, the 
user organisation.34 In France, the designation of the employer in the triangular relationship is 
complicated by the concept of subordination, which has played a central role in French 
employment law since 1848 when complex hierarchical structures were replaced with a bilateral 
relationship based upon clear lines of authority (Centre d’étude de l’emploi, 2008, p. 14), and 
which is a defining feature of the employer-employee relationship. The employment  contract is 
defined as a “convention by which a person engages to put  their employment/activity at the 
disposition of another person, under the subordination of this person, in return for 
remuneration” (Pélissier et al., 2006). Subordination means in practice that the employer has the 
legal authority to “give instructions to the worker, to control their execution [of the work] and to 
sanction non-performance” (Havard et  al., 2009, p. 260). Thus, the employer is formally granted 
disciplinary and managerial power over the worker. In return, the employee receives not  only a 
salary, but  also insurance against social risks and the guarantee of ongoing employment. Since 
subordination refers to the execution of work and occurs at  the point of production, there is a 
strong case for the user-organisation to be designated the employer, as was argued in a German 
court  case in 1970 (Caire, 1973, p. 96). The agency worker is obliged to observe the rules of the 
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to settle this issue (see for example the Dacas case in 2004).
user organisation, and to respect the hierarchical organisation of the workplace. The problem 
was expressed by the Rapporteur who presented the report to the Senate:
On the one hand, their is the temporary work agency, which is not  the employer de 
facto but would like to be de jure; on the other, a business which is de facto 
employer but does not want  to be de jure; in between there is worker, who is 
employed by a firm for which he does not work and is not  employed by the firm 
for which is is working. 35
An additional problem was that  neither solution to the “employer problem” resolved the issue of 
the legitimacy of the activities of temporary employment agencies:
Either the temporary employment agency is the employer of the temporary worker, 
and in this case, the activity of this company consists solely of hiring out  the 
workforce to other companies, “trading” which is forbidden by the law, if not by 
jurisprudence. Or the employer of the temporary worker is the user firm and, in this 
case, the activity of the temporary employment  agency consists solely of placing 
the workforce in other companies, a “placement” activity for which the state has a 
monopoly in the eyes of the law, if not in fact.36
The 1972 law adopted the former solution. This required a new type of employment contract 
and the writing of new legislation governing the activities of employment agencies. The 
legislature drew upon the work of Camerlynk who proposed a new employment  contract 
specific to agency work, the contrat de mission or assignment contract (Caire, 1973; Grunelius, 
2004). 
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sociales du Sénat, 291, 1970-1971 cited in Caire, 1971, p. 98.
36 Cited in Caire, 1973, pp. 96-97.
3.2 The “contrat de mission” and the “contrat commercial”
The legislation articulated the agency/agency worker/user-organisation nexus around two 
simultaneous and synchronised contracts. The assignment contract between the agency and the 
agency worker is a unique form of employment contract that  exists only so long as there is a 
commercial contract  between the agency and the user organisation. Thus, the commercial 
contract preempts the employment contract  (Vigneau, 2008, p. 92). Whilst the status of 
employer lies with the agency, there is a de facto recognition that the agency is not the sole 
bearer of employment rights and responsibilities in relation to agency workers. Commercial 
contracts differ from employment contracts in that both parties are considered equal. In the 
employment contract, there is both a de jure and de facto relationship of power (Havard et  al., 
2009, p. 261). The former is embodied in the concept  of subordination, the latter is implicitly 
acknowledged by the statutory obligations put in place to protect  the worker from the arbitrary 
power of the employer. In the case of agency work, managerial power is effectively transferred 
from the employer (the agency) to the user organisation, since the agency is not  in a position to 
exercise control over the labour process. The result  is a dual relationship of subordination, with 
both agency and user organisation having a hierarchical claim over the agency worker. There is 
no clear regulatory frame of reference for the relation between the agency worker and the user 
organisation, although it is essentially a service relation rather than an employment relation. 
Figure 1, adapted from Havard et al. (2009) illustrates the elements of the triadic relation which 
constitutes the agency contract in French labour law. 
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Figure 1 The triadic relations of the agency work contract
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The distinction between the employer and the user of the agency worker is fundamental to the 
legal assignation of responsibilities of each of the parties in the triadic relationship. Whilst  there 
is no juridical basis to what is de facto  a “joint-employer” relationship37, the 1972 law does 
make provision for the “employer-like” obligations of the user organisation to the agency 
worker. The rights of the agency worker flow from the different relations that are embodied 
within the agency work contract: the legal status of an employee; the integration into a specific 
work community; and the precarious employee/work relationship (Vigneau, 2008, p. 94). The 
status of employee gives rise to a number of collective and individual rights. Payment  of wages, 
social security contributions, payment  of leave entitlement and training provision all lie with the 
agency. The user-organisation assumes responsibilities and rights associated with the employer 
at  the point  of production: organisation of work carried out; elaboration of tasks; working time 
and breaks; provision of equipment  to be used; health and safety requirements; provision of 
common facilities. The working conditions of the agency worker must  comply with those set 
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that employer responsibilities are divided between the two parties. Where there is legal ambiguity with 
regards to the employee status of agency workers, as has been the case in the UK and in Ireland, 
individual cases of long service at the same workplace can lead to the user-firm being designated the 
employer (Sobczak et al., 2008, p. 23).
out in relevant  legislation, as well as those flowing from collective agreements in the sector 
concerned. Union representation is complicated by the division in rights and responsibilities. 
The agency, as the legal employer, is the  reference point for the representation of agency 
workers. Though agency workers have no formal right to representation at the user-organisation, 
they are included in the head count of employees for the purposes of calculating the 
composition of statutory workplace committees – the works councils (comités d’entreprise) and 
the workplace delegates (délégués du personnel). In addition they can submit  grievances to the 
workers representative body in the user organisation. 
The precarious nature of the agency work contract is recognised by the prime de precarité, 
formally known as the prime de fin du contrat (end of contract  bonus), which is calculated at 
10% of the overall salary over the period of the assignment. French legislation also has 
provisions to ensure parity of pay and conditions between agency workers and comparable 
permanent employees of the user-organisation. However, income levels of agency workers tend 
to be lower than those of permanent workers due to periods of unemployment between 
assignments and the lack of seniority-related pay increases (Erhel et  al., 2009). Agency workers 
are also disadvantaged in that they do not  automatically receive the 13th month bonus that  many 
French workers receive, nor do they receive any profit-related bonuses that employees of the 
user-organisation are paid. 
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3.3 Regulating the temporary employment sector
As well as establishing the legal parameters of the employment relationship, the 1972 
legislation also regulated the business activities of temporary employment agencies, which were 
legally defined in the following terms:
a temporary employment agency is any moral or physical person whose exclusive 
activity involves placing employees (whom it  hires on the basis of agreed 
qualifications and pays accordingly) at the temporary disposal of users.
(L.124-1 of the Labour Code)
Agencies are subject  to strict regulations which define the scope of their activities. The 1972 
legislation reinforced the state monopoly on permanent job placements by excluding such 
activity from the remit  of temporary employment  agencies. This meant that  temporary 
employment agencies were not  to be involved in the practice of pre-selection and screening, and 
the business of supplying temporary workers to organisations became the sole responsibility of 
duly registered employment  agencies. The three broad conditions under which temporary 
agency work was permitted (these have since been modified) were: 
- To temporarily replace an absent employee; 
- To allow organisations to function during exceptional peaks in activity; 
- To carry out duties that are by nature temporary.
(Article 2 Law no. 72-1, Journal Officiel, 5th January, 1972, pp. 141-144.)
The principle that agency work should be of a limited (temporary) duration was established by 
two key elements of the Labour Code, as amended in 1972. Agency work “can have neither as 
an aim nor as its effect to permanently fill a job related to the normal and permanent activity of 
a company” (Art. L. 124-2, Labour Code). The same article of the Labour Code refers expressly 
to “tasks”, thereby establishing the requirement to justify the use of agency work with reference 
to clearly defined objectives. The temporary nature of agency work is further reinforced by 
Chapter 5 The Temporary Employment Sector in France
137
limiting the renewal of agency contracts for any given post. In general, agency contracts are 
limited to eighteen months and can be renewed only once, under strict conditions. By 
associating contracts with specific posts, user-organisations are (in theory) unable to assign 
successive agency workers to the same post. Legislation also sets out the specific circumstances 
under which the agency work contract  is prohibited: to replace striking workers; for occupations 
deemed dangerous; and in the six months following redundancies of permanent employees. The 
rationale behind these measures is to avoid temporary agency work being used by organisations 
to avoid the higher costs of the permanent contract. Prior to 1972, some employment agencies 
had candidly underlined this advantage for clients in their promotional campaigns (Guilbert, 
1970, p. 94).
4. Temporary employment agencies: from pariah to partner
Given these clearly defined restrictions on agency work and a societal consensus that  sees the 
standard employment  relationship as a benchmark for employment  norms, why is it that the 
temporary employment  sector has found France such a fertile ground for expansion? Any 
explanation for this must  take into account a confluence of different factors. The origins of the 
sector coincided with a shortage of labour faced with the demands of post-war reconstruction. 
The subsequent history of its evolution is one of different types of socio-economic and political 
conjunctions, which have favoured the growth of the sector, despite a hostile regulatory 
environment. Beyond favourable contingent factors, such as the post-war labour shortage or the 
shift  towards flexibility amongst political and economic elites in the 1980s, the major agencies 
have actively sought to shape labour market  trends in parts of the economy. The following 
historical analysis illustrates an agential process by which employment agencies have self-
consciously constructed their market  through a systematic campaign of public relations and 
political lobbying, which facilitating access to business opportunities at different  economic 
conjunctures.  
4.1. The role of lobbying and public relations in the temporary employment sector
The big players in the temporary employment  sector have sought to influence opinion and 
legislation. The experience of setting up employment  agencies at  the very moment that labour 
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was advancing its social and economic and employment-based rights, required the creation of 
effective tools to combat  the bad image of the sector. Thus, from the beginning, public relations 
campaigns and gaining the ear of political elites has been a major part of the business strategy 
pursued by the representatives of temporary employment agencies. Beyond the advertising 
campaigns of individual agencies to present agency work in a positive light – commonly 
focusing on the freedom accorded by agency work – there has been rigorous engagement  with 
debates on employment  policy, with the sector proposing solutions to employment issues that 
would have the effect  of reinforcing its position in the allocation of labour. The early 
manifestations of this were the study groups set  up in the 1960s to provide empirical evidence 
of the positive role of agency work (Caire, 1973). In addition, since the 1960s the sector has 
developed mechanisms of self-regulation and codes of conduct, prefiguring contemporary 
concerns with corporate social responsibility. This has occurred at the international level as 
well. CIETT, the international body of temporary employment agencies was set  up in Paris in 
1967, a location which denotes the historical importance of the French sector within Europe. 
CIETT is now based in Brussels, as is Eurociett, its European arm, which plays an important 
role in representing the sector in negotiations with European social partners. Tensions exist 
between the national bodies represented in Eurociett; for example, REC (Recruitment  and 
Employment  Confederation) which represents the UK sector, has historically not  been in favour 
of the kind of “flexicurity” practices Eurociett has been prepared to negotiate around. REC was 
opposed to the EU Directive on equal treatment of agency workers38, a directive which was 
modelled on the French (and Belgian) legislation and was supported by Eurociett  with the 
proviso that it would include the lifting of “unjustified restrictions” on agency work.   
The sector has a comprehensive strategy to guarantee the sector a presence in the national 
debate around employment policy and relations, despite the relatively small weight of the sector 
in the economy. The most recent Code of Practice of PRISME (the current  name of the 
organisation representing employment agencies in France) starts from the premise that 
temporary employment agencies “represent a modern answer to reconcile the requirement of 
labour flexibility for user companies and the need for work security for employees”, and that  the 
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services of employment agencies “provide workers with an opportunity for employment 
security, enhanced occupational status and a stepping stone function whilst reconciling 
employee aspirations and employers needs for a flexible workforce”. This perception of the role 
of agency work in the contemporary labour market  has been promoted by the sector since the 
1980s. The discourse of flexibility was skilfully employed at  a time when management and 
business elites were presenting the post-war wage-labour relation as an impediment  to France’s 
competitiveness in the global market, and promoting the need for workplace flexibility.  
In the early 1980s, temporary employment  agencies were again faced with prohibition when the 
Left won the presidential and parliamentary elections. During the 1981 election campaign, the 
Parti Socialiste (PS) promised to ban temporary employment agencies and to provide the ANPE 
with sufficient resources to effectively implement the formal state monopoly on employment 
services, including temporary placements.39 As in 1968, expressions of hostility to agency work 
were palpable. During the election period, activists carried out  a fly-posting campaign, covering 
agencies with posters proclaiming “outlawed!” in anticipation of a ban. Again Manpower led 
the sector’s opposition by meeting Jean Auroux, the minister responsible for labour issues, in 
order to plead the case for employment agencies. The then two organisations that represented 
agencies (UNETT  and PROMATT) together with the employers’ organisation, the CNPF, 
lobbied hard against  the proposals. Finally, rather than banning employment  agencies, the 
Ordonnance no. 82-131, significantly modified the conditions under which employers could use 
agency work, and pledged to reinforce state surveillance of agency work, taking as its premise 
that temporary agency work played a “harmful role” if used as a substitution for permanent 
work (Grunelius, 2003, p.110). Restrictions – coupled with a decline in overall employment  – 
led to a decrease in the number of agency workers and assignments. Between 1982 and 1984, 
the number of agency workers fell from 124, 651 to 102,514. At the same time the number of 
registered agencies fell from 1518 in 1980 to 763 in 1984, as smaller agencies found themselves 
struggling to survive in the new regulatory environment (Grunelius, 2003). 
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4.2. From ad hoc substitution to structural flexibility
The larger agencies were able to benefit  from this “creative destruction” by consolidating their 
position through a series of mergers and acquisitions and consolidating their relationships with 
large clients, such as automobile construction companies, with long term accounts and through 
price wars to undercut the prices of rivals. The best-placed agencies were able to capitalise on 
the contradiction that lies at  the heart of agency work regulation. The legislation not only 
restricted agency work, it  also deepened the institutionalisation of agency work, by creating an 
environment  for national negotiations between unions and agencies. In 1984, UNETT and 
PROMATT  held a press conference on the experience of the sector since the 1982 Act, the aim 
of which was to reaffirm the place of temporary agency work: “The ruling of 5th February 1982 
was a heavy loss for the profession, but  it was also the confirmation of its economic utility and 
its role in the labour market, as well as the consolidation of the status of agency workers and the 
unblocking of social dialogue” (Grunelius, 2003, p. 113). 
In 1986-88, during the period of Cohabitation  between Mitterrand’s presidency and Chirac’s 
RPR centre-right government, the approach to agency work became more “pragmatic” and less 
“ideological”. The consolidation of the larger agencies placed them in a good position to 
redefine their relationship with business clients in such a way that would cement their role as 
indispensable mediators in labour allocation for sectors particularly susceptible to the challenges 
of highly competitive globalised markets. Although agencies continued to offer the traditional 
ad hoc substitution function of covering for existing employees or managing exceptional peaks 
in activities, a process of internal restructuring facilitated the development  of specialised 
functions adapted to different  economic sectors and heralded the changing economic role of the 
sector (Peck and Theodore, 2007). In the post-recession recovery in the latter part  of the 1980s, 
a more concentrated agency work sector was able to respond to the flexible labour force 
demands of user-organisations, presenting agency work as the human resource equivalent of 
just-in-time. In the 1990s, agency work experienced even more rapid growth (see below) and 
firmly established itself as some sectors began to incorporate agency work as a strategic part  of 
human resource management (Erhel et al., 2009, p. 40). Belkacem et  al. (2011) view the 
concentration of the sector as being unique to France. In 1997, the 10 top agencies accounted 
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for 71% of sector turnover. By 2004, four companies made up 70% (Adecco, Manpower, 
Vedior-Bis and ADIA), with Adecco and Manpower alone constituting 46% of turnover 
(CIETT data, cited in Michon and Belkacem, 2011, p. 44). Another striking feature of the 
temporary employment  sector in France is the way in which it  has been able to deepen its 
influence whilst  constituting a small (though growing) proportion of employment. Political 
lobbying and strategic alliances have successfully promoted the role employment  agencies play 
in contemporary French labour markets. 
4.2.1 The forums du travail temporaire
One of the mechanisms the industry has used to influence government  and employers has been 
the regular forums that have brought together heads of employment agencies, government 
ministers, academics and representatives of EUROCIETT. The CFDT has also participated in 
these forums. They have been an important  arena for the sector to promote its vision of 
employment and the central role of the temporary employment agencies within that vision:
As you know, temporary work40 is an important actor in the economy, essential in 
its role of regulator of business needs, but it also plays a social role given its action 
in favour of training and labour market integration and its role in fighting 
unemployment.
(President of SETT, Forum du Travail Temporaire, 1999)
At the first forum in 1999, the president  of CIETT remarked he was struck by how “more and 
more young people often regret  that  their parents were directed towards a permanent job early in 
their career”. This anecdotal observation was a significant rebuke to the labour movement 
which is portrayed as clinging on to anachronistic employment  norms (i.e. the standard 
employment relationship) which, the sector argues, no longer correspond to the aspirations of 
new generations of employees.
A number of themes have emerged in the Forums between 1999 and 2007, illustrating both 
continuity and change in the strategies of temporary employment agencies, with the role of job-
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CDD (Contrat du durée déterminée).
matching and replacement becoming less of a priority as new functions emerge: labour market 
integration of young workers; combatting long term unemployment; and the cultivation of 
“professional pathways” through training and development. The forums also illustrate the 
changing relationship with government. The first forum was held under a Socialist government, 
and was attended by a representative of the Ministry of Employment and Professional Training, 
who raised concerns that agency work be restricted to providing employees to cover absences or 
to meet temporary peaks in demand. This was, unsurprisingly, not  well received – it  also 
reflected the contradictory position of a Socialist government wedded ideologically to the 
defence of employment norms, whilst  permitting the presence and growth of atypical 
employment. There was also a robust  exchange between heads of employment agencies and the 
representative of the ANPE, with one delegate suggested that social benefits were a disincentive 
for the employed to find work, which deprived agencies of potential candidates. The ANPE 
representative replied that  it  was up to agencies to ensure that  agency work was an attractive 
option. This led to vociferous protestation from the floor which one of the speakers described as 
a “lynching”. In the second forum, in 2001, a representative of employment  agencies advised 
the government against plans to provide a minimum income to students, which the French state 
“could ill afford”, and which would, again, deprive the sector of potential candidates from the 
student  body; it  was the role of the temporary employment  sector to provide students with 
income through part-time work. These interventions are interesting in that they demonstrate the 
relationship between social benefits and the availability of (cheap) labour – a relationship which 
is fundamental to Burawoy’s politics of production. 
By the 2005 Forum, the agency work sector had undergone profound changes that  would further 
embed its structural role in employment policy. In the same year, the centre-right UMP 
(Sarkozy’s Union pour un Movement Populaire) government had passed the Law on Social 
Cohesion which had extended the range of activities of temporary employment  agencies to 
include recruitment services and employment  placements, and had reinforced the partnership 
between employment  agencies and the ANPE. There were also changes in the conditions under 
which agency work could take place. For the first  time, the rationale for agency work was 
determined by the “needs” of the worker. Certain categories of the labour force – those deemed 
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in need of training or help with labour market integration – were considered appropriate 
candidates for employment  agencies to assist  in finding employment. This marked a significant 
turning point in the evolution of the regulatory framework of agency work, and corresponded to 
the themes raised at the forums. The transformation of the temporary work sector since its 
origins in the 1950s and the 1960s was acknowledged by the Vice-President of SETT: 
Twenty years ago we were considered as creators of precariousness. Today we are 
actors in the employment market. This transformation of our image opens up many 
possibilities for change. Similarly, from the point of view of job-seekers, we are 
going to be able to take charge of a much larger population, made up of all those 
seeking work. Our image is transformed and valorised by the social cohesion plan. 
(Forum du Travail Temporaire, 2005, p. 14). 
The Forum acknowledged the significance of the changes to the 1972 legislation in making 
employment agencies the “principle vectors of training” for young people – a move which 
represents a huge market for the sector, as does the outsourcing of ANPE functions to 
employment agencies.  
The reports of the forums offer an insight  into how the interests of employment agencies have 
converged with business and political elites to influence significant reforms to labour law and 
labour market institutions. The challenges posed by promoting numerical flexibility in a country 
strongly attached to the standard employment relationship constituted a significant part of the 
discussions that  took place, at  times taking on the form of a quasi-sociological debate of the 
nature of work and the recognition that the US “model” was incompatible with French 
employment relations. The representatives of the sector were confident of their role: “Our 
profession invented flexibility. We need to propose new forms of employment. The labour 
market lacks ideas.” (Forum du Travail Temporaire, 2005, p. 25) 
The presence of academics at the forums further legitimises the kinds of solutions proposed 
during the discussion, all of which were underpinned by a consensus that  employment  agencies 
are integral to the efficient  functioning of labour markets. The task of “influencing legislation 
and attitudes” was seen as an ongoing one, in particular in relation to removing barriers to 
Chapter 5 The Temporary Employment Sector in France
144
agency labour in the public sector as well as the continued need to address cultural barriers 
(Forum  du Travail Temporaire, 2007). The significance of the success of the sector lies in how 
it is able to offer flexible “solutions” to organisations in a national context still characterised by 
“labour market  rigidity” (according to dominant neo-liberal approaches to employment  policy). 
Attempts by French governments to fundamentally reduce the protection accorded by the CDI 
have been met with fierce opposition by French workers and youth, most notably during the 
2006 movement against proposals to make it  easier to sack young workers (Contrat de première 
embauche).
5. The growth of temporary agency work
The fear expressed in 1972 by trade unions (and the left political parties) that  the legalisation of 
agency work would serve to legitimise it as a form of employment appear to have been borne 
out. Despite the restrictions that accompanied legalisation, agency work has experienced an 
exponential long-term growth. It is generally acknowledged that  agency work has been used in 
circumstances that  not only stretch the interpretation of the legal framework, but also in 
instances that  are clearly beyond the legal framework (Erhel et  al. 2009; Belkacem et al., 2011). 
The extensive body of legislation over the course of the past forty years, encompassing both 
liberalising tendencies alongside protective measures for agency workers, has been 
accompanied by a steady growth in agency work, punctuated briefly in 1982 when the Socialist 
governments’ restrictive legislation led to a drop of 17% in rates of agency labour. 41 
Thus, despite a strong cultural and political attachment to the standard employment  relationship 
arising from deeply embedded social expectations regarding employment norms (Rubery, 
2005), there has been little in the way of obstacles to the long-term growth of agency work in 
France. In 1975, there were 100,000 agency workers working on a daily basis (Caire, 1973). By 
2007, this had grown to 650,000. Agency work now accounts for over 3% of employees 
(DARES, 2011). According to most  accounts of the activities of employment agencies, in the 
1950s and 1960s, services were provided predominantly for clerical and administrative posts, 
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41 Between 1982 and 1984, the number of agency workers dropped from 124 651 to 102 541. By 1986, 
the numbers had increased to 128 451.
which were more likely to be held by women (Vigneau, 2008, p. 86; Erhel et al., 2009; 
Belkacem et  al., 2011). However, Caire (1973) points out that key industrial sectors were also 
calling upon the services of temporary employment  agencies. Pialoux (1979) cites a study by 
Manpower in 1968 in which 62% of agency workers were found to be working in 
manufacturing jobs and 31.9% carrying out office work, although this is likely to be specific to 
Manpower, which had taken the strategic decision to move into manufacturing. Whilst  it  is 
difficult to arrive at  a precise profile of agency work during the 1970s, there is some evidence to 
suggest  that the 1970s was the “industrial stage” of agency work (Broda, 1978), as companies 
sought out human resource strategies aimed at fulfilling a range of functions dealing with the 
interrelated dimensions of labour costs and labour control (Germe, 1978). It is not  possible that 
this was due in some part  to the advances of labour made in the 1968 period since according to 
Germe (1978), those sectors that  had the most comprehensive collective agreements were those 
that most used agency work. Reforms that  undermined the market  element  of the labour-capital 
relationship, such as restrictions on the sacking of workers, statutory rights to employment-
based training, the monthly payment of salaries (which guaranteed the payment  of sick leave 
and holiday pay), increased the incentive of employers to circumvent the Labour Code; a 
strategy facilitated by the activities of key employment agencies. As unemployment grew 
during the 1970s, agencies were able to adapt  their business model from one which supplied 
labour in the context of a tight labour market, to one which claimed to offer a “pathway” into 
employment for young disadvantaged workers. Pialoux (1979) describes this process occurring 
in the northern suburbs of Paris, which experienced a rapid concentration of agencies in 
industrial zones. Additionally, Pialoux drew attention to how young unqualified workers in the 
Parisian region had long been compelled to access employment via agencies: 
In the Paris region, the use of temporary employment  agencies (ETT) became, 
from the 1960s onwards, one of the most  common and most  “normal” means of 
obtaining work for youth from the least qualified sections of the working class.
(Pialoux, 1979, p. 32)
This suggests a form of dualism within the labour market, arising from the labour market 
disadvantage associated with lack of skill, which rendered such workers dependent  upon 
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agencies for access to (precarious) employment. It also highlights the failure of the ANPE to 
provide an alternative to private employment agencies.42
5.1. Overall trends over the last two decades
Since 1997, agency work has been the fastest growing form of temporary employment in 
France. The most  significant period of growth occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. In 1995, 
there were 292,000 agency workers. By 2000, this had more than doubled and barring the fall in 
agency work due to the economic downturn of 2002, growth continued until 2009 when agency 
workers bore the brunt of the economic crisis that  unfolded in 2008. In 2010, the volume of 
agency work partially recovered although the volume of agency work is still below 2008 levels. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the volume growth and the rate of growth since 1990 respectively. 
Figure 3 shows that there have been four periods of negative growth over the past  twenty years. 
Agency work is highly sensitive to economic changes, far more so than other forms of 
temporary employment  (Segal and Sullivan, 1997), confirming its function as a tool of 
flexibility in sectors of the economy which are particularly susceptible to economic fluctuations. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the relationship between the rate of growth of GDP and the rate of 
growth of agency work: there is a notable correspondence between the two sets of data.  
Since 2009, agency work has driven the recovery in employment in France (Trésor-Éco, 2011). 
Peck and Theodore (2007) identified a similar movement  in the 2001 US recession when the 
sector was able to shed “one fifth of its arm’s-length workforce in the space of a few 
months” (p. 172), a description similar to the haemorrhaging of agency work in French 
manufacturing (particularly in car manufacturing) over the 2008/2009 period, and which 
illustrates precisely the function of temporary agency work under contemporary conditions of 
accumulation. Peck and Theodore’s (2007) work is a useful explanation of changes in the nature 
of employment  relations in the US, which may anticipate trends in France, despite the very 
different  regulatory and socio-economic contexts. In the 2001 recession in the US, the share of 
temporary agency work within overall job loss was 25.7%. In earlier recessions, this figure was 
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42 The ANPE is notoriously ineffective in carrying out its remit to provide labour allocation services. 
Neither jobseekers nor employers are reported as being satisfied with the ANPE. One of the demands 
CGT and the CFDT over the decades has been to provide the ANPE with sufficient resources as a 
prerequisite for their demand for a state monopoly on all types of employment placements. 
lower: 7.4% in 1990 and averaging 2.6% for 1973, 1980 and 1981. In the recovery following 
the 1990 and 2001 recessions the decline in aggregate employment was accompanied by a 
robust growth in temporary employment. When net employment began to register positive 
figures, temporary agency work was a large proportion of job gains. Agency work had thus 
became a “central feature of an elongated process of workforce adjustment, as employers 
add[ed] workers employed on temporary contracts whilst  continuing to shed permanent 
employees” (Peck and Theodore, 2007, p.178), thereby entrenching the role of the temporary 
employment sector in economic restructuring and creating the context  of a “jobless recovery” 
which, the authors argue, undermines sustained employment growth. There has been a similar 
movement in France with agency work falling at far higher rates compared with overall 
employment. The rate of decline in agency work was far higher than in previous recessions, 
especially in manufacturing, indicating the increased weight of agency work in sectors sensitive 
to economic cycles. By the end of 2009, when employment growth was still stagnating, agency 
work was growing rapidly (Belkacem et al., 2011, p.10). For PRISME and CIETT, this is 
illustrative not only of the important  role that  the sector plays as an early indicator of 
employment trends, but also of the sector’s influence on the hiring decisions of firms: “without 
agency work, employment would simply have stagnated” (Prisme, 2010). This claim is based 
upon a comparison of rates of job loss during the 1993 and 2008 recessions, in relation to the 
percentage decline in GDP. In 1993, a 0.9% drop in GDP led to a fall in salaried employment  of 
2.4%. In 2008, the reduction in GDP was nearly three times higher, yet employment fell by only 
2% due to the increased weight of temporary agency employment.  
A further interpretation is that  temporary employment agencies have succeeded in establishing 
their active, institutional role in the labour market:
The very availability of just-in-time employment  practices can contribute indirectly 
to the joblessness of a recovery. Just-in-time employment lets firms wait and see 
that a recovery is robust before hiring, yet  still expand production on short  notice 
by hiring temps and using overtime. It  allows them to lay off workers and delay 
hiring to a greater extent.
(Schreft and Singh, 2003, p. 65, cited in Peck and Theodore, 2007, p. 181)
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Such “just-in-time employment practices” rely upon the existence of a comprehensive network 
of local agencies able to respond rapidly to the needs of the organisation, a requirement  that the 
French temporary employment  sector easily fulfils with 1,200 agencies and 6,400 branches 
(Ciett, 2012) located in local labour markets that make extensive use of agency work. This 
tendency is particularly pronounced in the manufacturing sector, where the drop and rise in jobs 
over the 2008-2010 period is amplified when compared with other sectors (Figure 7).
Source: DARES (based on monthly reports from temporary work agencies).
The FTE (équivalent emplois temps pleins) are calculated with reference to the number of days 
worked (not hours).
Salaried employment accounts for approximately 65% of the active population
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Source: Dares
Source: DARES, INSEE (adapted from PRISME, 2010)
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5.2. Sectoral trends
Figures 5 and 6 show the sectoral distribution of temporary agency work over time. 
Manufacturing accounts for the highest  proportion of agency work (Figure 5). The structural 
position of agency labour in manufacturing emerged in the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2002, 
permanent jobs in manufacturing declined by 7.5% whilst agency work increased threefold 
(DARES, 2005). Official (government) reports of this change in the composition of labour in 
French manufacturing share the assumption of the temporary employment sector that agency 
work reduces the impact  of permanent job losses. At its peak in 2000, the volume of agency 
work in manufacturing was 311,600, representing 52% of all agency workers (Figure 5). 
Despite a subsequent decline, the sector continues to dominate the sectorial distribution of 
agency work, making up 44% of all agency workers in 2010. In 2009, this had dropped to 38% 
(approximately 229,100 agency workers FTE), however, 70% of new agency contracts in 2010 
were in manufacturing. These data conceal the highly uneven distribution of agency work 
between those sectors of activity that make up the broader manufacturing sector. The 
automobile industry (car assembly and suppliers) is the industry which makes by far the most 
extensive use of agency workers, measured as proportion of all employees (Table 1), registering 
a peak of 13.6% in the first quarter of 2002. Before 2008, agency work represented 9.7% of the 
total workforce, compared with 3.6% for all sectors combined. In the early to mid-1990’s the 
rate of agency labour in the automobile industry had ranged from 3% to 5%. However the 
establishment of close alliances between automobile plants and employment  agencies 
encouraged the growth of agency labour in the second half of the 1990s (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 
2011, p. 81).
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Source: DARES
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Source: DARES, INSEE
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Table 1. Temporary agency work as a % of total employment
All Manufacturing Construction Services Automobile Industry
1998 2.9 6.1 6.6 1.2 8.5
1999 3.3 6.6 7.8 1.5 9.5
2000 4.1 8.0 8.7 2.0 11.9
2001 3.6 7.6 8.3 2.0 11.4
2002 3.4 6.5 7.3 1.7 10.4
2003 3.2 6.4 7.6 1.5 11.0
2004 3.2 6.6 8.1 1.5 10.3
2005 3.3 6.7 8.6 1.6 9.6
2006 3.3 7.0 8.8 1.6 8.7
2007 3.6 7.5 8.8 1.7 9.7
2008 3.4 7.3 8.1 1.6 8.4
2009 2.6 5.0 7.1 1.3 4.7
2010 3.0 6.7 7.5 1.5 7.1
Source: DARES
There is a break in the data series from 2008 onwards. Prior to 2008,  the automobile sector was classified 
as a sector in its own right. Since then changes to the classification of sectors of activity have resulted in a 
combined category of the fabrication of “transport materials” (C4) including, for example, naval 
construction, however it is accepted that this sector of activity is made up overwhelmingly of the old 
automobile industry category and is therefore acceptable data.
Chapter 5 The Temporary Employment Sector in France
154
5.3. The characteristics of temporary agency workers
Agency workers in France are predominantly male. Whilst  men make up 42% of total 
employment43, they account for 72% of agency workers (DARES, 2010). In the 1960s women 
made up, by a small margin, the majority of agency workers (Caire, 1973). Since then the trend 
of agency work, in particular its growth in manufacturing has increased the proportion of men 
within the agency workforce. The agency workforce is also younger than the salaried labour 
force as a whole. 27.9% of agency workers are under 25 years of age (Figure 8) compared with 
8.9% for total employment. On the other hand, over the past  decade there has been a steady 
increase in the proportion of over 25 year olds. Since 2000, the proportion of agency workers 
who are under 25 has decreased from 36.4% to 27.9% (Prisme, 2010). 
Source: DARES
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43 Labour Force Survey by sex and age. See OECD statistics portal: http://www.oecd.org/els/
employmentpoliciesanddata/keyemploymentstatistics.htm
Source: DARES
Agency workers are primarily semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Figure 9 shows the distribution 
of agency work according to broad occupa .mtional category. 77% are “ouvriers” (workers), of 
which 40% are skilled workers. The occupational profile of agency workers has changed over 
the past  decade, with the proportion of unskilled workers decreasing by 10% since 2000 
(Prisme, 2010). The percentage of professional agency workers (cadres) has increased during 
this period from 0.9% to over 1.7% and intermediate professions from 4.7% to 7.9%. Whilst  the 
2010 Prisme report has made much of this trend in agency work, the overall profile has not 
significantly changed over the past decade. Thus, the profile of agency workers diverges from 
that commonly portrayed by the temporary help industry. It  is the case that  there has been an 
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increase in the diversification of “types” of agency workers such as those identified by Faure-
Guichard (2000) and Jourdain (2002): those seeking permanent  employment (l’intérim 
d’insertion); those between jobs (l’intérim  de transition); permanent  agency workers (emploi 
permanent); those seeking an extra source of income (e.g. students); and those who found 
themselves unable to escape low-skilled, agency work. However, the data indicate that semi and 
low-skilled manual workers continue to dominate, even though the temporary employment 
sector promotes, in addition to the labour market integration function of agency work, the idea 
of the “boundaryless” knowledge worker, in particular through its current  emphasis on training 
portfolios. Agency workers in the first  two categories above tend to have a positive view of 
agency work since it  provides them with the experience and confidence in the labour market 
that will increase their chance of finding permanent employment. The third category resembles 
the boundaryless worker who chooses to create his/her own “pathways” in order to successfully 
navigate the labour market. In recent  years, the temporary employment sector has sought  to 
cultivate “permanent” agency workers by emphasising how improvements to the rights 
accorded to agency workers can provide a secure framework for individual career path, thus 
responding to the twin demands of flexibility and security. 
However, it  is the last category that makes up a significant proportion of the agency workforce, 
for want of a permanent alternative. Temporary agency employment is therefore largely 
involuntary. This indicates that  despite a legislative framework aimed and protecting workers 
from job insecurity, for an increasing number of young workers, job insecurity is a daily reality. 
The final section of this chapter examines how trade unions have responded to this 
encroachment upon the standard employment relationship. 
6. Unions: from opposition to “real politik”
The responses of trade unions to agency work are conditioned by their (changing) ideological 
positions and their position within national industrial relations systems. The French system of 
industrial relations is one of frequent contestation marked by industrial conflict and legal 
interventionism rather than collective bargaining, and a union movement which has historically 
been ideologically strong whilst  being organisationally weak (Crouch, 1993; Goetschy, 1998, p.
357; Visser, 2001). Modern French history has been marked by key events which strengthened 
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the position of organised labour in negotiating and regulating labour-capital relations through 
national institutions governing labour relations and social welfare. The most far reaching 
reforms have occurred following mass movements of general strike action, for example 1936 
and 1968 and, to a lesser extent, 1945. After 1968, trade unions increased their legal and 
institutional recognition at  the local level. Similarly, the victory of Socialist  François Mitterrand 
in the 1981 presidential election and the subsequent  election of a left government  made up of 
Socialists and Communists (Union of the Left) reinforced the position of unions through the 
1982 Auroux Laws. French industrial relations are characterised by a comprehensive system of 
national collective agreements which cover 90% of all employees. Labour legislation is 
normally the outcome of national negotiations between social partners. French trade unionism 
has been described as “state-centred weakness” (Sellier and Sylvestre, 1986, cited in Goetschy, 
1998, p. 360) due to the interventionist  role of the state in according individual employment 
rights, associated with the contractual status of employment as codified in the Labour Code, and 
the extensive coverage accorded by the collective agreements regardless of trade union 
presence. This reduced the need to join a trade union, hence the low level of trade union 
membership – under 8%.44  However, trade unions are influential not  only through the formal 
mechanisms of industrial relations and social partnership but also in their ability to mobilise 
workers in mass demonstrations and strikes.   
The five union confederations that  have been designated as “representative” at national level are 
divided along ideological and confessional lines. Historically, there have been two main 
divisions. One strand is the CGT  and FO, which emerged out  of the militant syndicalism of the 
early French labour movement. The other strand is the CFDT and the Confédération française 
des travailleurs chrêtiens (CFTC) which has its roots in social Catholicism. The fifth 
representative trade union, the Confédération générale des cadres (CGC), organises 
professional groups of employees (cadres). Smaller union confederations have emerged as a 
result of splits from the major confederations – the Union nationale des syndicats autonomes 
(UNSA), the Fédération syndicale unitaire (FSU) and the Union syndicale – Solidaires (SUD), 
a federal grouping of radical independent unions which emerged from a series of splits in the 
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44 See OECD Statistics: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN
late 1980s and the 1990s, mainly from the CFDT. With a relatively strong presence in rail, 
postal (La Poste), telecommunications (France Télécom) and rail services (SNCF), SUD has 
also been growing in the health and education sectors, and in services such as cleaning where 
they have been active in fighting for the rights of workers on precarious employment contracts. 
Contemporary accounts of union divisions in France have evolved from viewing the CFDT/
CFTC/CGC as the “reformist” wing of trade unions in opposition to the “revolutionary” wing 
represented by CGT/FO, and more recently SUD. Pernot (2005) considers that “radical” (protest 
oriented) is a more appropriate designation of the CGT and FO, although Sainsaulieu (1999) 
placed FO in a separate intermediary position. Categorising trade unions, however, conceals the 
fluidity of union confederations (Pernod, 2005) and of rank and file activists in reaction to the 
local dynamics of the trade union and class struggle. 
6.1. Union strategies: opposition, negotiation and acceptance
During the 1970s, the three main confederations (CGT, CFDT and FO) refused to engage with 
the organisations representing the agency work sector. They had been opposed to the 1972 law 
viewing it  as providing legitimacy to a regressive form of employment. The decision of the 
CGT to sign an agreement with Manpower did not affect its overall stance toward legalisation. 
This was not surprising since, outside of the team negotiating with Manpower, the agreement 
was met with astonishment  by the trade union movement, including within the ranks of the 
CGT, especially since the text  of the agreement  contained within it  an acknowledgement of 
supply side explanations of agency work. Manpower correctly considered the agreement to be a 
major coup: “The most  important  French union confederation found that  agency work provided 
a service to workers. This was a big deal” (Grunelius, 2003, p. 83). In return, there was a 
“guarantee” that  agency workers would not be used to replace permanent  workers, and the 
negotiating team expected that  the CGT  would become the natural home for agency workers 
looking to unionisation.   
The French labour movement in general (with the exception of unions organised along 
professional lines such as the CFTC) considered that  where temporary employment  was 
appropriate, it  was the role of the state to allocate labour through the ANPE. Throughout the 
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1970s, the three main unions continued to use a prejorative vocabulary to describe agencies and 
their activities, adopting terms such as négriers (slave-traders), and officines (shady agencies). 
Although agency workers themselves were not  the target of their opposition, there has been 
little attempt  until recently to unionise agency workers, partly because trade unions have been 
most concerned with their core constituency of permanent  workers (Béroud, 2009) and partly 
due to the difficulties associated with organising agency workers, in particular the fragmented 
and transitory nature of their employment (Grollier, 2010). Béroud (2009) has also argued that, 
where trade unions have been opposed to agency work, they have tended to refer to the negative 
effects of precarious work on permanent workers and union organisation, first in terms of 
weakening their core membership, and then through a reluctant acceptance of agency work as 
the quid pro quo of restructuring (the “buffer” effect). 
The evolution of the position of trade unions towards agency work has followed the contours of 
political developments of the mainstream left parties, as well as the ideological evolution of the 
unions themselves. The left  victory in 1981 produced a shock wave throughout  France and an 
expectation within the labour movement and the left not felt  since 1968 (Bergounioux and 
Grunberg, 2005). Mitterand’s victory in the first  round of the elections, and the mobilisation of 
the right in response,45 prompted the Communist Party to call for Mitterrand’s victory in the 
second round, thus restoring the Union of the Left  (Union de la Gauche) between the Socialists 
and the Communist  Party which had broken down in 1977, and which had led to a 
corresponding tension between the CFDT and the CGT. Mitterrand’s programme was a far 
reaching Keynesian inspired program of reforms aimed at  creating jobs, redistributing wealth, 
improving workers conditions (for example, by introducing a fifth week of annual leave). The 
Left also promised to prohibit the activities of temporary employment  agencies. However, by 
the mid-1980s the government had abandoned its program of reforms in favour of a more 
monetarist inspired policy, and, as early as 1982, had already watered down its proposal to 
prohibit  agency work. The departure of the Communist Party from the government in 1984 
influenced the Communist-dominated CGT’s position towards the Socialist Party and the 
government. Whilst  the CP was in government, the CGT’s opposition to the 1982 legislation 
Chapter 5 The Temporary Employment Sector in France
160
45 The right, alarmed at the prospect of a Socialist victory, organised demonstrations between the first and 
second round of the presidential elections.
had been muted; whilst opposing agency work, it recognised the positive elements in the 
legislation. The CFDT, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported the legislation. The 
ideological shift  of the CFDT  away from its radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s, and a return to 
the “social regulation” politics of its origins resulted in a focus on negotiation. By 1979, the 
CFDT was already supporting the idea of “limited agency work” (Caire, 1993, p. 92). Both the 
CFDT and the FO participated in the tripartite negotiations which preceded the 1982 legislation. 
During the 1980s the institutionalisation of agency work was reinforced via a series of 
collective agreements. The 1982 legislation established a framework for the social partners to 
negotiate collective conventions to improve employment-based benefits associated with agency 
work, such as enhanced access to complementary health insurance and funds for professional 
training and development. This process reflected the evolution of union strategy towards 
negotiation, including the CGT  for a brief period during the Union of the Left. In 1982, all the 
social partners were encouraged by the government  to negotiate an agreement on social 
protection and training. The CFDT’s position, in particular, had evolved from opposition and 
refusal to negotiate with temporary employment agencies to the acceptance of a discourse which 
recognised the role of “flexibility” in combatting unemployment. Whilst  Mitterrand had been 
elected on a programme that promised to restore full employment, by the mid-1980s 
unemployment was growing. The government’s U-turn in 1983, which the CFDT  supported, 
replaced an employment  policy which promoted job creation though state intervention with a 
focus upon organisational competitiveness and profitability, one component of which was 
flexibility. With regards to agency labour, three years after the tightening of restrictions on its 
use, the government relaxed laws on the duration of agency contracts where businesses could 
show they needed longer term contracts to cope with production of goods for export. During the 
cohabitation with the RPR government following the 1986 legislative elections, labour market 
flexibility was pursued “with a vengeance” according to one author (Daley, 1993, p. 19). In the 
first  year of the Chirac government (1986-7), a ruling was passed to remove some of the 
restrictions on agency work. 
During this period, there was a growing acceptance that temporary agency work should be 
allowed to provide solutions for organisations that went beyond ad hoc substitutionism. An 
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agreement  in 1990 signed by the CFDT and the CFTC further underpinned the function of 
agency work as a legitimate tool of flexibility, allowing companies to respond appropriately to 
the requirements of a globalised economy, with the caveat that  agency workers should not 
replace permanent employees. This period was, therefore, an important  one in the history of 
agency work, not  only because of the (partial) unblocking of social dialogue (Caire, 1993, p. 
121), but  also because it heralded the gradual acceptance of a form of employment that  deviated 
from the employment norm and which had been met  with vigorous opposition just over a 
decade before.
The CFDT has since combined a strategy of negotiation at the national level with a critique of 
precarité in its publications. The pursuit of improved “flexicurity” and an active engagement 
with the temporary employment sector (e.g. its presence at the Forums du Travail Temporaire) 
has been traditionally favoured above mobilisation strategies. The CFDT has participated in the 
negotiations that  have led to (formal) improvements in the conditions of agency work; training 
has been a major preoccupation, seen by the CFDT  as an important component  of “flexicurity” 
since it  is said to reduce the risk of periods of unemployment. The evolution of the CFDT’s 
strategy has its roots in its “recentrage” of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it abandoned 
the goal of social transformation in favour of negotiating with social partners, adopting a model 
of engagement  with employers (Heery, 2004). Whilst  maintaining the centrality of the standard 
employment relationship, the CFDT sees temporary agency work as necessary both for user-
organisations (who need to manage their workforce in such a way as to maintain 
competitiveness) and for young workers in need of assistance in accessing jobs. 
The CGT has maintained its principled opposition to agency work. Whilst it was party to the 
1982 negotiations that led to the Fonds d’action social du travail temporaire (FASTT) and the 
Fonds d’assurance formation du travail temporaire (FAF-TT), it  has kept  its distance from 
collective negotiations with the sector. For example, it did not  sign the latest  collective 
agreement  on training (2010). The CGT was also heavily critical of the 2005 agreement  to 
extend the use of agencies, and was the only representative union not  to sign, claiming it would 
aggravate job insecurity.46  The union has struggled with the tension between a position that 
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formally seeks to abolish agency labour but which also campaigns to improve the conditions of 
agency workers. The danger of this latter strategy is that it risks “institutionalising” agency 
work, and, if it  succeeds in improving the conditions of agency workers, makes abolition more 
unfeasible. In recent  years this contradiction appears to have been resolved within the ranks of 
the CGT in recent years as it  has become more active in campaigning for the rights of agency 
workers, alongside its continued ideological denunciation.
SUD maintains a similar opposition to agency work. Like the CGT, the union’s literature 
contains repeated calls for the transformation of agency contracts into permanent contracts. As a 
relatively small and non-representative union, and given its critique of the “bureaucratism” and 
“institutionalisation” of the main unions, SUD’s strategy is focused more at the local and 
workplace level combining immediate demands for improvement  with more general 
denunciations of agency labour, reflecting its roots in radical, protest  oriented trade unionism 
(Connelly, 2012). The limited weight of Sud means that much of its strategy has revolved 
around using propaganda against agency work to distinguish itself from the other unions, and 
where, possible, building social movement type support  for workers in precarious employment 
conditions (for example, cleaners employed by external sub-contractors).
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6.2. Union mobilisation
The long term decline of French trade union membership47 has obliged French unions to address 
their “crisis” of membership (Bouffartique, 2005). The low level of trade union membership in 
France has not been treated as a major problem in an IR context in which legitimacy derives 
from workplace elections. However, the rise in independent representatives, and a questioning 
of the legitimacy of the role of “representative” trade unions in the tripartite social model, given 
their loss of membership, has obliged unions to address this problem. The unionisation of 
agency workers presents a challenge to unions for a number of reasons, not  least  the 
vulnerability that arises from the contingent nature of the contract, regardless of the formal 
rights to union representation. The discontinuity of employment and the episodic absence of 
income is a brake on union members (Cingolani, 2005). There are also objective factors flowing 
from the agency contract  which hinder unionisation. The dichotomy between the employment 
relation with the agency, and the work relation with the user-organisation creates a contractual 
and physical separation between the various elements of the wage-labour relationship which is a 
key reference point  for union mobilisation and collective action. At  a grass-roots level, unions 
have tended to focus on the effects of precarité on the collective consciousness of the working 
class in terms of general propaganda, rather than mobilising agency workers to defend their 
specific interests (Béroud, 2009). However, as with other European unions, French unions have 
been slow to develop organisational and mobilisation practices targeting constituencies beyond 
the traditional core worker (Béroud, 2009; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). Historically, 
unionisation has been a contentious issue, due to the concern that mobilising agency workers 
around demands to improve their conditions will inevitably lead to agency work becoming a 
legitimate and normal form of employment, thus undermining attempts to challenge the very 
principle of agency work. A 1990 article in the CGT’s Le Peuple attempted to square the circle 
thus: 
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47 In 1970, union density stood at 22%. This had dropped to 9.8% in 1990 and 7.6% in 2008 (OECD 
Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN). Mouriaux (1998) and Andolfatto 
(2002) see this as a resulting from a combination of external structural factors, such as unemployment and 
changes in the profile of the working class, and the crisis of the grand narratives that have inspired trade 
unionisms in the past.
… did we not  have a tendency at times to fear that  the demands raised by the 
workers concerned [agency workers] are in contradiction with our fundamental 
objectives, and as a result were we not  timid? We should be confident. If we 
discuss with workers starting from their needs, of course the issues that will 
emerge will be about immediate problems relating to their situation. But  one 
essential issue will necessarily arise: that  of their contract, their capacity to 
organise their lives, to control, the right to have plans, the use of their skills, never 
being paid, etc. What  will emerge will be strong convergences with other workers 
which we need to highlight. 
(Le Peuple, no, 1320, 1990, p. 5, cited in Kornig, 2003)
This quote is an example of an attempt  to find common cause between agency workers and 
permanent workers, starting from the experience of the agency worker. However, the CGT has 
prioritised the general ideological struggle against  precarité over mobilising agency workers. 
One of the problems lies in the nature of the French industrial relations system. Where 
competitive unionism exists alongside institutional support for unions, mobilising support  for 
workplace elections becomes a priority (Connelly, 2012). Since agency workers do not vote in 
the elections at  the user-organisation, and are considered less likely to vote in elections at 
employment agencies due to their distance from their legal employer, addressing their issues 
becomes less of a priority.
Most  unions deal with this by organising agency workers within their “services” federations. 
The CGT, however, was the first union to organise agency workers through a relatively 
autonomous national trade organisation, the Union Syndicale de l’Intérim-CGT (USI-CGT). 
SUD has recently followed suit by establishing Sud Intérim in 2011, and has succeeded in 
establishing a base in Manpower. The lack of coordination between the unions at  the 
employment agencies and unions at the user-organisation compounds the problems of 
mobilisation. Union representation at the employment agencies is difficult  due to the small 
number of employee representatives and the geographical dispersion of agency workers 
amongst large number of client organisations. Research has identified the difficulties in 
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combining agency work with official trade union activity. Agency workers who are trade union 
representatives face numerous obstacles, not least  being able to maintain a presence at  user-
organisations. It  is estimated that trade union density of agency workers is below 1% (Belkacem 
et  al., 2011). The USI-CGT  claim to have at least  800 agency workers. The Fédération des 
Services-CFDT, with a membership of between 1000 and 15000 members is unable to give a 
breakdown of agency workers and permanent employers of employment agencies. The low 
number of agency workers in SUD can be inferred from a breakdown of delegates at its 2008 
conference. Out of 270 delegates, only one was an agency worker (Béroud et al, 2011, p. 59)
The contradiction between organising agency workers in their own union federation and 
opposing agency work is reflected in the conflicting demands that can arise. Although, the CGT 
is opposed to agency work and demands that  all agency contracts are transformed into 
permanent contracts, the USI-CGT has developed autonomous demands which concretely 
address their situation as agency workers. For example, the USI-CGT calls for the retention of 
employee status in between agency contracts, in order to improve the security of agency 
workers, by classifying them as agency employees between contracts (Grollier, 2010, p. 28), as 
has been the case, until recently, in Germany. The increased interest  shown by the CGT in 
proposing solutions within the framework of the temporary agency contract is perhaps reflective 
of the acceptance that  agency work is not going to disappear, in the absence of a radical political 
challenge. Of the representative unions, the CGT has been the most  open to new forms of union 
organising, inspired by innovative trends in other countries, such as community unionism.48 The 
CGT has been the most active of the larger, representative unions in campaigning at  a grass-
roots level against the misuse of agency work. The most  high profile movement was the strike 
of sans-papiers, undocumented migrant  workers who, whilst  legally able to work in France are 
deprived of citizenship rights and, therefore, vulnerable to abusive practices. SUD has also been 
actively engaging in mobilising strategies to attract new generations of workers amongst the 
precarious workforce and has some success in La Poste and amongst cleaners. One of the 
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48 Community unionism is a new model of trade unionism aimed at overcoming the fragmentation of the 
working class and mobilising marginalised workers (see Wills and Simms, 2004). Recently, there have 
been attempts in France to emulate community unionism, particularly within SUD and some local 
organisations of the CGT (Béroud, 2009). 
features of this new focus on workers in precarious employment  has been to draw in active 
support from social movement organisations (Denis, 2005; Béroud, 2009). 
There have been some rare attempts to overcome the fragmentation of agency workers in the 
auto sector, by creating a geographically-based structure to bring together agency workers 
rotating between suppliers and assembly plants within a given industrial zone. In the early 
2000s at  Renault  Trucks, the CGT engaged in a combined strategy of organising agency 
workers geographically, in order to bring together multiple sites of work, using survey as a way 
of engaging and mobilising agency workers, organising demonstrations at  agencies (manifs 
kleenex) and legal challenges. Whilst this action led to the successful reconversion of agency 
contracts into permanent  posts, there was little gain in terms of increased membership (Béroud, 
2009). Mobilising activities such as these rely on the presence of committed activists 
(Darlington, 2008) and a local network that  can support stunts such as occupations of agencies. 
In the case of Renault  Trucks, the presence of young, militant  ex-agency workers was a crucial 
factor.
7. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the history, evolution and incremental institutionalisation of agency 
work in France. It  has illustrated that  the temporary help industry has been a key agent in 
carving out  the transition from the origins of employment agencies as marchands d’hommes to a 
situation today where employment  agencies are privileged partners in the institutional 
mechanisms which frame labour market  policy, with an increasing emphasis on combatting 
unemployment and facilitating labour insertion of lower-skilled workers. This does not  mean 
that agency work is no longer contested. There is still an ideological battle, enjoined by sporadic 
industrial contestation, played out over the weakening of the standard employment relationship. 
Agency work is still perceived by the defenders of the post-war compromise to be a particularly 
pernicious form of flexibility which allows employers to “hire and fire” at will. 
Temporary employment  agencies have made themselves indispensable labour market  actors in 
the twenty-first  century France. The relevance of the sector’s representative bodies in this story 
is evident in the historical evolution of the sector, from pushing forward an agenda to save the 
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sector from illegality to the present day partnerships between Prisme and local public 
employment agencies.49  In the next chapter, this is examined at  the meso level (automobile 
sector) with the aim of illustrating how the intersection of temporary employment  agencies and 
automobile manufacturers has transformed the regime (or regimes) of labour control in the car 
industry. 
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49 In September, 2011, PRISME signed an agreement with regional employment agency of Basse-
Normandie and FAF-TT to increase the access of youth and jobseekers to professional contracts and 
agency work development contracts.
CHAPTER 6
FACTORY REGIMES, LABOUR SEGMENTATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AGENCY LABOUR IN FRENCH CAR MANUFACTURING
1. Introduction
Auto manufacturing occupies an important  place in modern industrial history, playing a pivotal 
role in the changes that have taken place, from the introduction of new technologies to new 
forms of work organisation that have taken place in the sector in recent  decades. Druker, writing 
in 1946, referred to the sector as the “industry of industries” due to its position as a catalyst  for 
change. More recently, Bouquin (2006) referred to the sector as a “quintessential example of 
capitalist  rationality”. Auto manufacturing also has an iconic place within the history of the 
labour movement, exemplifying the power of large numbers of workers to disrupt the “Fordist” 
production process, and underpinning national models of industrial relations. The sector has 
been both a key component of the post-war social comprise, and an illustration of the fragility 
of that compromise, given the high levels of industrial action carried out  by auto workers. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that  much of the literature examining transformations in the labour 
process and employment relations draw heavily on the car industry (Coffey and Thornley, 
2010). 
The French auto sector evolved within a socio-economic context that  has been characterised by 
strong state support, and a regional policy from which emerged the automotive regions that have 
transformed local employment  landscapes. Labour-capital relations have also been influenced 
by French colonial history. In the post-war years, access to workers from French colonies in 
North Africa facilitated labour segmentation within car plants, providing employers with a 
source of highly exploitable labour. In the early 1980s, a series of militant strikes, organised 
largely by migrant workers in low-skilled assembly line work, improved the pay and working 
conditions of the lowest  grades of workers in car manufacturing plants. In the case of PSA 
Peugeot-Citroën, the strikes led to the reconfiguration of post-war labour relations in a company 
that has a history of “despotic” labour relations based upon a combination of paternalism, the 
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promotion of “company unionism” and strict discipline to enforce management  control over the 
labour process. The first major wave of restructuring in the auto sector took place in the 
mid-1980s and many of those who had lead the strikes were laid off. Since the 1980s numbers 
employed in auto manufacturing have fallen dramatically. In the early 1980s, there were over 
300 000 workers in the sector. By 1990 this had dropped to just  over 200,000, and by 2010 the 
auto sector employed less than 150,000 people. 
Whilst temporary agency workers have been used by PSA since the 1980s (Beaud and Pialoux, 
1999), this form of employment became widespread in the sector during the latter half of the 
1990s, as manufacturers used agency workers to deal with increasingly volatile markets. 
Successive waves of restructuring have resulted in a significantly reduced core of permanent 
workers, and although productivity gains have increased the output of this smaller workforce, 
the sector has increasingly factored into its labour resource strategy, a parallel workforce of 
predominantly younger workers on agency contracts. This chapter examines how this modern 
form of labour segmentation has come to be “structurally embedded” in this key part  of the 
French economy. The chapter examines key features of the post-war factory regime of car 
plants, and the forms of labour management that  emerged within the context  of the French post-
war social model. The first  part of the chapter looks at  the role of the state in directing French 
industry towards national priorities guided by the dirigisme that defined state-capital relations. 
The chapter then explores the nature of the factory regime that characterised auto 
manufacturing, and forms of labour segmentation in post-war France, before discussing the 
emergence of agency labour in the context of the restructuring of the sector. The final part  of the 
chapter looks at how the use of agency labour in auto manufacturing has been viewed in French 
society, through the lens of media coverage.   
2. The political economy of automobile production
2.1. State, capital and labour
Burawoy (1985) stresses the role of the state in shaping factory regimes by framing production 
and labour relations within institutional mechanisms that  modify labour-capital relations. In the 
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post-war period, the priority was to overcome the destruction of war and return shattered 
economies to sustainable levels of production in peace-time. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the French state played a particularly pronounced role in directing investment and 
production, one of the first acts of the post-war government being to nationalise key sectors of 
the economy. The post-war government sought  to mould French capitalism according to 
nationally-defined priorities, and to support  French industry through investment and restrictions 
on imports. Industrial policy was complemented by a system of social dialogue that promoted 
an element  of redistribution of wealth through the regulation of wages and the provision of 
social benefits (Lipietz, 1985).
In the early 1950s the dirigiste state steered the geographical dispersal of investment  throughout 
the country by initiating a programme of regional development which was bolstered in 1964 by 
the creation of a regional development agency, DATAR (Délégation à l’aménagement du 
territoire), the aim of which was to revitalise regional economies through the delocalisation of 
production. With the notable exception of Peugeot’s historic plant  at  Sochaux, the French 
automobile sector had traditionally been concentrated in the Paris region. In 1962, 54% of 
employment in the auto sector was located here. By 1975, this had dropped to 34% (Oberhauser, 
1987, p. 450). Renault, as a nationalised company, was under particular pressure to decentralise 
production away from Paris (Oberhauser, 1987), opening up plants in Douai and Maubeuge in 
the North. Peugeot also expanded its geographical spread by opening up a plant in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais, and opening a second plant in another part of Franche-Comté (Mulhouse). 
Decentralisation suited the auto industry. Rising incomes meant that  more people were buying 
cars and Paris could not provide the land required to expand productive capacity. The 
employment landscapes of those regions where new plants opened were significantly altered 
over the decades, as changes in relationships with suppliers have generated vast auto clusters 
and labour markets dominated by vehicle production. The Nord-Pas-de-Calais region illustrates 
the changes that occurred in local economies. In the 1970s the auto sector accounted for 
approximately 1,000 jobs in the surround areas. By the mid-2000s this had rising to over 30 
000, boosted by the opening of the Toyota plant in Valenciennes in the early 2000s.
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State interventionism still plays a role in French industrial policy despite the international 
consensus that considers state intervention to be economically bad. The French government has 
responded to the crises in the French auto sector by stimulating the sale of cars manufactured in 
France. In the mid-1990s, finance schemes known as the Balladurette and the Juppette (named 
after the Prime Ministers of the day) provided cash incentives for car owners to replace their old 
cars, and reduced Value Added Tax on the purchase of new cars. The governments of the day 
openly espoused the need to protect  French capital, whilst also arguing that the replacement of 
older, high polluting cars with “greener” models was good for the environment  (Adda and 
Cooper, 2000). Similar measures were introduced to combat the fall in car sales in 2008 and 
2009. The prime à la caisse (scrappage scheme) was a key element  of the rescue package 
introduced in 2009. The government also hoped to prevent PSA Peugeot-Citroën from 
relocating large parts of its production to the Czech Republic. Nicholas Sarkozy, the French 
President  at the time, used his announcement of the government’s 6.5 billion euro bailout 
package to urge French car manufacturers to keep production in France.50  His discourse was 
very much part  of the ideological tradition of appealing to the “social” function of private 
organisations; in addition to the primary aim of generating profit, business are also expected to 
serve l’intérêt social.51
Although successive governments have accepted the principles of market  liberalisation, there is 
a persistent  tension between French industrial policy and the liberalising trajectory of the 
European Commission (EC), exemplified through the lens of the auto sector. Whilst France is 
not alone in its protectionist  and interventionist bail-out  of national car manufacturers52, it was 
France that  pioneered these schemes in the 1990s. The French state has also been a vocal in its 
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50 L’état demande à Renault et PSA de ne pas fermer de sites en France, Le Monde, 7 décembre, 2008.
51 Jefferys (2010) presents a convincing analysis of the difference between Sarkozy and Thatcher. He 
argues that Sarkozy is a prisoner of a national tradition that is unlikely to embrace Hayek, given the 
weight of Rousseau’s ideas in the construction of the modern French state.
52 Similar schemes were implemented in other countries, including a particularly generous scheme in the 
US, due to the importance of the sector for broader economic performance and the need to maintain 
employment in geographically concentrated car plants (OECD, 2010).
opposition to the EC’s trading policy53 in relation to auto vehicles. For example, attempts to 
harmonise the technical regulations of vehicles were opposed by France (and Italy), since 
maintaining local standards is a way of preventing non-EC imports. McLaughlin et al. (1993) 
describe the state-capital relation expressed here as a “symbiotic” relationship between the state 
and manufacturers, where the influence of manufacturers is felt via national political 
representation in Brussels, beyond any direct  company and associational lobbying that  may take 
place. 
The French state has also discouraged hostile takeovers of flagship manufacturers. The 2005 
Breton Law (designed to prevent  a hostile takeover of Renault), and other legislation making 
government approval necessary for takeovers in sectors deemed “sensitive”, have allowed 
French capital to retain a strong indigenously character, unlike, for example, the UK car 
industry. The latter has undergone a process by which it has been transformed “from a sector 
were British owned firms and foreign direct  investors competed against one another, to one 
where British firms were all either wholly owned or partially owned by foreign 
competitors” (Reich, 1990).54  Admittedly, the corporate structures of Renault and PSA have 
undergone significant changes since the 1990s, which have changed the character of their 
corporate governance. The privatisation of Renault  reduced the state’s stake in the company to 
15%. Of the floating shares which make up 62% of Renault’s capital, 58% are institutional 
investors, 45% of which are non-French. The merger with Nissan in 1999 gave Nissan a 15% 
stake but no voting rights.55 Foreign capital does not have a majority claim on Renault  and the 
company still maintains its place as an iconic French company in the popular imagination. PSA 
also maintains its French character with non-French institutions accounting for a third of shares, 
the Peugeot  family accounting for 30% and French institutional shareholders making up 22% of 
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53 The maintenance of the “block exemption”, introduced in 1985 and which continued until 2007 
reflected view within Europe that the auto sector was a “special case” and, therefore, exempt from 
European competition rules.
54 Reich explains this with reference to the “liberal democratic” ideology, which makes no distinction 
between firms “on the basis of foreign or domestic ownership” exemplified in the UK auto industry 
(Reich, 1990, pp. 1-2). However, he locates the ideological differences between UK and countries on the 
continent in the legacy of the industrial policy of fascism. In emphasising the experience of fascism, 
Reich ignores the significance of pre-war ideological divisions and post-war compromises that sprung 
from the need to create a national identity out of class polarisation.
55 See http://www.renault.com/en/finance/action/pages/repartition-du-capital.aspx
shares.56  The prevailing French character of these companies permits Sarkozy, and François 
Hollande (the current  President) to appeal to the patriotic sensibilities of French car 
manufacturers. The state-capital relation is, of course, a two-way process. Like the temporary 
employment industry discussed in the previous chapter, the most powerful players in the auto 
industry exert pressure on government  both individually and collectively, via their organisation 
Union des industries et métiers de la metallurgie (UIMM) 
2.2. The role of the UIMM within the system of social partnership  
The UIMM is an employers’ organisation which covers a broad range of activities associated 
with engineering. Large auto manufacturers have a dominant  position within the UIMM. Many 
of the agreements that are negotiated between the UIMM and representative unions originate 
from issues that  have emerged within collective negotiations in the auto sector, for example, 
agreements on early retirement  for workers in physically draining posts (travail penible). Within 
the MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises en France – the French employer’s organisation) and 
its predecessor, the CNPF (Conféderation nationale des patrons de français), the UIMM has 
traditionally held a hegemonic position. Until 2005, UIMM presidents were invariably those 
supported by the engineering industry (Woll, 2005). However, recently, the UIMM’s position in 
the MEDEF has been challenged by the election of Laurence Parisot  as president.57 In addition, 
recent  revelations concerning a financial scandal involving the unaccountable transfer of large 
sums of money, some of which appears to have been destined for an anti-strike fund, have 
damaged the reputation of the UIMM.58 
Through the MEDEF, the UIMM has been able to promote its model of tripartite capital-labour-
state relations, within the constraints of a “social compromise” that  is expected to safeguard 
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56 See PSA Annual Report http://www.psa-peugeot-citroen.com/fr/publications
57 Laurence Parisot, the current President of the MEDEF, comes from the service sector. Her election was 
greeted by an article in the newspaper Le Point entitled “MEDEF, the engineering industry not longer 
rules the roost”. http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-economie/2007-01-17/les-metallos-ne-font-plus-la-loi/
916/0/18878.
58 Whilst mindful that the UIMM contributes 20% of the MEDEFs budgets, Parisot demanded that 
members of the UIMM who sat on bilateral bodies in the name of the MEDEF stand down. The general 
secretary of Renault, who represented the MEDEF on UNEDIC, was one of the first to stand down.
“l’intérêt general”.59  The UIMM is actively engaged in societal debates around the future of 
work and social policy, both on its own account  and through its influence within the MEDEF. In 
recent  years, this intervention into social policy has seen the UIMM venture further away from 
the post-war model by promoting a break with France’s “rigid” labour laws. In May 2011, the 
organisation announced its intention to draw up a “Manifesto for Industry” which would revolve 
around four key areas in need of reform: unemployment  insurance, public employment  services, 
the employment contract, and training. Measures proposed in the preparatory document 
included a reduction in the “generous” unemployment  benefits of temporary workers and a 
proposal that employers should be free to adjust the working time of employees according to 
business cycles, with a corresponding adjustment of wages.60 
This direct intervention into policy areas is a response to the difficulties experienced by 
successive governments of the right in tackling head-on the protections accorded to labour in 
the twentieth century. The transformation of the CNPF into the MEDEF was an overtly political 
response to the failure of President Chirac and his Prime Minister Juppé to overhaul public 
sector pensions. The establishment of the MEDEF – a “movement” not  a “confederation” – 
represented the attempt of the employers’ organisation to galvanise employers around a political 
project of neo-liberal restructuring of labour-capital relations. In other words, they sought to 
succeed where the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) (the predecessor of Sarkozy’s 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire – UMP) had failed. The deeply-entrenched attachment 
within French society to a model of state-brokered social dialogue, employee representation at 
national and local levels and joint management  of welfare, has both shaped and constrained the 
way in which employers’ organisations have advanced their vision of twenty-first century 
French capitalism. The financial crisis of 2008 provided the UIMM with an opportunity to 
reaffirm its liberalising propositions in the context  of the generalised insecurity of 
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59 The documents of the UIMM make frequent reference to “l’intérêt générale”. During the 2012 
presidential election campaign, the organisation countered Sarkozy’s idea of a referendum on issues such 
as unemployment insurance, by reaffirming its commitment to social dialogue via general framework of 
social partnership as a “key factor of social cohesion”, whilst recommending changes to the conditions of 
representation of unions away from the outcome of elections to actual membership. See http://
www.usinenouvelle.com/article/l-uimm-met-en-debat-un-nouveau-pacte-social-dans-la-
presidentielle.N168973.
60 See http://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/2011/05/19/04015-20110519ARTFIG00680-chomage-salaires-les-
idees-detonantes-de-la-metallurgie.php.
manufacturing workers, who have been the most affected by crisis. These proposals would 
dramatically alter the employment relationship in favour of capital and, in turn, alter the factory 
regime that shapes the labour process by making the employment relationship more responsive 
to management priorities. Currently, it  is the temporary agency contract that allows car 
manufacturers to overcome the “rigidity” of the standard employment  relationship: a modern 
version of the labour segmentation of earlier decades, and one which has different advantages 
and functions for car manufacturers. The next section examines the nature of the labour process 
in French car plants and the forms of factory regime that emerged and evolved in the latter 
decades of the past century, creating the context for contemporary employment trends.
3. Varieties of factory regimes in French car plants
Amossée and Coutrot (2011) interpret Burawoy’s concept of “factory regime” as an institutional 
mechanism located between the labour process and the state, which establishes coherence 
between the nature of competition, the reproduction of labour power and the organisation of 
work. The term “coherence” masks the dissonance that is fundamental to the capitalist  labour 
process, the expression of which varies according to national and temporal context. If coherence 
is defined by productivity growth with a corresponding distribution of wealth which in turn is 
the basis for further capital accumulation, then the factory regimes (broadly speaking) during 
the Trente Glorieuses can be characterised as “coherent”. However, economic growth under 
capitalism cannot be isolated from the fundamental antagonism that drives the management 
strategies to control labour, an antagonism that  expresses itself in different forms and to 
different  degrees, according to different contexts. The spread of Fordist  production in the post-
war decades did not  entail a simple transposition of an American form of labour process to 
France, any more than lean production was a simple transposition of a so-called Japanese model 
of production61. The following section explores the nature of factory regimes in French car 
plants. The cultivation of labour segmentation in what  is considered to be an iconic exemplar of 
Chapter 6 Factory Regimes, Labour Segmentation and the Emergence of Agency Labour
176
61 Japanisation refers to the idea that Japanese “best practice” can be conceptualised an a single model of 
production, referred to as Toyotism or lean production. Elger and Smith (1994) critique the idea that 
Japanese industry can be reduced to one model.
the hegemonic regime, is shown to be an important  element  in shaping the labour process in the 
car manufacturing. 
3.1. Car manufacturing under Fordism: a weak hegemonic regime?
Classic theories of Fordism assume that workers trade acquiescence to the management goal of 
increased productivity in exchange for job security, increased wages, and an internal labour 
market based upon clearly defined grading structures and progression through seniority (Piore 
and Sabel, 1984; Jessop, 1994). Burawoy also considered this trade-off to be a key characteristic 
underpinning the hegemonic regime (Burawoy, 1985). It would, therefore, be expected that  this 
would be a feature of labour relations in car plants in France, a country which is a model of a 
tripartite social compromise between labour, capital and the state. Yet, various ethnographies of 
life on the line for the French car worker reveal a factory regime characterised by low wages, 
high rates of absenteeism, high turnover rates, harsh management  practices and few 
mechanisms available for progression (Linhart, 1974; Beaud and Pialoux, 1999; Durand and 
Hatzfeld, 2002). Bouquin (2006) argues that the distinctiveness of French Fordism lies in an 
industrial relations system that focuses union power at  the national level at  the expense of shop-
floor bargaining power. Local unions took their cue from national federations, and prioritised 
general class-wide demands or demands which reflected class-wide concerns at a sectoral level. 
This was evident in 1968 when, despite militant factory occupations, the demands of car 
workers were those that united car workers nationally (reduction in the working week, an 
increase in the minimum wage and retirement  at 60) with little attention to local shop floor 
issues, despite the militant occupations of factories. Some abstract slogans emerged reflecting 
local concerns; the slogan “time to live” at  the Renault  factories at Cléon and Flins captured the 
effects of a long working day which began and ended with an hour-long journey from rural 
areas to the factory and back. However, trade unions were less vocal around issues concerning 
the organisation of work (Almond, 2004, p. 11), in contrast  to UK, German and Swedish 
counterparts (Bouquin, 2006). 
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Issues related to the organisation of work and job content were left to management.62 Instead, 
trade union power was concentrated at  the national level, with trade unions granted an important 
role in overseeing the redistribution of wealth generated from higher productivity (Goetschy, 
1998, p. 358). Grunberg (1986) observed a similar distinction between the UK and France in his 
comparative study of the Peugeot plants in Poissy (France) and Ryton (UK). At Poissy, 
management had virtually uncontested control over production unlike the Ryton plant  where 
workers were able to impose far more on the labour process. Grunberg provides a further 
explanation for this disparity; At the Poissy plant there was a high proportion of immigrant 
workers; unable to to access welfare benefits, they were dependent upon the plant  for their 
material sustenance and therefore had less scope to challenge management. 
The lack of voice at plant level that Bouquin (2006) describes was overcome to some degree by 
the events of 1968. A more confident working class felt more able to raise demands outside of 
the structures of national union federations. In the auto sector, numerous conflicts arose in the 
post-68 period, predominantly around grading structures that  prevented the progression of the 
lowest  skilled, the ouvriers specialisés (OS), who made up the large proportion of the 
workforce. Skilled workers were classified in the category OP (ouvrier professionel). 
Progression from OS to OP was hindered by a lack of recognition of the skills learnt  on the job, 
so that  those without the Certificat d’aptitude professionnel (CAP), a general skills certificate, 
found themselves stuck at OS level, regardless of their years of service. The pay inequality 
arising from the grading structure and the lack of mobility meant that it was common for 
workers to be carrying out  similar work for significantly different  wages. In contrast, the 
German and UK systems had a much more condensed hierarchical structure, which generated 
less wage disparity. In addition, the OS could only access the stability accorded by a monthly 
salary (la mensualisation63) after twenty-five years of service. Although rates of pay for the OP 
were low in comparison with, for example, car workers in Germany, the situation of the OS was 
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62 There were exceptions to this in the post 68-period in other sectors. Notably, the 1973 strike at the Lip 
watch factory in Besançon, which began as a struggle against closure and which culminated in an 
occupation of the factory and an attempt to impose workers self-management (auto-gestion). 
63 This had also been a demand during May 1968. In the early 1970s there were a series of agreements 
that accorded monthly salaries to blue collar workers who had previously been excluded from 
mensualisation which was limited to white collar staff (employés) and management (cadres).
considerably worse, given the lack of opportunity to progress. This is a version of labour 
segmentation within primary economic sectors that Reich et al. (1973) identified.64 The division 
of labour, formalised by job stratification systems, generates different types of labour markets 
within the same company with different rules of entry for white collar workers and blue collar 
workers, and little movement  between the two. Each segment operates according to its specific 
internal labour market (ILM). Segments are differentiated mainly by “stability 
characteristics” (Reich et al., 1973 p. 359) with one segment  benefitting from job stability and 
career progression opportunities, and the other on unstable contracts, low wages and limited 
access to progression. In French car plants, labour segmentation was imposed by a hierarchical 
division between the OS and the OP which did not reflect the nature of skill acquisition on the 
shop floor.
3.2. Migrant labour and the struggles of the ouvriers specialisés
This form of labour segmentation was reinforced by the high proportion of immigrant workers 
amongst the OS. Algerian workers recruited to Renault  in the late 1940s and 1950s (when 
Algeria was still a French) were assigned to posts on the lowest  levels of the grading65 
regardless of qualifications (Pitti, 2006). This resulted in an ethnic-based division of labour that 
prevailed for decades and enabled Renault to maintain a large low-wage labour force, subjected 
to intensive exploitation, and often lodged in insalubrious hostels and slum areas.66  It  was 
therefore possible to square the circle of low salaries/harsh work and sustained recruitment  at  a 
time when there were many other employment options available. Later, the presence of migrant 
labour allowed French manufacturers to postpone changes in the organisation of work aimed at 
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64 Earlier theories of labour market segmentation viewed segmentation in terms of core and peripheral 
sectors, affected differentially by the degree of stability of product markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). 
Atkinson’s flexible firm, on the other hand, located segmentation at the firm level, according to skills and 
activities carried out by employees. The various models of segmentation are limited in their application 
due to the complex interaction between characteristics of employees and of organisations that influence 
organisational strategies. 
65 According to Pitti (2006), in workshops where they were mainly OS, Algerian workers were 
systematically recruited on the lowest levels. Where there were largely OPs the Algerian workforce were 
predominantly OS: “[Mahfoud C] joined Renault the 2nd November 1955, with a CAP de fraiseur and 
was nonetheless recruited on OS1, whilst comparable French workers were recruited as OP” (Pitti, 2006, 
p. 52). 
66 Some immigrant workers took part in rent strikes against their intolerable living conditions (see Hmed 
2007).
“humanising” the factory, with one manager noting that  it  was cheaper to use migrant  labour 
than it was to modernise the plants. At  a time when manufacturers elsewhere – for example, in 
the UK and in Sweden – were experimenting with theories of job enrichment, French employers 
were entrenching Tayloristic discipline on car workers (Bouquin, 2006).  
This division of labour between immigrant/French and OS/OP was, for a time, a major barrier to 
collective action. Skilled workers were not receptive to the demands of the OS to be upgraded to 
OP status since this was perceived to represent a downgrading of their status. The main union in 
the sector, the CGT, did little to overcome this division. In a classic example of the insider/
outside divide, the CGT  defended its core constituency, which was the predominantly white and 
OP. When, in the early 1970s, the OS engaged in struggles around their own demands, they 
were rejected as divisive. The CGT preferred to focus on demands that had the potential to unite 
the workforce (Bouquin, 2006, p. 85).67 
Reich et al. (1973) argue that labour segmentation functions to reproduce capitalist hegemony. 
By setting up a grading system based upon arbitrary divisions, and by drawing upon an 
immigrant  workforce, manufacturers were able to undermine the collective organisation and 
power of labour that, in the context  of a large, homogenised Taylorist  factory has the potential to 
challenge this hegemony. Beside the advantage gained from the downward pressure on wages, 
this was an important  mechanism of labour control. However, management strategies are open 
to contestation as labour learns and reacts to workplace and broader experience. The strikes that 
broke out in the aftermath of 1968 were born out  of a period that had seen workers galvanised 
around slogans such as travail égal, salaire égal. Despite the barriers to collective action the OS 
were able to overcome national differences within their own ranks (Bouquin, 2006, p. 84) and 
execute effective strike action, illustrating that  subordination to the labour process is open to 
challenge and resistance even though conditions for resistance are severely undermined by 
workplace practices and organisation. 
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67 This does not mean that the CGT never fought for the rights of immigrant workers. In the 1950s, the 
CGT and other unions campaigned against the large disparities between Algerian and French workers in 
family-related benefits. The CGT also took up the cause of the mains d’oeuvre – who were an even lower 
grade to the OS – to be assimilated into the OS grades, although it maintained its opposition at this time 
for the OS to be assimilated into OP grades (Pitti, 2006). 
An important  contextual factor that  contributed to the spread of strikes in the early 1980s was 
the presidential election of François Mitterrand in 1981, which created a sense of expectation 
and confidence throughout the working class. However, Mitterrand’s turn away from many of 
his Keynesian-inspired electoral promises in the mid-1980s facilitated a process of job loss in 
the sector, by allowing manufacturers to employ a variety of institutional mechanisms to 
alleviate some of the costs associated with shedding labour. State support  for restructuring was 
outlined in a 1984 government report  that suggested that the sector cut  70,000 jobs (Dalle, 
1984) in order to respond to the crisis of overproduction in the 1980s that  was compromising 
the realisation of value through sales. The struggles of the OS also have to be set against the 
economic crisis that affected car manufacturing in the 1970s. The oil crisis led to a collapse in 
car sales in 1973 and 1974 (Loubet, 1974, p. 114). Manufacturers responded with a twin 
movement towards both concentration and international expansion which created the conditions 
for economies of scale and access to other markets.68 At  the same time, increased competition 
meant  that  manufacturers could not put  off modernising production, at  a time when changes to 
the classification system had raised the wages bill (Liepetz, 1985; Bouquin, 2006). The 
increasing cost  of fixed capital led to a drive to increase productivity, a process reinforced by 
the crisis of overproduction that hit the sector in the 1980s and which generated a price war. At 
this point, increases in productivity were expected to be achieved mainly through the reduction 
of the workforce and technological advances, rather than the “Japanisation” of French car 
manufacturing, and the intensification of work (Durand, 2004)
The history of the OS in the French auto sector is a reminder that  the subordination of labour in 
capitalist  social relations is a tendential phenomenon, subject  to the ebbs and flow of conflict 
within the labour process, influenced by events both internal and external to the factory. The 
relationship between capital and labour is antagonistic and dialectical; both sides are inexorably 
drawn to advancing their interests against  the other. Both sides learn from the experience of 
conflict. In the case of French car manufacturers this learning process has at  times been explicit. 
Pitti (2005) describes how Renault  monitored different groups of workers to identify their 
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68 Peugeot acquired Citroën in 1974 following its collapse (an acquisition encouraged by the French 
state); it then bought Chrysler Europe in 1978, making it the biggest European car manufacturer and the 
third biggest globally.
relative advantages and disadvantages for management priorities (Pitti, 2005).69  Peugeot 
engaged in strategies to manage labour in addition to labour segmentation, relying on 
paternalistic forms of labour-capital relations and cultivating a system of company unionism 
that was more successful than in other companies. The company monitored its strategies, and 
reacted if they were found to have outgrown their usefulness. When Peugeot found that  its 
policy of housing production workers together in subsidised (Peugeot-owned) tenements had 
the effect  of strengthening the collective identity of their workers and resulting in labour 
conflict, the system was replaced with the provision of home loans (Hatzfeld, 2002). 
The history of the OS also provides an indication of how the concept  of factory regimes, which 
Burawoy developed according to dominant  national models, needs to account  for hybridised 
regimes at various levels. Workers in the same plant, carrying out similar work, can labour 
under different forms of regime – a forerunner to the segmentation that came with the turn to 
temporary agency work. Although temporary agency labour was present in car plants in the 
1970s and 1980s, as replacement  labour for absences which Grunelius (2003) describes as high 
in the sector, it  was not until the 1990s that  it  became a structurally embedded form of 
employment differentiation.
3.3. Embedding agency labour in auto manufacturing
The steady decline of core workers since the 1980s has seen direct  employment  in the sector 
decline from a peak of 350,000 in 1978 to less than 150,000 in 2010 (Figures 10 and 11). At the 
same time, parts of the sector, such as PSA, were beginning to turn to employment  agencies in 
order to make up the shortfall in labour when the core workforce was not sufficient. The 
requirements of production in the sector corresponded to the discourse of the temporary work 
sector which throughout the 1990s developed services specifically for the auto manufacturers. 
Agency work has the added advantage that it  can undercut  resistance to change. Beaud and 
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69 Renault’s reports even detailed the tendency for some migrant workers to suffer from illnesses due to 
their inability to “adapt” to the climate. Hatzfeld’s study of Peugeot uncovered similar classifications and 
associated stereotypes. The UIMM’s report on “The problem of the OS” classified workers as “white” or 
“coloured” with the latter being less open to progression to a lack of qualifications, in contrast to studies 
that found that many of the immigrant workforce did in fact have qualifications over and above those 
demanded by their assigned positions. See Pitti (2005) and Hatzfeld (2002, p. 119).
Pialoux’s (1999) study explains Peugeot’s large scale recruitment of young agency workers in 
the period 1987 to 1990 as a response to the resistance of older workers to organisational 
transformations (PSA was introducing its version of lean production via its Plan Mercure in the 
mid 1980s). The growth in agency labour at this time was significant, reaching 3,500 agency 
workers by July 1990. Peugeot  led the way in the recruitment  of agency workers amongst  the 
big manufacturers, although by 2000 Renault had 4,500 agency workers (against Peugeot’s 
12,000), making auto-manufacturing the sector with the highest  rate of agency workers as a 
proportion of the workforce (Eurofound, 2002). 
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From the manufacturers’ point of view, agency labour is consistent with the contemporary 
management trends of just-in-time and lean production. If production is to be finely tuned to the 
cycles of product markets, then why not  labour too? The temporary work sector recently 
highlighted a government  study which found that in those sectors, such as the automobile 
industry, where production is organised around principles of just-in-time, agency work is a key 
mechanism for managing fluctuations in productive activity (PRISME, 2010). However, this 
approach to labour sourcing is problematic in the French context  given the relative protection of 
workers on permanent contracts and the tight restrictions and protections which limit the use of 
agency labour. In the absence of a liberal legal framework governing agency labour, companies 
have engaged in practices that have permitted the presence of large numbers of agency workers, 
for long periods of time, despite the legislation. These practices have been reported both 
anecdotally and through legal challenges. They include altering job descriptions to get  around 
the 18 month time limit, and interspersing agency contracts with fixed-term contracts. Agency 
contracts are preferable to fixed-term contracts due to the services of temporary work agencies, 
which reduce the risks associated with large scale flexible labour. The costs associated with 
agency labour (the indemnity for precarious work and agency fees) have been reduced by 
negotiating major contracts to supply agency labour on a large scale (Eurofound, 2002). Since 
the 1990s, negotiations with temporary work agencies eager to establish durable and substantial 
contracts have succeeded in pushing down the unit  price of agency contracts (Belkacem, 2011). 
Contracts between large manufacturers and temporary work agencies are frequently negotiated 
at  a national level (Glaymann, 2005), and implemented at  a local level via the temporary work 
agencies that have opened up near plants (Pialoux and Beaud, 1999).
Therefore, despite the “end of the assignment bonus” and fees to the agency, the cost reductions 
associated with temporary agency work can be considerable. Although smaller companies that 
make up the third and second tier suppliers lack the bargaining power of the large manufacturers 
when negotiating with agencies, they compensate for this by paying agency workers a salary 
corresponding to coefficient  165, despite this grade being virtually non-existent  for auto 
workers since the 1980s when most OS were placed on coefficient 175 (Bouquin, 2006, p. 157).
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The increasing prevalence of agency work in the auto sector from the 1990s onwards indicates 
that researchers such as Gorgeu and Mathieu are correct in raising concerns about  the structural 
position of agency labour within the overall employment policy of automobile companies. It  is a 
significant development in a sector that  has employed a variety of strategies to achieve the twin 
goals of wage limitation and labour control. A combination of factors has privileged agency 
work as a strategy: the presence of a strong temporary work sector responsive to the business 
requirements of its major clients; the lack of correspondence between employment  legalisation 
and the business imperatives of a key economic sector exposed to a competitive global market; 
the lack of adequate control mechanisms to oversee the use of agency work in the sector by state 
or labour institutions – this is discussed further in the following chapters. The final part  of this 
chapter examines the dissonance between the use of form of labour and societal expectations of 
employment in a sector associated with the post-war industrial norm of employment.
4. Temporary agency work in the auto sector: “winning hearts and minds”? 
Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007) argue that temporary work agencies engage in practices aimed at 
transforming attitudes in a national environment  that  is hostile to agency labour, so that  attitudes 
are aligned with the “new culture of work”. The previous chapter examined the ways in which 
the temporary employment  sector has attempted to “win hearts and minds” by promoting the 
positive role of agency work in mediating labour market interactions in a similarly hostile 
cultural context. Whilst  agency work has become embedded within labour sourcing strategies, it 
is not  evident that it is an accepted form of employment  beyond the most  enthusiastic 
proponents of agency labour. Attitudes to agency work may differ according to sectoral and 
occupational context, with the small proportion of skilled, professional agency workers 
establishing good relations with agencies and client organisations (Kornig, 2011). When agency 
work is largely viewed as a low cost replacement for permanent  workers, attitudes may well 
continue to be negative. One of the gauges of attitudes to agency labour in the auto sector is the 
extensive coverage of the issue in the French print media. The national daily and local 
newspapers have followed developments since the 1990s. The coverage has, in large part, been 
negative coverage. As early as 1998 it was noted that  temporary agency work was becoming “a 
structural component of the organisation of companies” in a sector that  was simultaneously 
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reducing the number of workers employed on a permanent contracts.70  Many articles in the 
1990s referred to the “excessive” use of agency workers, reflecting societal expectations that 
agency work should be a marginal and limited form of employment. There are also references in 
the second half of the 1990s to the implications of agency work for job insecurity, and health 
and safety in the context  of general coverage of issues related to employment and society (see 
Appendix 1). 
The overall tone of newspaper coverage reflects the prevailing attachment  of French society to 
the standard employment contract  in the face of changing forms of employment and the claims 
of employers and temporary work agencies that flexibility is an indispensable tool for 
contemporary human resource management. The human cost of these practices in the auto 
sector is documented in the anecdotal evidence published by newspapers, in particular regional 
ones. The impact of the crisis on local labour markets was extensively covered in those regions 
heavily dependent  on the car industry for employment. Newspaper interviews with agency 
workers revealed not only their present situation and fears for future employment but also their 
experience of work. Most had hoped to obtain a permanent  position at some point  in the future, 
despite long periods of successive agency contracts.71  The lack of choice open to agency 
workers and their dashed aspirations contrast with the discourse of employment  agencies that 
promote agency work as corresponding to the changing employment preferences of workers, 
and as providing a bridge into permanent work for young people.72 The transformation in the 
employment experience for new generations of workers was expressed by one young agency 
worker who contrasted his experience with that of his father who had never had to use the 
services of an agency to access employment in the regions’ car plants. This exclusion of young 
workers with few qualifications from traditional pathways into employment  and the extended 
duration of employment insecurity has been observed by researchers as a growing phenomenon 
in recent years (Durand, 2006, p. 30; Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2008).
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70 Les Echos, 20th November, 1998; La Tribune, 9th December, 1998; Les Echos, 30th December, 1998.
71 Ouest France, 13th November, 2008.
72 Libération, 7th April, 2006.
5. Conclusion
Gorgeu and Mathieu (1995) and Pialoux (1998) show how the large car manufacturers have 
employed a variety of strategies aimed at  reducing labour costs. In the 1960s, the arbitrary 
maintenance of the OS as a low-wage section of the workforce was one such strategy, which 
had the additional effect  of thwarting shop-floor unity. The capacity of labour to overcome the 
barriers of labour market  segmentation and force changes to their working conditions led 
manufacturers to elaborate new strategies. The reduction in the workforce that accompanied 
lean production and the intensification of work, whilst reducing unit  labour costs, generated 
labour conflict. In addition, the sector found itself under-resourced at  times of peak production. 
The inability to easily dismiss workers and the costs associated with redundancies makes 
agency labour an attractive option. The presence of a “super-exploited” section of the labour 
force, which from a Marxist  perspective is labour exploited beyond the “normal” standards of 
exploitation in any given society, retains a continuity with past forms of labour segmentation 
(Bouquin, 2006, p. 156) and has advantages for capital beyond the reduction of labour costs. 
This chapter does raise a further issue. How is that car manufacturers have been able to 
comprehensively undermine the legislative framework governing agency work? This question is 
addressed in the final chapters of this thesis by bringing together the macro-level contextual/
historical data that have been examined in this chapter and the previous chapter, with the meso 
and micro-level data presented in the following chapter. Paradoxically, agency work began to be 
embedded in the sector in the years following the Socialist  government’s strengthening of plant-
based unions through the Auroux Law of 1982, which might  have had the potential to 
strengthen labour’s capacity to resist flexibilisation. The Socialist government  also reinforced 
statutory dismissal protection in the 1990s73, when agency labour was becoming embedded in 
the HR strategy of auto manufacturers. This liberalisation at the margins (Clasen and Clasen, 
2003), occurring in the context  of legal enhancements of the core, appears to be a trade-off 
between labour and capital, at  the expense of a growing periphery of younger generations of 
workers. The current  crisis has seen the negotiation of alternatives to redundancies (e.g. wage 
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73 Labour Minister, Martine Aubrey overturned Chirac’s 1986 weakening of employment law, stipulating 
that employers have to put in place comprehensive social plans which favour redeployment and training.
and working time reductions) in order to limit  the impact on permanent workers, a compromise 
that has excluded those on agency contracts. 
Labour market “duality” (OECD, 2011) has allowed the French political and financial 
establishment a “get out clause” that limits the effects of its inability to successfully confront  the 
protections accorded to the Contrat du Durée Indeterminée, due to the continued attachment to 
the post-war compromise as witnessed by the militant action taken by students and unions 
against the Contrat de Première Embauche (CPE) in 2006. However, the ability of the French 
labour movement to resist threats to the standard employment relationship has been undermined 
by the growth of agency labour, which may weaken the response of the labour movement to 
future attempts to modify the employment relationship, most notably the plans for a contrat 
unique, which will institutionalise flexibility for all employment contracts. The OECD has 
identified labour market “dualism” as a problem for France since it shifts the risks of economic 
shocks to “non-integrated workers”, as recent  developments in the auto sector have confirmed. 
The proposed solution to this inequity is to better align the rights of permanent workers with 
those of temporary workers by simplifying redundancy laws whilst improving access to training 
during periods of joblessness (OECD 2011, p. 106). 
Increasing job insecurity, the reduction of wages and the wider context of plant closures that are 
a consequent  of the period opened up in 2008, indicate a deepening of features associated with 
hegemonic despotism (Hyman, 1987, p. 51). The current situation in the French car sector has 
confirmed the prescience of Burawoy’s 1985 characterisation of the new regime of hegemonic 
despotism. More than ever, workers in car plants have been confronted with the need to grant 
further concessions to capital to ensure the survival of their plants, concessions that not only 
concern their own working conditions, but also the fate of large numbers of agency workers. 
Nevertheless, such concessions are no guarantee of long-term job security; the buffering 
function of temporary agency work is increasingly a delusion, as the recent announcement to 
close a number of Peugeot plants demonstrates. Trade unions, therefore, are confronted with 
their failure to respond effectively to the increase in temporary agency work. Despite a number 
of successful challenges in the courts, manufacturers have continued to maintain high 
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proportions of agency workers. The consequences of this for agency workers (and permanent 
workers) are examined more closely in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIENCES OF LIFE ON THE LINE AS AN AGENCY WORKER
1. Introduction
This chapter examines how the status of the agency worker affects the experience of the labour 
process in car plants. The chapter first  sets out the socio-economic and labour market context  of 
the PSA Peugeot-Citroën plant  in Aulnay-sous-Bois before presenting interview data from 
union reps and agency workers at  the plant, and from union reps, officials and agency workers 
external to the plant. The interview data presented in this chapter is not  only from the Aulnay 
plant. Interviews with agency workers at Toyota and union representatives from other plants are 
also included. These interviews provide an additional source of data from which to examine and 
analyse the experience and perceptions of agency work in car plants generally, and, in some 
instances, prove to be central to the analysis. The presentation of the Aulnay plant  provides an 
anchor to the research by setting out a contextualised case of a car plant with a specific 
historical and socio-economic location. 
2. PSA Peugeot-Citroën in Aulnay-sous-Bois
The Aulnay plant of PSA Peugeot-Citroën is located in the town of Aulnay-sous-Bois in the 
department of Seine-Saint-Denis, 20 km north of Paris. The plant is the biggest employer in the 
department, drawing in workers from the surrounding areas, including Paris. Seine-Saint-Denis 
is the most  deprived department  of the Ile-de-France region, whilst Aulnay-sous-Bois is one of 
the most  deprived local areas or communes within Seine-Saint-Denis. The unemployment  rate 
for the department  is higher than both the Ile-de-France region and France as a whole74. The 
2010 unemployment  figures were 11.3%, 8.2% and 9.4% respectively.75  Youth unemployment 
(15-24 year olds), at 27.7% is higher than the national average (22%).76 The gender composition 
of the local labour market differs significantly from that  of France in that  men account for a 
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74 All statistical data for France relates to “metropolitan” France and excludes overseas territories.
75  INSEE, localised unemployment rate. See http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?
reg_id=20&ref_id=17539
76 Ibid.
larger proportion of employees (69%, compared with 53% nationally), reflecting the weight of 
North African immigrants in the demographic make-up of the department, since women in this 
demographic group have lower rates of employment (Machado et  al.,). The youth labour market 
is characterised by a high proportion of young people leaving school without  any qualifications 
(30% compared with 20% for the Ile-de-France) and a higher proportion of young workers 
classified as blue-collar workers (ouvriers) than other departments in the region (Pottier and 
Hamet, 2011). As a result, youth in Seine-Saint-Denis experience significant difficulties in 
school-to-work transitions. Temporary agency work is an important entry point to employment 
for many young people; Seine-Saint-Denis has a higher incidence of agency work than other 
parts of the Ile-de-France (Pottier and Hamet, 2011). 
Aulnay-sous-Bois is one of the larger communes within Seine-Saint-Denis with a population of 
83,000 (only Montreuil and Saint-Denis are larger). In terms of demographic and labour 
statistics, Aulnay-sous-Bois can be said to be a microcosm of Seine-Saint-Denis. It  is classified 
as a ZUS – Zone Urbaine Sensible (Sensitive Urban Zone). These are areas that exhibit  a 
number of indicators of social deprivation such as high unemployment  and a high proportion of 
social housing. The Ile-de-France has a higher proportion of residents living in ZUS than for 
France as a whole (11% compared with 6.8%). Seine-Saint-Denis is the department with the 
highest  proportion of residents living in ZUS (20.5%), including Aulnay-sous-Bois, which is 
classified as one of the of the most challenging ZUS in terms of the combination of indicators.
The auto sector is an important source of employment in Seine-Saint-Denis. The Ile-de-France 
has maintained its status as a major automobile region due to the presence of PSA and Renault 
and associated sub-contractors. The most  recent data (2009) put the number of employees in the 
region in the auto sector at  51,500. Although this is down from 56,100 in 2006, the sector 
continues to be an important  source of employment. The bulk of job losses have occurred in 
production posts, whilst employment  in research and development has grown (Machado et  al., 
2011). Figure 12 shows the recruitment trends for PSA in the Ile-de-France between 2000 and 
2007. At the beginning of the decade PSA was recruiting over 2,500 employees onto permanent 
contracts. This began to fall to below 2,000 recruits in the second half of the decade falling 
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dramatically to just over 100 in 2007. Taken as a whole, total employment  at PSA (directly 
employed staff in the whole of France) fell from just over 100,000 in 2004 to around 84,000 in 
2010, a fall of 16% (Figure 13). Production workers make up most  of the job decline at PSA. 
Production workers declined by nearly 20% between 2005 and 2010 whilst  other occupational 
categories declined far less dramatically (Figure 14). Between 2006 and 2010 operators 
represented only a small proportion of all recruitment (Figures 15 and 16). The  large proportion 
of operators recruited in 2011 was a consequence of the government  bail-out. Rates of agency 
labour (Figure 17) have also been in overall decline since the peak at  the start of the decade 
(which led to a union campaign against the “abuse” of agency labour - see previous chapter). 
However, agency labour has continued to make up a significant proportion of the workforce in 
relation to production line employees (where agency labour is concentrated). Between 2006 and 
2008 the number of agency workers stood at 8%-11% of directly employed production workers. 
To these figures can be added the contrats pros which increased significantly after 2009 (Figure 
18). The numbers of temporary agency workers at the Aulnay plant  (Figure 19) have been 
estimated from various sources. Whilst  there has been a decline in agency labour at  Aulnay 
since the very large presence of agency workers in 2000 (1,800), the number of agency workers 
was regularly over 500 until 2012.
Source: PSA Annual Reports
0
750
1500
2250
3000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Figure 12 PSA recruitment (permanent contracts) Ile-de-France 
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
193
Source: PSA Annual Reports
Source: PSA Annual Reports
0
22000
44000
66000
88000
110000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 13 Total employment PSA 2004-2011
0
15000
30000
45000
60000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 14 Occupational breakdown of PSA employees 2005-2011
Operators Supervisors Management
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
194
Source: PSA Annual ReportsSource: PSA Annual Reports
Source: PSA Annual Reports
0
1750
3500
5250
7000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 15. PSA recruitment (permanent contracts) 2003-2011
0
750
1500
2250
3000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 16. PSA recruitment (permanent contracts) of operators 2003-2011
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
195
Note: 2010 and 2011 reflect hiring as a condition of bailout funds
NOTE: These figures are from PSA annual reports. Figures for agency labour no longer appear 
in PSA reports after 2008 (date for 2007 is also not available).
*average monthly numbers
Source: PSA Annual Reports
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Figure 18. Number of Contrat de professionalisation at PSA 2004-2011
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
196
Source: These figures have been compiled from union and media sources. They do not reflect 
monthly variation. See Appendix 2.
At the beginning of 2012, 40% of scheduled job losses in the Ile-de-France were in auto-
manufacturing (INSEE, 2012 data). Seine-Saint-Denis, and, in particular, Aulnay-sous-Bois, 
have been identified as areas that are exposed to the risk of economic stress due to the weight  of 
one economic sector (the auto sector) in employment, and due to the high proportion of blue-
collar workers. In Seine-Saint-Denis, 13% of manufacturing employment is in the auto sector, 
accounting for 4,700 jobs in 2009, the majority being in the Aulnay plant.77 The 2008 crisis led 
to a big increase in the number of young people seeking employment, particularly amongst 
young low-skilled men. A similar trend was observable during the 2001/2002 crisis, which hit 
the auto sector hard. In July 2012, PSA confirmed that  the Aulnay plant would close in 2014 as 
part of a restructuring process that will see the loss of over 6,000 jobs in France. Some sources 
estimate that over 13,000 jobs are threatened by the closure of Aulnay – 3,500 directly and a 
further 10,000 jobs that are said to depend upon the Aulnay plant.78 The importance of the site 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1998 1999 2000 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 19 Estimations of numbers of agency worker at Aulnay plant
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77 See http://industrie-iledefrance.org/uploads/_industrie_iledefrance/fiches/cc_maquette_bois_2011.pdf
78 This figure was quoted by the mayor of Seine-Saint-Denis in the local Aulnay magazine, Oxygène, no. 
148, February, 2012, p. 3. 
to the local community was illustrated when 2,000 marched to save the plant, filling up the main 
square of Aulnay-sous-Bois, a sight not  seen since France won the world cup in 1998 (Oxygène, 
2012).
2.1. The plant
The plant  is situated on a vast terrain at  the intersection of three motorways. Comprising three 
workshops – body assembly, painting and final assembly – it  has a production capacity of 1800 
cars a day. The workforce has been nearly halved over the past  decade. In 2002, there were 
6,900 workers, including 1,500 agency workers. Since 2010, Aulnay has faced a series of 
restructurations which have progressively reduced the number of agency workers. Alongside a 
plan of incentives to encourage voluntary severance, management closed down the night shift, 
ending the contracts of 500 agency workers. According to the latest (2012) figures79 for the site, 
3,300 workers are left, of whom 300 are agency workers. At the same time, management 
maintained obligatory Saturday working, which it had introduced in 2009. The average monthly 
salary of a production worker is €1,250 Euros net. Agency workers take home around between 
€1,000 and €1,100, a wage that is not much higher than the poverty line rate of €945. 
The plant  is surrounded by sub-contractors whose workflow and organisation is tied to the 
rhythm of the Aulnay plant. Some of these are subsidiaries of PSA. Trigo, a company that 
verifies the controls on cars and which is located within the plant, is a typical example of trends 
in the sector. Once part  of PSA, it  was set  up in 1997 by an ex -PSA cadre (professional/
manager), thereby transferring 1,000 PSA employees to a new employer. 
Access to the plant is by car or by one of the many coaches supplied by PSA to collect workers 
at  various points in the surrounding areas. Whilst most workers live in the suburbs, a small 
number of coaches bring in the minority of workers who live in Paris. The opportunity to take 
the coach from Paris to Aulnay provided a small but significant insight  into the labour force at 
Aulnay. The coach for the day shift leaves Nation in the east  of Paris at  13:35pm picking up 
workers who will not return until 10 o’clock in the evening. Apart from a relatively older profile 
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79 This figure is quoted regularly in the numerous reports on the closure of the Aulnay plant.
– the average age at the plant  is 35 – the workers on the coach reflected the demography of the 
plant, mainly North African males but also men of sub-Saharan African origin, with some 
workers of other ethnic origins (the plant has recently recruited new migrants from countries 
such as China and India) and a handful of women. The coach was a “luxury” coach with a 
driver in a smart  uniform, in contrast  to the workers; a sign forbids eating and drinking on the 
coach. The most  surprising aspect  of the journey to the Aulnay plant was the lack of 
conversation amongst these workers on their way to begin their working day. Apart  from the 
odd brief conversation, the coach was silent. Some of the workers slept, others stared out of the 
window. The impression was of a workforce drained of any enthusiasm or energy as they began 
their working day.
Once at the plant, the change of shift was impressive. Hundreds of workers passed through the 
gates to take up the posts of those on the morning shift. For a brief period, the area outside of 
the gates came alive, as those who were coming off their shift exchanged information with 
union reps, caught up with colleagues who had been moved to other workshops, or even bought 
a copy of the Trotskyist  weekly Lutte Ouvrière being sold by workers at  the plant and by young 
members of the Lutte Ouvrière group being initiated into the world of the industrial working 
class. The younger workers were well dressed (smart casual), in contrast to the typical “look” of 
a traditional French worker, and in contrast to the older workers. 
The morning shift  begins at  06:46 and ends at 14:37 at  which time the next  shift begins, in order 
to ensure that  the line keeps moving. Before the night  shift  was abandoned, it too began when 
the previous shift ended, at 22:28 finishing at  06:09. The union representatives who I 
interviewed described a strict regime of time-keeping at the plant. As set  out  in the collective 
agreement  negotiated by the union and the metal industry employers’ organisation, the UIMM, 
workers on the line have two ten minute breaks, and a lunch break of 35 minutes (for some the 
walk to the canteen takes ten minutes, followed by long queues), with extra breaks limited to 
one per day. Union pressure was required to ensure that pregnant women were allowed to take 
more breaks (this is a legal right). Any lateness is noted and is docked from pay as appropriate, 
sometimes for as little as one minute.
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2.2. Labour relations at Aulnay
The plant, like other plants in the PSA group, has a history of conflictual labour management 
that has sought  to marginalise oppositional unions. This was achieved in the past by cultivating 
company unionism amongst the skilled and, especially, supervisory layer of workers who were 
pitted against  the mainly migrant ouvriers specialisés (OS). The OS were subjected to a harsh, 
largely despotic regime, and were unable to join their union of choice. The militant OS strike of 
1982 temporarily broke the hold of the Confédération syndicale libre (precursor to the Syndicat 
Indépendent de l’automobile – SIA) within the plant, by successfully winning the right to 
organise freely in the plant  as members of the CGT union. However, a series of lay-offs two 
years later returned the CSL to its dominant position. Aulnay, therefore, is still marked by the 
legacy of company unionism – despite an espoused change to a more consensual, social 
partnership model of labour relations in the late 1990s throughout  the PSA group. Although 
there are active CGT  and SUD branches at  the site, SIA manages to attract  the most votes in 
workplace elections. In the January 2011 elections, SIA won five of eleven seats on the 
workplace committee (Comité d’établissement) with 40.38% of votes. The CGT  came second 
with three seats (28.22%), followed by the FO, SUD and CFE/CGT  with one seat  apiece. 
Similarly, in the elections for the workplace delegates (Délégués du Personnel), SIA got  11 
seats, the CGT 8, FO and SUD 3, and the CFDT and CFE/CGC 1 (Tables 2 and 3). Whilst  this 
represents a slight  decline in SIA support from previous years (in favour of CGT, FO and SUD), 
SIA continues to retain significant support amongst workers at the plant.
Nonetheless, a number of small scale conflicts have broken out in recent  years, including a 
wildcat strike in 2005 for the maintenance of salaries when management temporarily ceased 
production by imposing chômage partiel. It  was this strike that  led to the presence of SUD at 
the plant. In 2006, a hundred or so agency workers went on strike to demand that  they, too, 
receive payment  of days of “partial unemployment”. This was a successful strike that  was 
resolved by the management  of the plant transferring responsibility to the temporary 
employment agencies. The payment of the non-worked days by the agencies (following 
negotiation with the PSA management) was described as a “pyrrhic victory” in an article in the 
business magazine L’Usine Nouvelle, since the agency workers involved would no longer be 
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working for PSA.80 Some agency workers also took part  in an unsuccessful minority strike in 
2007 when 500 workers, organised by the CGT and SUD, demanded a wage increase of €300 
and the reclassification of the 700 agency contracts (out of a workforce of 4,500) into 
permanent contracts. 
Despite this episode of unity between the CGT  and SUD, relations between the unions at the 
plant are not good, reflecting divisions in French unions nationally, but  also plant -specific 
dynamics (see Chapter 4), with the SUD representative displaying a vehement  attitude to the 
CGT representatives. However, the threat over the future of the plant  has led to the creation of a 
joint union body (intersyndicale), made up of all the unions – including SIA which, as the 
majority union, has found itself compelled to fight the closure.81
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80 “De plus en plus d’ouvriers touchés par la pauvrété”, L’Usine Nouvelle, 14th December, 2006.
81 Nevertheless, SIA’s seems to be maintaining its role as “company union” according to an account of the 
intersyndicale meeting that was held at the plant the day management announced the closure. The main 
SIA representative at the plant urged workers not to disrupt production or do anything that might make 
things even more difficult for PSA. 
See http://www.rue89.com/rue89-eco/2012/07/18/psa-aulnay-les-collegues-craquent-retardement-tous-
les-jours-les-pompiers?sort_by=thread&sort_order=ASC&items_per_page=50&page=2
Table 2 Works Council (Comité d’établissement) Elections 2007 and 2011
Union 2007 2011
% Seats % Seats
SIA 44.10 6 40.38 5
CGT 27.21 4 28.22 3
CFDT 5.92 - 4.9 -
FO 7.71 - 12.02 1
CFTC 3.57 - 4.25 1
SUD 6.28 1 10.23 1
CFE/CGC 5.21 1 - -
Source: GSEA
Table 3 Worker Representatives (Délégués de Personnel) 2007 and 2011
Union 2007 2011
% Seats % Seats
SIA 40.63 15 37.77 11
CGT 27.80 10 29.39 8
CFDT 6.53 2 4.93 1
FO 8.22 2 12.55 3
CFTC 3.96 1 0 0
SUD 6.9 2 9.9 3
CFE/CGC 5.96 1 5.47 1
Source: GSEA
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3. Union perceptions of temporary agency work in car plants 
This first part  of the interview data sets out  how union activists and officials view the changing 
composition of the workforce in the auto sector and the position of agency labour within human 
resources strategies to manage the labour force.
The interview data from the union representatives and officials reflected the approaches and 
concerns of their respective national unions. The SUD and CGT  interviewees expressed a strong 
opposition to agency labour in principle, and were vocal on the negative effects of agency 
labour on working conditions. The CFDT official had a more nuanced position. The CFDT 
frequently cloaks its demands in references to the “shared goals” of management  and workers. 
A leaflet from 2008 raising the demand for extra break time at PSA began with the following:
The PDG of PSA wants to make the company the most competitive in Europe in 
2015. The CFDT shares this goal but  the PSA system of production must  not  be 
implemented to the detriment of employment and conditions of work.82
The CFDT official spent  some time explaining to me how he thought  that companies were 
realising that  temporary agency work brought more costs that advantages to manufacturing. As 
the discussion in Chapter 6 suggests, the CFDT’s focus on the coûts cachés (Savall and Zardet, 
2003, cited in Larbi, 2008) of agency work expresses the union’s strategy of negotiation and 
influence in contrast  to the CGT and SUD’s more combative stance. It is also a position that was 
espoused by Toyota for a very brief period following the opening of the Valenciennes factory, 
when the company CEO announced: “[I]f we want to make a car that  is a good quality car and a 
cheap car, it’s not with agency workers that we will be able to achieve this”.83  As Eddie 
described, such sentiments were short-lived; two years later 17% of the plants’ workers were on 
agency contracts.84
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82  Leaflet of the Fédération Générale des Mines et de la Métallurgie-CFDT (CFDT metal workers 
federation), dated 30th May 2008,  PSA: La CFDT demande un repos hebdomadaire pour les salariés 
confrontés au nouveau système de production. 
83 Libération, Toyota: counter-inquiry on a social model
http://www.liberation.fr/evenement/0101496832-toyota-contre-enquete-sur-un-modele-social
84 Ibid.
3.1. Temporary agency work as embedded flexibility
When asked about views on the evolution and trends of agency workers in the car sector, union 
representatives and officials identified profound changes in recruitment  practices and workforce 
management. Their interpretation of changes and the increasing use of agency labour 
corresponds to trends and explanations already identified in the literature. The consensus is that 
agency labour is increasingly a structurally embedded form of labour, without which car plants 
would not be able to function. Whilst  precarious employment  is seen as increasing in general, 
for the automobile sector agency work is a “real boon” (Victor, CGT representative, PSA 
Mulhouse). Union interviewees interpreted the constant and large presence of agency work as 
an integral part  of a system of production premised on the concept  of lean, in the context  of an 
uncertain market that relies upon excluding a significant  proportion of the workforce from 
employment norms, with the aim of creating a pool of easily disposable workers. These 
disposable agency workers function as a key variable adjustment (variable d’ajustement absolu) 
for employers who were shedding permanent jobs while engaging in a parallel process of 
increasing their dependency on precarious employment:
I came here in 1981 and there were very few agency workers. Then there were the 
mass lay-offs in 1984. There were 7,000 workers.....they sacked 2,000…...in total 
there was a reduction in the workforce of 2,000. We went from 7,000 to 5,000. And 
a year later they began to put  agency workers in their place, not straight away, but 
after two years we had 500, 600 agency workers, and then more. We had as many 
as 2,000 agency workers.
(Pierre, CGT rep, PSA Aulnay)
The use of agency work at  PSA was described as being on an “industrial” scale. In the Aulnay 
plant, it  was not  unusual to have workshops where half of the workforce was agency labour. At 
the Mulhouse plant, Victor described his workshop, where only 6 workers out of 40 had 
permanent contracts – the remainder being either standard agency workers or agency workers 
taken on as contrats pros. Victor found the numbers of agency workers at his plant (2,700) 
incomprehensible:
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It’s a huge amount, the equivalent  of a medium sized company, like some 
subcontractors who have 1,500 people. That means we could have two factories 
with the number of agency workers there are at Peugeot.
(Victor, CGT rep, PSA, Mulhouse)
In a sector characterised by volatility, the advantages of temporary agency work are evident  in 
the context  of a labour regulatory regime that  presents barriers to shedding workers. An 
additional advantage is the invisibility of agency workers when their contracts come to an end:
Instead of it  making the front  page like when they sack 200 people at  Peugeot, with 
a social plan, etc, redundancy pay and all that, which also means that  everyone can 
enter into a struggle to save jobs, instead they can sack without  have to tick these 
boxes, to bypass the unions, redundancy pay......
(Victor, CGT rep, PSA Mulhouse)
The disposable nature of the workforce that this quote highlights is further illuminated by the 
use of the term “stock” by the SUD official when referring to agency labour. He was 
unapologetic about the use of the term, since it  reflected the way management  views agency 
labour as merely another factor of production, devoid of the human element:
And yes I do mean “stock”, in general we talk of stock when referring to 
commodities but now we talk of stock when referring to human beings.
He continued by contrasting the treatment of agency workers, viewed as any other input  into 
production, with the way in which the protection accorded by the standard employment 
relationship obliged employers to treat  their workers better. This interpretation of changing 
forms of employment  relations encapsulates the decommodification thesis and the return to a 
more commodified form of labour. 
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3.2. Workplace outcomes and embedded flexibility 
Whilst agency labour was viewed primarily as a tool allowing manufacturers to better match the 
workforce to production requirements, other advantages for manufacturers were identified. 
Again, views of how manufacturers benefit from agency labour correspond to the literature. 
Manufacturers are able to filter the temporary workforce in order to limit  the risk of taking on 
the “wrong” kind of permanent employee. Agency workers can be evaluated over a long period 
of time to ensure they meet  their organisational requirements, with recruitment to the assembly 
line at  Aulnay being exclusively from the pool of agency labour. Those unable to keep up with 
the speed of the line or those who display the wrong attitude can be excluded both from future 
agency contracts or permanent  employment. Thus, the traditional function of agency work as a 
mechanism for selecting permanent  workers continues to operate, although now it  appears that 
this has been extended to the selection of long-term agency workers. The SUD official referred 
to this as an extended “trial period” which could last for two or three years, during which time 
agency workers would be on their best behaviour in the hope of getting a permanent post. The 
consensus was, unsurprisingly, that  car manufacturers benefit from a more “malleable” 
workforce on the shopfloor, whilst collective action is undermined by the division of the 
workforce. This has a generalised negative effect on workers’ conditions and negotiating power. 
In addition, agency workers provide manufacturers with a constant  pool of physically fit young 
workers, an advantage in a production process which, under conditions of lean production and 
intensification, can quickly lead to significant  occupational health problems. Hamil, the SUD 
rep from the Aulnay plant, stressed how repetitive tasks at  high speeds over a long period of 
time takes their toll on workers who after a couple of years at  the plant can find themselves with 
chronic musculoskeletal disorders (troubles-musculosquelletiques or TMS). Hence the added 
advantage of agency workers, whose gaps in assignments and periods of unemployment can 
provide a space to recuperate before being taken on again. Car manufacturers can therefore 
make efficient use of available young and fit labour in a favourable labour market, whilst 
filtering out any workers who were considered physically inappropriate. 
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4. The role of institutional weakness in undermining “good laws”
A “temporary increase in activity” is the typical justification given by PSA for using agency 
labour. According to union interviewees, this bears little relation to reality, given the persistent 
presence of agency workers on the assembly line. The fallacy of this motive is illustrated by the 
use of agency workers during periods when permanent workers are laid off. Interviewees 
explained that  the posts that are being taken by agency workers are posts that would normally 
be filled by workers on permanent contracts. Human resource strategy was therefore 
undermining the legislation by implementing “a conscious strategy of precarious 
employment” (CFDT  official) in which the agency workforce is a substitute for permanent 
labour rather than a solution to temporary labour force issues. The legal challenges that have 
resulted in the post  hoc reclassification of agency contracts are based upon proving that  the non-
substitution principle is not being adhered to. An additional justification used by PSA is the 
need to use temporary labour to deal with the extra work associated with the launch of a new 
model. Union spokespersons (from the CGT) have argued that  management should factor such 
work into the organisation of work and the efficient  management  of human resources rather than 
relying on precarious labour to deal with production needs that  are a regular and planned 
occurrence for manufacturers in the sector. 
Despite the success of individual legal challenges throughout the decade, practices that 
undermine the legislation continue. For Pierre this is because “[T]he law is good but  it  is not 
applied”. For Patrice too, the law was a “responsible” one that was nonetheless undermined due 
to the lack of concrete protection accorded to agency workers. The Labour Inspectorate 
(Inspectorat du travail), the government  agency responsible for ensuring labour law is adhered 
to, was widely viewed as being unable to tackle this “implementation gap”. All the union 
interviewees agreed that labour inspectors do not have the means to enforce legislation. The 
lack of an adequate number of workplace inspectors, combined with the large number of agency 
contracts that occurred on a “daily basis” in big car plants, makes it extremely difficult to 
monitor company practices. Since a large car assembly plant  has many posts, it is relatively easy 
to move an agency worker from one post  to another thus making it appear that agency labour is 
not being used on permanent posts. For Patrice, that the law being “completely violated” on 
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such a scale that  labour inspectors were unable to keep abreast of what  was going on. The SUD 
official considered that labour inspectors had an important  role in providing useful information 
on labour rights but beyond that their power was “extremely limited” and “weak”. 
Pierre explained that  to seriously challenge PSA labour inspectors would need to start  legal 
proceedings (procès verbal) against PSA on behalf of the state, and that they would most 
certainly lose. In any case, the Labour Inspectorate would not countenance such an action since 
it did not correspond to centrally-determined priorities, due to political sensitivities. This theme 
was raised by Halim, and by the CGT and CFDT national officials. Halim’s view was that  state 
protection was lacking for political reasons:
The Labour Inspectorate doesn’t  want to enter into these debates because for them, 
I imagine, a job is a job, whether it’s precarious or not. At least  PSA provides jobs 
to people. So its a bit  contradictory....when they know that for years and years 
Citroën has been using.....precarious jobs to produce cars when normally these jobs 
are permanent, an agency worker replaces an agency worker. It’s like that, labour 
inspectors are aware of this, we tell them this frequently. Unfortunately, they don’t 
want to intervene because they think that  as long as Citroën supplies work, it’s 
work even if it’s precarious.
This was echoed by the CFDT official who explained how the priorities of work inspectors are 
set, and the political nature of the process: 
 I think this is a very political issue. You need to know how it  works. First, there 
are very few workplace inspectors in France….they can’t do everything. What 
happens is they have both ministerial and regional directives that set  out  their 
priorities. So if, if for example, the misuse of agency work is not  one of their 
priorities, there is little chance that  the Labour Inspectorate will be interested. It’s 
as simple as that. I should add that  the crisis means that  the rules have been very 
relaxed. Before, no one was interested in the use of agency labour, so even then the 
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situation was difficult. The fact  that  companies are taking on agency labour again, 
even if it’s not in strict accordance with the legislation, is more or less accepted by 
everyone in this period of crisis. 
(Paul, CFDT official)
In a similar vein to temporary employment  agencies, PSA promotes its role in facilitating the 
labour market integration of young workers. The group’s 2010 annual report  set  out its aim to 
attract and integrate youth with an emphasis on its role in areas like Seine-Saint-Denis, which 
face particular socio-economic challenges (PSA, 2010, p. 168). This raises a further aspect  of 
the contextual factors that  permit  large proportions of agency workers in car manufacturing; the 
big national car manufacturers have an important  weight  politically and economically. The 
presence of groups such as PSA – especially national ones in the French context  – in local 
economies such as Seine-Saint-Denis where they are key employers – makes them powerful 
players, who are partners with the state in shaping local employment  outcomes. The CGT has 
referred to the influence of PSA in the local area in its communications, suggesting in a recent 
leaflet on the expulsion of sans-papiers from a branch of the Randstad temporary employment 
agency at  Aulnay-sous-Bois, that  the decision of the prefecture (the local body of the Ministry 
of the Interior) to end the occupation in a violent manner was due to the agency’s commercial 
relations with PSA.85
Halim also considered that occupational health doctors were unwilling to challenge 
management and enforce workplace standards:
It’s the occupational health doctors who validate the post under the authority of the 
management, they are dependent. They are doctors paid by Citroën, they’re not 
independent....the health of employees is not their main priority.....rather it’s that 
the work goes on....the vehicles have to get out.... in whatever way.
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85 USI-CGT leaflet dated 16th December 2009: Explulsion of undocumented migrant agency workers at 
Aulnay (Expulsion des intérimaires sans-papier à Aulnay).
Halim’s opinion of occupational health doctors was harsh. In his eyes, they were an “extension 
of human resources” and he was quick to correct Léa when she suggested they were “under 
pressure”. The compromised role of doctors charged with overseeing occupational health within 
PSA was highlighted by action taken against Dr. Margaret Moreau, an occupational health 
doctor at the Sochaux plant. Dr. Moreau was disciplined for raising the negative affects of lean 
manufacturing on the health of workers at  the plant. In particular, she had questioned a PSA 
report (signed by all the representative unions except the CGT) on the evaluation and prevention 
of psycho-social risks. The treatment  of Dr. Moreau was criticised by the General Secretary of 
the Occupational Health Professionals Union (SNPST).86 For the occupational health doctor I 
interviewed, barriers to effective surveillance of workplace practices that may harm health are 
compounded by the agency contract, since the legal employer (the agency) has no direct power 
over working conditions. According to PSA’s annual reports a “support and management 
system” has been established jointly with temporary employment agencies which:
emphasises coordination between temporary employment  agencies and the Group 
for prevention actions and management  of the health and safety of temporary 
employees. Management from temporary employment  agencies visit  the Group’s 
facilities, and take part  in the risk-observation preventive procedure and analysis of 
workplace incidents.
(PSA, 2011, p. 191)
According to the report, this led a reduction in the rate “lost-time incidents” from 25.1 to 8.6. 
However, the validity of this claim is questionable given the pressures upon agency workers to 
not report  workplace accidents, as reported by both agency workers (see Section 7 below) and 
the occupational health doctor interviewed. 
Weaknesses in the institutional safeguarding of labour standards hinder the role of unions in 
defending the principle of the standard employment relationship. At  a national level, trade 
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86  http://sociologias-com.blogspot.co.uk/2010/01/le-depart-dun-medecin-du-travail-de-psa.html accessed 
26th October 2011.
unions have tended to focus on propagandistic denunciations of agency labour (this is 
particularly the case for the CGT, FO and SUD), combined with attempts to render their 
situation less precarious (particularly the CFDT). At a plant level, beyond taking individual 
cases to the employment tribunal, unions appear to have few resources to resist the misuse of 
agency labour:
Of course we can always demand or even write to management. Management  will 
respond as it  always does, [saying] that’s how it is.....It’s really difficult to fight 
against a management that sticks to its position.
(Halim, SUD rep, Aulnay)
5. Anatomy of a two-tier workforce
5.1. One plant, two systems of employment
Despite the principle of parity long enshrined in French legislation, interviewees highlighted the 
disadvantages arising from the separation of agency workers from the internal system of 
employment within the user-organisation. With regards to pay, union representatives identified 
two factors that undermine the parity principle. First, agency work contracts are set at the lowest 
salary scale with little chance of incremental progression due to the interruption of assignments. 
Secondly, the large contracts with agencies had facilitated this process of driving down the 
hourly wage rate. Temporary employment  agencies are able to maintain hourly rates at  a low 
level due to the high demand for employment, whereas in the past higher wage compensation 
would be a means of attracting workers to register with agencies. High unemployment, coupled 
with changing employment practices in the sector, has left the agency worker with little 
bargaining power over the question of wages. Wage inequality is exacerbated by the exclusion 
of agency workers from additional boosts to income such as productivity bonuses, or the 
“thirteenth month” of salary that many French workers are entitled to, and which exist  at PSA 
for permanent  workers. User-organisations are not  legally bound to include agency workers in 
these schemes. The financial advantage to PSA in maintaining a significant proportion of 
production workers on the lowest salary scale was spelt out by Pierre (CGT rep, PSA-Citroën):
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At several levels, taking on....having….its about  30% in the factories, 30% of 
workers who are agency workers, sometimes more, that  means 30% of workers are 
paid the minimum, the minimum wage. If these workers were permanent, their 
salaries would evolve. Though it  might be slow, they would at  least have a salary 
increase. So there you have 30%....who stay on the lowest pay without moving. 
That’s a significant economy on wages.
This, coupled with exclusion from any bonus system, means that  agency workers are frequently 
earning between 10% and 25% less than the permanent  workers they are working alongside. 
The maintenance of a two-tier labour force also has negative consequences for the wages of 
permanent workers:
It  weighs on the others. As a result, the evolution of the wages of permanent 
workers will also slow down. It’s not referred to formally, but  that’s the truth. At 
least you earn more than an agency worker; you’re not on the minimum wage.
(Pierre, CGT representative, Aulnay)
The different systems governing employment presents a challenge for union representatives at 
the plant  faced with the problems that agency workers may have. During agency assignments it 
is much easier for agency workers to seek out union reps at  the user-organisation if they are 
worried about  irregularities in their wages. Such queries are difficult  to deal with due to the 
differences between pay slips:
The wage slips are not the same. The way in which they are written, that changes 
from one agency to another, Adia, Manpower, Adecco, Ranstad, it’s not the same. 
It’s complicated for us to intervene. We can’t  intervene in the normal way with the 
company with regards to wages for these workers.
Accessing employment rights, be they to do with reward, conditions or representation, 
therefore, is immediately compromised by the introduction of a third party – the employment 
agency – in the employment  relationship. So it was, in the months following the 2008 crisis, 
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
212
that agency workers were excluded from state-funded protection from loss of income during 
“unemployed days”. This “outsider” status is exacerbated by the difficulties posed by being part 
of a union structure external to the plant. Speaking about their experiences at  Toyota, both 
Daniel and Elodie considered that  unions at  the plant  did not  defend the interests of agency 
workers. For Daniel, it  was because their role was “first and foremost  to deal with permanent 
workers”. For Elodie, it  was due to the agency workers being “independent from the union” 
since agency workers “had to go with the union at their agency”.  
5.2. “Disposable” versus “protected” workforce
Employment  insecurity is an overarching feature of the agency contract that  underpins the 
division of the workforce, and which has far reaching consequences on how agency workers 
experience life on the line. Within the plant, the recurrent  ending of agency contracts is highly 
visible due to the large numbers of agency workers whose contracts end at  any one time. Both 
union representatives at Aulnay pointed to the simultaneous ending of hundreds of agency 
contracts, through the reorganisation of production lines or shifts. The insecurity of employment 
experienced by agency workers creates a de facto hierarchy between agency worker and 
permanent worker, premised not  only on the fear of job loss, but also on the internalisation by 
the permanent  workforce of the function of agency workers in the plant’s survival. Whilst  the 
union representatives at  the Aulnay plant did not  refer explicitly to the role of agency workers in 
protecting permanent workers from exposure to unemployment, other representatives, who used 
to be agency workers, were more open on this point. Eddie explained how permanent  workers 
could feel more secure where agency workers were present:
In the minds of permanent workers, when there are agency workers, at  the end of 
the day, they are protected. They feel protected. As long as there are agency 
workers, their employment  is guaranteed. When there aren’t  any more, there isn’t 
this defence, so if there are other problems, it will certainly be the permanent 
employees who are hit.
(Eddie, CGT representative, Toyota)
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For Victor, this was a rationale used by management  to justify the existence of a two-tiered 
workforce:
At the end of the day, the argument of the bosses is that, okay, there are a number 
of precarious contacts that allow us to maintain fixed employment. So today, what 
they are saying is that we if take 10,000 and we give them all permanent  contracts, 
tomorrow when we reduce our activity, we are obliged to sack workers. But, at  the 
end of the day, we say, that  is we the CGT, and in the broad political sense as well, 
we say that every time that an agency worker leaves, that  too is a sacking, nothing 
less. 
(Victor, CGT rep, PSA, Mulhouse)
The CFDT  official also raised the issue of protection and buffering when asked about  divisions 
between agency workers and permanent workers. His approach differed in that  he considered 
the response of permanent workers to their relatively cushioned status was a natural “human” 
reaction:
Generally relations are good. However, in a way which is a bit egotistical but also 
human and understandable, when there is a reduction in the activity of the 
company, the permanent  workers are not going to protest  that  the agency workers’ 
contracts are finished. I think that this relatively normal. In a way they are happy 
that they have the social plan. So I think the division exists mainly at this level.
(CFDT official)
This extract  displays an acceptance of the need to maintain an agency workforce in order to 
enhance the competitiveness of the company, which in turn is said to save jobs, reflecting, of 
course, the CFDT’s approach to agency work. 
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5.3. Division of labour and work effort
Agency workers can act as a buffer in others ways, beyond their supposed function in 
safeguarding permanent jobs. All interviewees from plants referred to an informal hierarchy on 
the shopfloor that  relegates agency workers to the posts which are seen to be more punishing 
than others (“dirty jobs”). The following quote reveals this hierarchy in explicit terms:
There is a difference, of course, because they [agency workers] are not  permanent. 
But  in terms of typical relations, evidently for some the difference is that they 
[permanent workers] make the most of having agency workers or contrats-pros 
taking the most  difficult posts, the most punishing posts which permanent workers 
are rarely given….They are always under pressure….because they are poodles for 
those with a permanent contract who have an interest in shoving these posts onto 
the agency workers.....if they don’t want to work there, if they have a bad back, or 
whatever.
(Victor, CGT rep, PSA, Mulhouse)
So the existence of a two-tier employment system can generate a collusion of perceived 
interests on the shopfloor. Permanent workers may, inadvertently or not, find themselves in a 
position of power in relation to agency workers, which they can use to their own advantage. For 
all of the interviewees who had experience of life on the shopfloor, the relegation of agency 
workers to the worst posts was an important factor in defining the experience of work, one 
which was rooted in their insecure status and which had the potential to create tension and 
resentment. Léa and Amina, agency workers at Aulnay, expressed strong resentment that  agency 
workers were typically given the hardest posts and expected to work harder than permanent 
workers. They also implied that the posts they were given should have been assigned to men, 
but that, because they were agency workers, their gender was not considered in the allocation of 
posts:
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The posts are too, too, too hard for agency workers....or we could say for women. 
Normally the posts that  they give to women, they are posts….these are posts for 
men.
(Léa, agency worker, PSA, Aulnay)
Amina, in particular, was said to have been given an “extremely difficult post”. When she was 
moved to another post  following a workplace accident, her post  was given to two permanent 
workers. The absurdity of the situation was illustrated by Léa’s laughter at  the idea that  Amina, 
a woman in her early 50s, physically small and slight, could be put to work for months on such 
a post. Halim confirmed that this was common practice, whilst  the CFDT official considered 
that being given the most difficult and “thankless jobs” was the most “flagrant” aspect  of how 
agency workers were treated in comparison to permanent  workers – although perhaps he also 
thought  that the role of permanent workers in perpetuating this division of labour flowed from a 
natural sentiment of self-interest, given his perception of buffering as described above. 
Although permanent workers were seen to play a role in avoiding harsh work at the expense of 
agency workers, this is rooted in the marginally greater power that  relative job security accords 
the permanent workforce, as well as the social ties that  are formed on the shopfloor, which 
reinforce the informal hierarchies:
It’s true, a permanent worker cannot  say no, but his supervisor, he’ll try to say, 
okay we’ll put an agency worker on your post because it’s hard. Because with an 
agency worker, he’s not  going to complain, because he’s only there for a certain 
time, one month, two, three months.
(Halim, SUD rep, PSA-Citroën)
All the agency workers complained about the speed of the line and the difficulty in keeping up 
with it. Halim and Léa’s explanation of Léa’s accident rested on this:
Léa: ....the car had left  [my area] before I had finished my operations and I ran to 
catch up with it and I fell.
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Halim: It’s like what I was saying to you before [in the car on the way to the 
interview]....It’s the line, the car advances, it advances, and then you have to run 
behind it.
Int: So it’s because of the speed of the line?
Halim: The speed, yes.
Léa: Yes, I fell over, I fell on my stomach.
The experience of Amina and Léa is not limited to agency workers. Brahim, a worker on a 
fixed-term contract, interviewed at  the factory gates, felt  that  all those on temporary contracts 
were relegated to the worst  jobs. It is also not an inevitable experience throughout the sector. 
Daniel, speaking about  his experience at Toyota, felt that  working in a small team facilitated 
good relations and that, as a result, he was not treated any differently from his co-workers in 
terms of job allocation. On the other hand, he did not think that  his experience was typical of 
that of other agency workers at the plant:
I think that on other lines, the agency workers....they are given the most difficult 
posts, so that the long term workers can take it easy. They don’t hesitate to do that.
(Daniel, ex-agency worker, Toyota)
This quote illustrates the underlying perception that permanent workers use the presence of 
agency workers to make their work at  the plant  more bearable. The fact that Daniel, despite his 
more positive experience, recognised this, indicates that  in comparing their position to 
permanent workers, agency workers are all too aware of the differential treatment that acts to 
their disadvantage on the shopfloor. This differential treatment may also be expressed in the 
social interactions that accompany work on the production line: 
I think that  as an agency worker, if I make a mistake, I’ll be shouted at. But  a 
permanent worker, if he makes a mistake that makes no difference: I’ve made a 
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mistake so what, what do you want  me to do about  it? I think that  for them, there is 
a difference between an agency worker and a permanent worker.
(Daniel, ex-agency worker, Toyota)
In addition to the actual jobs being harder, agency workers also felt they had to be seen to work 
harder, as expressed most vividly by Amina: “we worked, as we say, like dogs”. One of the 
factors in maintaining a high intensity of work was the successive use of short contracts at  the 
Aulnay plant:
They don’t  do eighteen months. They do contracts of two months, three months, 
you see. And then they are always able to put pressure on the workers. They never 
do long contracts; never eighteen months in one go.
(Pierre, CGT representative, PSA-Citroën)
The PSA charter, signed after the spate of legal cases, reduced the maximum contract to eleven 
months. Having been taken to task over long contracts, the company changed its policy to 
shorter ones – the lawyer representing PSA admitted they should have been “cleverer” and 
made the contracts shorter. Thus, PSA’s reaction to the legal challenges was to worsen the 
conditions of insecurity of agency workers. 
The fragility of their employment relationship gives rise to a labour regime that  is 
overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the employer, able to mobilise the agency workforce 
through fear of job loss, a feature which marks out the experience of agency workers from that 
of the permanent workforce. The short duration of contracts is exacerbated by a lack of 
alternative in the local area, thereby intensifying the pressure on agency workers to perform 
better to avoid being “viewed badly” and “to no longer have a job”. The threat of job loss can be 
explicit, as illustrated by Amina’s experience:
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....we signed a two-month contract and then I was told, if you haven’t done all the 
operations, we won’t renew the contract.
Unlike permanent workers, agency workers do not  have access to the institutional space 
provided for by the standard employment relationship, which gives some room for negotiation. 
An agency worker “cannot defend himself like others, because he is scared of being noticed, he 
is scared he will be sacked” (Patrice, CGT rep, Ford, ex-agency worker). This leads to a further 
division in terms of work effort  on the shopfloor, with agency workers “always doing more 
work than others” and having “to give more”.
5.4. Workplace relations
These shopfloor differences can affect  workplace relations. Interviewees had different 
perceptions of daily interactions and workplace solidarity, reflecting the second-hand nature of 
some of the accounts (those from union representatives) as well as the complex, dynamic and 
changing nature of social interaction on the shopfloor. Whilst  Léa considered that  relations were 
forged or not regardless of contract  status, she agreed with Halim when he insisted that 
permanent workers rarely expressed solidarity with agency workers. Léa did express strong 
feelings about  the differential treatment between permanent and agency workers, and how 
permanent workers could transfer blame to agency workers when errors were made. However, 
this did not appear to translate into hostility to this “privileged” section of the workforce but 
rather produced intense frustration with the situation of agency workers, for which she was 
quick to blame PSA. 
Workplace divisions at  Aulnay were said to revolve around divisions of ethnicity, which are 
entwined with perceptions of hierarchy at  the plant. Despite the ethnic make-up of the plant, 
“management and supervisors are white”, “you need to be called ‘Bernard’ to get on” (Brahim, 
Aulnay, PSA). Elodie and Daniel had more to say about  the relations between different sections 
of the workforce. Elodie felt that  agency workers were not totally respected by other workers 
and that in order to gain respect  they had to work doubly hard. This theme of respect was 
important  to Elodie, not having respect at  work lead to a “bad atmosphere”. Daniel, who was 
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more positive about his relations with his colleagues, felt that because he was a hard worker he 
had good workplace relations. He also thought that  on the larger production lines of forty or 
fifty workers, agency workers could easily find themselves teased by the permanent  workers. 
Although his experience was a good one – “we regain our strength by depending on each other” 
– he felt  that agency workers were unable to deal openly with issues with fellow workers in the 
way that other workers could:
My team…we got  on okay. There’s only a few of us, and we are straight with each 
other. Sometimes there can be problems and generally, an agency worker he’ll keep 
quiet, even if he’s not happy. He’ll take it  but he won’t say anything. Someone who 
is permanent, if someone makes a remark and he doesn’t  like it, he’ll get worked 
up.    
Elodie thought that the lack of respect on the shopfloor could translate into an assumption 
amongst (some) permanent workers that  agency workers did not  work as well as they did – this 
was similar to Léa and Amina’s complaint  about the assumption that  mistakes are due to agency 
workers – despite the fact  that  they worked hard for fear of losing their job. The allocation of 
the worst jobs to agency workers was viewed as a  source of tension, although agency workers 
may feel obliged to conceal their antagonisms to “keep things sweet”. 
The complexity and contradictory nature of relations is most apparent in relation to the “buffer” 
function of agency. Whilst agency workers are said to protect  permanent workers from the worst 
jobs, the pressure that  leads agency workers to work harder raises the benchmark for permanent 
workers:
Because they give us, the agency workers, the hardest  posts, and the more we 
work, the more they add operations. But once we have finished our contract, the 
permanent worker takes over....and at that moment it’s harder for the permanent 
worker because he’ll say he can’t do it, and they’ll say to him there was an agency 
worker before you who was able to do it, so you can do it. 
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
220
(Léa, agency worker, PSA Aulnay)
6. Agency workers as the “ideal” worker
The interview extracts above illustrate some of the ways in which an insecure employment 
relationship can modify behaviour. In workplace relations the agency worker may feel unable to 
confront problems and issues that arise in his or her daily interactions with co-workers and 
supervisors. Unable to counter a division of labour that  sees the most difficult  jobs going to the 
agency workforce, the agency worker has, in the words of Leila “no choice” but to “submit” to 
whatever is demanded of him/her, without complaining, a theme taken up by Patrice:
The agency worker, being precarious, and being able to be sacked from one day to 
the next, doesn’t contest management policy. He doesn’t  defend himself like 
others, because he is scared of being noticed, he is scared that  he will be sacked the 
next  day so he doesn’t say anything, he does the overtime, he does what he’s told. 
That too is the feature of agency workers, and for the boss/employer (patrons), it’s 
an advantage, he knows that he has someone who will not  question things, who 
will do what he is told. 
(Patrice, CGT rep, Ford, ex-agency worker)
Halim also stressed how the agency worker has to submit to management demands:
....the agency worker doesn’t have a choice, he puts up with it, but doesn’t  say 
anything, he says absolutely nothing. You see, he puts up with the pressure, he has 
to run....and afterwards two workers have to replace him, it’s automatic, it’s 
normal, you see, it’s a situation that is almost normal.
Being a “good” agency worker extends beyond the technical capacity to do the job well and 
keep up with the speed of the line, and encompasses behavioural traits in the workplace that are 
requested by the user organisation. Aptitude for the work includes “being good workers, who 
don’t question things”. Thus, agency workers have a “tendency to accept  things”. This creates a 
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workforce that is “malleable and compliant”, with which the employer “could do what they 
wanted”. For example, being ready to work overtime and to work even when ill. Those who do 
not conform to this ideal could be filtered out  either through the non-renewal of contracts or the 
reduced likelihood of a permanent job. Victor provided an example of a young agency worker 
who, despite being familiar with all the different posts and capable of his work, was not 
considered for a permanent post due to what Victor described as “a few instances of lateness”. 
6.1. Consent through aspiration or coercion through job insecurity?
The examples of working harder and accepting the worst jobs without complaint  discussed 
above all feed into this construction of the type of ideal worker that job insecurity facilitates. 
However, whilst  Amina and Léa’s experience was, at  this point  in their time at PSA, perceived 
in wholly negative terms, Daniel reflected upon his enthusiasm at the beginning of his 
assignment at  Toyota. He described how he had worked hard to prove himself in the hope that 
his effort  would be rewarded with a permanent contract. He displayed a consent  to work hard in 
exchange for the vague possibility of permanent  employment. These two very different 
approaches to work effort, one driven by coercion through fear, the other by consent  through 
aspirations lead to similar production outcomes, and both are rooted in employment insecurity.
Striving to please can arise from contradictory inner sources. On the one hand, agency workers 
are responding to a process characterised by compulsion, coercion and constraints associated 
with job insecurity. On the other hand, it  is possible to draw upon positive resources rooted in 
the aspiration to obtain a permanent post, or at  the very least, for Daniel, to retain his agency 
contract for as long as possible. This was more evident in the interviews with Daniel and Elodie. 
Toyota differed from PSA in that  agency contracts could be up to 18 months. This offered at 
least some security, according to Eddie, the CGT rep at Toyota, since it  provided a “guarantee” 
that if “I don’t make any mistakes, at least  I’ll have the assurance of a year’s wage”. Even 
though agency workers are not explicitly led to believe that an agency contract  can lead to 
permanent work, agency workers may grasp the hope of such as a way of providing meaning to 
their work, as Daniel did when he presented himself as an “enthusiastic worker”. Although this 
possibility could also be used as a warning:
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I think that for agency workers, they [the company] make it known that to be 
absent, that can go against us, if in the future there are permanent vacancies. The 
say, they make it known, that  the less we are absent, the better it … we can hope 
for something. They play on that. They say.....not  to put us under heavy manners, 
but to say watch out.
(Daniel, ex-agency worker, Toyota)
The experience of Daniel, and even Elodie for a time when she still harboured hope of a 
permanent post, contrasted with that of Léa and Amina whose orientation to work at PSA was 
expressed solely in terms of constraint and coercion. Neither expressed any aspiration for 
permanent employment  at  the plant  – both were happy to leave, although they were both 
outraged at the circumstances of their departure. It is notable that  the contrats pros, who had 
also been enthusiastic at  the beginning of what  they thought  could be a career with PSA – on 
condition they worked hard and displayed an aptitude to learn – were similarly angered by their 
experience at Aulnay and more than ready to leave.     
6.2. Projecting the right image
Regardless of the individual factors driving “appropriate” workplace behaviour, agency workers 
can be seen to engage in strategies aimed at  generating a variety of outcomes, some of which 
are interrelated. Léa was not  prepared to engage in the “games” associated with being the ideal 
worker and which involved projecting a certain image on the shopfloor, behaviour she had 
observed in others at the Aulnay plant. Over and above being a hard worker, keeping your head 
down and not  complaining, it was also important to be friendly with the right kind of people in 
the plant. In short, being an ideal worker means getting on with the boss and not  being seen as 
being too friendly with union activists. Léa thought  that being friendly with the supervisors was 
part of the general culture at  the plant if you wanted to get  on. This was confirmed by Brahim, a 
young worker who spoke to me briefly outside the factory gates. He thought that establishing 
the right  sort  of social network, for example, team leaders and supervisors, counted for a lot  if 
you wanted to get  a permanent position, as did maintaining good relations, keeping calm and 
avoiding arguments. A similar pressure to be “amenable” to those in positions of influence was 
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identified by Emilie and Daniel. Daniel experienced this as an internalisation of the need to 
keep quiet: 
Generally, my reflex….even if I don’t  agree, a boss who is not.. a boss who is 
wrong....I’m not going to tell him.
(Daniel, ex-agency worker, Toyota)
So projecting the image of an ideal worker entails simultaneously positive and negative 
workplace behaviour, since doing what is expected also entails not  doing what  you may 
otherwise do in a “normal” employment relationship. Patrice, recalling his time as an agency 
worker, spoke of the need to keep quiet about union sympathies:
I remember the time when we were agency workers, we said nothing, even with 
regards to the unions, we didn’t show our support. We were….we made out  as if 
we didn’t think about such things.
There was a time when management openly said that  we must  not  hang out  with 
the unions. Even in the recruitment  interview, they put these questions to the 
agency worker. What do you think of unions? What  do you think of strikes? And 
obviously, you can’t  say what you think. You have to say that  You don’t agree … 
you had to lie.
This revelation that  it is necessary to “lie” in order to say what the agency and the user 
organisation wants to hear suggests that the agency worker status creates an employment 
relationship within which the worker is obliged to suppress important dimensions of their 
personality/character or the “self”, over what  can be a long period of time, and instead construct 
an image that  is amenable to the agency and the user-organisation, thereby engaging in a form 
of behavioural compliance in order to get  on. Daniel did not  feel confident in displaying his 
agreement  with the CGT  representative who worked alongside him: “I wasn’t  going to tell 
everyone in the factory....you didn’t…. I kept it  to myself”. For Elodie, it was fine to hang out 
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with union members (those considered oppositional) so long as agency workers didn’t  join or 
take part in action. However, clearly for some agency workers, their employment status is an 
important  factor in determining their behaviour towards unions, as illustrated by the example of 
an agency worker at the Poissy PSA plant who dared not even take leaflets from unions.87 
The need to conform to a particular type of worker was repellent  to Leila: “you can’t be a 
hypocrite like that”. Although she recognised that  once you got where you wanted to be you 
could change, “be yourself”, it was not  something she could do. Emilie too, did not want to 
conceal her “nature” in order to get a permanent job:
It’s not in my nature. If I am hired I want  it  to be on the basis of my work, the 
quality of my work. I don’t  want to be hired because I’m nice, because I do 
overtime..... I want  to be hired quite simply because of my work, just as I said 
earlier about  respect. I want to be hired out of respect, because I work well, 
because I am at  my post, because I am never absent, lots of things like that. I don’t 
want to be hired because I am nice to the boss, because I say yes to the boss. That’s 
why I didn’t think I would be taken on permanently.
Daniel, on the other hand, demonstrated that he was willing to “play the game” and go against 
his normal reflex or instinct  in his daily social interactions on the shopfloor. Although he did 
display discomfort at  having to always maintain smooth relationships regardless of what  was 
said or done. Being amenable and projecting a certain image was part of a strategy that  he 
thought all agency workers engaged in to enhance their chances of permanent employment:
An agency worker will try to get  himself noticed, to chat to everyone, just in order 
to make himself stand out. Why? Because if he stands out, he’ll get a permanent 
contract.
(Daniel, agency worker, Toyota)
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So on the one hand there is this requirement  to not stand out, to hide what  is really on the mind 
of the agency worker, to keep quiet, keep out of trouble and keep one’s head down, “to not 
make any demands for two or three years with the promise of a permanent  post  two years 
later” (SUD official), to keep quiet  and “accept the difficult  working conditions of the factory in 
the hope of being taken on permanently” (Eddie, CGT  representative, Toyota). On the other 
hand, the agency worker has the objective of “finding a way of getting taken on permanently”, 
and that means getting on with people, being liked and “getting noticed”. Daniel explained how 
he hung about  after his shift, chatting to people, to ensure that  others knew who he was. His 
strategy, besides being a good worker was to create the kind of social network that Brahim had 
said was, necessary in order to get on.
7. Dual control in the triadic relationship
It  is possible to identify examples of Gottfried’s thesis of duality of power within the  interview 
data. The interviews reflect  the pressure that  comes from having to submit  to two levels of 
subordination. Agencies play a role in selecting those workers that fit  in with what is expected 
by the client – the user-organisation. Léa explained how agencies warn agency workers “not to 
discuss with union representatives”, echoing the experience of Patrice. The importance of 
agencies in accessing future job opportunities reinforces the control of agencies over agency 
workers, preventing them from raising problems either with the agency or with the 
manufacturer. As Léa put it, “their objective is that we work”, suggesting a narrow and despotic 
approach to the employment relationship that  leaves out of the equation the agency of the 
worker in negotiating his/her experience of work. This is possible due to the insecurity of labour 
and the dual pressure that arises from the unequal triadic relationship:
After all, agency workers know that if you disagree with something, if you start to 
say, “yes but….that’s not okay”....the next day you can easily no longer have a job 
with the agency. So you see the climate….it’s for that  reason that the bosses can 
really profit  from all that because clearly they end up with workers who won’t say 
anything.
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(Patrice, CGT rep, ex-agency worker, Ford)
The commercial relationship between agencies and manufacturers exerts a pressure on the 
agency to ensure the “quality” of the employees that  they are sending to their clients, 
particularly in the context of competition between the big players in the temporary employment 
sector for the big contracts:
The temp agency, which wants to keep its contract  with Ford or with Renault, so 
the big companies, these are big contracts, they have the rights to dozens of agency 
workers, it’s a big contract, so clearly for them, they are looking to find 
“trustworthy” agency workers. 
(Patrice, CGT rep, Ford, ex-agency worker)
So agencies expect  their agency workers to carry at  the assignment according to the contract and 
not worry about such things as employment rights or unions:
No, they don’t talk to you at all about things like that. For them, an agency worker 
it’s….work....you do it….you say nothing that’s it, you graft and you’re paid, that’s 
all. As we say in France, you get on with it or you’re finished….you do as you’re 
told….and even if you are ill….if you’re not okay you carry on, you carry on....you 
don’t start complaining. 
(Elodie, ex-agency worker, Toyota)
Both Daniel and Elodie remarked that  if absence levels were not  good, that  would create 
problems, to the extent that  the agency wouldn’t  “risk giving you an assignment”. Therefore job 
insecurity is compounded by the duality of power within the agency worker-agency-user-
organisation nexus. If an agency worker strays from the expected path, s/he can effectively be 
“blacklisted” by the agency. Interviewees used the terms grillé and fiché interchangeably to 
describe a process of registering those who did not  correspond to the expectation laid down by 
agencies and manufacturers – a process similar to blacklisting in the UK. This was the 
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experience of both Leila and Emilie. Leila refused to give in to pressure not to declare a 
workplace accident, something that both agencies and car manufacturers were said to 
encourage. She claimed that, as a result, her contract was not  renewed and she did not  expect to 
find future work with the same employment agency, nor with PSA. Halim explained further: 
Halim: If you have a problem, for example, a workplace accident that  is registered, 
you have to change your agency. Return to PSA? Impossible.
Int: So in this situation, the workplace accident is noted.
Halim: She’ll never return to PSA. 
Léa (laughing): I am blacklisted.
Halim: She’s blacklisted, she’ll never come back, even if she changes her 
employment agency.
Patrice confirmed from his own experience that problems in the workplace led to problems with 
the agency:
In itself, it’s not so bad when you are an agency worker, sacked from a place. 
You’ll get taken on elsewhere, excepted that you are blacklisted. You are no longer 
recruited by that  agency and you are seen as someone who will dig about, even 
though all you are trying to do is get your legal rights respected.
Elodie found that taking strike action resulted in doors being closed to her with her agency:
I am still with the agency, I can still contact  them. But  the problem is, they don’t 
want to give me any work, because I was part of the strike committee. They are 
scared to give me work.
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For Daniel, the need to maintain good relations with the agency also made it difficult  to refuse 
to accept  assignments that  were offered: “you are more or less obliged to accept  all that they 
propose, you don’t  have much choice” and “If I say I am on holiday, it’s finished….they won’t 
call me anymore”. The triadic relationship, therefore, creates a powerful combination of 
pressures emanating from the combined pressure of the agency and the car manufacturer, which 
leaves the agency worker with little space to negotiate to have his/her employment-related needs 
taken into account. 
8. Disillusion, misbehaviour and resistance
The pressure to be an “ideal worker” is not necessarily sustainable over the long term. Several 
factors can undermine the aspirational consent or constrained compliance to exhibit  workplace 
behaviours solicited by manufacturers and the agencies that supply their temporary labour. The 
combination of job insecurity over a long period of time coupled with the reality of harsh work 
under coercive conditions can lead to disillusion and anger. For Léa and Amina, this was rooted 
in their sense of injustice over how agency workers were treated and, for Léa, a general culture 
of oppressive work relations at Aulnay. For the contrat pros, their disillusion with PSA was 
equally palpable in the light  of their experience at  the plant. In addition to their dashed hopes of 
permanent work, they particularly objected to their lack of training. Despite receiving 
government subsidies and exemption from social security payments, PSA had not  kept  to the 
terms of the contract, which stipulated the provision of a tutor and 280 hours of formal training. 
They thought that in reality they represented for PSA “cheap agency workers”, rather than 
apprentices, and were told not to complain when they raised any objections. Their perception of 
PSA was very negative: “they make promises but nothing happens”; “it’s a big, big 
disappointment”. Moraud found it  shocking that  a big company could act  in such a way, whilst 
Erwan considered that such a company “should be improving things”. For Cyril, PSA was able 
to present itself as a company taking on young people in the area when, in fact, the company 
was “abusing” them; it was like the “middle ages”, or as Mourad put  it, “intellectual slavery, 
they think we are fools”.
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The disillusion and anger, rooted in a deep sense of social injustice, expressed by Mourad, Cyril 
and Erwan was particularly intense given the expectations and aspirations associated with the 
contrat de professionalisation, which set them apart from the normal agency workers. The 
contract, between their agency and PSA, had, in their eyes, been broken by PSA, leading them 
to challenge PSA, with the help of the SUD union. They felt  that they had nothing to lose either 
because they no longer wanted employment  at Aulnay, or because permanent employment was 
evidently not on the cards. 
Similar themes of “getting to the end of the line” and “having nothing to lose” underscore the 
paths taken by Léa and by Elodie, and also lie beneath the surface of those examples in the press 
coverage of agency workers taking on auto companies once their long-term insecure 
relationship with one company comes to an end. Pierre confirmed that agency workers were 
more likely to go to tribunals in this kind of circumstance:
It’s necessary after all that workers at  some point come to us to put together a legal 
case.....it’s not easy....generally they do it  at the end of their contract, because their 
contract is ended. They know they are not going to stay, their contract is not  going 
to be renewed. At that point, with a bit of luck they will take it to a tribunal.  
Léa’s behaviour, however, was mainly rooted in a strong sense of social injustice combined with 
an apparent  lack of concern for the negative consequences that  would inevitably arise from 
making a stand. Two instances of Léa’s subversive behaviour came up in the interview: refusing 
to cede to pressure to conceal her workplace accident, and taking part in strike action. Both Léa 
and Elodie were strike leaders – a rarity amongst  the agency workforce. Elodie’s indignation at 
the lack of equality between agency workers and permanent workers, and her sense of 
marginalisation and exclusion despite being at the Toyota plant for four years, compelled her to 
join a strike when the opportunity arose. She expressed little regret at no longer being at the 
plant, although she professed a positive attitude to the work itself, and had once harboured 
hopes of a permanent contract. Léa on the other hand felt that there was no future at  the plant, 
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even for those on permanent contracts. There was “no evolution” for those on the production 
line. 
8.1.  Winning respect through collective action
Elodie’s experience of taking part in strike action contrasted starkly with her experience of 
agency work, which made her feel like an outsider despite being at the plant for four years. She 
was the first agency worker to go on strike, although by the end of the strike, which lasted 
eleven days, she had brought a dozen agency workers with her: “not really  a lot  but  it  really 
represented the discontent  because Toyota seriously exploits agency workers”. Her experience 
of the strike and of being on the strike committee was a good one: 
[It was] an fantastic experience, a huge experience. I learnt  about  myself. I learnt 
about the law, texts that  we don’t all know. I got to know people who I now see 
regularly, people who I didn’t  meet before, because I didn’t  work on the same line. 
I even learnt to respect myself and to respect others.
Here Elodie is expressing a number of deep-seated needs for self-development, social 
interaction on equal footing, self-respect and respect  from others – needs that  had been left 
unfilled by her experience as an agency worker. This extract encapsulates the desire to escape 
the alienation of life on the line and the exacerbation of that  alienation that comes with the 
agency contract. Daniel had sought  to overcome the alienating efforts of work by attempting to 
actively carve out  his future at  that plant. Léa, for her part, armed with qualifications and 
previous employment  experience as a technician in a lab, drew upon her plans to seek her future 
elsewhere, thus engaging in a strategy that would inevitably lead to her exit  from Aulnay. All 
three, in their different ways, and drawing upon different individual resources, attempted to 
escape the passivity that their situation threatened to impose upon them.
8.2. Individual resistance: misbehaviour and exit
These examples show that  even within the constraints of insecurity, there is space for agency. 
Victor also provided a contrast  to the overall narrative of control by describing the ways in 
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which young agency workers in his workshop display behaviours outside of the framework of 
the ideal worker, which he interpreted as a generation effect:
When I arrived, I was an agency worker before being taken on permanently.  I 
worked Saturdays, I never took sick leave. Today we see agency workers who go 
on sick leave and bruise easily.
Victor’s interpreted this as a lack of class consciousness in the younger generation which 
resulted in individual rebellion (in the form of lateness or taking sick leave) rather than dealing 
with the reality of work through collective class mechanisms. He explained how basic concepts 
which were second nature to his generation of workers (he is in his 40s), such as class or unions, 
were foreign to younger workers:
Most  of the youth here, there are lots of youth from difficult areas. There is a 
natural revolt which isn’t collective or anything like that. It’s like with the 
unions….most of them don’t  know what  a union is….or why they don’t like the 
CGT or the other unions. Class consciousness today….there’s a real problem. Even 
if we start with things which are not very complicated….immediate demands they 
will not say…..we’re exploited….that  there are those who are exploiters….we’re 
not there today. Its funny....class struggle? They’ll say “what class? First  or 
second?” [laughs] It’s tragic.
Halim’s perspective on the youth at Aulnay was altogether different. He, too, identified a 
generational difference, but  with opposite results. For Halim, it  was the older generation of 
workers who lacked collective class consciousness, which he explained with reference to their 
North African origins. Halim thought that  they lacked the class collective identity that defined 
the French working class. Their sons and daughters, however, who make up the younger (and 
precarious) workers at the plant, were more “French” and therefore more influenced by the 
French tradition of class struggle. They were unable to express this, however, due to their 
precarious status: “they are ready to fight....their parents work calmly....are exploited but they 
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would never accept the same conditions as their parents”. Halim’s interpretation of the lack of 
militancy of the older generation is a curious one, given the history of struggle which saw the 
overwhelmingly North African OS engage in militant strikes and occupations. An alternative 
interpretation is that  years of hard and repetitive work at  the factory may have crushed the spirit 
of the older workers, many of whom, according to Halim, were looking to retire and to return to 
their countries of origin. 
The lack of options for engaging in collective resistance, however, as described by Halim, can 
lead to individual expressions of resistance, one of which was raised by Halim and Léa – that  of 
leaving the plant. For Pierre, this was more a common strategy in the 1990s when Aulnay 
management, after looking further afield for young production line workers (for example, as far 
as Lille), turned to youth from the deprived areas surrounding the plant:
In the 80s and 90s, there were lots of agency workers who did not stay, they 
arrived, they stayed three days and then were off. Moreover, it was the youth....it 
was funny because they arrived in the workshops, the production workshops (they 
are very big), so they arrived....skateboarding was in fashion. So they arrived with 
their skateboards and stuff....the young workers they went  up and down the 
workshops on their skateboards with their radios [laughs]. They had big 
radios….but  it wasn’t  the done thing in the factory....the bosses let them know, so 
they said “goodbye I’m off, it’s a prison here”.
(Pierre, CGT, Aulnay)
Pierre considered that this was no longer an option given the rise in unemployment. So although 
exit may be tempting as a strategy, it  is frequently not  an option. On the other hand, Léa and 
Halim insisted that  agency workers were not interested in permanent posts at Aulnay. However, 
a quote from an agency worker at Aulnay in an article in the newspaper Libération from 2006 
highlights how labour market  constraints generate contradictory orientations to their precarious 
employment situation: “A permanent contract  scares me. I don’t  want to spend my life at 
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Peugeot”.88  However, when offered a permanent contract, the agency worker in the article 
accepted it (although a subsequent recruitment freeze resulted in the offer being rescinded). 
Similarly, Brahim recognised that although he found the work hard (and getting harder) and 
demoralising, it was necessary to have a job. The lack of alternatives reinforces this 
contradiction, as illustrated by a quote from an agency worker in another article on Aulnay from 
2010: “This factory is the only place where we can hope to work”.89
For the many agency workers for whom leaving the plant is not an option, keeping within the 
parameters of behaviour expected of them rather than workplace resistance will be their 
preferred strategy. The lack of an outlet  to express discontent, combined with a lack of 
perspective, can result  in desperate actions. Victor described an incident at  his plant involving 
an agency worker attacking a co-worker with a knife. This is an extreme and rare example of an 
agency worker “going over the edge”, and needs to be viewed in the context of the society-wide 
discussion of “workplace suffering” which has been acknowledged as an issue facing French 
society. The background to this debate is a series of workplace suicides, including five at the 
Mulhouse plant. One suicide was of an engineer at  Renault research centre at Guyancourt, 
others have been employees of France Telecom, thus involving a broad spectrum of contracts, 
occupations and sectors, and are largely explained by the intensification of work and a 
reorganisation of the labour process which has undermined past gains. For Victor, such acts 
represent a failure of trade unions and political parties, with reactions against workplace 
suffering become more violent as workers become less collective.  
The final part  of this chapter discusses the barriers to collective representation and mobilisation 
from the perspective of both agency workers and union actors. 
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9. Barriers to collective representation and mobilisation
Union reps and officials spoke at  length about  the difficulties in representing, organising and 
mobilising agency workers. As the data above demonstrates, there are numerous barriers to the 
trade union organisation of agency workers: fear arising from job insecurity; the need to sustain 
the image of the “ideal worker”; the separation of the employer from the workplace; 
fragmentation and isolation of agency workers from fellow legally defined employees. The 
union activists were also acutely aware of the consequences of a two-tier workforce on the 
capacity of the core workforce to mount an effective defence of all workers in a given plant. 
Pierre explained that  unions can engage in two types of action with regards to agency work: 
taking legal action against  misuse of the temporary agency or organising agency workers on the 
ground. It  is the former that  has been the main focus of activity of the CGT, and which has had 
some degree of success though without seriously undermining the sector’s ability to use agency 
workers on a large scale. This strategy also relies upon agency workers being willing to put 
themselves forward to take on the company. As discussed above, this normally occurs when 
long standing agency workers feel that  the implicit promise of ongoing employment  is broken 
when agency contracts have not been renewed and agency workers are left with no financial 
compensation beyond the 10% precarious employment bonus, despite having worked for the 
company for years. Organising agency workers on the ground has proved less successful.
Lack of job security was considered by the CFDT official to be the “most  important brake on 
the unionisation of agency workers”. Léa’s views on this, discussed above, were shared by 
Daniel and Elodie who underlined the problems associated with joining a union as an agency 
worker:
In my opinion, an agency worker who joins a union, he’s not going to stay around 
for long, they’ll do whatever they can to kick him out.
(Daniel)
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I must  be the only one. I wanted to be an example, but  an agency worker who joins 
a union will be very badly viewed. 
(Elodie)
As Léa, Elodie and Patrice explained, employment agencies also play a disciplining role that 
reduces the likelihood of agency workers mobilising and taken action. Both Elodie and Patrice 
experienced negative reactions from employment  agencies when they went  outside of their 
remit to get  on with the job and keep their head down. Elodie described how she suffered 
victimisation at both the plant and the agency. This further impinges on the ability of agency 
workers to take action, since even if they have reached a point  where they no longer see a future 
in the plant, they may still need to maintain good relations with their agency. In the past, this has 
been the basis upon which the CFDT  has criticised the tactic of the CGT in encouraging agency 
workers to launch a legal struggle against PSA for the reclassification of agency contracts. The 
CFDT claimed that  the CGT was sacrificing agency workers who, although they might  receive a 
financial settlement associated with a normal redundancy package, end up unable to find 
employment because “they are definitively blacklisted”.90 The fear of being blacklisted appears 
to be a well-founded one. Both interview data and newspaper articles illustrate the potential of 
discriminatory action against agency workers, and the negative affect upon the ability of agency 
workers to mobilise. A mobilisation at  the PSA plant at  Poissy in 2003 organised by the CGT 
against the ending of 500 agency contracts mobilised only a “handful” of agency workers, one 
of whom was sought  out  by the manager of his employment agency during the strike and told to 
leave the factory.91
A further brake on union mobilisation is the formal separation of agency workers from co-
workers. Agency workers are not part of the same union structure as permanent workers and 
they are not necessarily organised alongside fellow agency workers. This is a significant 
organisational problem. Even if agency workers make links in the sector in which they are 
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working – as did Léa and Elodie – there is no guarantee that they will continue to be working in 
the same sector when their contract  ends. Pierre spoke of the difficulty in following up the 
problems of agency workers given they are not  unionised within the plant. This involved having 
to track down the union representatives at  the employment agencies, who were more likely to be 
based at  headquarters rather than in small, local branches. As a result, despite the auto sector 
being one where there is good plant level union representation (at least in the big plants), agency 
workers working in the sector are left isolated. 
The existence of a two-tier workforce, and the lack of correspondence between union structures 
and the temporary agency contract  can leave agency workers feeling that the disadvantages 
associated with their employment status extends to union representation at the plant:
Int: Do you think that unions defend the interests of agency workers:
Élodie: I would say yes and no. That’s to say during the strike, yes since they 
wanted the same thing for everyone, including agency workers. But the rest  of the 
time I would say no, because us agency workers, we’re are independent of the 
union, we have to be with the union at our agency, so we have to….the agency and 
a union, that’s rare.
Daniel also found that unions in the plant were mainly interested in defending permanent 
workers, which was “understandable” since “that’s what  they were there to do”. Union 
representatives could be a source of information but  beyond that  they did not  really defend 
agency workers. 
Barriers to unionisation can have a broader impact on the development  of class consciousness. 
Union organisation can create networks of solidarity that bring together workers around a 
common identity. In France, the expression of broad class solidarity is particularly felt  when 
union confederations call on their members to display their collective strength on the streets at 
times when important social issues are being negotiated. At the time of one of the field visits 
there was a national movement of one day strikes and demonstrations in defence of pensions. 
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The CGT and SUD branches of the Aulnay plant attended a series of demonstrations that  took 
place in Paris. The size of the union contingents from Aulnay was small, suggesting weak 
support  from all sections of the workforce, and mobilising support from amongst agency 
workers was unlikely, since, as Halim pointed out, that would mean taking part  in strike action, 
even for the weekend demonstrations (organised to include non-strikers), given the obligatory 
Saturday working. The SUD official considered that  the status of agency worker and the 
inability to unionise, hindered collective consciousness:
Of course, there are agency workers who come on the demonstrations but  it  is a 
small number because they are less conscious, less political, less unionised by 
nature. When you fear for your job....when you can be sacked from one day to the 
next....when you have a precarious status, you find it harder to fight than if you 
have a regular job....the kind of job that  existed for thirty years after the second 
world war.
The SUD official had few examples of concrete action in the auto sector to mobilise and 
campaign around agency labour, beyond demanding that  agency workers be given permanent 
contracts. This is due to SUD’s lack of implantation in the sector. Instead, he pointed to 
examples of how SUD is adapting to agency labour in other sectors, namely through direct 
action in the form of the occupation of agencies supplying labour to the construction industry. 
This was, he thought, a sign that the union was adapting to the new conditions of precarious 
working. 
The CFDT official had few examples from the automobile sector. The most  important  work 
unions could do, from his point  of view, was to provide agency workers with information about 
their rights and the importance of trade unions, something that was done in other sectors and 
was beginning to take place in the auto sector:
I have one example, it’s in the west  of Paris, it’s an area where the automobile 
sector is concentrated and there is a company….It’s not  only the CFDT, its other 
Chapter 7 Experiences of life on the line as an agency worker
238
unions too. Also with the local government  we try to do something globally for 
agency workers. There are training sessions for agency workers when they are not 
working at user-firms. This work has meant we can progress....we can bring them 
together, to see them, to explain what trade unions are, what they do and to offer 
them better conditions. So they can be in training instead of being unemployed. I 
think it’s an interesting initiative.
(CFDT official)
The CFDT’s main policy towards agency workers has been to work at improving conditions for 
agency workers, hence its willingness to sign agreements with large car manufacturers such as 
PSA and with employment agencies. The most recent set of agreements have been centred on 
rendering agency labour less precarious by offering agency workers the chance to train in 
between missions. In the interview, the CFDT official made frequent  references to how agency 
labour was a false economy for companies due to the negative impact of having to constantly 
take on and train new workers. He felt that companies were beginning to realise this and that 
some were responding by supporting the initiatives such as training to improve the quality of 
the agency workforce. He also thought that  there was a consensus amongst unions that  this was 
a correct strategy faced with the reality of agency work:
All the French unions are, I would say, for once relatively in agreement  and 
consider that agency workers are after all second class employees who pay for the 
security of others and that, therefore, we need to do all we can to make their work 
less precarious. We know very well that  we can’t  get them all taken on as 
permanent employees. On the other hand there are ways…..of making their 
situation less precarious.
This is consistent with the CFDT  approach to flexibility, which emphasises the role of 
flexicurity in improving the position of agency workers. The CFDT  sees good quality flexible 
employment as a way of promoting jobs growth and accepts the argument of PSA management 
that ending agency labour would result  in job losses. In 2006, when the CGT  tried to challenge 
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PSA on the “principle” of using agency labour during the launch of new models, a PSA 
spokesperson suggested that  “the CGT would be responsible for a policy of delocalisation”. The 
CDFT echoed this argument:
“In certain workshops, in certain plants, the use of agency labour is not  justified. 
To go from that  to demand a radical change in general recruitment policy…. The 
auto sector is a sector characterised by fluctuating activity, if all the agency 
workers had been recruited, as the CGT wanted, we would certainly be faced today 
with social plans.”
Whilst the CFDT’s “realist” approach to agency labour contrasts strongly with the unambiguous 
opposition to agency labour from the CGT  (and SUD), the CGT has found itself adapting to a 
situation which it has been unable to influence in any fundamental way. The recent  signing of an 
agreement  guaranteeing access to training for agency workers at PSA signals the CGT’s 
acknowledgement of the enduring presence of agency work in the sector and, therefore, the 
need to lessen the impact of precarious employment. At  the same time, the CGT  has continued 
to be involved in militant actions against  temporary employment agencies, although like SUD 
this has tended to be in other sectors of the economy and involving migrant workers. For the 
CGT, the construction industry has been an important site of militant  action. During the field 
work, USI-CGT organised an occupation of a small temporary employment agency in Paris. 
The union was acting to highlight the abusive practices in relation to the employment of migrant 
workers on building sites. For the CGT official organising the action, it was important that  the 
union put  itself “on the front line” to protect  agency workers who were not able to defend 
themselves. The occupation was carried out  by USI-CGT officials, one of whom (Sandra) 
expressed her fears that  agency work has “serious consequences for future labour rights, 
representing a regression in relation to the rights and conditions of work that  her generation had 
benefitted from”. Her resentment  of the manager of the employment agency was palpable. The 
action, as with other similar actions carried out by the CGT  and by SUD, illustrates the 
contradiction  that these unions face, combining a strategic and militant opposition to agency 
labour with the need to respond to the immediate defence of agency workers who are denied 
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their statutory rights. It  would appear that the choice of strategy depends upon the sector, with 
the CGT in the auto sector focusing its resources on legal challenges. 
10. Conclusion
Much of the data in this chapter reflects common assumptions regarding the constraints faced 
by agency workers in the auto sector that  define their experience of work. Disadvantaged by 
their insecure employment  status, agency workers find themselves subject  to a harsher regime, 
taking on the worst  jobs and compromised in terms of their interactions with management and 
employers. Manufacturers, using agency workers primarily as a tool to rapidly and easily adjust 
their workforce, benefit  from agency labour in a variety of ways that enhance management 
control over the labour process. The employment  insecurity associated with the temporary 
contract exposes agency workers to the market  and represents a (re)commodification of the 
employment relationship. However, this is compounded by the nature of the temporary agency 
contract, which revolves around the triadic relationship. Duality of control is evident in the 
interview data from agency workers and from union representatives who have experience of 
agency work. This duality of control reinforces the construction of the “ideal worker” as 
perceived by the auto manufacturers – a malleable workforce that is unable to contest the harsh 
working conditions, as described by those on the ground. The temporary employment  agency 
acts as a transmission belt  for the requirement of its clients, which includes not only the 
technical capacity to carry out  the work, but also behavioural traits. The need to maintain 
relations with the agency constrains agency workers further. 
However, within these constraints, there is room for consent to labour under bad conditions, 
although the forces leading to consent  are complex and can exist alongside compliance. The 
examples of Léa and of Élodie also illustrate the possibility of individual and collective 
resistance, although the consequence of acts of “resistance” appear to be largely negative. It 
appeared that the willingness to accept exit  from the plants encouraged their departure from the 
norm of the “ideal worker.” 
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The data also provide further evidence for the embeddedness of agency labour in the sector in 
the descriptions from long standing auto workers who have noted the changes over the last 
decade or so. Institutional weaknesses have been suggested as an explanation for the disregard 
for the legislative boundaries of agency work use, not  only in terms of the lack of resources, but 
also the implicit political choices that  have facilitated the human resource strategies of car 
manufacturers. Alongside these institutional lapses is the inability of unions to systematically 
confront a process that  has seen the replacement of a reduced “core” with a “peripheral ring” of 
agency workers. The union representatives and officials, whilst expressive in terms of the 
negative consequence of agency work, had little to propose beyond legal challenges (for the 
CGT) and improving conditions of agency workers (for the CFDT). In the absence of a 
mobilising capacity amongst  the temporary agency workers and faced with the reluctance of 
permanent workers to seriously struggle against precarious employment practices, the legal 
option does offer some, limited advance. At the time of the interviews, the SUD representative 
was in the process of mounting a case for the contrats pros by identifying the non-
implementation of clauses in the contracts, thus using the opportunities available to mount  a 
challenge, a strategy similar to the CGT. From this data, the challenges to mobilising agency 
workers do appear to be too great  to offer any long-term perspective beyond providing 
information and/or training. Whilst  there were examples of collective action amongst agency 
workers, including from the interviewees presented here, there was little evidence of long-term 
strategies to mobilise agency workers along the lines of the innovative practices discussed in 
Chapter 5.
The data presented here have also introduced areas for further discussion in relation to the 
theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 3, which the next chapter covers in more detail.
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CHAPTER 8
AGENCY LABOUR AND NEW FORMS OF HEGEMONIC DESPOTISM
1. Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to explore the nature of the factory regime which shapes the  working 
lives of temporary agency workers working in French car plants, by examining the historical 
processes from which contemporary practices of labour sourcing have emerged, and by 
researching the experience of agency workers in car factories. Starting from Burawoy’s (1985) 
The Politics of Production, the thesis established a conceptual framework to examine how the 
political apparatus of production that  governs the experience of agency work is the outcome of 
the tendencies and counter-tendencies that  emerged within a temporal and geo-spatial context 
(Nichols, 2004). The thesis also established both the relevance of “production politics” and 
“factory regimes” for contemporary LPA and the need to reassert the significance of external 
factors, such as the employment contract, in the constitution of factory regimes. Chapter 5 
examined the emergence of temporary agency work in post-war France as a form of 
employment which ran counter to norms of employment that  were beginning to take shape 
within the French model of social compromise under the Trente Glorieuses. Chapter 6 provided 
an historical overview of the French auto industry in order to establish the specificity of the 
factory regime that broadly characterised post-war car production in France, as a distinct  form 
of hegemonic regime, shaped in no small part  by colonial ties that provided a source of cheap, 
super-exploited labour. The militant  strikes throughout the sector in the early 1980s which 
succeeded in transforming the conditions of the ouvriers specialisés (OS) occurred when the 
sector was on the cusp of responding to the challenges of an increasingly globalised market 
through restructuring and automation/robotisation. The subsequent shedding of labour was 
accompanied by an intensification of work and by a gradual turn to agency labour as a pivotal 
tool for responding to a volatile market.
These two chapters provided the historical and contemporary grounding of the data presented in 
Chapter 7, which examined the workplace outcomes of the increasingly structural position of 
agency labour in car plants. Although the flexibility to shed labour at will was shown to be a 
major influence in changing recruitment  practices, a further advantage, from the perspective of 
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manufacturers, is the effect  of agency workers on labour-capital dynamics in the workplace. 
Whilst not  necessarily part of a coherent strategy to shift the balance of power towards capital, 
the logic of capitalist  production to reduce labour costs has, nonetheless, had this effect 
(Hyman, 1987, p. 36). The data presented in Chapter 7 illustrated the overall despotic nature of 
the labour-capital relation. However, significantly, it  also identified the possibility of consent, as 
well as the variegated responses that  can flow from despotism. This chapter discusses how these 
findings complement, challenge and build upon theoretical approaches to coercion and consent 
in the labour process within contemporary forms of factory regimes. 
2. From flexibility to labour control
In the first  part  of the previous chapter, union representatives and officials gave their 
interpretations of the growth of agency work in the auto sector. The union representatives in 
particular described how the presence of agency labour in some of the tougher workshops is 
indicative of a division of labour within assembly plants. Whilst  official statistics paint an 
alarming picture – from the viewpoint  of longstanding norms of permanent  employment – of the 
rate of agency work in the sector, the description of even higher proportions of agency workers 
on the most demanding production lines illustrates how temporary agency work has become an 
“essential cog in the wheel” of production (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011, p. 80). Both Victor and 
Halim claimed that  the plants they worked in could not  function without  the existence of the 
agency workers. This places the sector’s use of agency labour at  odds with French legislation 
which explicitly refers to the “exceptional” nature of agency work. Union representatives 
emphasised how agency workers provided not only a flexible workforce for manufacturers, but 
also a means of selecting appropriate permanent  workers, as identified by Gorgeu and Mathieu 
(2011). This “filtering” function, operating in the context  of employment, generated advantages 
relating to labour control, a positive “externality” for management  of the main driver of agency 
labour. 
Elsewhere in the EU, the growth of agency work has been stimulated by significant changes in 
the regulatory environment. In France, growth occurred despite the absence of fundamental 
change to a restrictive legislative framework; the first  major change to regulations concerning 
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employment agencies being the 2005 legislation. Steady growth of agency work has altered the 
composition of the agency workforce, from what is assumed to have been a predominantly 
female, clerical workforce in the 1950s and 1960s to a predominantly male, blue collar 
workforce (Vigneau, 2008, p. 85). The demographic composition of agency labour, and the 
extent  of agency labour in the auto sector, is indicative of the largely involuntary nature of 
agency work, since the literature associates positive volition with women and professional 
occupations, rather than occupations traditionally associated with the “male breadwinner” 
model. Within the auto sector, the first significant wave of agency labour, occurring in the late 
1990s, came after a process of restructuring and mass redundancies. Globally the industry has 
been marked by internal reorganisation and the implementation of lean production which has 
been accompanied by externalisation via both outsourcing and the restructuring of the value 
chain (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2010, p. 58), allowing car manufacturers to transfer entire 
workforces to a new employer, including those which remain at the plant, such as Trigo at 
Aulnay, thus transferring employer responsibilities. Agency labour is a way of incorporating the 
transfer of employer responsibilities into core productive activities. It  is an attractive option in 
this highly internationalised and competitive industry – one that  has undergone numerous crisis 
of profitability over the last  four decades – in a context where the formal process of dismissal is 
complex and costly. These costs are not  only financial and bureaucratic, they are also political. 
Large-scale redundancies very quickly become highly political, including at a national level, 
attracting the mobilisation of labour and political movements beyond the entreprise. Although 
the scale of job losses amongst agency workers in the auto sector in the 2008/9 also attracted 
much attention, the loss of temporary employment continues to generate less reaction than the 
loss of permanent jobs. Crucially, it does not engender sustained collective action to save jobs.
The use of temporary agency work reasserts the right  of management  to define labour force 
requirements at  will. Labour – “flexible” according to the discourse of management, 
“disposable” (des kleenex) according to the discourse of trade unions – is reduced to “stock”, 
little different from any other factor of production. Embodied in the standard employment 
model is the “human” element of labour that  sets it  apart from other commodities. An outcome 
of historical, political processes shaped by a combination of macro- and micro-histories as 
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organised labour asserted itself economically and politically, the standard employment 
relationship obliges employers to treat  employees as something other than just  another factor of 
production. It  does this by imposing social obligations towards the workforce, in particular 
through the alleviation of the risks associated with unemployment by guaranteeing secure 
employment and providing compensation should job loss occur. Agency labour obviates many 
of these obligations, so that  “lay-offs cost nothing”, rendering the agency workers invisible as 
far as the reduction of the workforce is concerned. 
The relative invisibility accorded to the shedding of agency labour obscures the reality of mass 
job losses for large numbers of workers. This is reflected in a terminology which differentiates 
the non-renewal of agency contracts from economic redundancies. The latter is licenciement 
économique – which entails complicated negotiations around the plan social; the former is 
merely the non-renouvellement du contrat de mission, which entails no negotiation and little 
compensation beyond the 10% precarious employment bonus. The licenciement économique 
sets in process a whole series of mechanisms through which labour asserts itself as a 
“commodity of a special kind” (Marx, 1969). The non-renouvellement du contrat is of concern 
only to the temporary employment worker – and his/her temporary work agency. 
Given the regulation governing the use of agency labour, the rationale behind car 
manufacturers’ use of agency labour is only one part  of the story. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
history of the temporary employment  agency in France has been a controversial one. Yet the 
opposition to agency labour expressed formally through legislation, and informally in the form 
of a widespread cultural rejection of agency labour, has not been a barrier to its sustained 
growth. Rather, the 1972 legislation, the first  in Europe with the explicit  aim of containing and 
limiting agency work, was the beginning, not only of its institutionalisation, but also of the right 
of employers to “bend the rules” (Beaud, 2004). The new legislation in January 2005 which 
formally established the role of agency work within the French employment  landscape and 
permitted the use of agency work as a form of pre-hiring, was in fact the formalisation of what 
Belkacem et  al. (2011) describe as a “slow revolution”, a practice which had been widely 
acknowledged for some time (Glaymann, 2005). Such “bending of the rules” (or rather, flagrant 
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disregard for the rules) by the car manufacturers has been widely acknowledged and tolerated 
by regulatory agencies. 
As Pierre, the CGT  union representative, and others pointed out, “the law is good but it is not 
applied”. The situation in the French auto sector contrasts with that of the German auto sector, 
where a strict legislative framework, is complemented by strong plant-based institutionalised 
trade union power, has prevented employers from introducing agency work on a large scale 
(Huw, 2010). The relative weakness of plant-based trade unionism in France has left unions 
incapable of sustained resistance to agency labour. This situation is compounded by an historic 
tendency of the unions to focus on the core workforce, and, at times, to view agency labour as a 
way of protecting the permanent  workforce. In addition, weaknesses in the institutional 
mechanisms in place to protect employment standards have contributed to an observable 
“implementation gap” with regards to employment  legislation. Although the Labour 
Inspectorate had some success in general workplace issues, agency labour appeared to be a 
blind spot – a situation compounded by the lack of resources on the ground. In addition, the 
identification of a system of priority-setting which accorded little weight to agency labour hints 
at  the role of political factors. There was the suggestion that the low priority accorded to dealing 
with the misuse of agency labour was a consequence of political choices related to the problem 
of high youth unemployment; temporary agency work is tolerated since it is considered to be 
one of the ways of combatting unemployment.  
Government policy has moved increasingly towards the temporary employment  agency sector’s 
vision of its role as a key intermediary in 21st century labour markets. This trend has been 
promoted by the sector through years of well-targeted lobbying. The history of the temporary 
employment sector in France is an impressive path from pariah to privileged partner of public 
employment services. Early on in its history, major players, in particular Manpower which took 
its cue from the US experience, were able to identify market opportunities in areas such as car 
manufacturing, hitherto overlooked by the sector. In the late 1990s, when the auto industry was 
undergoing profound structural changes, temporary employment  agencies were able to offer 
manufacturers cost-efficient  means of adapting their workforce, stimulated by price wars and 
the economies of scale that came with large centralised contracts. Thus, Gorgeu and Mathieu 
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(1998) could describe temporary agency work in the auto industry at  this time as a specialité à 
la française.92  
Strong, strategic, alliances between these two important  economic actors have been facilitated 
by the political priority accorded to combatting the persistence of youth unemployment  that has 
blighted the employment landscape over the past two decades. Getting young people, 
particularly those in the zones urbaines sensibles, into employment, has largely overridden 
concerns over the type or “quality” of employment  on offer. As a result, car manufacturers have 
succeeded in moving the goal posts of employment practices in the auto sector, with temporary 
employment agencies providing the means to embed agency work firmly within their human 
resource strategies. In doing so the sector has increasingly taken on elements of “neo-liberal 
enterprise” (Appay and Coffey, 2010, p. 41), within a national context  that still retains many 
checks on capital associated with the standard employment relationship. This is an outcome of a 
confluence of factors starting from the need to adapt to a new model of accumulation in which 
labour is required to be a more pliable input  into production. An aggressive and powerful 
temporary employment  sector has facilitated this, itself aided by a combination of state action 
and inaction. 
Bouquin makes a valid point  in highlighting the continuity between the current form of two-tier 
workforce resulting from agency labour and the large numbers of immigrants who made up the 
ouvriers specialisés (OS) in the past  (Bouquin, 2006, p. 156). There, too, the state played an 
important  role in facilitating access to cheap foreign labour. The state also facilitated the retour 
au pays when, in the aftermath of the militant strikes in PSA and Renault plants in the early 
1980s to improve their conditions and wages, immigrant  workers were considered too illiterate 
to be able to cope with the demands of an automated production process.93 The mass lay-offs 
that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, which were accompanied by an increasing use of agency 
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92 UK studies on the car industry at this time also indicate the use of agency labour,  but it appears to have 
been used more as a conscious strategy to create a “green” or entirely new workforce in order to facilitate 
new forms of work organisation in particular plants (Danford, 1988; Smith and Elger, 1998).
93  News archive of proposals for redundancies in 1990 shows a PSA spokesperson explaining the 
incompatibility of “illiterate” and “untrainable” production workers at Aulnay with new production norms 
which are centred around automation and robotisation.
http://www.ina.fr/economie-et-societe/vie-sociale/video/PAC02005808/aulnay-plan-social-a-
citroen.fr.html
labour, were also underpinned by government  support. The Socialist government – the election 
of which had emboldened the OS to take strike action – underscored the plans of the big 
manufacturers to “streamline” their workforce. The government  proposed shedding thousands 
of jobs in order to make the sector more competitive, and was prepared to facilitate this process 
through subsidies and by mediating between the companies and the trade unions. The trajectory 
taken by car manufacturers, presented as the inevitable outcome of economic conditions, cannot 
be separated from political choices which have smoothed the way for new forms of labour 
sourcing by auto manufacturing.
The reassertion of “employment-at-will” for a significant  proportion of auto workers has 
consequences for the playing out  of the structural tensions/contradictions that lie at  the heart of 
the labour process. It  is generally assumed there is an association between job insecurity and 
bad working conditions. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) concepts of commodification and 
decommodification capture the idea that labour which is exposed to the market  will be subject 
to worse working conditions than labour which is protected from the market, job quality being 
associated with the degree of exposure. Burawoy (1985) took a deeper analytical leap in 
demonstrating that the freeing up of labour from the despotism of the market  was reflected in 
the labour process as a particular configuration of coercion and consent. Where Esping-
Andersen saw improvements in job quality, Burawoy saw the ability of labour to resist  the 
arbitrary control of management in the labour process, resulting in a different  type of factory 
regime. Whilst a key advantage of agency labour lies in providing car manufacturers with the 
capacity to easily adjust  their workforce by availing themselves of a pool of labour – similar to 
a reserve army of labour though all the more efficiently filtered through the services of 
employment agencies – this function cannot  be dissociated from its effect on the mechanisms of 
labour control. Indeed workforce size itself is an element  of managing production, in particular 
with respect to the consequences upon levels of work intensification.  
3. The place of agency work within a regime of hegemonic despotism
Whilst the focus of the research presented here is on agency labour, interviewees spoke at  length 
about labouring in car plants in general. There was an overall narrative of a labour process 
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marked by years of restructuring, job loss and intensification of work. The discourse used to 
describe work at  the factory corresponds little to the image promoted on the web sites and in the 
mission statements of companies such as PSA, which has been recognised for its “ethical” 
practices.94  The journey to the Aulnay site on the company coach was illuminating in this 
respect. The atmosphere on the coach suggested a labour force drained of life, filled instead 
with a silent  and weary resignation as the workers began their hour-long journey that would take 
them to eight hours of repetitive work on the line, only to repeat it  again the next day. It is 
striking that a labour process that  was described as harsh and pressurised two decades ago is 
now described as being even more intensive as productivity gains accompany a steady and 
significant reduction in the labour force (Durand, 1990; Corouge and Pialoux, 2011). Whilst 
some of the gains in productivity are due to technological developments, the accounts given in 
Chapter 7, which describe the increase in the speed of the line, the inability to “breathe” before 
the next car arrives, illustrate how work on the line has become increasingly intensified. 
Burawoy’s identification of the key features of factory regimes under hegemonic despotism is 
largely borne out in this research. A climate of constant  restructuring and job loss, and the ever 
implicit threat of delocalisation have created the context in which workers appear to have 
accepted the need to “sacrifice”, or at  least  see themselves unable to put  up any collective 
resistance to the degradation of work. The global reach (in production terms) of a company such 
as PSA, reinforces the threat of delocalisation. The 2008 crisis intensified the generalised 
insecurity so that in the words of Victor, “we are all agency workers in our heads”. As a result, 
despite the formal guarantees accorded by the permanent  contract, market despotism is not 
altogether absent, though there is a perception that  the vulnerability of permanent  workers is 
partly alleviated by the presence of agency workers. 
Burawoy briefly described the transitory and atomised nature of temporary agency work which 
results in the deepening of the subordination of workers, tempered by the illusion of freedom 
(Burawoy, 1985, p. 264-265). What  Burawoy did not envisage was the way in which temporary 
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94 In 2003, PSA Peugeot-Citroën was named France’s most ethical company by the national observatory 
of ethical values (Observatoire des valeurs éthiques) and in 2009 received a diversity commendation 
from the government in recognition of good practice in HRM, which included a 2004 agreement on 
diversity and social cohesion. The latest (2010) Ethical Charter consists of key values to which the group 
and its employees should adhere. This includes respect for the law and non discrimination, and respect for 
health and safety.
agency labour could become a key element in the arsenal of hegemony. Sallaz’s (2004) 
observation of how agency labour is both an implicit  threat  to permanent  workers and a 
protection against closure has been borne out  by this research, with agency workers considered 
simultaneously as a buffer to protect  permanent worker from redundancy and from the worst 
jobs, and perceived also as an essential element in the long-term survival of the plant. The 
management of PSA openly argue that without agency labour, relocation is a real possibility: in 
2003, amidst  the criticism of the auto sector on the question, the head of Human Resources at 
PSA argued that  “agency work constitutes a flexibility necessary to the development  of our 
activities, and on a wider level, the maintenance of employment  in France”.95 Yet  this neither 
corresponds to the role of agency work established by legislation nor the normative values 
within the context of French society as a whole. It  does, on the other hand correspond to 
dominant economic theories, reflected in the discourse and policy agendas of political elites that 
seek to end remaining examples of “labour market rigidities”. The gradual encroachment upon 
long standing national employment norms does not, however, reflect the inevitable 
consequences of globalisation as some have argued (Ohmae, 1995). Institutions are not 
powerless to prevent flexible employment  practices, rather they have facilitated this process, 
within the context of France’s prevailing adherence to post-war employment norms. 
This justification for maintaining large numbers of production workers on precarious contracts 
seems to have been accepted by core workers. It  is not difficult to see how a labour force that 
has experienced the halving of its numbers, as is the case with the Aulnay plant, may be tempted 
to accept the transfer of risk to those on agency contracts. It is a rationale that is also accepted 
by some of the unions. The CFDT official expressed this most  clearly in that he thought  that, 
although agency work is a problem for the labour movement, it  is inevitable given 
contemporary conditions of global competition. Durand (2004) wrote of the internalisation of 
changes in the labour process that have been associated with lean production such as just-in-
time and forced cooperation; this finds an echo in Victor’s description of the “progress circles” 
at  PSA. Despite his contention that  French workers are not very participative, they end up 
bound by a situation over which they feel they have little control. Similarly, the “inevitability” 
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95  Le Monde,  23rd September 2003: PSA attempts to make the use of agency work in its factories 
unexceptional (PSA tente de normaliser l’usage de l’intérim dans ses usines).
of agency labour not  only becomes a given, but also forms a de facto hierarchical division of 
labour which sees agency labour relegated to the bottom, thereby reinforcing mechanisms for 
eliciting consent. Stewart  et al.’s (2004) contention that  lean production represented a new mode 
of cultural control and compliance can be extended to agency labour, both as an element of lean 
production (the expression of JIT  within labour force management), and itself a distinct form of 
control and compliance.
Permanent workers can actively perpetuate the disadvantage lodged within the agency contract. 
This is a contemporary form of “game playing” which sees workers attempting to alleviate their 
alienating experience (albeit marginally) by diffusing the worst aspects of labour process to 
agency workers. As well as being able to transfer risk and avoid the worst jobs, there is also the 
potential for permanent  workers to engage in other types of “games” and “making 
out” (Burawoy, 1979) as a means of better enduring their subordination (Stewart et al., 2009, p. 
148). Agency workers can find themselves the butt  of jokes, or worse, the focus of anger, 
without  the resources to respond in kind. Yet, agency labour plays a contradictory role when it 
provides a means of cushioning the experience of core workers. As well as transferring risk and 
some of the worst  aspects of labour process, interviewees described how agency workers raise 
the benchmark for productivity since they are compelled to work so much harder than 
permanent workers. Agency labour exerts a downward pressure on the conditions of all workers 
in the plant by undermining the conditions for collective action due to the division of the 
workforce (Bouquin, 2006 p. 147). Thus the role of the agency worker as a buffer, whilst 
seeming to advance the interests of permanent  workers, obscures the general interests of the 
workforce. By accepting agency labour, and by engaging in “games” which contribute to the 
inequitable division of labour on the shopfloor, core workers unwittingly contribute to the 
reinforcement  and reproduction of the social relations which underpin their exploitation 
(Burawoy, 1985).   
4. From consent to resistance? Expanding the repertoire of workplace behaviour
Agency labour, therefore, functions within the regime of hegemonic despotism to elicit 
“consent” to sacrifice (Sallaz, 2004). At the same time, agency workers are also subject to a 
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factory regime which constrains their range of actions within the workplace, and yet  may also 
provide space for both consent  and resistance. Studies in the auto industry discussed in previous 
chapters have assumed that  the range of action available to agency workers is severely curtailed 
by their insecure status (Bouquin, 2006; Beaud and Pialoux, 1999). Other French authors 
writing about  agency work in general assume that agency labour is subject to surexploitation  – 
exploitation over and above social norms and excessive domination (Glaymann, 2006; Paugam, 
2000). Whilst  the interview data does confirm that agency workers are subject to a high degree 
of coercion to perform, it  is possible to detect  elements of consent  which correspond to the kind 
of behaviours described by Gottfried (1992) and Smith (1998).
4.1 Transitory traces of consent within market despotism
Although this research focuses on PSA, the discourse of Daniel and Elodie, in contrast to that  of 
Léa and Amina, and the secondhand accounts of Pierre and Halim, all provide evidence of how 
consent  can operate in the context  of a regime marked by coercion through labour market 
vulnerability. The discourse of the contrats pros at PSA is also illuminating. Whilst  these young 
workers are not  strictly agency workers in that they are seconded from their agency during their 
apprenticeship, they are still subject to insecurity and, in the absence of permanent  employment 
at  the end of their training, will need to rely upon the employment agency to negotiate access to 
future employment. Their positive orientations to their work at the beginning of their contracts 
were influenced by the sense that they were learning a trade – although, as pointed out by 
Victor, if PSA was not  going to recruit them at  the end of their contract, their training would be 
of limited use. Whilst it  is not possible to make a direct  correspondence between their 
experience and that of agency workers, it  is possible to connect their experience with that  of 
Daniel, whose desire for a “proper job” drove his willingness to engage in workplace 
behaviours associated with the “ideal worker”. 
The nature of the interviews with Léa and Amina was such that it was not  possible to probe 
further into their first  days as agency workers at Aulnay, and their discourse did not  go beyond 
negative descriptions of life as an agency worker at  the plant. Given the theoretical focus on 
consent  as well as compliance and coercion, it  is the data from the Toyota plant  which is more 
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pertinent. Both Daniel and Elodie spoke in ways that suggested that  they had a strong 
perception of what constituted a “good” worker and that they had a need for “good” work to be 
acknowledged, in particular through respect in the workplace. This differs from Durand’s 
findings that  place the younger generation at odds with the older generation which still holds to 
the idea of dignity in work (Durand, 2006, p. 265), but is similar to Padavic’s (2005) 
identification of a deep-seated need for agency workers to sustain a sense of dignity and self-
respect in a work context which accords them the status of “outsiders”. Léa and Amina were 
faced with negative assumptions about their ability to do the job, despite being given harder 
posts than permanent workers. The agency workers in Padavic’s study continued to display 
commitment  to their tasks and their colleagues despite the lack of reciprocal behaviour. When 
Daniel and Elodie found that respect  and recognition of their work was not forthcoming, they 
attributed this to their status as agency workers. The hierarchical division of labour and 
inequality of treatment eventually undermined their willingness to approach their work in a 
positive way that indicated their consent. 
It  may be that  for Padavic’s agency workers, the observed positive orientation to their work 
concealed negative sentiments, which Thompson (1983) refers to as muted resentment; unable 
to break from the need to display a positive attitude to work due to their vulnerability, agency 
workers can feel obliged to maintain an image of the conscientious worker, as was the case for 
Daniel. The compulsion to conceal attitudes which do not fit  in with the image of a good 
worker, and also to engage in practices to get noticed in order to improve the (slim) chances of 
permanent employment, is thus transformed from being an expression of consent  (enthusiastic 
participation) to compliance (resentment) under the coercion of the market.
4.2 The variegated effects of eroded aspirations and disillusion
In Smith’s (1998) research, “enthusiastic participation” was maintained by agency workers over 
time, although she does suggest that this may have been a mask concealing dissatisfaction with 
their situation. As Linhart  and Linhart  (1985, cited in Calderón, 2008) point  out, it  is possible 
for workers to work hard and simultaneously oppose their situation. The data presented here, 
however, reveals how time erodes the enthusiasm and commitment to perform if there is a 
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dissonance between expectations, aspirations and perceptions of justice, and the reality of their 
situation. When Daniel described his attempts to stand out, to get  noticed by overachieving and 
exceeding expectations, he displayed a frustration that  it  was necessary to work so hard in order 
to give himself the best  chance possible to get a permanent post. The need to be constantly on 
trial whilst  the goal of permanent employment  becomes increasingly elusive erodes the consent 
that is rooted in future, long-term aspirations. This undermines the operation of “soft” 
hegemonic mechanisms which elicit  consent  by tapping into the desire for a permanent  post. 
This does not  mean that  there is a sudden qualitative shift from consent to work through to 
coercive compliance to labour, rather there is the co-presence of forms of constrained adhesion 
and submission which contain the seeds of “latent resistance” (Bouquin, 2006, p. 128). When 
compliance becomes the dominant  orientation to work, the outcome may not  differ in terms of 
productivity and workplace behaviour to that  which flows from a more positive orientation – 
although this may depend upon the technical and intellectual nature of the work. Importantly, 
coercive compliance has the potential to tip over into acts of “misbehaviour” or more formal 
forms of resistance to the labour process. 
In Daniel’s case, the outward image of the ideal worker concealed his internal reaction to his 
lack of job stability. On one level his active participation continued to be rooted in aspirations 
for permanent  employment despite his awareness of how unlikely an outcome this was. He 
continued to engage in strategies that might lead to this right up to the end of his contract, 
displaying a form of cognitive dissonance in simultaneously grasping the highly insecure nature 
of his employment situation, the lack of opportunities open to him, whilst  clinging on to the idea 
that he could have some control over his future by proving himself on the shopfloor and by 
cultivating good relations. This contrasts with Léa and Elodie who, drawing upon their deep-
seated sense of injustice, combined with a readiness to accept the inevitable consequences of 
their action, asserted themselves in opposition to the user-organisation and, in turn, the 
employment agency. Elodie started from a similar point  to Daniel, eager to get on, with a similar 
work ethic that facilitated an orientation to work corresponding to that  expected by the two 
other parties in the triadic relationship. However, at  some point she found that  being a “good 
worker” was no longer sufficient to maintain her positive orientation to work. Like Daniel, she 
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emphasised the need for respect at work and expected respect to be accorded in relation to how 
she performed. The lack of respect  was experienced as an assault on her dignity which she 
ultimately resolved through taking part in collective strike action. Elodie’s response to 
disillusion and loss of aspiration, different  to that  of Daniel, may well have been conditioned by 
her individual biography. Coming from a family of union activists, she considered trade unions 
to be a natural tool for combatting workplace injustice. The way in which agency workers 
interpret their situation and frame their response depends upon a variety of factors, including 
personal biographies and the resources that  they can draw upon. These resources are not only 
material – for example, their ability to sustain themselves should they be exposed to 
unemployment as a result  of their actions – but also the internal resources they have 
accumulated from past and present  social relations (family, education, work). Elodie and Léa, in 
different  ways, drew upon a variety of resources that supported their choice to counter corporate 
demands, which resulted in their exit from their respective workplaces. 
4.3 The  relationship between resistance  and exit in conditions of labour market 
vulnerability
Literature on temporary agency workers in the auto sector highlights the constraints they face in 
asserting themselves in opposition to management (Beaud and Pialoux, 1999; Bouquin, 2006; 
Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011). Acts of resistance for agency workers as a whole are far less 
common than compliance, as agency workers are likely to accommodate to what  is expected of 
them (Gottfried, 1992; Smith 1998), although Farcy (2008) is able to point to some rare 
examples of micro-resistance where the organisation of work permitted individual acts of 
“misbehaviour” to be undetected. Elodie and Léa were unusual in taking part in collective acts 
of resistance, aware that  such action could, either directly or indirectly, cost  them their jobs. 
Elodie knew that the path she was taking would not be looked upon favourably and she left 
Toyota due to implicit  acts of victimisation following strike action. Léa’s action in refusing to 
conceal her workplace accident led to her contract  not  being renewed. In one respect, this can be 
viewed as a modified version of the “exit strategy” (Edward and Scullion, 1982, cited in Smith, 
2006). Farcy (2008) notes that  exit  can be a strategy for agency workers in low-wage, harsh or 
dangerous work where there is little respect  or dignity for the agency workers. Perrin (2004) 
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sees this strategy as an individual action to redress the agency worker’s lost dignity in the 
workplace. Léa and Halim suggested that  this was feature of life at Aulnay for many young 
workers, given the conditions of work at  the plant, although the desire to exit  is not  easily 
fulfilled. Being a low paid temp is “better than nothing” for many agency workers (Farcy, 2008, 
p. 163), since whilst contemporary European capitalism does not currently literally compel the 
worker to “work or starve”, there is still a compulsion to work in order to maintain a socially 
acceptable minimum level of consumption, as well as non-material needs such as dignity and 
self-respect. Hence, the co-existence of negative attitudes to the working environment  and 
action to keep the Aulnay plant open.96 
In contrast  to the rhetoric of the temporary employment sector, low-skilled agency workers lack 
the mobility power that Smith (2006) views as a potential bargaining tool in the wage 
relationship. The ability to quit  (in contrast to slave and feudal forms of labour), is a factor in 
the bargaining power of the employee (mobility-effort bargaining), particularly in contexts of 
high turnover or where professional employees have sought-after skills. The French auto sector 
has, in the past  experienced retention problems due to the nature of the work. Pierre, CGT union 
representative, described how the Aulnay management brought  in workers from as far away as 
Lille (220 km from Paris) as a substitute for the young workers of the banlieues of the north 
Parisian suburbs who were considered inappropriate and unlikely to respond to the demands of 
life on the shopfloor.97 The presence of large numbers of employment  agencies specialising in 
the auto sector has helped resolve this by providing a revolving pool of young workers with 
little risk to the manufacturer as agencies take on the role of selecting appropriate candidates. 
These young agency workers have little mobility bargaining power; the combination of high 
local youth unemployment  and low qualifications significantly reduces their chances of 
employment elsewhere. 
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96  Workers at the Aulnay plant illustrate this well. In interviews they have described their contradictory 
relationship with the plant. Whilst heavily critical of the work regime at Aulnay, they depend on the plant 
for their livelihoods, recognising that there is little on offer for them once the plant closes.  See http://
www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/220712/psa-aulnay-la-bombe-retardement-de-la-cite-des-3000
97 In a recent article on the Aulnay closure, workers (presumably members of the CGT) spoke of how the 
in the early 2000’s the two main CGT reps at the plant put pressure on management to recruit local 
workers. See: http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/110712/des-salaries-daulnay-va-etre-le-cauchemar-
de-psa-et-du-gouvernement 
In such a context, exit  in the traditional sense has little effect in terms of disrupting the labour 
process, and is seen as a strategy of last resort in dichotomous opposition to “voice”, where 
dissatisfaction is expressed to management (Hirschman, 1970). However, in these examples, the 
willingness of Léa and Elodie to contemplate exit was a significant factor in propelling them to 
take action, in contrast  to Daniel whose immediate concern was to maintain his job. This 
difference is located in part  in their different  biographies. Léa, with higher levels of 
qualifications, felt marginally more secure in her chances of employment, whilst  Elodie’s status 
as a lone mother of young children, coupled with her frustration at  her length of time as a 
“precarious worker” in the same plant, influenced her decision to make a stand. 
5. Duality of control and the construction of hegemony within market despotism 
Gottfried’s (1992) concept of duality of control encapsulates the double layer of management 
that is embodied in the triadic relationship. Duality of control operates first through the intake 
process whereby the agency selects appropriate workers and set out  the behavioural parameters 
within which agency workers are expected to remain. The agency cultivates the image of an 
ideal worker whose “conduct and demeanour conforms to extant  organisational 
norms” (Gottfried, 1992, p. 449) and elicits consent  from the agency worker by presenting 
agency work as a path to permanent  employment. In the data presented in the previous chapter, 
agencies do not appear to have proposed this as likely outcome, though agency workers can 
nurture this aspiration in spite of experience suggesting it is unlikely. More significant  is the 
need to avoid the non-renewal of the agency contract and maintain good relations with the 
agency, the gatekeeper to future assignments. Thus the agency is able to set  out  the “rules of the 
game” which are expected to be adhered to in order to secure future income. In Gottfried's 
(1992) account, the underlying rules related to how to interact  with supervisors (e.g. not 
pestering them with foolish questions). Here, the most  important rules are to work, keep your 
head down, and keep away from the unions. Thus, the agency acts as a transmission belt  for the 
requirements of the user-organisation. This was most notable in relation to unions where 
“keeping away from unions” is presented as essential to maintaining good relations with the 
agency and the user-organisation. 
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Agencies can react negatively when agency workers step outside of the norms of expected 
behaviour. When Léa and Elodie did not conform, they were classées/fichées, struck off the list 
of reliable temps and, effectively, blacklisted. Duality of control is also expressed in 
expectations of “reliability”. Agency workers can feel pressurised to take whatever assignment 
is offer to them, however inconvenient, further illustrated by a CGT press release condemning 
the “harassment” of a single mother who was unable to work on the night shift  at a PSA plant 98. 
Daniel considered that  it was not  possible to turn down a mission or to make holiday plans, for 
fear that  he would not  be viewed as reliable, and as a result, lose out  on future assignments, 
conforming to Peck and Theodore’s (2001) “reliably contingent” agency worker. The rhetoric of 
choice, therefore, seems hollow in the light  of the experience of agency workers. Neo-liberal 
discourse, reflected in national and European policy orientations, makes much of the freedom 
and choice that is generated by market  mechanisms. This is also reflected in the discursive 
practices of the temporary employment sector. “Choice” operates here on various levels. 
Agency work is promoted as responding to “choice” as expressed in the market  with the growth 
of the sector driven by demand for and supply of temporary labour. Furthermore, agency work 
is said to offer the freedom and liberty to choose when and for whom to work. Neo-liberal 
discourse, however, encounters difficulties within the French context, which, despite having 
experienced incremental reforms inspired by neo-liberalism, is still characterised by its 
opposition to neo-liberalism at  both the discursive level (Jefferys, 2010), and concretely, as 
evidenced by the mass strikes and mobilisations that  have taken place over the past  two 
decades.
The temporary employment sector, therefore, has been obliged to engage in supplementary 
forms of discursive practices to legitimise the use of agency labour, for example, the “good 
practice” charter agreed between the major agencies and PSA in response to criticisms of 
agency work in the auto sector. The concentration of agency work in lower-skilled occupations 
is not easily associated with “freedom” and “choice” through agency work, and has also obliged 
the sector to promote the role of agency labour as an indispensable mechanism in facilitating the 
labour market integration of young workers. Successful industry lobbying has played a role in 
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98 REF to CGT leaflet
legislative change that has modified the 1972 legislation. The process of extending the role of 
the sector to take on more employment  services has been facilitated by neo-liberal policy 
prescriptions at  EU and national level which aim to reduce the role of the state in the allocation 
of goods and services, by replacing the underfunded and inefficient  French public employment 
service with private, for-profit  organisations (employment agencies). One of the less publicised 
consequences of the EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work is the further deregulation of the 
sector and the removal of restrictions on agency work.
The hegemonic dimension of “normalising” agency labour amongst young workers relies on a 
lack of credible employment  alternatives which reinforce the perception that assistance is 
needed in accessing employment, thereby creating a “new culture of work” (Degiuli and 
Kollmeyer, 2007), different  to that  of previous generations of car workers. The ideological shift 
in conceptions of the school-to-work transition is reinforced by the closure of direct entry to 
employment at PSA, as described by interview participants. In turn, it  is the large agencies that 
facilitate access to flexible labour to PSA and the surrounding factories which supply the 
assembly plants, by providing a pool of appropriate labour at  a competitive price. Thus, 
employment agencies and auto manufacturers contribute to the emergence and reinforcement  of 
a local youth labour market in which temporary employment is increasingly the norm. The auto 
sector is an important source of employment  for young workers in Aulnay-sous-Bois and in the 
Seine-Saint-Denis department. The high proportions of youth in the department who leave 
school with no qualifications could, in previous generations, have hoped to embark on long-
term employment  in a workplace such as the Aulnay plant. Today, access to employment is 
increasingly mediated by the specialist  agencies which have emerged over the course of the last 
two decades, as illustrated by high levels of (manual) agency labour amongst the young workers 
in the area (Pottier and Hamet, 2011). The involvement  of employment agencies in training and 
labour market insertion of those who are least qualified will deepen this process.   
Although precarious work may be increasingly the norm for young people, in particular for 
those who rely on the auto sector for employment, this does not  necessarily translate into a 
positive internalisation of this form of employment. France is still a country that  is characterised 
Chapter 8 Agency labour and new forms of hegemonic despotism
260
by a deep-seated cultural hostility to the “normalised insecurity” that  the temporary employment 
sector is attempting to construct  (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Numerous attempts to overhaul 
labour legislation have met with intense and active opposition, in which youth have also played 
an important role (e.g, the strikes and occupations against the CPE – First Employment 
Contract). So whilst young workers at the Aulnay plant may be accustomed to the lack of job 
security that has been encroaching on the sector since the 1990s (Beaud and Pialoux, 1999), this 
does not necessarily equate with a normative acceptance of agency work, particularly when the 
phase of transition to permanent work is increasingly extended into the future. Brahim, for 
example, contrasted his situation with that of his father’s generation, for whom secure work was 
taken as a given. Rather than a positive acceptance (consent) to the “new culture of work”, the 
data point more towards compliance due to an inability to counter the constraints of new labour 
market conditions. Deguili and Kollmeyer (2007), who describe the ideological cultivation of 
precarious employment as a norm by employment agencies through practices aimed a recasting 
expectations of employment, hint that the success of such practices is not  a given. The research 
presented here suggests that  temporary employment  agencies have been more successful in 
influencing governments than in winning over the hearts and minds of French workers, despite 
an environment  that is critical of agency work in some quarters (Vigneau, 2008, p. 86), as 
illustrated by the approach of the CFDT.
The traces of consent discussed above can be viewed as agency workers confronting constraints 
by playing the rules of the game, as laid down by the agency and the user-firm, with the aim of 
overcoming those constraints. A similar observation is applicable to the contrats pros. 
Consensual behaviour is also facilitated by the perceptions of the “good worker” which Padavic 
(2005) describes as being a residual element of Fordism. Attention, therefore, turns to how 
labour – as a special kind of commodity – will inevitably assert its agency. Despite the 
constraints of the labour process, workers will be found attempting to react to and engage with 
their work context. The range of workplace behaviours in which workers engage encompasses 
consent, compliance and resistance. Where consent is observed, it  is not  necessarily an indicator 
of hegemonic influence. It  can arise from internal sources of “self-discipline” as well as 
discipline cultivated by the temporary employment  agency. Consent can be both a way of 
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achieving material security and employment (adopting stances required by agencies and user-
organisations) and a way of achieving a sense of meaning or dignity at work by adopting self-
imposed standards of work.  
For Padavic (2005), the need to frame identity and self respect  around perceptions of being a 
“good worker” was associated with overcoming the stereotype of being “just  a temp” (Hensen, 
1996). In the interviews, the negative connotations associated with being “just  a temp” coloured 
the way in which agency workers viewed social relations within the workplace, from being 
blamed for mistakes, to assumptions about the quality of their work, to being subject  to 
potentially unpleasant banter, without  the capacity to respond. Overcoming the treatment that 
results from negative stereotypes requires agency workers to go that extra mile, to overachieve 
in order to gain respect. Whilst this may not go as far as representing “loyalty”, as suggested by 
Padavic (2005), it  can result  in a (temporary) correspondence with the goals of the user-
organisation. In trying to overcome what Padavic refers to as the “spoiled identity” imposed 
upon them by their status as agency labour, through taking control of their own “identity 
management”, agency workers can also contribute to the reproduction of the social relations that 
perpetuate a form of labour that is marginalised in terms of employment rights. 
This is not to fall into post-structuralist or Foucauldian concepts which focus on subjective 
identity as the primary unit  of interest  in social research. Nor does it  suggest that the working 
class is bound to reproduce capitalist social relations, which Burawoy implies in his reflection 
on the transition from the hegemonic regime to hegemonic despotism (located in the 
incorporation of workers under the hegemonic regime, and the subsequent inability of organise 
labour to resist  the neo-liberal assault  on labour standards99). The compulsion to frame 
“identities” in response to the “spoiled identity” of the temp can also result  in instances of 
“misbehaviour” that can undermine those social relations, as the examples of Léa and Elodie 
illustrate. Both took part in strike action and Léa refused to conceal her work accident. Personal 
processes (reactions to situations and events) can be both individual and collective since 
collective action depends upon how situations are perceived by individuals (Martinez-Lucio and 
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99 See foreword to the Chinese edition of Manufacturing Consent available on the authors’ website http://
burawoy.berkeley.edu/Biography/Thirty%20Years.pdf Accessed 19th March 2012.
Stewart, 1997). The disillusion and resentment that  was expressed in the interview data, 
including that  of Daniel, reflects a realisation that  there is a conflict, rather than a 
correspondence, between organisational and individual goals. This opens the door to a different 
set of behaviours within the workplace, which can include individual and collective resistance. 
The individual strategies that agency workers engage in, encouraged by an employment  contract 
which isolates agency workers from both co-workers (at the user-organisation) and co-
employees (employed by the agency), are bound up in the tensions that  arise from the structural 
antagonism of a labour process that  is a collective endeavour. The “identities” adopted to pursue 
individual goals are not  incompatible with collective action (Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997), 
as the trajectories taken by Léa and Élodie illustrate. The lack of respect and dignity at  work and 
the requirement to keep your head down and work without  questioning management authority 
was ultimately viewed as an assault  on their “identities”, which they were expected to conceal 
behind the image of the “ideal worker”. 
Yet, participating in collective action is difficult for agency workers. As expected, the interview 
data draws out the many barriers to union mobilisation. Those who are willing to engage in 
collective forms of resistance find themselves at  risk of unemployment, thus depriving trade 
unions of a new generation of potential activists (Béroud, 2009). Beyond the barriers which are 
associated with job insecurity and the duality of control, temporary agency workers have also 
have had to contend with a lack of consistent support from the labour movement. The historical 
opposition to temporary employment agencies adopted by trade unions, although rooted in a 
“progressive” defence of the standard employment relationship, had the effect of turning the 
attention of trade unions away from the mobilisation and defence of agency workers within the 
framework of the agency contract. Trade unions have since modified their approach. The 
CFDT’s “recentrage” of the late 1970s was the basis upon which it  accommodated to the 
emerging neo-liberal consensus around “flexibility” and the acceptance of temporary agency 
work as a legitimate form of employment. The CGT, whilst maintaining its fundamental 
opposition to agency labour, has attempted carve out a position that  simultaneously provides a 
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platform for the concerns of agency workers, through the USI-CGT. SUD, as a new, radical, 
protest-oriented trade union, has a position similar to the CGT. 
Over the last decade, there has been increasing interest in the need to find new ways of 
engaging with workers on precarious contracts. The obstacles presented by the triadic 
relationship of agency work have proved to be difficult  to overcome. The organisational 
structures of trade unions do not facilitate the mobilisation of a workforce that is fragmented 
across different sites of work, that moves from one workplace to another and is formally 
separate from the permanent workers they work alongside. Attempts to overcome this by 
organising workers according to geographical territories have demonstrated the potential of new 
methods of organisation and mobilisation, but success has been limited and contingent upon 
local factors such as the presence of dynamic, young activists and a local social movement 
network. At the PSA plant, despite instances of collective action by agency workers in the past, 
levels of unionisation remain low. The union representatives described their attempts to combat 
precarité at  the plant, mainly through communication (leaflets), but also, where possible, 
through supporting agency workers where problems arose, and through the legal challenges 
where they had a chance of demonstrating misuse. The high proportions of agency workers at 
the plant illustrates the limited impact they are able to have. 
6. New forms of hegemonic practices under conditions of market despotism 
The extensive use of agency labour has consequences that extend beyond the ability to alter the 
size of the workforce in response to market conditions. Agency workers labour under a 
modified political apparatus of production, based not only on the removal of the standard 
employment relationship, but  also upon the duality of control which emerges from a triadic 
employment relationship. The factory regime under which permanent workers labour is also 
influenced by the presence of agency workers, who act both as a buffer and a reminder of how 
much worse their conditions could be, as well as a force for establishing higher benchmarks for 
productive activity. More significantly, both empirically and theoretically, the data presented 
here suggests that the range of workplace behaviours of agency workers cannot  be reduced to 
passivity and subjugation under the yoke of despotism. There is also room for consent and 
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resistance, though the former may be short-lived before it turns into compliance, and the latter 
may be followed by exit (forced or “voluntary”) with both forms of behaviour determined by 
the insecure nature of the contract, and influenced by the duality of control that  lies within the 
triadic relationship.
Despite the overwhelmingly coercive nature of work as described by interviewees, and 
confirmed by other sources, the factory regime that frames the labour process of agency workers 
does contain room for what can be described as forms of hegemonic practices, albeit  to a lesser 
degree and of a different kind, to those experienced by permanent co-workers. Burawoy 
suggested that  labour control under the hegemonic regime rested upon the notion of a shared 
prosperity between workers and the employing organisation, given that market coercion was 
blunted by progressive reforms (welfare and employment rights). Under new conditions of 
mobile capital, this gave way to a new form of hegemony premised upon the “mutual 
consideration” of plant profitability (Sallaz, 2004). For agency workers, on the other hand, the 
threat of job loss is an omnipresent feature of their working lives. High levels of productivity 
are not associated with increasing the profitability of the workplace but  with the immediate task 
of maintaining employment tomorrow. In this sense, the market despotism that comes from the 
reestablishing of the right  of employers to dismiss unsatisfactory workers (Degiuli and 
Kollmeyer, 2009) creates a “coordination of interests” only in a very loose sense. However 
loose it may be, it still indicates that consent  can emerge even within highly coercive factory 
regimes. This appears to be less to do with the success of the hegemonic practices of 
employment agencies and more to do with personal orientations to work and the aspirations of 
agency workers to access permanent  posts, even if conditions suggest  that  this outcome is 
unlikely. On the other hand, the agencies set  out  the rules expected in order to maintain good 
relations with their clients (the user-organisations) and, implicitly, the agencies themselves. 
Duality of control, therefore, can operate through a combination of aspiration and fear of loss of 
income, illustrated in the positive examples of wanting to work well (getting noticed) and 
negative examples of keeping quiet (keeping one’s head down). Over time, the persistence of 
job insecurity and lack of progression creates the context for the prevalence of compliance over 
consent. Similarly, there are instances where agency workers are prepared to step out of the 
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constraints imposed by their contractual situation and assert their labour rights. Although the 
nature of the temporary agency contract leaves the agency worker unprotected against  job loss 
and exposed to a dual system of labour control, labour is still capable of asserting itself.
The presence of temporary agency workers within auto plants also constitutes an important 
element  of the ideological basis of compromise in the face of management restructuring, as the 
remaining core of permanent workers are marginally less exposed to job loss. In addition, 
permanent workers are protected from the worst jobs, illustrating how the “buffering” function 
of the agency workforce operates at  different levels. The description of workplace relations in 
which agency workers feel less able to partake in workplace rituals of banter and jokes, 
provides a further illustration of how the hierarchical division of the workforce according to 
employment status creates opportunities for some sections of the workforce to engage in what 
Thompson and Ackroyd (1993) refer to as “irresponsible autonomy”, whilst  others experience 
more constraints in their workplace interactions. However, as the current threat to the Aulnay 
plant demonstrates, flexible labour is no guarantee of job security, as the cracks in the 
“peripheral ring” that  is meant  to protect  permanent  workers are exposed. This poses the 
possibility of overcoming divisions based upon employment  status, as both agency and core 
workers face the threat of job loss in a local context  such as Aulnay where a large assembly 
plant dominates the employment landscape. Yet there is nothing inevitable about  a united 
resistance to lay-offs and closures, and the opposite effect  can occur with workers throughout 
the sector accepting worse conditions for fear of meeting the same fate of those at Aulnay, 
providing the context for a reconfiguration of hegemonic despotism within the sector.100
Beyond the theoretical considerations of the nature of the factory regime and the identification 
of different forms of workers’ agency, there is also the immediate issue of the challenges posed 
to the labour movement  in directing those instances of workers’ agency – where they 
correspond to the concerns of collective labour – into collective mobilisation and action. The 
current period opened up by the crisis of 2008 leaves agency workers in the auto sector more 
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100  At the PSA plant in Sevel Nord, the decision of management to produce the K-Zero vehicle was 
predicated upon the acceptance of a competitivity agreement which included clauses such as a wage 
freeze for two years. See http://www.humanite.fr/social-eco/psa-linsupportable-chantage-de-la-direction-
aux-salaries-de-sevelnord-501105?x
vulnerable than ever. The first  group of workers to pay the price of the crisis, they have since 
found themselves subject to an intense period of “yo-yo” employment. Agency workers are 
likely to continue to play a central role in providing manufacturers with a convenient and risk-
free form of flexible labour, despite the persistence of key elements of post-war employment 
norms and the promise of the new Socialist  government  to tax the excessive use of temporary 
labour. 
The research presented here has provided further evidence of the process by which car 
manufacturers have been able to override the legislative framework that governs temporary 
agency work, itself designed to protect  the standard employment  relationship and prevent the 
use of agency labour as a way of escaping labour market  “rigidity”. An essential part  of this 
process has been the successful emergence of the temporary employment  sector within the key 
period of French socio-economic history which set in motion the post-war social model. Also 
essential is the history of the French auto sector, a sector marked by conflictual labour relations 
and which, in the post-war years, for a significant section of the workforce, bore only a limited 
resemblance to Burawoy’s hegemonic regime, despite its key position within the French 
economy and labour movement. The use of cheap and over-exploited immigrant labour in a 
labour regime characterised by the lack of full citizenship rights, can be viewed as a forerunner 
to contemporary forms of segmentation which are based upon the denial of full employment 
rights in a socio-economic context  that  has reinforced the vulnerability of labour to market 
despotism. In new conditions of accumulation (globalisation) the alliance between the 
temporary employment sector and the auto industry, facilitated by the (in)action of the state, 
generated the conditions for this new form of segmentation and the reconfiguration of labour 
control that emerged. 
The next  chapter extends the discussion on changing forms of factory/production regimes and 
and the new forms of consent, compliance and resistance that  arise from these regimes by 
examining how Burawoy’s concept  of hegemonic despotism can be applied beyond this case 
study to broader developments in the labour process. It takes as its starting point the extension 
of agency labour and other forms of precarious work within an emerging socio-economic 
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context that appears to be increasingly unfavourable to the position of labour within the labour 
process, and broadens the discussion out to general emerging tendencies within European 
workplaces. This extended theoretical contribution supplements the empirical data presented in 
previous chapters.
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CHAPTER 9
HEGEMONY AND DESPOTISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
1. Introduction
The expansion of temporary agency work into occupational arenas in which permanent 
employment contracts were previously the norm has taken place within an overall context  of 
change that has significantly undermined the post-war settlements that  underpinned the 
influence of labour within the workplace and, also, society as a whole. The combined pressures 
of diminished protection, the risks associated with job loss, and the internal squeeze on labour 
as organisations exhort employees to “work harder with less” (McGovern et  al., 2007) is a 
general feature of workplace relations for many employees within contemporary capitalism in 
advanced economies. As capital seeks a “qualitative intensification” of .labour (Thompson, 
2010), Burawoy’s concept of hegemonic despotism, a seemingly paradoxical production regime 
that combines hegemony and despotism (Vallas and Hill, 2012, p. 175), appears to be more 
relevant than ever as workers experience labour regimes of tighter internal controls in the 
context of exposure to external economic risk. In France, the UK, and elsewhere, research has 
pointed to the intensification of work, often imposed by workplace bullying and “management 
by terror” (Beale and Hoele, 2013; Carter et al., 2011; Coutrot, 2006; Palpacuer and Seignour, 
2012; Taylor et  al., 2010; Thompson, 2010). At  the same time, prevailing managerial discourse 
continues to emphasise humanistic values and “soft” HRM (Thompson, 2011). This dissonance 
between workplace realities and the professed aims of normative models of HRM indicates a 
tension between the different dimensions of labour control within contemporary labour 
processes. On the one hand there is an appeal to workplace commitment based upon normative 
assumptions regarding employment relations and “decent” work. On the other hand, those 
elements of employment associated with “decent work”, such as permanent employment, 
discretion and autonomy, are being undermined as more authoritarian forms of labour control, 
that bear little resemblance to text book norms, take hold. The growth of contingent and 
precarious forms of employment  had already begun to undermine scholarly assumptions 
regarding a future of high performance work systems, employee involvement and commitment, 
given their association with long term employment.  The situation of significant proportions of 
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agency workers, stuck in low-paid work with little prospect of permanent work, and subject  to 
authoritarian control regimes provides a glimpse of the impact of job insecurity within a context 
of crisis and welfare state retrenchment.
Changes in the provision of welfare entitlements to those not  in employment  have resulted in a 
reinforcement  of market discipline on labour within Europe. In many countries, reductions in 
unemployment benefits have been accompanied by sanctions for those not considered to be 
doing enough to secure employment  (Eurofound, 2010), providing governments and employing 
organisations with a powerful mechanism to propel workers to take up whatever jobs are 
available, however low-paid and lacking in job quality. The recent body of literature on 
workplace tyranny and “management  by terror” suggests that despotism as a feature of the 
labour process extends beyond the contingent workforce and that the global financial crisis has 
intensified this development  (Thompson, 2011; 2013). Taking the growth of agency labour and 
other forms of contingent  employment  as a starting point, this chapter discusses the factors 
which define contemporary production regimes for broader groups of workers. The first part of 
the chapter contextualises the development of temporary agency work by situating it  within the 
general development of employment  and work within Europe. It then sets out political and 
economic processes which frame hegemonic despotism. The chapter then introduces a 
conceptual matrix which attempts to capture the complex variety of labour process under 
contemporary conditions of capitalist  accumulation. It  does so by both building upon the 
research presented in previous chapters and the recent literature on work in the 21st  century 
outlined in the first part of the chapter. 
2. Labouring under conditions of employment insecurity 
The previous chapter referred to the challenges that confront workers faced with an economic 
system that  appears less able or willing to provide secure employment for large sections of 
workers. The ability to provide for oneself and for one’s family – both in the present and in the 
future – is an important component of modern democracies. For much of the last  century, 
European workers were, in large part, able to conceive of a future in which they and their 
children could prosper (relatively speaking), giving them a stake in capitalist social relations, 
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within which the exploitation of the capitalist  labour process was partially obscured (Burawoy, 
1985). The economic crisis has shaken the prospects for whole swathes of workers in Europe, 
whilst  also encouraging those voices promoting further deregulation of the labour market as a 
way of creating jobs. Temporary employment  agencies, as powerful resource-rich entities, have 
been able to respond to new conditions by envisaging future pathways to flexible employment 
in which they play a key role in ensuring the supply of flexible labour. As set  out by Peck and 
Theodore (2002), agencies play an active part  in the construction of a flexible (insecure) labour 
market. Previous chapters have discussed how the French temporary employment sector has 
carved out  its role historically, placing it in a good position to take advantage of the current 
context, and to further promote its activities in uncertain labour markets. In the UK, 
employment agencies have used the “Swedish derogation” to establish new forms of 
employment that are more insecure than the traditional agency contract, in order to bypass the 
additional costs of agency labour arising from the implementation of the EU Directive on 
Agency Work. Agencies are able to set  up a permanent contract with agency workers, thereby 
waiving their right to the protections accorded by the 2011 UK Agency Work Regulations 
(AWR). Whilst  permanent, these contracts do not provide employment security in any real sense 
since the average minimum working hours can be set  as low as four hours a week. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that  the full force of the duality of control inherent  in the agency contract is 
being felt  by agency workers forced to sign the new contracts under threat of losing their jobs 
(Purcell, 2013). Agency contracts also make up a large number of UK workers on “zero hours” 
contracts, which tie workers to an employer without a corresponding promise of work, and in 
some cases deny them the right  to employment  elsewhere. These contracts are used in a wide 
range of sectors (e.g. retail, food processing and higher education).101 Other European countries, 
such as Austria, Ireland and Sweden, have also seen a significant rise in these contracts 
(Eurofound, 2010). Working time, a long-contested frontier of control within the labour-capital 
relationship (Taylor at  al., 2010), has been ceded in its entirety to management  in the zero hours 
or on-call contract, with workers obliged to work “unsociable” hours whether they want  to or 
not (Eurofound, 2010. Management is able to limit wage labour strictly to that  required at any 
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%20and%20Circulars/Zero%20Hours%20Factsheet.pdf 
given time whilst enforcing behavioural compliance through their direct control over future 
hours.  
Germany, often held up as a model of economic success combined with institutionally 
embedded social partnership (Greer, 2008), has also experienced a dramatic degradation of 
work and pay over the past  decade. The 2003 Hartz reforms, aimed at  creating employment 
through “active” labour market policies and labour market  deregulation, led to an explosion of 
“mini-jobs” and the erosion of pay in the service sector (Hassel, 2011). A decade later, nearly a 
quarter of German employees (23%) are in low-wage employment  (earning less than €9.15 an 
hour).102 Although manufacturing workers in Germany have continued to be relatively protected 
compared with workers in other sectors, in particular those in part-time insecure employment, 
recent  concessions agreed by auto workers’ unions indicate that the pay and conditions of core 
workers are increasingly under threat. In both Germany and France, the economic crisis of 2008 
has intensified the process of concession bargaining within car manufacturing, with the threat  of 
relocation and plant  closures undermining the capacity of unions to defend the terms and 
conditions of workers. Shortly after the PSA’s restructuring and plant  closures became public, 
Renault forced unions to agree to a new employment contract  (l’accord du compétivité). The 
contract included a 6.5% increase in working time and a wage freeze.103  Unions at  the General 
Motors Strasbourg plant accepted an agreement in which they ceded six days of annual leave 
and their bonus in addition to a wage freeze and the loss of 200 jobs.104 In Germany, unions at 
General Motors agreed to a pay freeze and the closure of one of their plants in return for 
safeguarding the jobs of 20,000 workers.105 
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102 The study was carried out by the Institute for Work, Skills and Training at the University of Duisburg-
Essen. See http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/oct/26/real-cost-labour-reforms-germany.
103 “Renault: l’accord du compétivité signé par trois syndicats” (Renault: the competivity agreement 
signed by three unions), Le Monde, 13th March, 2013. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/03/13/renault-l-accord-de-competitivite-signe-mercredi-
par-trois-syndicats_1847007_3234.html
104 “A Strasbourg, “regrets” et “ambiance malsaine” pours les anciens de GM” (At Strasbourg, “regrets” 
and “bad feeling” for ex-GM workers), Libération, 5th March, 2013.
http://www.liberation.fr/economie/2013/03/05/a-strasbourg-regrets-et-ambiance-malsaine-pour-les-
anciens-de-gm_886542
105 Automative News Europe, 28th February, 2013, “GM guarantees Opel jobs after unions agree to 
factory closure, pay freeze”.
http://europe.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130228/ANE/130229890/gm-guarantees-opel-
jobs-after-unions-agree-to-factory-closure-pay#axzz2cirIRYQ7. 
The ability of capital to hold labour to ransom in this way lies in the insecurity that  Burawoy 
identified as an outcome of globalised capital’s ability to relocate elsewhere, and points to the 
expansion of employment  insecurity beyond those on temporary contracts (Broughton et  al., 
2010). In this sense, the concept  of precarity can be generalised to the wider working 
population. The impact  of neoliberal globalisation upon the the ability of workers to access 
secure and stable working futures and maintain post-war gains has been extensively discussed 
since the 1990s (Bourdieu, 1998; Beck, 1992; and Paugam, 2000). The extent of the precarity 
has been recently critiqued by Doogan (2009) who argues that employment insecurity has been 
exaggerated. Instead,  the precarious nature of employment  exists more as a mental state that is 
manufactured as an ineluctable fact  of globalisation, and which negatively affects the 
confidence of workers. Doogan (2009) correctly draw attention to the political choices that 
underpin economic outcomes (as opposed to the workings of inevitable economic forces). He 
also correctly identifies the continued prevalence of permanent employment. However, he 
underestimates how the growth of contingent  work, and the existence of, for example, agency 
workers working alongside workers on permanent contracts, doing the same work but on very 
different  pay and conditions, can act  as a brake upon workers’ collective action. Such working 
arrangements can also undermine normative assumptions concerning conditions of employment 
and the confidence of workers on the shopfloor. Whilst Doogan makes some salient points in his 
critique of those who lament the “inevitability” of current  trends, he underestimates how the end 
of employment  for life, coupled with the focus on the responsibility of individuals to maintain 
and develop their “employability” across the lifecourse, can impact  upon employees’ experience 
of job insecurity. When jobs growth is driven by contingent work and the phenomenon of 
underemployment106, those who have survived redundancy may well feel fragile in relation to 
the labour market (Taylor, 2012). The fear of job loss expressed by UK public sector workers in 
a recent study (Gallie et al., 2012) illustrates the pressures faced by segments of the “core” 
labour force. This fear is likely to be exacerbated by welfare regimes that  sanction rather than 
protect the unemployed – an effect of the disciplinary element of active labour market policies 
put into place by EU states (Eurofound, 2010).
Chapter 9 Hegemony and despotism in the 21st century
273
106See http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/europes-growing-army-underemploy-news-512315
3. The tightening of the chain in the contemporary workplace
Whilst job insecurity is directly experienced by temporary agency workers and other contingent 
workers, it  is not  confined to these groups of workers. In the current context, in particular, its 
effects are felt  throughout  the labour market, and, in sphere of control over the labour process, 
employment insecurity facilities the ability of management to tighten control over their 
workforce. Anecdotal and academic evidence in France, the UK, and elsewhere points to an 
intensification of management control across a broad range of occupational profiles (Felstead et 
al., 2007). In France, the telecommunications sector is a dramatic example of how changes in 
the organisation of work have created a context  of workplace suffering that has had tragic 
consequences in the form of high numbers of suicides. Extensive restructuring and downsizing 
of France Telecom (60,000 jobs lost  between 1998 and 2008) has transformed the working 
conditions of what  was a well-protected public sector workforce. Palpacuer and Seignour (2012) 
document the decades-long process of organisational change that transformed this major state 
company into a share-holder driven multinational. As a result, the organisational culture and 
practice of France Telecom (FT) is now one of “social violence” hidden beneath benign 
management rhetoric. According to the study, half of the 32 suicides that took place at FT 
between 2008 and 2009 can be directly linked to “organisational bullying” in the context  of new 
forms of management and pressure to work harder, an association that has been identified in 
other research (Fevre et  al., 2012). The gradual change in the status of FT, from nationalised 
company to a profit-driven privatised financial concern, had the effect of altering employee 
orientations to their work and to management, in an organisational context  perceived to be 
centred on the “exclusively finance driven project” of top management (Palpacuer and 
Seignour, 2012, p. 161), resulting in intensified and tightened managerial control. In the French 
postal sector too, oppressive working conditions have been identified as a factor behind two 
suicides in 2012, within a broader context of a reduced labour force (a loss of 24% between 
2002 and 2011) and the extensive use of agency labour (Lefebvre, 2008), combined with 
increasing workflows.107 
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Berribi-Hoffman’s (2012) study of French IT professionals in multinational companies, working 
under a variety of employment/consultancy contracts, identified a relationship of domination 
enforced by perceptions of insecurity, which left employees unable to challenge heavy 
workloads. Thus the consequences of lean production, described in this thesis in the context of 
the auto sector, make themselves felt  in other parts of the economy. In Carter et al.’s (2011, 
2013) study of UK tax processing, the deskilling of previously skilled clerical work has 
facilitated work intensification and micro-management through performance monitoring, 
supplemented by measures aimed at ensuring compliance to targets (e.g. the display of 
individual results on whiteboards). Here, the shift  from “indirect normative” control to “direct 
performative control” is framed by the principles of New Performance Management (NPM) 
through which the organisation of work has been realigned to mirror private sector business 
models in a quest for “efficiency” and “value for money”. Technological innovation, which 
once offered the promise of skill enhancement  and autonomy (Guiliano, 2008, cited in Carter et 
al., 2011), has instead been employed to impose routinised, standardised and repetitive work 
that is closely monitored and controlled (Carter et  al., 2011). Diminishing control via 
management strategies to regulate and audit  performance through targets and client/customer 
feedback (Carter et al, 2013; Taylor et al., 2010; Thompson 2011) has been accompanied by 
bullying as a form of management control (Palpacuer and Seignour, 2012; Beale and Hoele, 
2013). The frontier of control has shifted considerably in favour of management. As a result, the 
range of permissible workplace behaviours is being reassessed, with hitherto “legitimate” 
behaviour now categorised as deviant. Thus, sickness absence, once a point of refuge for 
workers, and even tolerated as a guard against more damaging forms of workplace disruption 
(Edwards and Scullion, 1982), has become an unwelcome cost to be minimised (Taylor et  al., 
2010). The principle of lean – aggressively implemented within the labour process and resulted 
in a reduced core workforce – has rendered workplace attendance an area of contestation to be 
resolved through coercion rather than consensus. 
Similar processes are occurring elsewhere in Europe where the public sector is under pressure to 
replicate the private sector model of cost-cutting. The case of the French postal sector, as cited 
above, is one such example. Other parts of the French public sector, such as education, are also 
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facing strains due to the combined effects of workforce reduction and increased workloads 
(Mongourdin-Denoix, 2013). In Austrian hospitals, the outsourcing of “secondary” non-medical 
services and the reduction of labour costs has been found to lead to lower wages and a 
deterioration in working conditions.108  It is in the UK, however, that the encroachment  of 
models associated with the competitive private sector has gone furthest, with the private sector 
taking on more responsibility in the direct delivery of public services, often through temporary 
employment agencies. In the sphere of adult  social care, the results of this process are currently 
most visible in terms of public debate, first and foremost  concerning the quality of service 
delivery, but increasingly with regards to the nature and quality of employment within the 
sector. In this example, employment insecurity is linked to the precarious employment status, 
rather than the ebbs and flows of a consumer product  market. The nature of this work, taking 
place within the homes of service users, would appear on the surface to encourage the autonomy 
and discretion of skilled carers. Yet here too, autonomy is undermined by pressures associated 
with “efficiency savings”, with low-paid care workers under pressure to finish caring tasks in 
the limited time accorded to them (Pennycock, 2013). Both the nature of the employment 
contract and the isolated nature of the work are barriers to challenging bad employment practice 
and the effect of these practices on the care provided.109 Belanger and Edwards (2013) note that 
whilst  the labour process involved in providing individual care differs considerably from that  of 
a worker in a factory or a call centre, the broader context of a neo-liberal economy undergoing 
further restructuring in the post-2008 period makes its presence felt. The control of working 
time is driven by cost-cutting imperatives as local government reduces the funds available for 
the delivery of the service. 
Similar examples of negative workplace experiences related to job insecurity, staff cuts and 
pressure from workplace reorganisation have been identified in other national contexts, such as 
Ireland (Russell and McGinnity, 2013), presenting a very real challenge for significant sections 
of Europe’s labour force (Eurofound, 2013). The Fifth Danish Work Environment Cohort Study 
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108 Qualitative case study carried out by the Working Life Research Centre (FORBA). For an English 
summary of the research see http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2012/06/AT1206021I.htm
109 Some care workers feel unable to give their names when reporting on their employment conditions in 
the national press, see for example, guardian.com/society/2013/jun/13/care-firms-law-on-pay
(Milling and Nielsen, 2011), which highlights the rise in bullying in Danish workplaces, 
indicates that this is occurring across very different EU states. These examples of European 
labour processes have more in common with “hard” models of HRM that  view labour as a 
“factor of production” to be utilised as appropriate to organisational ends (Legge, 1995, cited in 
Taylor, 2012) than the “soft” version of HRM that has been in vogue with academics and 
practitioners. On the other hand, there is a continued reliance upon organisational discourses 
that present organisational change in a positive light. Surveillance of workers’ performance is 
couched in the euphemisms of efficiency, quality, feedback and customer care (Taylor, 2012), in 
an attempt to obscure practices which are, for McGovern et al. (2007), at  the opposite pole to 
the ideas which are purported to be at the root  of human resource management (McGovern et 
al., 2007, p. 143). The adoption of charters, such as PSA’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
agreement  (see Chapter 8), which incorporate a “socially responsible” approach to labour 
standards, is a further example of the gap between discourse and practice. The tension between 
the hegemonic and despotic dimensions of organisational practices appears to have deepened 
since Burawoy first  identified hegemonic despotism. The next section of this chapter  looks at 
the factors driving this by setting out  the broader socio-economic developments that  have 
transformed the experience of the labour process within contemporary workplaces.
4. Back to the future? The contours of contemporary production politics
Although many of the features of hegemonic despotism established by Burawoy are relevant to 
contemporary accounts of the labour process, there are key differences in the politics of 
production within which wage labour takes place in today’s advanced capitalist  states. One 
major difference is the spread of precarious work and the subsequent precariousness that 
characterises the working lives of new generations of workers in a wide range of industries, as 
discussed in section 2 above. Burawoy’s production regimes focused upon core workers in key 
industries labouring under the relative protection of full-time jobs. Exposure to the market was 
rooted in the expansion of opportunities available to capital in the global economy, and the 
rhetoric of “relative profitability” faced with global competition. As far as agency workers were 
concerned, their labour process was characterised by a despotism born of direct  vulnerability to 
the market, combined with the construction of a narrative of freedom aimed at  galvanising the 
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adhesion of a largely female temporary agency workforce to low-paid work. The nature and 
composition of temporary agency work has since changed as it  has spread from a peripheral 
form of work, confined to those with “marginal labour market  attachment”, to become a form of 
work that  is integral to contemporary capitalism, drawing in a workforce who would prefer – 
and need – to be employed permanently. Agency work is, however, only one form of precarious 
employment. Precarious forms of work are fast  becoming a defining element of contemporary 
European production politics, particularly for young workers, expressed in terms such as 
“generation précaire” in France, “generation 700 euros” in Greece, or “Generation Praktikum” 
in Austria (Gouglas, 2013).  The extent of precarious work has grown  considerably since the 
economic crisis, leading to Greek commentators to coining a new version of their phrase: 
“generation 300 euros” (Gouglas, 2013). Whilst there may no longer be a clear cut  distinction 
between those on open-ended contracts and those in fixed-term positions in terms of 
employment security (Broughton et  al., 2010), the emergence of new forms of employment, 
such as zero hour or on-call contracts, exacerbates the experience of employment insecurity. 
Such developments, which point to far-reaching changes in labour markets, are at  one with the 
European Commission’s job strategy, which promotes flexibility as a key part  of employment 
growth (European Commission, 2006).
Within the workplace, precarious forms of employment considerably alter relations with 
management. Under the hegemonic regime, the “internal state” of collective bargaining and the 
institutionalisation of worker-management relations within the company played a large role in 
explaining what Burawoy saw as the willingness of workers to cooperate, and the replacement 
of coercion over consensus in the labour process. Whilst the political apparatus of production 
included external factors, most  notably the social wage embodied in the welfare state, Burawoy 
was particularly interested in “in-plant” sources of co-operation and, ultimately, the 
reproduction of relations of exploitation within the plant. For Burawoy, the internal labour 
market fostered positive attitudes towards the company and, via formal structures of 
negotiation, went  some way to sealing off employees from external competitive pressures; 
costs were absorbed elsewhere, for example, by the customer (Roy, 1980). Subsequent 
developments in capitalist political economy undermined the “internal” state, exposing 
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workforces to external risk, as the costs of capitalist competition were directed back towards the 
workforce, ushering in the new regime of hegemonic despotism. Burawoy’s identification of 
hegemonic despotism as a new type of production regime, arising out  of the contradictions of 
the hegemonic regime, captures many of the features that are now commonly associated with 
neoliberalism. However, prescient as his analysis was, it  was unable to foresee the full 
unravelling of production politics into the twenty-first century. 
The consent  fostered by the internal state was framed by an external political apparatus of 
production which took the form of direct and indirect state intervention in the wage-capital 
relationship and the reproduction of labour power. This fundamental element  of the hegemonic 
regime is no longer guaranteed under contemporary conditions of capitalism. The return of 
labour’s dependency on wage-labour for its subsistence provides capital with a ready supply of 
cheap labour as workers have no choice but  to take on employment  that, in previous decades, 
would have been confined to marginalised groups within the labour market. Employment 
regulation has been relaxed in order to facilitate numerical flexibilisation, including in France 
which is still culturally attached to labour rights.110 The restructuring of the welfare state over 
the past three decades and the weakening of formal protections accorded to labour has 
accelerated since 2008, to the extent  that in some EU countries, non-participation in paid work 
for those without personal sources of income now brings with it  the danger of destitution in 
some EU countries. The aim of state intervention into the labour-capital relationship is now 
more likely to be directed towards easing the regulatory environment in order to promote job 
creation. Delteil and Dieuaid (2010) detect  a renewal of state intervention in France since 2008. 
However, this takes the form of “tailor[ing] institutional frameworks of social dialogue as 
closely as possible to the new economic constraints experienced by firms (organisational 
flexibility, management  restructuring, control of labour costs)”, rather than attempting to 
“balance” these firm-level interests with those of workers. Instead, they argue, social dialogue is 
a management-led political game, the outcome of which is guaranteed to serve management 
interests. On the other hand, there has been renewed legislation initiated by the European 
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110 Whilst earlier attempts to weaken employment protection legislation were met with strong resistance, 
the 2008 changes to the Labour Code made it easier to break the employment contract. 
Directives aimed at protecting the growing numbers on atypical contracts. This has had the 
affect  of embedding and normalising precarious employment  relations within labour markets, 
whilst  appearing to have had less success in protecting workers – as the experience of the UK 
has shown. Indeed, the example of agency work in the French auto sector illustrates how 
legislation does not  necessarily translate into practice. Direct  and indirect  state intervention in 
the labour-capital relationship, therefore, has been significantly modified in the direction of the 
re-commodification of labour.
A further dimension of contemporary production politics is the growing role of financial 
institutions in the economy. For Thompson (2011), financialisation is the determining factor 
behind recent  changes in the labour process. The increased penetration of financial actors in the 
governance of organisations has modified the role of management within the labour process, as 
power has shifted away from internal organisational processes to the realm of the circulation of 
capital. For Thompson (2011), this means it  no longer makes sense for labour process analysis 
to understand labour control strategies as rooted in the indeterminancy of labour power. It is 
instead necessary to turn to the valorisation process in the circuit  of capital as the determining 
factor compelling managers to deviate from HRM models. Managers no longer have a 
discretionary decision-making role within organisations, having become more tied to the 
priorities of shareholders and investors, who demand short-term dividends. This creates a 
“disconnect  between employer objectives at the level of the firm and the shift to the imperative 
of the investor and shareholder value” (Clarke, 2009, p. 784). Àlvarez Peralta (2012) also 
argues that financialisation in France has been accompanied by the transition from a managerial 
to a shareholder form of management, whereby corporate governance criteria are no longer set 
by internal controls. Delteil and Dieuaide (2010) trace this process within French industry and 
examine the effect  of prioritising shareholder value on HR policies and labour management 
relations. This distancing between those “responsible for company strategy” and local managers 
“without strategic power” was for Contrepois (2011) a major factor in explaining the decision to 
close the Molex automobile supplies plant in southern France. The lack of consultation, despite 
this being a requirement  of French labour law, and the lack of an economic rationale for the 
closure of the site, reflected the power of the multinational corporation to take globally strategic 
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decisions driven by shareholder concerns, irrespective of a national context  that formally 
required adherence to local standards. 
It  is possible to acknowledge the primordial role of financialisation in diverting organisations to 
short-term profit-making goals without dispensing with the continued relevance of the dynamics 
of the labour process. Ultimately, the imperative to generate more profit  relies, in a global sense, 
upon the productivity of workers producing surplus value. There is a continuity in the role of 
managers as custodians of capital, albeit  under new conditions which may well include, as 
Thompson (2011) argues, less discretionary power. Nonetheless, “shareholder capitalism” has 
been an important  factor behind the reorganisation of capitalist units in order to generate more 
profit within tighter timeframes at  various levels of the value chain (Thompson, 2013). The 
associated complex chain of relationships arising from subsidiaries and outsourced activities, 
and the innovative structures in place to avoid tax liabilities by key multinational companies, 
mirror the complexity of “atypical” employment  relations that  blur employer responsibilities. 
The major companies at the top of the supply chain transfer costs to those lower down the chain. 
Inevitably, these costs are absorbed by the workers, who, as the case of the auto supply chain 
illustrates, are likely to be low paid agency workers (Pulignano, 2002; Taylor 2010).
A further dimension of the political economy of contemporary capitalism is formed by the 
changing contours of the working class and the impact  of this upon its collective identity. 
Within the realm of employment relations, outsourcing and precarious forms of employment act 
as a barrier to collective organisation and action (Bouffartigue, 2008). The decline of 
collectivity in terms of union membership across a number of Europe countries (Jeffreys, 2011) 
has undermined the temporal links that  bind the class and which constitute collective experience 
and memory (McBride and Martínez Lucio, 2011). This weakening of class power feeds back 
into the labour process and employment norms, reinforcing the very processes from which it 
emerges. Standing’s (2011) book, The Precariat, a provocative academic response to changes in 
the working class and in employment  relations, sets out a quasi-dystopian future in which the 
mass of the working class is reduced to, and defined by, increasingly fragmented and precarious 
forms of employment, fundamentally undermining the ability of the working class to 
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collectively influence society. The loss of working class collectivity as a result of changes in 
employment relations and the rise in precarious work should not, however, be overstated. 
Working class collectivity is not based solely on traditional occupational or workplace 
identities; it  is also located in working class communities and new emerging forms of struggle 
(McBride and Martínez Lucio, 2011). Unions have recognised this by moving beyond their 
traditional core constituency and have taken steps to take on board changes in the composition 
of the working class. For example, by finding ways of integrating workers on precarious 
employment contracts and by responding to different forms of collectivity (e.g. by working 
class communities or migrant  workers) in order to forge anew trade union consciousness and 
action (Wills and Simms, 2004; Denis, 2009). At  the same time, the reduced role of organised 
labour organsiation within workplace negotiations has been said to have sparked militant, 
radical forms of action, such as the spate of “bossnappings” in France, seen by many as a 
legitimate form of action as expectations of employment norms are dashed (Gall, 2011). This 
suggests that collective working class action is not off the agenda – although it may take on a 
variety of new (or earlier) forms. That said, the new realities of a class in flux, as it  adjusts to its 
altered position in relation to capital, constitute an important element  of the emerging political 
apparatus of production of western capitalism in the first half of the twenty-first century.
The general political and ideological apparatus of production that  has been emerging within 
European economies can be summarised thus:
1. Increasing precarisation of employment. This affects younger workers, in 
particular, who are often employed on an expanding variety of temporary 
contracts, frequently mediated through agencies that  facilitate access to labour 
on an ad hoc basis. However, job insecurity is no longer confined to contingent 
workers.
2. The withdrawal of state protection for labour, in the form of both direct and 
indirect  intervention into wage-labour relationship. This is resulting in the re-
commodification of labour.
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3. Financialisation of capitalist  economies and the consequences of this for 
organisational strategies and labour management/human resource policies.
4. A weakening of the traditional forms of working class collective organisation 
and action, which is undermining the position of labour in relation to capital. 
However, new forms of organisation and action are emerging. 
These developments have been widely documented by economists, sociologists, political and 
social scientists. Although the specific configurations of production regimes vary according to 
different  contexts, it  is possible to identify in a general sense how these elements of the political 
apparatus of production weigh upon contemporary forms of labour process – just  as Burawoy 
identified the key trends that constituted the weakening of the hegemonic regime. The 
components of the political apparatus that are emerging to different  degrees within specific 
historical, institutional and political relations can be said to be reinforcing the despotic element 
of the capitalist labour process. How, therefore, is the hegemonic dimension constituted within 
contemporary forms of hegemonic despotism?
5. Conceptualising contemporary forms of hegemonic despotism
This thesis has discussed how the temporary agency contract  facilitates the emergence of 
despotic forms of labour management, and how consent  might  be elicited under such a labour 
regime. If workplace despotism is becoming more prevalent in general, as suggested above, 
then the question of how consent  operates within the broader labour process becomes pertinent. 
Or to put  it another way, what form might  consent  take today and how does it  differ from 
consent  to work under the hegemonic regime or under the early period of hegemonic despotism 
which Burawoy did not examine to any great  extent? The matrix below suggests four categories 
of consent which can be said to be operating under the general conditions of contemporary 
capital accumulation. Whilst  embedded within the overall conditions of hegemonic despotism, 
each category relates to a different  configuration of hegemony and despotism, drawn from both 
the research in this thesis and the recent literature identified above. 
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Figure 20. A conceptual m
atrix of hegem
onic despotism
 in the 21st century
HEGEMONY
Com
prom
ised consent
-Control of labour through hegem
onic practices continues to play a key role 
in organisational discourse and culture.
-Perceptions of a “coordination of interest” and com
m
itm
ent to com
pany 
goals are underm
ined by organisational practices aim
ed at eliciting ever 
increasing perform
ance, and reduce the space for negotiation in the 
organisation of work.
-Hegem
ony is underm
ined by acknowledgem
ent of the influence of (distant) 
shareholders on m
anagerial priorities.
-High-skilled em
ployees continue to have relatively high degrees of 
autonom
y over their work. This is a key source of consent to high 
perform
ance. 
-Consent to work is accom
panied by a negative internal response (e.g. 
cynicism
) to m
anagem
ent directives and organisational goals.
-Although relatively protected in the labour m
arket, job loss is a concern.
Aspirational consent
-Consent to work is predicated upon perceptions of investing in future 
em
ploym
ent opportunities.
-Hegem
ony operates outside and within the labour process around 
institutionally-grounded discourses of flexibility, em
ployability and individual 
responsibility to navigate a dynam
ic and com
petitive globalised labour 
m
arket.
-Changed norm
s of em
ploym
ent affect the way newer cohorts of workers 
respond to “bad jobs” and their susceptibility to hegem
onic discourses 
regarding the new world of work.
-Insecure and low-paid work is perceived as an unavoidable (and enduring) 
stage in the transition from
 school to work, and the transition to financial 
independence.
-Aspirational consent is tim
e-bound. Hegem
ony is underm
ined by the 
inability to m
ove into “good jobs”. 
HEGEMONY
Defensive consent
-Control of labour is increasingly based upon fear of job loss.
-“Coordination of interests” takes on a defensive form
 as workers concede 
to m
anagem
ent strategies to downsize and radically alter term
s and 
conditions of em
ploym
ent.
-Intensification of work and, in som
e cases, de-skilling, reflects the ability of 
m
anagem
ent to introduce coercive elem
ents of control, based upon the 
fear of job loss.
-The reduction of the core workforce and the expansion of tem
porary 
em
ploym
ent contracts constitutes a further aspect of the politics of 
production allowing workers with the perception of risk being transferred to 
the contingent workforce, whilst sim
ultaneously reconciling perm
anent 
workers to their relatively safer position.
-Coercive control becom
es m
ore prom
inent as recurrent waves of 
redundancies underm
ine the perception that jobs can be saved by 
constant restructuring and intensification of work .
Constrained consent
-Consent is based upon fear of job loss and, in m
any cases, insecure 
em
ploym
ent contracts. 
-Attem
pts to elicit positive consent to work beyond the dependency of 
workers on wage labour are either non-existent or of m
arginal interest to 
workers. The labour process is experienced overwhelm
ingly as coercive. 
-W
orkers possess few resources to either negotiate their working conditions 
or m
anage their experience of the labour process.
-The unequal nature of the labour process is starkly revealed as workers 
are reduced to disposable factors of production. The disposable nature of 
labour is increasingly facilitated by tem
porary em
ploym
ent agencies.
-For those on agency contracts labour control is no longer defined solely by 
the m
anagem
ent-worker relationship on the shop-floor. As with hegem
ony, 
coercive labour control is located both within and without the labour 
process. This duality of control is heightened by the role of tem
porary 
em
ploym
ent agencies in providing future em
ploym
ent opportunities.
DESPOTISM
DESPOTISM
This conceptual matrix sets out four ways in which consent  to work operates under different 
configurations of hegemony and despotism. The concept  of hegemonic despotism presented 
here is one in which hegemony and despotism co-exist  in dynamic tension, as the forces which 
underpin coercive forms of labour control are strengthened.  The nature of consent within each 
of these quadrants is influenced at  the macro-level by the broader socio-economic context  of 
neo-liberalism and financialisation, alongside the ideological and against the distributive 
policies of the post-war welfare state. It is also influenced by the resources available to workers, 
and their different locations in respect to the trajectory of their working lives.
Consent expresses the extent to which workers feel they have a stake in cooperating within the 
labour process (“mutual gains” or “coordination of interests”). It is also influenced by the 
capacity of labour to assert  its power in the labour process, thereby permitting some degree of 
autonomous space within the alienating experience of wage labour. Under the hegemonic 
regime, these two elements were, in theory, unproblematic since there was political and material 
incorporation of workers into the post-war capitalist  labour process and the democratic state in 
which it was embedded. Under hegemonic despotism, hegemony relies largely upon the 
capacity of political and financial elites to present  neoliberalism as the “only game in town”. It 
is, therefore, a fragile hegemony which rests upon the absence of coherent counter-narrative. 
Hegemony is further undermined by the re-assertion of coercive forms of labour control, which 
rest  upon fear of job loss and a weakening of the role of organised labour in labour process 
outcomes. Due to the fragile nature of contemporary forms of hegemony, successful attempts to 
present  organisational and managerial objectives in terms of mutual aims are likely to be 
enduring. Hegemonic claims need to have at least a veneer of credibility.  When credibility is 
undermined, the labour process may be increasingly experienced as a coercive, despotic regime. 
Thus defensive and aspiration consent can become constrained consent. 
This conceptual matrix does not cover all instances of contemporary labour process. Outside 
these four categories of hegemonic despotism, there are the minority whose rewards and 
position in the labour market  constitute the basis of a strong material interest in the capitalist 
labour process. These include highly skilled, professional agency workers whose relationship 
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with employment agencies is based upon reciprocal gains. At the other end of the scale, there 
are those for who the labour process can only be described as despotic, due to their marginal 
position at a societal level, as well as at the level of the labour market, for example, migrant 
workers without citizenship rights.     
Compromised consent
Compromised consent  describes a labour process in which the organisational discourse aimed at 
eliciting consent  is undermined by the reality of management  practice. Employees may be 
skilled and enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy and task discretion and/or they may be 
working in an environment which promotes participation at  a discursive level. Managerial 
imperatives to intensify the labour process, which may also impact upon autonomy, have a 
corrosive effect upon orientations to work and upon organisational commitment which may 
influence consent to managerial goals. Consent  to high performance can be maintained via 
positive orientations to professional skilled work. However, this is accompanied by a cynical 
attitude to the practices of HRM and managers, particularly in the context of organisational 
change perceived to impact  negatively upon workers. Whilst  highly skilled workers may have a 
stronger position in the labour market, economic uncertainty is a barrier to challenging 
management, either individually or collectively. This is the key source of despotism within a 
labour process that requires some degree of autonomy from employees, and which espouses 
contradictory logics of normative human resource practices on the one hand, and market 
imperatives on the other.  
Defensive consent 
Defensive consent  most resembles the hegemonic despotism described within labour process 
literature. It  is the outcome of decades of defeats of the collective gains of the labour movement. 
Whilst formal employment  protections continue to exist, rounds of restructuring and 
redundancies have created a context of intense insecurity, weakening the position of labour 
within the employment  relationship. Management has been able to redirect  the discourse of 
mutual gains towards the need to safeguard organisational survival and, therefore, jobs. In the 
public sector, the intrusion of private sector discourses around efficiency savings and value for 
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money have been strengthened by the broader context  of austerity. It  is on this basis that 
increased management control and/or de-skilling has altered the relative degrees of hegemony 
and despotism. Since there appears to be no mechanism for challenging the new norms of 
employment and work, and in the context of adverse labour market  conditions, consent  becomes 
the only “viable” option. The ability to offload risk and worse job roles onto more vulnerable 
workers can also constitute both a mechanism for alleviating the worst aspects of the labour 
process, and a rationale for consent by avoiding even worse conditions of employment.  
Aspirational consent 
Aspirational consent  is largely confined to younger workers entering the labour market  under 
very different  conditions to those of previous generations. These workers enter the labour 
market having been exposed to a discourse of individualism, flexibility, employability and 
portfolio careers. Early transitions from education to the labour market are marked by insecure, 
temporary employment, often accessed via temporary employment agencies. Increasingly young 
workers are expected to take on temporary, unpaid work. Although the insecure nature of work 
is typical of a despotic regime of labour, it is not  necessarily experienced as such. Hegemonic 
narratives operating outside of the labour process, via school, universities, careers services and 
labour market  intermediaries, present  insecure work as a crucial resource in building a credible 
career portfolio. Lack of autonomy within the labour process is compensated for by a feeling of 
playing an active role in constructing future employment paths. Temporary employment 
agencies play a key role in this by presenting employment  agencies as indispensable allies and 
in normalising employment insecurity and “bad”, low-paid work. Precarity is rationalised in 
terms of employability and the labour market becomes a terrain on which individual freedom 
can be sought - if young workers are prepared to take part in the game. This may also include 
consenting to undesirable social relations within the labour process. Aspirational consent is a 
temporary state. For some, for example, interns in well-placed positions and backed up by 
personal (familial) financial resources, aspirations are likely to be realised. For the majority, 
lack of movement to a better position within the labour market undermines aspirational consent 
and transforms their experience of the labour process into one in which consent is more likely to 
resemble the compliance of constrained consent. 
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Constrained consent 
Constrained consent  exists where lack of resources, choice and adverse labour market 
conditions combine to create a labour process within which despotism prevails over hegemony. 
Those typically labouring under such conditions will be in low-skilled and/or insecure 
employment, often working in outsourced activities within the supply chain. The lack of options 
and the limited material support  outside of the employment relationship means that  management 
can maximise control over the workforce and leave little space for negotiation. Increasingly, 
labour control also takes place outside of the workplace due to role of temporary employment 
agencies in mediating access to employment for low-skilled “disposable” workforces. Unlike 
aspirational consent, exploitation is experienced in a viceral way since it  is a means to an 
immediate end (material sustenance) rather than   to future goals. Consent may be outwardly 
expressed, particularly for those on temporary contracts under greater pressure to conform to the 
perceptions of the “ideal worker”.  However, this conceals an internal acknowledgement  of the 
conflictual relationship with the labour process. Within constrained consent outward submission 
and covert resistance can co-exist. These constraints are expressed in a even more coercive form 
under new and emerging forms of contracts, such as zero hours.
Temporary agency work: between aspiration and constrained consent
Most  temporary agency workers will be located in the last  quadrant - constrained consent  - 
although some may be temporarily located under aspirational consent. It  is possible that  an 
individual agency worker may be simultaneously in both (keeping their head down whilst  trying 
to get  noticed). The triadic relationship exerts different pressures towards hegemony and 
despotism within each of these quadrants. Under aspirational consent, employment agencies 
play a key role in framing the way agency workers respond to new norms of flexible and 
insecure employment. Under constrained consent, employment  agencies constitute one side of 
the duality of control that agency workers experience. Both situations are rooted in insecure 
employment contracts, access to which is dependent  upon their relationship with employment 
agencies. In France, this relationship has been strengthened by the role accorded to the sector in 
managing the “employability” of “hard-to-place” workers, including unemployed older workers. 
The benign discourse of the policy-makers and of employment  agencies glosses over the stark 
Chapter 9 Hegemony and despotism in the 21st century
288
power disparity between agencies and user-firms (which gain considerably from labour market 
insecurity) and agency workers whose labour market choices are greatly restricted. It  is this 
which defines the general character of a labour process framed by the triadic relationship and 
which places the majority of temporary agency workers in the final quadrant. 
The trajectory of contemporary labour processes has been shown to be in the direction of more 
despotic forms of labour control, with hegemonic practices limited to the discursive level. As 
hegemony declines, it can be expected that  coercive labour control will replace it, at least  for a 
significant proportion of workers engaged in waged labour. Temporary employment agencies, 
with their increasing role in managing the disposable workforce for organisation, will continue 
to play their part in the duality of control, taking on the task of selecting, filtering and 
blacklisting workers for user-firms, whilst expecting agency workers to conform in return for 
access to employment. 
On the other hand, coercive forms of labour control are but  one element  of the  displacement  of 
hegemonic forms of labour control. Hostility to a coercive labour process generates the seeds of 
resistance. The isolated instances of struggle reflect this, as do the individual forms of resistance 
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The more overtly conflictual nature of the capitalist  labour 
process has the potential to propel new forms of collective organisation and action adapted to 
contemporary conditions. The future trajectory of the hegemonic despotic regime is dependent 
upon this as much as upon the development  of the new phase of capitalist  accumulation that 
began with the economic crisis of 2007/8 and intensified despotism within the hegemonic 
regime.
5.1. Manufacturing consent under conditions of despotism
Burawaoy and Wright (1990) noted that despite the withdrawal of key elements of the 
hegemonic regime – public welfare and union power – there was little evidence in the US of a 
return to the market  despotism of earlier periods of capitalist development. Instead they 
observed the emergence of subtle and sophisticated forms of control, in particular the forms of 
collective self-surveillance predicated upon the perceived need to maintain organisational 
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profitability in the face of competition. This was Burawoy’s hegemonic despotism in action as 
workers “internalised” the discourse of global competitive markets and the ineluctable rules of 
capitalist  competition under changing conditions of accumulation. The despotism that flowed 
from external market conditions, is translated internally into threats to the survival of the 
individual capitalist  unit, generating an ideological hegemony over the workforce. Internal 
consent  and “soft” control, coupled with the market despotism that flows from adverse external 
conditions, is the expression of a new form of production regime in which workers consent  to 
increased exploitation in order to keep the organisation in business and safeguard their jobs. The 
source of consent within the labour process was reconstituted by new constraints faced by 
workers. Taking the old manufacturing industries as his starting point, Burawoy states that 
consent  is no longer driven by the “mutual gains” of increased profitability, negotiated by the 
“internal state”. Instead, workers feel compelled to cooperate with company goals in order to 
maintain relative profitability in the face of global competition. “Mutual gains” become reduced 
to the survival of the firm – at  the cost  of sacrifice from the workforce, (Burawoy, 1985, p. 264), 
as discussed in Chapter 3. Consent in this context  takes on a defensive form, in contrast  to the 
more positive form of consent that was said to be a feature of the hegemonic regime, 
underpinned by a comprehensive set  of social and employment  protections that translated into a 
more favourable negotiating position within the labour process (Burawoy, 1985, p. 126). In 
contrast, the new form of consent that Burawoy and Wright (1990) observed relied upon the 
construction of a hegemonising narrative whereby concessions to capital are presented as the 
only “realistic” response to preserve jobs. 
Consent to work under fear of job loss can be viewed as a rational response by those whose 
material well-being relies on selling their labour power – what  Burawoy and Wright (1990) 
refer to as “strategic rationality”. The correlation between exposure to the market and work 
effort expresses a surface level “coordination” between the conflicting interests of workers and 
capitalists. From this, Gramscian-inspired perspective111, longer-term, historical interests are 
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111 Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony was one in which the interests of the dominant appeared as the 
general interest (Burawoy, 1985, p. 10). Thus day-to-day ideology (common sense perceptions) wins out 
over the spontaneous ideology which springs from the experience of exploitation and oppression (Rees, 
1998, p. 236).
concealed beneath the very real dependency upon wage-labour (or exploitation) for  material 
survival. Other factors also affect work effort, such as behavioural norms which govern 
perceptions of what constitutes acceptable levels of performance – which Burawoy and Wright 
(1990) refer to as “non-strategic rationality”. As changes in the workplace take hold and 
workloads are intensified, the perceptions of groups of workers may change accordingly as the 
benchmark is raised higher, thus reinforcing the self-surveillance that Burawoy and Wright 
(1990) noted. Changing organisational norms regarding performance, work time, sickness and 
other types of absence, will be gradually absorbed, first  by a reluctant, perhaps defeated 
workforce, and then may be accepted as new generations of workers enter the organisation. The 
latter are examples of defensive consent, whilst  newer generations, aspiring to get  on in the 
labour market are likely to be labouring under different  perceptions of what constitutes “good 
work”. Changes in work and employment  conditions have taken place over decades as the 
employment rights and conditions which framed the hegemonic regime have been whittled 
away, underscored by a consistent  narrative of neo-liberalism by national and pan-national 
political elites. New generations of workers have entered the labour market   in a very different 
context to that  of older cohorts, one in which management-driven concepts of flexibility, 
efficiency and cost-cutting appear to be self-explanatory responses to global competition and 
market uncertainty. Younger workers may, therefore, be more inclined to express consent  to 
work given the new frames of reference by which to judge their situation. For example, agency 
workers in Papinot’s (2006) study felt  they had no right to a “real” job until they had spent  some 
time in this “transitional” phase. Older workers, in contrast, may feel more ambivalence towards 
the changing workplace, burdened by the experience of defeats or “survivor syndrome” as they 
are compelled “to do more, with less” (Taylor, 2012, p. 36). Consent for these older workers is 
born of defeat, a very different form of consent to that born of the victories of the post-war 
period. For the younger worker who has known only precarious work within intense labour 
market competition, consent  may be linked to their future aspirations and perceptions of what 
they need to do to realise their employment  related aspirations. Subjective perceptions of work, 
therefore, can therefore lead to different  sources of of consent  to work within a generalised 
regime of hegemonic despotism. In the context of a more fragmented employment relationship, 
the biographical location of workers is a significant factor in how the labour process is 
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experienced. Thus, a section of the workforce who are considerably disadvantaged in terms of 
salary, employment protection and security, draw upon future aspirations as a source of consent. 
This more positive source of consent contrasts with that  of older and more (formally) secure 
workers experiencing a deterioration in working conditions. 
5.2. Temporary employment agencies: cultivating aspiration or embedding constraint
As discussed in the last chapter, temporary employment  agencies strive to be influential in 
recasting expectations of the employment relationship. Agencies, therefore, occupy an important 
place within the aspirational quadrant, representing the growing influence of market 
intermediaries in labour market outcomes. For the young workers in this research, agencies are 
key to their access to work, reflecting the difficulties in finding direct pathways to employment. 
As such, agencies play a central role in this stage of their working lives, a role that  is likely to 
continue for some time if the average age of agency workers in France continues to rise. There 
is little to suggest from this research that agencies are seen as neutral or benign facilitators. 
Agencies were referred to by interviewees primarily in relation to control, setting out the 
parameters of behaviour, with the understanding that access to employment may be withdrawn 
if agency workers step outside of this. Yet agencies strive to portray themselves as facilitators 
within an uncertain labour market, providing advice which can secure future assignments. The 
triadic relationship can be located within both the aspirational and the constrained quadrants. 
Aspirational, since agencies can fulfil their role as provider of future employment opportunities, 
and constrained because this role gives employment agencies a powerful level over which to 
complement the control that is exercised within the labour process. The triadic relationship can 
be seen, therefore, to further obscure the complex interaction between aspirational and 
constrained consent. For agency workers labouring in difficult  conditions, this may express 
itself in a constant movement between aspirational consent and constrained consent, as with 
example of Daniel, striving to find meaning and dignity in work and ever hopeful of continued 
employment, either through future agency contracts, or through securing permanent 
employment with the user-firm. This example, of course, contrasts with  the cases of of Léa and 
Elodie, for whom constraint appears to be overwhelming. 
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5.3. The weakening of internal sources of consent
The influence of internal hegemonic practices upon the behaviour of agency workers are likely 
to be negligible. Beyond the possibility of a future job and “trying to get  noticed” as a “good 
worker” to this end, agency workers are more likely to be “keeping their head down” and 
putting up with unsatisfactory work conditions. With regards to the user-firm, the experiences 
described in this research lend themselves more to the concept  of despotism than consent, with 
little attempt  by auto manufacturers to elicit positive consent from their disposable workforce. 
Core workers, on the other hand, still retain some institutional bargaining power at  the plant 
level. The restructuring of work and employment has been a gradual and contested process, and 
many organisations subscribe to the idea that  employees need to be engaged in the process of 
organisational change (Meaney and Wilson, 2009). Appeals to profitability as a way of 
protecting core workers continue to have some traction within the labour movement, as shown 
by the response of the CFDT to PSA’s discourse around competitive pressures.  On the other 
hand, whilst managerial strategies may have succeeded in increasing work effort and 
bureaucratic control over the workforce, they may have had less success in positively engaging 
the employees in this process. The resulting combination of increased work effort and the 
degrees of cynicism/hostility towards management described in section 3 above can perhaps be 
ascribed in part  to the lack of a generalised political response to counter the neo-liberal 
consensus112. This may lead to a “fatalistic” acceptance that  there is no alternative to an 
economic and political system that  is increasingly unable to provide “decent” work and good 
living standards for large swathes of the population, as wages across EU countries decline in the 
face of rising prices (ILO, 2013). This fatalism is shared across the compromised, defensive and 
constrained quadrants, confronted with what  Burawoy and Wright (1990)saw at  work in their 
study, referred to as the “inescapable logic of precarious financial conditions” (Burawoy and 
Wright, 1990, p. 75). Under new conditions, with the negotiating power of labour weakened and 
the ability of capital to move production to regions more conducive to capital accumulation, 
workers are exposed to a constant narrative of the need to adapt to the reality of global capitalist 
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112 Whilst debating the political responses of the mainstream left to neo-liberalism’s ascendancy lies 
outside of the scope of this research, the adoption of many of the core tenets of neo-liberalism by social-
democratic parties (e.g. privatisation and a loosening of constraints on capital) can be said impact upon 
the range of perceived responses to workplace change. 
competition, within which national companies struggle to maintain their competitive edge 
against lower labour costs (Sallaz, 2004). The narrative of competitive pressures which appear 
to operate outside of the realm of negotiation and regulation (Clarke, 2009) is a powerful 
discursive tool for eliciting consent to work under worsening conditions as workers “adapt” to 
these external conditions. The need to pare down the organisation in the name of “efficiency”, 
by restructuring and re-organising work around the principles of lean production and flexibility 
(Stewart et  al., 2009) filters through organisations as a common sense narrative embodying the 
“rational tyranny of capital mobility over the collective worker” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 150). 
Today, workers are living with the consequences of a feedback effect within this process. With 
regards to this research, the acceptance of agency labour by a “defensive” core workforce has 
seriously undermined the capacity of the “collective worker” to withstand further concessions. 
Although concessions to capital are no guarantee of survival –  as the workers of Aulnay 
discovered. The power of the discourse lies in the lack of an alternative and compelling vision 
to that of neo-liberalism. Hegemony, therefore, becomes problematised for all but the 
aspirational quadrant, which itself is ephemeral in nature, as the example of Daniel illustrates. In 
each of the other quadrants, hegemony - understood as ideological domination through the 
presentation of the interests of capitalists as somehow coordinated with the interest  of workers - 
is weakened by both the experience of the capitalist labour process, and the inability of the 
capitalist  system to provide a socially acceptable standard of living. How this is expressed in 
terms of consent  to work differs in each of the quadrants, the conceptualisation of which draws 
upon literature which has attempted to capture the operation of consent under today’s 
conditions.  
6. The contradictory nature of consent
The matrix presented above attempts to capture the complex and varied nature of consent and its 
expression within the framework of hegemonic despotism. A number of formulations have been 
used to express consent to work under increasingly unfavourable conditions. McGovern et al. 
(2007) talk of “forced cooperation”, whilst Goussard (2008) refers to “paradoxical 
engagement”, whereby consent  is accompanied by a critical approach to the demands of 
management, similar to Durand’s (2004a) “paradoxical consent”. These concepts encapsulate 
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the contradictory nature of consent  within the contemporary labour process and are reflected, in 
a modified way in the quadrant  (constrained consent and forced cooperation respectively). 
Resistance may not  be far from the surface, though it  may be submerged by the façade of 
consent  or “muted resentment” (Smith, 1998). Such constrained versions of consent are difficult 
to disentangle from compliance. As the frontier of control shifts in favour of management, 
positive forms of consent, and the space for misbehaviour that  moderate the experience of 
alienated labour are both less likely to prevail. The new systems of labour control, couched in a 
discourse that bears little relationship to reality, may well breed the kind of cynicism referred to 
in the studies above, rather than engaged participation (Fleming and Spicer, 2007, cited in 
Belanger and Edwards, 2012).    
Where there is an enduring attachment  to traditional norms of employment, HRM is tasked with 
selling the new world of work to employees, playing a role similar to that of temporary 
employment agencies in recasting expectations of employment. The discursive practices of 
HRM embody “a powerful set of norms that have direct  bearing on the ways that  economic 
activity and human subjectivity are to be defined” (Vallas and Prener, 2012, p. 347). Vallas and 
Hill (2012) compare this to Burawoy’s view of the institutionalisation of worker’s “interests” 
within the hegemonic regime that  deprives workers of the resources required to “fashion an 
oppositional consciousness” (Vallas and Hill, 2012, p. 175). They draw upon Foucauldian 
approaches to hegemony and “governmentality” to explain how new “hegemonic subjectivities” 
are formulated by powerful interests consciously setting out to influence norms of behaviour:
“By moulding subjectivities, governmental power does not  merely produce 
subjects but  also produces self-producing subjects – individuals who internalise 
and reproduce desirable governed behaviours and modes of thought.”
(Vallas and Hill, 2012, p.181)
Whereas Burawoy prioritises the labour process as the site of the reproduction of the social 
relations of production (the political moment of the labour process), Vallas and Hill (2012) see 
contemporary forms of hegemonic construction as located beyond the labour process. The 
construction of “self-managed subjectivities” is a practice of “positive power” seeking to 
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obscure and mystify power relations and control through the illusion of autonomous action and 
freedom. It  is through the symbolic representation of agency work, for example, that  the 
negative connotations of precarious work are challenged. This can be extended to discourses 
around employability and portfolio careers (Knell, 2000) and the presentation of human 
resource management as a benign function (Guest, 1987). Vallas and Prener (2012) argue that, 
as workers internalise new norms of employment, shifts in expectations of work “have the 
potential to recast the way workers think about  and experience the employment relationship, 
with effects that  can have powerful effects [sic] on the outcome” (Vallas and Prener, 2012, p. 
338). This recasting of new “subjectivities” appears to be an inexorable process, given the 
reliance on Foucauldian constructs, through which social relations will be reproduced – an idea 
that is similar to Burawoy’s take on the neutralising effect of the hegemonic regime. Both veer 
in the direction of suggesting that the outcome of the class struggle is pre-determined. However, 
even as workers appear to accept the “inevitable logic” of new norms, the contradictory and 
contested nature of this process is unlikely to be far from the surface. Workplace relations may 
involve cooperation, which may be propelled by altered subjectivities at  particular points in 
time, yet this still needs to be understood in terms of the structured antagonism that  lies at  the 
heart  of the labour-capital relation which, although not driving behaviour in an immediate, 
unmediated way, feeds through at the level of workplace relations (Edwards, 1990). Thus, the 
flexible “subjectivities” inevitably come up against this structured antagonism which shapes the 
way in which other factors and pressures, such as financialisation, are “interpreted and acted 
upon” within the contradictory relationship between labour and capital (Edwards, 1990). This 
provides an analytical space for workers’ agency, challenging the idea that labour market 
insecurity has allowed employers to implement  “totalising” regimes of control that have all but 
eliminated the capacity of workers to contest and resist management (Paugam, 2000; Taylor, 
2013).
On the other hand, it  would be wishful thinking to suggest that this space has been occupied to 
any great  extent. Instead, varied forms of modified consent to labour prevails, which under 
certain conditions exhibit features more characteristic of compliance through coercion. 
Although Berribi-Hoffman’s (2012) IT professionals and Goussard’s (2008) auto engineers and 
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bear similarities to Cushen and Thompson’s (2011) Irish IT engineers, there are important 
differences. In both studies, high levels of productivity in the context  of a high performance 
workplace suggests an outward consent, which was shown to obscure an internal critique of 
lean production and work intensification. However, resistance, albeit of an individualised 
nature, is more apparent  in Goussard’s study in the form of high levels of resignations. In 
Berribi-Hoffman’s study too, experience of domination appears to be more keenly felt. It could 
be that  in the French context changes in employment  and work are more keenly felt  amongst 
some cohorts of workers, due to residual expectations of work which conflict with new 
practices. This may also be a factor in the suicides within the French telecommunications sector. 
In a national context where public sector workers have traditionally benefited from relatively 
good employment conditions, and where private sector workers have been covered by the 
employment protections accorded to all employees, deteriorating conditions at work appear to 
be incompatible with societal expectations, leading to the widespread phenomenon of 
souffrance au travail. 
7. Agency in conditions of heightened constraint
These dramatic individual responses do not, however, tell the whole story. At the Aulnay plant, 
permanent employees are able to engage in strategies which offload some of the negative 
aspects of the labour process onto less secure and more vulnerable agency workers. This 
fragmentation of the workforce constitutes a mobilising element  for core workers situated 
within the defensive consent quadrant. The role of a marginalised workforce with access to 
limited resources to negotiate with or challenge management, is an aspect  of hegemony and 
consent  that Burawoy overlooked, and which remains relevant  today. On the other hand, the 
relatively more despotic labour process under which such workers labour can also lead to 
instances of resistance, as illustrated by the historical account of ouvriers spécialisés in Chapter 
6, and, at a more individual level, by the actions of Léa and Elodie in this research. The matrix 
does make space for agency in the form of resistance although it is likely to be found under 
constrained consent. As the labour process is experienced more in terms of heightened 
constraint and despotism, with movements from other quadrants towards constrained consent, 
the possibility of resistance becomes heightened. For resistance to take place, defensive consent 
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needs to be seriously undermined by the realisation that the guarantees accorded by “mutual 
survival” strategy are limited, and the aspirations of those seeking to carve out  decent futures 
need be exposed as unrealistic. 
Despite the implicit  fatalism within Burawoy’s theoretical framework, it is possible, therefore, 
to draw a more positive account of the future of labour from his conceptualisation of the 
dynamics of the labour process as being played out  along the dimensions of hegemony and 
despotism. Within Burawoy’s work lies an essential understanding that workers, as active 
agents, are compelled to find meaning in their condition as wage labourers, and that this is 
relevant across different  types of production regimes which rely upon varying configurations of 
coercion and consent. Workers cannot be reduced to mere factors of production to be exploited 
as “warm bodies” or docile subjects – a conclusion that is implicit  in Aubenas’ (2011) account 
of night cleaners in France employed on temporary agency contracts and ground down by a 
labour process that dehumanises and isolates. Even within such atomised circumstances, 
workers’ agency is compelled to express itself within the realms of possible action. This can be 
through humour (Taylor and Bain, 2003) or faking commitment (Fleming and Spicer, 2007) and 
other forms of “organisational misbehaviour” (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). Workers are 
reflexive, creative actors (Brook, 2009), responding to their position in the labour process in a 
variety of ways, be it  by engaging in collective struggle to limit  exploitation and control, or by 
finding individual means to alleviate the alienating affects of the capitalist  labour process. In the 
absence of discernible resources to engage in the former, the latter response can include positive 
forms of consent that generate an illusion of control even in the most constrained circumstances. 
So the agency worker may indeed appear to internalise the idea that individuals have the power, 
and the responsibility, to shape their working lives and improve their position, not by 
collectively challenging the constraints of the market, as previous generations have succeeded in 
doing (albeit  in a limited way), but by framing their working lives in terms of enhancing their 
labour market  position or “employability”. Such is the contradictory nature of workers’ agency, 
responding to and reacting against  the experience of an empirical reality in ways that seem to 
correspond on one level to immediate interests. Behaviours targeted at  alleviating the negative 
consequences of wage labour have the potential to both challenge and reinforce social relations, 
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and are a potential source of collective action (Martínez Lucio and Stewart, 1997). Rather than 
an act  of submission, “consent to domination” is a deliberate action on the part  of workers as 
they combine critical appreciations of the capitalist labour process with practical necessities 
related to survival, an expression of the contradictory nature of consciousness, or “dual 
consciousness” to use Gramsci’s terminology (see Burawoy, 2011). For those who pursue 
radical social change, this contradiction provides an opportunity to build upon the capacity for 
human creativity and social justice within which the potential for counter-movements is lodged 
(Bolton and Laaser, 2013). 
Outside of a revolutionary transition, labour cannot  escape being embroiled within the workings 
of capitalism, and thus, even whilst  acting against the negative experience of capitalism, it  can, 
in effect, reproduce social relations of production and other relations of oppression – as the 
history of the post-war period illustrates. The social progress that  improved the working and 
living conditions of the populations of advanced capitalist  societies simultaneously strengthened 
capitalism against the threat  of revolution, just  as the hegemonic production regime undermined 
(rather than neutralised) the development  of independent class consciousness amongst 
Burawoy’s factory workers. Such were the factors that  facilitated the expansion of capitalist 
relations of production, fortified ideologically and politically by social democracy (Braverman, 
1974; Gramsci, 1971, cited in Rees, 1998).
The degree of leverage of discursive practices cannot  be disassociated from economic and 
labour market  environments that frame the choices available to workers. The marginalisation of 
contesting voices means that making concessions to capital becomes a pragmatic response for 
those obliged to sell their labour power. This, in itself, can be a powerful influence in shifting 
employment norms. What were considered “bad jobs” become normalised for increasingly 
larger sections of the working class, relieved to find themselves still in employment. However, 
this process is not  a smooth one. The agency workers in this research resisted the subjective 
internalisation of these norms. This is the case even for Daniel who, although most prepared to 
play by the new rules of the game in return for a more secure future, haboured negative attitudes 
to his employment  situation, which he was careful to conceal. The process of recasting 
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subjectivities is, therefore, not without obstacles and is by no means inevitable. In the current 
context, when the past  still weighs upon sections of the working class, the contradiction that  lies 
at  the heart  of the capitalist  labour processes generates tensions that  can deflate the ascendancy 
of neo-liberal ideology. Thus, though new norms of employment  are emerging on the back of 
the financial crisis, the reality of contemporary forms of wage labour will not cease to compel 
workers to challenge a labour process which condemns them to harsh, alienating, precarious and 
low paid labour. There are numerous examples of the compulsion to resist, such as the 
campaigns in support the migrant temporary agency workers denied legal recognition (sans-
papiers) in France (Tapia and Turner, 2013) or the struggles of low-paid migrant workers in the 
“Justice for Cleaners” campaign in London – and also by the actions of Léa and Elodie in this 
research. Thompson et  al. (2012) provide an important  reminder of the dynamic tension that 
exists even in the highly unequal relationship between employers and migrant workers. By 
identifying a shift  in the behaviours and attitudes of migrant workers who became less “good” 
over time as they felt more settled, “permanent” and informed of their rights, the authors make 
clear the contingent  and fragile nature of consent under conditions of despotism. The same can 
be applied to the four categories of consent identified in this chapter. It  is this fragility which 
opens a space for contesting hegemonic narratives.
Resistance, whilst sporadic and partial, can always be found, from the low level acts of 
individual misbehaviour/resistance to more collective class conscious resistance in the form of 
strike action. Whistleblowing by talking to journalists, or, indeed, researchers, is one form of 
individual resistance where overt resistance is risky. There are many examples of this type of 
action by agency workers working in the French auto sector. There are also examples within 
Europe of workers broadly situated with the compromised or defensive quadrants who have 
reasserted their collective power. The 2011 strike of airline workers at British Airways against 
changes to their terms and conditions, or the strike of biomedical staff at  a UK hospital trust 
against proposals that  would strengthen management’s control over working time in the context 
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of understaffing113  are but two examples of the potential for resistance even within conditions 
that are unfavourable for labour. The fierce resistance that  met the announcement of the closure 
of the Aulnay plant  is a further example in the French context 114. This militant  localised struggle 
has not  as yet been matched by generalised economic and political struggle capable of imposing 
a significant reversal of closures. Apart from a minority of trade union militants organised 
around SUD and, at times, the CGT, factory occupations and the occasional threats of violence 
against management have been targeted at improving redundancy compensation rather than 
preventing closures. The defensive nature of workers struggles, however, does not  negate the 
militancy of those struggles, but  rather highlights the gap between this militancy and the 
political confidence of trade unions. In the UK, the weakness of collective trade union action is 
reflected in the way much of the resistance to the poor employment  conditions takes place 
outside of the workplace. The response in the UK to employment contracts which are deemed to 
be “beyond the pale”, such as zero hours, unpaid internships and workfare115, highlights both 
the continued attachment  to minimum standards in employment  relations and the emergence of 
new sites of struggle around employment. Where agency at  the point  of production is 
compromised due to the vulnerability of the workers in relation to the employment  contract and/
or labour control, workers’ agency is being reconstituted, in the first  instance at  least, outside of 
the labour process. This kind of action in the UK is similar to collective action around the 
conditions of migrant agency workers in France and reasserts the capacity of working class 
collectivity to renew itself under new conditions, thereby challenging the hegemonic practices 
that seek to alter workers’ “subjectivities”. In the UK context, social media has been a crucial 
tool used against companies involved in a “bad practice”,116  providing a site for counter 
hegemonic action in the absence (so far ) of sustained action at the point of production. 
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113 See Unite press release “Biomedical scientists at Lancashire hospitals strike over imposed working 
conditions”, 28th August, 2013.
http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/biomedical-scientists-at-lancashire-hospitals-strike-over-imposed-
working-conditions/
114 http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/151013/sylvain-pattieu-jen-ai-tellement-raconter-sur-psa-
aulnay 
115 The response to the use of zero-hour contracts led the Labour leader Ed Miliband to make an 
uncharacteristic pledge to “crackdown” on the use of the contracts. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24012368
116 http://www.cipd.co.uk/blogs/cipdbloggers/b/public_policy_blog1/archive/2013/11/11/from-hero-to-
zero-zero-hours-contracts-in-the-spotlight-part-1.aspx
8. Despotism at odds with democracy
The current  economic context has brought into sharp relief the processes detrimental to labour 
that were already being identified prior to 2008 (Taylor, 2012). Austerity – the only political 
response to economic crisis that the ruling political parties in Europe countenance – has 
deepened the employment and economic insecurity of European workers. In the absence of 
sustained resistance, this is likely to result  in a further rebalancing of the hegemonic-despotic 
spectrum. The continued withdrawal of the welfare state will further undermine the position of 
labour in relation to capital, potentially creating a perception of powerlessness as workers 
struggle to survive under new constraints. The fear of job loss in the context  of diminishing 
social protection may further alter the expectations of work as those in employment will 
consider themselves “lucky” in relation to those out of work and faced with decreasing state 
support. Those in employment  may even perceive of themselves as agents of their destinies 
navigating the new realities of work as they follow the advice of experts to enhance their 
“employability”, gaining experience through low-paid (or unpaid) work and propelled to work 
harder to prove their worth to employers. In the absence of jobs, unemployed and 
underemployed workers are told to enhance their “portfolio careers” by imbuing themselves 
with key skills such as “emotional intelligence” (Hughes 2005), and to find ways of standing 
out from the crowd. At the point  of recruitment, potential employees are being asked to engage 
in humiliating experiences to prove they are “happy” and/or willing to cede to managerial 
requests,117 or to convincingly articulate their intrinsic motivation for what  are essentially low-
skilled, demotivating jobs (Aubenas, 2011).  Although, as this chapter has argued, the alignment 
of employees’ expectations and perceptions of decent employment arrangements and working 
conditions within the new realities of work, continues to be problematic. The conceptual matrix 
presented in this chapter attempts to capture the contradictory and dynamic nature of how the 
labour process is experienced under these evolving circumstances. 
The promise of secure, ongoing, “decent” employment  that permits citizens to carve out a future 
and feel that they have a stake in society is becoming increasingly elusive, particularly for 
“Generation Y” (those born after 1980). This has far-reaching implications that extend beyond 
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117 A university graduate was asked to dance in what he described as a humiliating recruitment process 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-23972952).
the workplace. As Appay (2010) points out, current trends in employment are at  odds with the 
very basis of the democratic societies that grew out  of the “social and democratic struggles to 
build a fairer society based upon political and social rights”. The precarisation of work is a 
“trend that is in contradiction to the progress of the social state of democracy” (Appay, 2010, p. 
23). Standing (2011) also takes up the theme of the incompatibility between current  trends in 
employment and work on the one hand, and democracy on the other. As standard employment 
recedes in the face of insecure work punctuated by periods of unemployment, a new “precariat” 
class finds itself alienated from, and hostile to, a diminishing core of mainstream society and 
increasingly open to the appeal of populist  and neo-fascistic type movements, as anger, anomie 
and anxiety takes hold. Whilst Standings’ (2011) categorisation of new layers of workers and 
skilled professionals is debatable and, according to Conley (2012), lacking in empirical rigour, 
he does make an important  contribution to the debate on the wider consequences of changing 
employment norms. Other commentators have likened the rise in new forms of precarious work 
since 2008 to the condition of stevedores in early periods of capitalism (Pocock et  al., 2005) for 
whom paid work was a hit and miss affair. On the other hand, it  was under such conditions that 
the mass organisations of the working class emerged (Mason, 2007). Whether this can be the 
outcome of the current condition of the working class will depend upon the development of the 
forms of struggles discussed in section 7 above. 
9. Prospects for turning back the tide of despotism
European societies are at  a turning point. In the past, although insecure, low-paid work and 
varying degrees of coercive management never ceased to be a feature of work for many workers 
under the hegemonic regime, workers in general benefited from the altered power relations 
between labour and capital. The unravelling of this compromise that  has been taking place over 
three decades has modified the nature of the production regime by reasserting market despotism 
and repositioning hegemony in the context  of a globalised economic system in which 
organisational governance is driven by the requirements of financial institutions. Since 2008, 
the dismantling of what is left  of the remnants of the hegemonic regime that  prevailed under 
hegemonic despotism is intensifying a process that is resulting in a transformation of power 
relations within the workplace and in society as a whole. 
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The deployment of Burawoy’s concept of hegemonic despotism to analyse changes in the 
labour process, in particular in auto manufacturing, provided a powerful rebuttal of the 
proponents of lean production and new management techniques (Danford 2000; Hatzfeld, 2004: 
Stewart  et  al., 2004). With the expansion of these managerial strategies to other economic 
sectors, the concept of hegemonic despotism can usefully be used to describe the production 
regime of the labour process in the 21st century. Viewed dynamically, this regime can be seen to 
be moving in the direction of despotism accompanied by a weakening of the (reconstituted) 
hegemonic dimension. The economic whip of the market, strengthened by the overhaul of the 
welfare state, has facilitated management in reorganising and restructuring work and labour to 
meet the demands of financialised capital. The situation of temporary agency workers described 
in this research, whilst representing an extreme form of vulnerability (though now being 
outpaced by new forms of employment such as workfare and zero hours), can, in some ways, be 
applied to workers on standard employment contracts who are also labouring under conditions 
of insecurity and perceptions of powerlessness. Whilst organisations still feel compelled to pay 
lip service to mutuality and employee well-being in the workplace, employing HRM discourse 
to elicit  the “consent” of employees to work under worse conditions, current trends suggest that 
the hegemonic dimension of the labour process may recede even more in the face of despotism, 
and that consent can very quickly become thinly veiled compliance. Hegemonic despotism 
might  be usefully be viewed as a transitional phase as the representatives of capital seek to 
return to a more “natural” state of market  despotism. Where Burawoy saw “emergence of a new 
despotic production politics in the contemporary period, one that bears the marks of the pre-
existing hegemonic regime” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 14), today those marks of the hegemonic 
regime are less pronounced, and despotism is more readily detected in the workplace. However, 
within this framework, it  is possible to identify differences in how consent operates in today’s 
context. The matrix presented in this chapter focuses attention to the location of workers, not 
only in relation to employment status and other sources of negotiating power in the labour 
process (such as skill level), but also to the biographical location of workers, in particular in 
relation to younger workers embarking on their working lives. 
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Labour, then, appears to be in retreat. Years of political defeat have had an important  impact  on 
the relations in production within the labour process. This, in turn, has undermined the ability of 
labour to influence political outcomes beyond the workplace. Of course there have been 
moments of resistance and instances of counter-hegemony that  have challenged the right of 
management to manage and restrained the trajectory of free market  capitalism. However, there 
has been no consistent  mainstream narrative against the market outside of a marginalised far 
left. Although left  of centre political formations have attempted to offer a more comprehensive 
political alternative (e.g.  Front de Gauche in France, Syriza in Greece, Die Linke in Germany) 
and have in some cases obtained impressive electoral results, the narrative of neo-liberalism, 
austerity and welfare state retrenchment has dominated the political landscape. There is, 
however, space for optimism within this bleak outlook. In order to set out  a more optimistic 
scenario it is useful to return, with a critical eye, to Burawoy’s understanding of the transition 
from the hegemonic regime to hegemonic despotism. Burawoy’s theorisation of this transition 
emphasises the role of the internal workings of the labour process under the hegemonic regime 
in sealing the fate of workers. The alignment of workers’ interests with those of management 
under the hegemonic regime was seen as being at the root of labour’s inability to resist changes 
in the organisation of work. This approach is too reductive and ignores external factors in 
shaping class consciousness – and in doing so goes against Burawoy’s stated intention in The 
Politics of Production, i.e., to go beyond the factory to account  for political and ideological 
apparatuses distinct from the moment of production. It  also ignores the militant  struggles that 
labour embarked upon against employment  practices inspired by the Chicago school of free 
market economic theory which came to prominence in the era of Reagan and Thatcher. In the 
US, which formed the backdrop of much of Burawoy’s research, airline workers staged 
protracted strikes to defend their employment conditions. In the UK, it  was the miners who 
symbolised resistance to Thatcher, followed by the printers and the dockers. In the case of 
France, the working class did not  give up any of its gains without  prolonged struggles and 
continued to demonstrate its organisational strength, most visibly in the 1995 public sector 
pension strike. The crisis of the hegemonic regime lay not in the supposed passivity of a 
working class incapable of forging demands in opposition to capital, but rather in the long-term 
incompatibility of the “Fordist” compromise with capitalism. The post-war period can be seen 
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as one in which the logic of capitalism was thwarted by the class struggle, expressed in a 
political settlement which restrained, to differing degrees, both labour and capital in the pursuit 
of their interests. The transition from this compromise away from the gains of labour was not  an 
inevitable process with its origins lodged in the supposed neutralisation of the working class. 
Rather, it was the consequence of political choices, most notably by the dominant  social 
democratic and communist  parties and labour movements which continue to operate under the 
assumption that capitalism can still simultaneously pursue its profit-seeking logic and provide 
an acceptable standard of living for the majority. 
Similarly, the future positive development of society, and the nature of work therein, will be 
dependent upon the emergence of a political response to the current  consensus. Any political 
alternative will need to reconnect the economic and political struggle by finding ways of 
appealing to a class that  is increasingly fragmented. The development of new layers of trade 
union activists, capable of organising young workers on temporary agency contracts and other 
atypical contracts, as well as unemployed workers, will be crucial if this is to occur. This 
process has begun as trade unionists and activists have come together to channel civil societies’ 
response the degradation of work into campaigns and action around a variety of issues; “justice 
for cleaners” in the UK and sans-papiers in France (Tapia and Turner, 2013); exposing 
Foxconn’s treatment of agency workers (Chan et  al., 2013); campaigns against  zero hours and 
workfare118. Social scientists researching work and employment have a role to play in helping 
this process by exposing the negative consequences of current forms of employment. As Appay 
(2010) puts it: “social scientists have a responsibility in the battle of ideas, [that] they contribute 
actively or passively in the development of dominant  paradigms and thus validate or invalidate 
the ways that thought and consequently action are organised in a given society” (Appay, 2010, 
p. 25). 
Burawoy’s work has been influential in providing researchers of work and employment  with an 
analytical framework though which to challenge the proponents of the new world of work. In 
spite of an underlying pessimistic view of the class struggle under the hegemonic regime, 
Chapter 9 Hegemony and despotism in the 21st century
306
118 New Stateman, 24th February, 2012: “The Revolt Against Workfare Spreads”. 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2012/02/scheme-greggs-grayling
Burawoy’s commitment  to the emancipatory politics of Marxism, akin to Gramsci’s “optimism 
of the will” (Gramsci, 1977), meant that, despite his theoretical approach to working class 
consciousness as forged in the context of the post-war labour process, he was also able to set out 
a more optimistic response to the transition from the hegemonic regime to hegemonic 
despotism, one which is even more relevant today119:
“One can anticipate that  the working classes will begin to feel their collective 
impotence and the irreconcilability of their interest with the development  of 
capitalism, understood as an international phenomenon. The forces leading to 
working-class demobilisation may also stimulate a broader recognition that  the 
material interests of the working class vouchsafed only beyond capitalism, beyond 
the anarchy of the market and beyond despotism in production.”
(Burawoy, 1985, p. 152)
Burawoy’s work is still important in that it centres attention on the dynamic tension 
between despotism and hegemony as employers attempt to square the circle of profit-
seeking activities under new conditions of capital accumulation, whilst  simultaneously 
seeking to elicit  consent to the increasing exploitation that this demands. This provides 
a useful frame of reference with which to understand how workers consent to work 
under conditions of duress and insecurity. However, although Burawoy’s intention was 
to move beyond the limitations of his focus on the “internal state” (Burawoy, 1985, p.
11) by elaborating a theory that drew in external factors, encapsulated in the political 
and ideological apparatus of production that regulated relations in the labour process, 
his work has a tendency to focus almost exclusively upon the process of production as 
the site of the reproduction of social relations of exploitation. Vallas and Hill’s (2012) 
response to this is to bridge the gap by bringing in external sites of ideological 
disempowerment, which influence workers’ orientations and interpretations of their 
specific labour process, in particular the ideological recasting of employment norms. 
In relation to the hegemonic regime, Burawoy referred to the promotion of 
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119 However, Burawoy has recently promoted his “uncompromising pessimism” in a series of articles 
offering a bleaker view of the future of working class struggle (Burawoy, 2010 and 2013).
“possessive individualism” (Burawoy, 1985, p. 10) within the internal state through 
the negotiation of workers’ interests and the internal labour market. Yet, that this was 
based upon the collective defence of (individual) workers is of crucial importance 
from an analytical perspective. Today, the combination of managerial discourse and 
the ideological narratives of governments and other powerful actors (e.g. employers 
and employment agencies) promote aggressive individualism through flexible 
employment  relations, the heightened monitoring of individual performance, 
individual bonus systems, and also competition for jobs. The individual is rendered 
responsible for their career progress. Individual relations with managers take on a 
more significant role in this context and, in the case of agency work, the relationship 
with an employment  intermediary exerts a further layer of pressure upon workers 
seeking some form of employment stability. By extending Burawoy’s analysis of 
hegemonic despotism beyond the core workers upon which his concept  was based, it 
is possible to view hegemonic despotism as a more varied and dynamic process which 
encompasses very different, though interrelated and changing experiences of the 
labour process. 
To conclude, the future of work and production regimes will be mapped out  in the 
coming years as the struggle over welfare, workers’ rights and the growing influence 
of financial capital continues. This chapter has sketched out  some of the more evident 
examples of workplace despotism that have been described in recent academic 
literature and in anecdotal accounts in the media. It  is a description of trends and 
future directions rather than a generalised account of work in the early years of the 
21st century. From these trends, the chapter has drawn out some tentative theoretical 
implications for Burawoy’s concept of hegemonic despotism. There will be 
considerable variations in experience across occupations and between countries. 
Within Europe, the UK appears to have gone the furthest in reconstructing the political 
apparatus of production by comprehensively restructuring the relationship between 
state and labour. Under the current government, the choice for many is to take up 
employment that scarcely provides for the reproduction of labour power or face 
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destitution. In other countries, the process of change has been more gradual, though 
the extreme circumstances that  have affected the southern European countries have 
dramatically altered the pace of change. 
The Politics of Production was written partly in response to those who heralded the 
death of the traditional working class through fragmentation and recomposition. Three 
decades on, working class struggle is still an integral part  of the European landscape. 
In France, where the position of young workers is characterised by precariousness and 
uncertainty, with temporary agency work an inevitable part of their working lives, the 
“core” working class is still engaged in a battle to defend its gains within a system 
which is no longer prepared to redistribute profits in a more equitable way. The 
struggles that continue to break out demonstrate the weight  of collective ideals 
emanating from working class struggle since the late nineteenth century – despite the 
changes over the past  30 years and the power and resources of political elites pursuing 
the neo-liberal consensus. Much more fundamental than the marks of the hegemonic 
regime, it  is the essential contradiction of the labour-capital relation that  lingers on to 
thwart or hinder the reassertion of despotism.
Whilst this thesis has focused upon one specific form of work in a specific national 
context, this chapter has broadened out  the discussion of hegemonic despotism to 
general trends in employment and work. Previous chapters established the specificity 
of temporary agency work in relation to the constitution of production regimes, and 
examined how consent, coercion and resistance might be expressed under increased 
exposure to market despotism, the duality of control and the emergence of new 
expressions of hegemony. Whilst  the experience of agency workers cannot be 
unproblematically transferred to other forms of employment, it is possible to establish 
similarities in the effects of job insecurity in contemporary labour markets and the 
unfolding of new forms of despotism, underpinned by political and ideological 
apparatuses operating both internally and externally to the labour process. As such, 
this chapter sets out the current  direction of production politics, which may or may not 
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be the outcome of current  trends, given the influence of a variety of contingent factors 
which have the power to either actualise or block the emergence of a new despotism.
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CHAPTER 10 
THESIS CONTRIBUTION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This short, final chapter sets out the contribution of the thesis to current knowledge and makes 
suggestions for further research. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, segmentation theory provides an important  critique of neo-classical 
explanations of agency work, it  is necessary to engage more fully with the complex social 
processes that  have led to the expansion of agency labour, particularly its increasingly structural 
position in those occupations and activities not traditionally associated with the periphery. This 
thesis builds upon the emerging literature that has examined how the activities of the temporary 
employment agencies have not only facilitated changing human resource practices in user 
organisations but have also actively engaged in business models aimed at  reshaping local labour 
markets and the role of employment agencies therein. By closely examining the role of the 
French employment agency sector, itself an influential component of CIETT (the European 
industry organisation), the thesis both confirms and extends the analyses of this expanding 
business by Peck and Theodore (2007). It  also contributes to the literature by examining the 
example of a temporary employment sector which has grown in a very different and 
contradictory environment  to that of the US or UK sectors, yet has successfully carved out  an 
indispensable position in labour allocation and in accompanying state institutions in 
implementing employment policies aimed at young workers. 
Peck et al. (2007) argue that “visualising the temporary [agency] workforce in a zero-sum 
relationship with the permanent  workforce misses the point concerning the true significance of 
these employment  practices” (Peck et  al, 2007, p. 272) which is that the temporary employment 
sector has had a transformative influence on the US labour market. The same can be said of the 
sector in France, despite the strict regulatory context and the deeply entrenched attachment to 
the standard employment  relationship, to the extent that  the role of the sector can now be 
“summarised as one of continuous labour mediation” (Peck and al., 2007). At  the same time 
employment agencies depend upon contracts with user organisations, hence the price wars in 
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the sector in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which drove the large centrally organised contracts 
that benefitted from economies of scale. The period opened up since 2008 illustrates that the 
alliance with big car manufacturers can be a difficult  one as manufacturers are able use the 
economic conjuncture to push down fees. The closure of the Aulnay plant will have a negative 
effect  on the local agencies that  supply the plant. On the other hand the employment  agency 
industry has proved itself capable of adapting and diversifying its activities, as it places more 
emphasis on high-skilled agency workers with whom the large agencies promote a long-term 
relationship (Kornig, 2011) and expands into placement and training activities.
By focusing on the car sector, the research fills another gap in the literature. Whilst  studies of 
car workers have inevitably referred to agency work, there has been no sustained empirical and 
theoretical focus on agency labour in the sector. The data presented in this thesis partly confirm 
many of the assumptions and evidence (both academic and anecdotal) of the difficulties 
encountered by agency workers in the auto sector, and the nature of the work they carry out due 
to the employment  insecurity associated with temporary contracts in a sector characterised by 
intense competition and organisational restructuring. Further, by adopting Burawoy’s 
conception of factory regimes and examining the interplay of despotism/hegemony and control/
consent, it  was possible to go beyond approaches to agency work that  focus on “quality of 
work” and labour standards – important though they are. This was done by examining how new 
forms of employment have far-reaching effects that alter the position of labour in the labour 
process and, subsequently, the constraints and possibilities of workers’ agency. Car 
manufacturing plants, as important  sites of research in the labour process tradition, have been 
seen to embody contemporary expressions of hegemonic despotism. Researchers have tracked 
the profound changes in the organisation of work in auto plants and appraised whether new 
forms of hegemony have succeeded in limiting the need for control and coercion in the 
workplace. As discussed in Chapter Two, the literature has identified the way in which new 
management techniques have attempted to elicit the consent  of the workforce to the production 
goals of companies, and the diverse ways in which workers have responded. Within this 
literature, agency workers have been discussed predominantly in relation to their vulnerability 
to the constraints of a despotic form of labour control. Drawing upon studies that have identified 
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how consent can operate within the triadic relationship, the research presented here shows that 
agency workers in the sector can engage in a wider range of behaviours and responses within 
the constraints of the triadic relationship, than that  assumed in the literature. Whilst the 
conditions within which production takes place may generate particular forms of factory regime 
more conducive to compliance than to consent, the special commodity that is labour power 
asserts its subjectivity and in so doing confounds preconceived assumptions about  behaviour. 
The traces of consent  that  are identified in the interview data, within the overall picture of 
despotism that emerges, illustrate the complex nature of hegemony and despotism within the 
labour process. This research shows the confluence of factors involved within the context of the 
agency contract, including in some cases the role of traditional notions of the “good worker” in 
enhancing self-respect despite humiliating conditions of work. Padavic (2005), in observing the 
same phenomenon, concluded that the need to overcome the “spoiled identity” associated with 
being “just a temp” is a powerful driver of this kind of behaviour. However, it  is also 
simultaneously driven by the need to maintain material security. Added to this mix is the role of 
the employment agency in setting out  the standards of behaviour expected of its agency workers 
so that prior conceptions of the “good worker” are amalgamated with agencies’ and car 
manufacturers’ conceptions of an “ideal worker”; a worker who keeps his/her head down, works 
hard, is reliable and avoids trade unions.
Future research could build upon the findings of this thesis by extending the sample base upon 
which these findings rest. The most  important  limitations in this research reside in the small 
sample size. A more rigorous investigation of the contribution to theory made in this thesis 
requires a larger sample size of auto worker and agency workers, in order to thoroughly 
investigate the breadth of workplace experiences and behaviours, and interactions with 
employment agencies. Further research would also be enhanced by access to user organisations 
and employment agencies. Temporary agency workers are also present, in even greater 
proportions, in second and third tier suppliers. Researching the factory regimes of agency 
workers throughout  the supply chain, where they are assumed to be labouring under more 
intensive conditions of work than those in assembly plants, is an important  and neglected area 
of research.  
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A longitudinal approach would permit  an interrogation of the way in which agency workers 
respond over time to their situations, given the emphasis here on the dynamic and shifting 
nature of labour under a contract which is ostensibly temporary and sold as a way into 
permanent employment, but  which is increasingly long-term. A longitudinal study would also be 
able to track the longer term effects of the 2008 crisis in the auto sector and the effect  of the 
closure of the Aulnay plant on labour relations in PSA and the wider industry. The recent 
presidential and legislative elections which brought an end to Sarkozy’s presidency and led to a 
new era of Socialist government  in France would also a provide a useful backdrop to investigate 
agency work and employment in the auto sector. François Hollande has pledged to tackle 
precarité by proposing additional social charges where companies misuse agency labour and 
other forms of temporary contracts, a proposal that  has been criticised by the head of Prisme.120 
During the election campaign, Hollande addressed a meeting at  Aulnay-sur-Bois that  centred on 
the theme of youth and precarious employment, in which he condemned the increasing 
precarisation of a generation who, seeking employment, were offered agency work.121  Hollande 
has made employment  a priority of his period of office. In respect to this, the closure of Aulnay 
(referred to by PSA not  as closure but as the “progressive reduction of activities” and “external 
mobility”) is a major test  for the new government. Rejecting calls to ban redundancies in 
profitable companies, his ministers have appealed to “the patriotism of big groups like PSA who 
have been largely funded by the public”.122  Those appeals have fallen on deaf ears. So far 
proposals aimed at  responding to the problems of auto manufacturing have centred on building 
capacity for innovative forms of green technology. The immediate future, however, is uncertain. 
The lessons of the Mitterrand era suggest  that  proposals to counter the spread of agency work, 
for example, can easily fall by the wayside.
As Glaymann (2005) points out, the development  of agency work is part  of a trend towards the 
destabilisation of the standard employment relationship in France. Despite the principle of non-
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120  See http://www.capital.fr/carriere-management/interviews/non-l-interim-ne-favorise-pas-le-
developpement-de-la-precarite-716504
121 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xpz4r5_meeting-de-f-hollande-a-aulnay-sous-bois_news
122  Les Échos, 12th July 2012: PSA, the first social test for the government, a shock for public opinion 
(PSA premier test social du gouvernement, choc pour l’opinion).
substitution in legislation, the sector and user-organisations have succeeded in constructing a 
parallel form of employment, which, although hard hit  by recession is able to rebound in the 
context of what Peck et  al. (2010) refer to as a “jobless recovery”. Whilst the drive for 
flexibility is the root  of temporary agency work, it  has profound implications for labour control, 
generating new configurations and forms of consent, compliance and resistance, filtered through 
the duality of control shaped by the triadic relationship. The “new culture of work” promoted by 
the sector, whilst not necessarily achieving popular acceptance, appears to be encroaching upon 
the rights of labour. The trade union movement, having made small steps in the direction of 
responding to this, needs to continue to reappraise its approach to new forms of employment 
and adapt its mobilising strategies in the light  of the lessons learned. This, too, is an important 
area for further research. 
At the European level, an additional unknown is the outcome of the crises that are engulfing the 
southern European states. The drastic upheaval of the securities of the post-war years, which has 
led to unprecedented levels of unemployment and the removal of basic safety nets from large 
swathes of the population of Greece, for example, ushers European society into a whole new 
period, the outcome of which is unknown. In this context, labour process takes on a different 
significance, as it  becomes both a site of survival for those still in employment, and a site of 
resistance to austerity. Future broad configurations of coercion and consent  will depend upon 
the outcome of current  struggles. Chapter 9 discussed how the crisis has exacerbated and 
deepened processes that were identified prior to 2008, in particular employment  insecurity and 
forms of management  that undermine workplace autonomy and discretion, even amongst  skilled 
layers of workers, to the extent  that researchers have used highly charged terminology to 
describe new management  practices such as “management by terror” and “workplace tyranny”. 
Theories of labour control in advanced capitalist societies have been developed in a context of 
relative stability. The extended theoretical chapter has critically examined what the current 
phase of capitalist accumulation may mean for labour control and consent to work across 
occupational boundaries and employment  statuses, as hegemonic despotism takes on a more 
despotic coloration. In doing so, the thesis has developed Burawoy’s concept of hegemonic 
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despotism by drawing upon the insights from the empirical data to set out how recent 
developments have transformed the broader labour process.
With regards to the specific example of agency labour, the danger of extrapolating too much 
from a small data set  has been countered by a comprehensive attention to integrating the data 
with theory in order to delve deeper into the mechanisms of the triadic relationship as they play 
out in the labour process. The need to bring in the voices of temporary agency workers is made 
all the more pressing by their relative absence and the indications in the literature that many 
agency workers do not feel able to share their experiences. This may be due either to their 
vulnerable position or to the numbing effect  of their working lives, as summed up in the 
following extract from an interview in Libération: “I find it  difficult  to talk, to explain what I 
do. At the moment I just try not  to think about it too much. Otherwise it’s too hard”.123 It is for 
this reason that it is important that  future research succeeds in hearing and understanding the 
voices of those who “find it difficult to talk”.
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APPENDIX ONE
Notes: The data presented in this appendix are the results of a search of the Factiva database 
which contains digital archives of newspapers from around the world from 1995 onwards. The 
search generated few results from the period 1995 to 1999, partly due to the limited 
digitalisation for that period. Regional titles which are published daily in France and have a high 
circulation, do not figure prior to 2000. A separate search of the financial newspaper, Les Échos, 
the archives of which have been digitalised from 1995, confirmed the low number of articles 
between 1995 and 1999, confirming the overall trend of the original search. 
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APPENDIX TWO
Sources for estimates of temporary agency workers at the  PSA Peugeot-Citroën Aulnay 
plant
2012: 300: Various newspaper articles on closure
2011 800 source: Newspaper articles on closure, corroborated by interviews
2010 700 source http://www.lutte-ouvriere-journal.org/?act=artl&num=2183&id=41
2009 900 source: USI-CGT leaflet dated 16th December 2009: Explulsion of undocumented 
migrant agency workers at Aulnay (Expulsion des intérimaires sans-papier à Aulnay).
2008 450 source: Usine nouvelle 18th Dec 2008
2007 700 source: http://www.cnt-f.org/fte/?PSA-Aulnay-en-lutte-On-tiendra&lang=fr
2006 600 source http://libcom.org/history/temp-workers-strike-citroen-france-2007
2002 1300 source: Libération 14/02/2002 Auto les interimaires attaquent (http://
www.liberation.fr/economie/0101403082-auto-les-interimaires-attaquent)
2000 1500 source:Libération 8/03/2001 http://www.liberation.fr/economie/0101366505-citroen-
abus-d-interim
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